Sounds like an opportunity
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Sounds like an opportunity for someone to jump in with an agent-based,
religious-fervored flocking crowd model. Sorta like Zozobra one, but without the alochol. http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn8583 --Doug -- Doug Roberts, RTI 505-455-7333 - Office 505-670-8195 - Cell -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20060114/8d173cf1/attachment.htm |
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Keith Still, one of the central figures in the Crowd Dynamics modeling
community, has modeled the Al Jamarat bridge extensively following the 2004 tragedy. He appears to have pulled the main page on his site that describes the project: http://www.crowddynamics.com/Myriad/Jamarat.htm But here is the same page in Google's cache: http://tinyurl.com/cvdtu -S -----Original Message----- From: Douglas Roberts [mailto:[hidden email]] Sent: Saturday, January 14, 2006 9:12 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: [FRIAM] Sounds like an opportunity Sounds like an opportunity for someone to jump in with an agent-based, religious-fervored flocking crowd model. Sorta like Zozobra one, but without the alochol. http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn8583 --Doug -- Doug Roberts, RTI 505-455-7333 - Office 505-670-8195 - Cell |
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So, what happened? Why did the model fail, if it did?
Gus Koehler, Ph.D. Principal Time Structures 1545 University Ave. Sacramento, CA 95825 916-564-8683, Fax: 916-564-7895 Cell: 916-716-1740 www.timestructures.com -----Original Message----- From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Stephen Guerin Sent: Saturday, January 14, 2006 9:33 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Sounds like an opportunity Keith Still, one of the central figures in the Crowd Dynamics modeling community, has modeled the Al Jamarat bridge extensively following the 2004 tragedy. He appears to have pulled the main page on his site that describes the project: http://www.crowddynamics.com/Myriad/Jamarat.htm But here is the same page in Google's cache: http://tinyurl.com/cvdtu -S -----Original Message----- From: Douglas Roberts [mailto:[hidden email]] Sent: Saturday, January 14, 2006 9:12 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: [FRIAM] Sounds like an opportunity Sounds like an opportunity for someone to jump in with an agent-based, religious-fervored flocking crowd model. Sorta like Zozobra one, but without the alochol. http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn8583 --Doug -- Doug Roberts, RTI 505-455-7333 - Office 505-670-8195 - Cell ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at Mission Cafe lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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Gus writes:
> So, what happened? Why did the model fail, if it did? I don't think so. Modeling for crowd dynamics can focus on: 1) modifying physical layout 2) modifying human behavior in the crowd 3) modifying crowd control policies of the security personnel >From the limited information I have on the project, they successfully modeled a physical feature of the bridge and its modifications. Friday's tragedy appears to be trigged by luggage brought into the event which was supposed to be prohibited. This seems like more of breakdown in human behavior and crowd control. You can argue the ultimate cause was the huge densities reported of 14 people/ square meter. >From the literate, pedestrian traffic jams start around 6 people / square meter and get critically dangerous at 10 people / square meter. To give you a feel, attendees at Zozobra are at about 2.5 people / square meter during the event and reach about 6 people / square meter near the exits. Sadly, they were 2 days away from a major reconstruction of the bridge to make it multistory and better able to accomodate the crowds and reduce density. On a *much* smaller scale we saw very similar factors at Zozobra. Zozobra was 1% the event of Hajj with about 30,000 attendees compared to the 3 million at Mecca and 700,000 approaching Jamarat bridge. At Zozobra, we made some recommendations that were followed to minimize the densities of the crowd. We also knew that if crowds reached expected densities on the exit bridges from the model, they would exceed the posted bridge loading by a factor of 5. Crowd control strategies by the police were implemented to regulate flows. An incident could have easily happened if there was a triggering event. For example, there was a breakdown in crowd control/crowd behavior where lawn chairs and coolers were leaking into the event. These obstacles coupled with a smoke bomb or gun shot could have caused a serious tragedy. -Steve For more information, here's a post this morning by Keith Still to the CrowdDynamics listserve that some of us are on: Following Pete's comments. >Whilst this is a terrible tragedy it just brings to the forefront of >how difficult it is to organise crowds even with all the >improvements that have already been implemented at Jarmarat Bridge. The Saudi's authorities put an ENORMOUS effort and for 2 days their operation at the Bridge was facilitaing between 2 - 3,000,000 pilgrims per day. >Fortunately improvements that have been made seemed from what I >understand to have worked as designed and as you point out what >seemed a minor obstacle turned into a major tragedy. The Eastern Entrance is 45 metres wide - and fed from a plaza that is full to capacity. I've video of the area from previous years. To compare this to other events - a football stadium is around 70,000 There were reports that estimate some 700,000 (source Arab News) in the Plaza area. That would be 10 footballs stadia in (approx) 49,000 square metres. If you do the maths the figures come out at 14 people per square metre. Then at Noon - they all want to get through a 45m entrance. >I have spoken to friends who have visited Jarmarat on Pilgramage >in previous years and they have commented on how much the safety >has improved with the changes made. The change from circular to elliptical Jamarah (the pillars-walls) increased the capacity. We modelled the shape (aspect ratio) of the Jamarah - there were no reports of accidents relating to the Pillars. >From what they say it is the excitement and deep feeling of such a >special place which misleads visitors into a false sense of security >and they tend to forget their own responsibilities for their own and >others safety. There are behavioural and cultural issues with the crowds. Yes. >To look at this in a risk perceptive the actual percentage injured/ >killed is still very small for such a mass gathering. We've been collating a database of accidents and incidents - the statistics show that. Again if anyone wants a copy of the database, drop me a line. >Our prayers go out to those and their families in such a tragic >time. It is a tradegy that touches many countries and we are all too aware of the dangers in large crowds - our prayers to all involved in this most tragic incident. Regards, Keith |
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If the luggage theory is true, how come it wasn't a trigger at previous Haj?
