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The society of mind

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Jochen Fromm-4

The society of mind

Can we describe the mind as a society of agents?
Marvin Minsky has written a book about the topic, and
Steven Pinker speculates about it in "How the Mind
works". How would the basic emotions we pain/displeasure
and joy/pleasure look like? How does self-consciousness
fit into this picture?

I have collected some humble thoughts on this
sfcomplex Wiki page, and would like to
invite you to join this discussion at
http://sfcomplex.org/wiki/Society_of_Mind

-J.

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Prof David West

Re: The society of mind

The very first paper I published - too many years ago - in AI Magazine,
then the flagship of the AI publication world - was a two part article,
first part critiquing the prevailing computational falsework (a
framework erected around a bridge to support it while concrete is being
poured), the second part dealing with alternative metaphors of mind.

One of the metaphors I talked about was Minsky's society - which was not
a society at all - it was a bureaucratic hierarchy! At that time Minsky
was adamantly opposed to the very idea of emergence and Society was
supposed to be a way to get to intelligence without emergence - but he
snuck in a homunculus around chapter three to make the whole thing work.

The only metaphor, at least then, that had any room for emotions, pain,
pleasure, etc. was Bergland's gland/brain chemistry/whole body model.

davew

On Sun, 27 Jul 2008 12:49:31 +0200, "Jochen Fromm" <[hidden email]>
said:

> Can we describe the mind as a society of agents?
> Marvin Minsky has written a book about the topic, and
> Steven Pinker speculates about it in "How the Mind
> works". How would the basic emotions we pain/displeasure
> and joy/pleasure look like? How does self-consciousness
> fit into this picture?
>
> I have collected some humble thoughts on this
> sfcomplex Wiki page, and would like to
> invite you to join this discussion at
> http://sfcomplex.org/wiki/Society_of_Mind
>
> -J.
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Prof David West

an interesting quote

In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4

Came across this when looking at Peter Naur's work on programming -
thought it might be interesting to some involved in the mathematics
issues of debate recently - especially the ones dealing with mathematics
"privileged" status.

" ... ignorance towards any form of knowledge other than the one that
builds on the Aristotelian
concept of epistemea logically and terminologically elaborated system
of situation-invariant
(generally) true propositions. The focus on episteme in the Western
sciences has lead to an unjustified
and systematic prioritization of episteme and at the same time to a
disparagement and exclusion of
alternative forms of knowledge. Before the invention of the episteme,
the ancient Greeks also
considered techne (the technical know-how enabling to get things done)
and phronesis (the practical
wisdom, drawn from social practices) as forms of knowledge. While
episteme is not embedded in the
everyday practice of action and communication among humans, both techne
and phronesis are ..."

davew

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Kenneth Lloyd

Re: an interesting quote

Dave,

Thanks for the quote, and it's wonderful insight.

Aristotle, Socrates, and Plato were excellent teachers. But the knowledge
they imparted contains artifacts - meaning errors and critical omissions -
that must be overcome even today.

The gist of the Gödel / Hilbert conflict is that it changed the nature of
science from a search for the truth to "separating what is probably true
from the demonstrably false". From H. Pollack -- Uncertain Science,
Uncertain World.

What we believe we know is always in the context of our culture and our
time. That is always subject to Quine's paradox.

Ken

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [hidden email]
> [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Prof David West
> Sent: Monday, July 28, 2008 7:53 AM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: [FRIAM] an interesting quote
>
>
> Came across this when looking at Peter Naur's work on
> programming - thought it might be interesting to some
> involved in the mathematics issues of debate recently -
> especially the ones dealing with mathematics "privileged" status.
>
>
> " ... ignorance towards any form of knowledge other than the
> one that builds on the Aristotelian concept of epistemea
> logically and terminologically elaborated system of
> situation-invariant
> (generally) true propositions. The focus on episteme in the
> Western sciences has lead to an unjustified and systematic
> prioritization of episteme and at the same time to a
> disparagement and exclusion of alternative forms of
> knowledge. Before the invention of the episteme, the ancient
> Greeks also considered techne (the technical know-how
> enabling to get things done) and phronesis (the practical
> wisdom, drawn from social practices) as forms of knowledge.
> While episteme is not embedded in the everyday practice of
> action and communication among humans, both techne and
> phronesis are ..."
>
> davew
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

glen ep ropella

Re: an interesting quote

Ken Lloyd wrote:
> The gist of the Gödel / Hilbert conflict is that it changed the nature of
> science from a search for the truth to "separating what is probably true
> from the demonstrably false". From H. Pollack -- Uncertain Science,
> Uncertain World.