Perhaps we're seeing a many-to-one problem: lots of things can cause the disaster (crowd density, bridge design, luggage) and we can work out which one was responsible after the event but (unfortunately) we cannot predict which one to focus resources on before the event. Robert On 1/15/06, Stephen Guerin <stephen.guerin at redfish.com> wrote: > > Gus writes: > > So, what happened? Why did the model fail, if it did? > > I don't think so. Modeling for crowd dynamics can focus on: > 1) modifying physical layout > 2) modifying human behavior in the crowd > 3) modifying crowd control policies of the security personnel > > >From the limited information I have on the project, they successfully > modeled a > physical feature of the bridge and its modifications. Friday's tragedy > appears > to be trigged by luggage brought into the event which was supposed to be > prohibited. This seems like more of breakdown in human behavior and crowd > control. You can argue the ultimate cause was the huge densities reported > of 14 > people/ square meter. > > >From the literate, pedestrian traffic jams start around 6 people / square > meter > and get critically dangerous at 10 people / square meter. To give you a > feel, > attendees at Zozobra are at about 2.5 people / square meter during the > event and > reach about 6 people / square meter near the exits. Sadly, they were 2 > days away > from a major reconstruction of the bridge to make it multistory and better > able > to accomodate the crowds and reduce density. > > On a *much* smaller scale we saw very similar factors at Zozobra. Zozobra > was 1% > the event of Hajj with about 30,000 attendees compared to the 3 million at > Mecca > and 700,000 approaching Jamarat bridge. At Zozobra, we made some > recommendations > that were followed to minimize the densities of the crowd. We also knew > that if > crowds reached expected densities on the exit bridges from the model, they > would > exceed the posted bridge loading by a factor of 5. Crowd control > strategies by > the police were implemented to regulate flows. An incident could have > easily > happened if there was a triggering event. For example, there was a > breakdown in > crowd control/crowd behavior where lawn chairs and coolers were leaking > into the > event. These obstacles coupled with a smoke bomb or gun shot could have > caused a > serious tragedy. > > -Steve > > For more information, here's a post this morning by Keith Still to the > CrowdDynamics listserve that some of us are on: > > Following Pete's comments. > >Whilst this is a terrible tragedy it just brings to the forefront of > >how difficult it is to organise crowds even with all the > >improvements that have already been implemented at Jarmarat Bridge. > > The Saudi's authorities put an ENORMOUS effort and for 2 days their > operation at the Bridge was facilitaing between 2 - 3,000,000 > pilgrims per day. > > >Fortunately improvements that have been made seemed from what I > >understand to have worked as designed and as you point out what > >seemed a minor obstacle turned into a major tragedy. > > The Eastern Entrance is 45 metres wide - and fed from a plaza that is > full to capacity. I've video of the area from previous years. > > To compare this to other events - a football stadium is around 70,000 > > There were reports that estimate some 700,000 (source Arab News) in > the Plaza area. That would be 10 footballs stadia in (approx) 49,000 > square metres. > > If you do the maths the figures come out at 14 people per square > metre. > > Then at Noon - they all want to get through a 45m entrance. > > >I have spoken to friends who have visited Jarmarat on Pilgramage > >in previous years and they have commented on how much the safety > >has improved with the changes made. > > The change from circular to elliptical Jamarah (the pillars-walls) > increased the capacity. We modelled the shape (aspect ratio) of the > Jamarah - there were no reports of accidents relating to the Pillars. > > >From what they say it is the excitement and deep feeling of such a > >special place which misleads visitors into a false sense of security > >and they tend to forget their own responsibilities for their own and > >others safety. > > There are behavioural and cultural issues with the crowds. Yes. > > >To look at this in a risk perceptive the actual percentage injured/ > >killed is still very small for such a mass gathering. > > We've been collating a database of accidents and incidents - the > statistics show that. Again if anyone wants a copy of the database, > drop me a line. > > >Our prayers go out to those and their families in such a tragic > >time. > > It is a tradegy that touches many countries and we are all too aware > of the dangers in large crowds - our prayers to all involved in this > most tragic incident. > > Regards, > > Keith > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at Mission Cafe > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20060117/4e32940e/attachment.htm |
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