I'm not sure who I'm disagreeing with, here, you or Pollack [grin]; but
I do have to disagree with what I think that statement means.

The gist of the Goedel/Hilbert thing (I don't think it's appropriate to
call it a conflict) isn't really about what's true or false (probable or
determined). It's about language and expressibility.

This is clearer if you set Goedel's work aside and look closer at
Tarski's work in the same area, which separates languages into at least
two sets, those simple enough to tolerate a solid definition of "truth"
and those too complex to tolerate it.

Now, I suppose one might say that if languages simple enough to tolerate
a well-defined "truth" are always easy to distinguish from reality (the
theorems formed are unsound), then that's evidence that reality is more
well-described by complex languages. Hence, if complex languages don't
have a well-defined "truth" and reality is best described by complex
languages, then, perhaps reality doesn't contain a well-defined truth.

And, if we jump to that conclusion, then, sure, the Goedel/Hilbert thing
might ultimately be about real truth and real falsity. But that's an
awfully large jump.

And I also think it's a bit aggressive to claim that the Goedel/Hilbert
thing impacted science. It certainly impacted how we reflect on
scientific progress. But does it really impact science? Have any
scientists changed their methods (i.e. the methods sections of their
published papers) citing the GIT? Would I use different beakers or dig
in different locations if the GIT were false? Would I change my
experimental subjects from baboons to rats? Granted, at the boundaries
between physics and metaphysics (string theory, GUTs, speculative
cosmology, etc.), the GIT rises to play a very important role. But for
most of what we call "science", the GIT's irrelevant.

(Please note that I'm playing Devil's Advocate to some extent because I
do believe Rosen's hand-waving claims that ambiguity is key in causal
entailment and (largely) absent from inferential entailment, and that
these claims are important to science. So, if we're right in our
premature conclusion that reality contains ambiguity, then that's
further justification for thinking that the GIT has a real correlate ...
i.e. that the GIT impacts science.)

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Jochen Fromm-4

Re: The society of mind

In reply to this post by Prof David West

I guess you mean the following article from AI Magazine:
>From Society to Landscape: Alternative Metaphors for AI
http://www.aaai.org/ojs/index.php/aimagazine/article/viewFile/896/814

Interesting. I have read "The society of Mind" a few years ago
- at least large parts of it - and I don't remember that Minsky's society
is in fact a bureaucratic hierarchy. According to Max Weber, a
bureaucracy is the most efficient form of organization, but I
don't think the mind works that way.

-J.

----- Original Message -----
From: "Prof David West" <[hidden email]>
To: "The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group" <[hidden email]>
Sent: Monday, July 28, 2008 12:59 AM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The society of mind

>
>
> The very first paper I published - too many years ago - in AI Magazine,
> then the flagship of the AI publication world - was a two part article,
> first part critiquing the prevailing computational falsework (a
> framework erected around a bridge to support it while concrete is being
> poured), the second part dealing with alternative metaphors of mind.
>
> One of the metaphors I talked about was Minsky's society - which was not
> a society at all - it was a bureaucratic hierarchy! At that time Minsky
> was adamantly opposed to the very idea of emergence and Society was
> supposed to be a way to get to intelligence without emergence - but he
> snuck in a homunculus around chapter three to make the whole thing work.
>
> The only metaphor, at least then, that had any room for emotions, pain,
> pleasure, etc. was Bergland's gland/brain chemistry/whole body model.
>
> davew
>