All,
Ok, so my questions about Rosen are of a really fundamental nature. You guys are already WAY down the track. In fact, could somebody clarify, in terms that a former english major would understand, what it means to say, "organisms are closed to efficient causation." I read it and I read it and I READ it and it just doesnt STICK! Would that amount to saying that Rosen believes that nothing is entailed by the fact that you just poked a tiger with a pool cue? Whereas, much is entailed by saying that you have just poked a pool ball with the same cue? If I changed the words above from "entailed by" to "implied by" or "inferable from", does Rosen get off the boat? Would anybody who accepted "organisms are closed" claim be willing to enter a tiger's cage with a pool cue KNOWING THAT the tiger had just been poked with the same pool cue? For the new year, I dream of a world in which no two people are allowed to argue in my electronic presence until the key AGREEMENTS that make their argument possible are made explicit. That is probably amounts to asking you all to be as dumb as I am. Hey! I can ask! Nick OTHER STUFF FROM THIS THREAD > > ------------------------------ Message: 10 Date: Sat, 29 Dec 2007 08:43:31 -0800 From: "Gus Koehler" <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Robert Rosen To: "'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'" <friam at redfish.com> Message-ID: <000001c84a39$f2e9d0a0$6401a8c0 at EA5E71A6DE4A4D9> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" A Living System Must Have Noncomputable Models A. H. Louie Abstract: Chu and Ho's recent paper in Artificial Life is riddled with errors. In particular, they use a wrong definition of Robert Rosen's mechanism. This renders their "critical assessment" of Rosen's central proof null and void. http://www.panmere.com/rosen/Louie_noncomp_pre_rev.pdf Gus Koehler, Ph.D. President and Principal Time Structures, Inc. 1545 University Ave. Sacramento, CA 95825 916-564-8683, Fax: 916-564-7895 Cell: 916-716-1740 www.timestructures.com Save A Tree - please don't print this unless you really need to. -----Original Message----- From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Joost Rekveld Sent: Saturday, December 29, 2007 5:34 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Robert Rosen Hi, apparently these articles have given rise to rebuttals, see http:// www.panmere.com/?cat=18 for a survey of this discussion. I read 'Life Itself' a while ago, found it extremely interesting but not an easy read either. Later I read some of the essays from 'Essays on Life Itself", which helped. The biggest problem with Rosen's writing was for me that it is very concise; for a layman (like me) it would have been good to have a bit more flesh around his central argument, in the form of historical references and examples. Later I discovered the writings of Howard Pattee (an essay in the first Artificial Life proceedings) and Peter Cariani (his thesis from 1989 <http://homepage.mac.com/cariani/CarianiWebsite/Cariani89.pdf> and a later article for example <http://homepage.mac.com/cariani/ CarianiWebsite/Cariani98.pdf>. I found both their writings more digestible. hope this helps, Joost. On Dec 29, 2007, at 5:03 AM, Russell Standish wrote: > By all means have a discussion. Rosen is not an easy read, nor easy to > talk about even. I have some grumbles with Rosen, which I mention in > my paper "On Complexity and Emergence", but these are fairly muted. > There've been some interesting articles recently in Artificial Life by > Chu & Ho that appear to disprove Rosen's central theorem. I suspect > their rather more rigourous approach crystalises some of my grumbles, > but I haven't found the time yet to try out the analysis more formally > myself. > > Cheers > > On Fri, Dec 28, 2007 at 08:41:43PM -0700, Nicholas Thompson wrote: >> All, >> >> On the recommendation of somebody on this list, I started reading >> Rosen's Life Itself. It does indeed, as the recommender suggested, >> seem to relate to my peculiar way of looking at such things as >> adaptation, motivation, etc. The book is both intriguing and >> somewhat over my head. Pied Piperish in that regard. So I am >> wondering if there are folks on the list who wold like to talk about >> it. By the way, does the fact that I am attracted to Rosen make me a >> category theorist? I am told that that is somewhat to the left of >> being an astrologer. >> >> Nick >> ------------------------------------------- Joost Rekveld ----------- http://www.lumen.nu/rekveld ------------------------------------------- "This alone I ask you, O reader, that when you peruse the account of these marvels that you do not set up for yourself as a standard human intellectual pride, but rather the great size and vastness of earth and sky; and, comparing with that Infinity these slender shadows in which miserably and anxiously we are enveloped, you will easily know that I have related nothing which is beyond belief." (Girolamo Cardano) ------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Friam mailing list Friam at redfish.com http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com End of Friam Digest, Vol 54, Issue 25 ************************************* -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20071230/e6b9a865/attachment.html |
On Sun, Dec 30, 2007 at 11:32:33AM -0700, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> All, > > Ok, so my questions about Rosen are of a really fundamental nature. You guys are already WAY down the track. > > In fact, could somebody clarify, in terms that a former english major would understand, what it means to say, > > "organisms are closed to efficient causation." > I read it and I read it and I READ it and it just doesnt STICK! > You probably read about Aristotle's four causes - this is the origin of the term efficient causation. "closed to efficient causation" in my mind simply says that something is its own cause. If we ask why does this chicken exist, the answer is because of an egg existing. When we ask why did the egg exist, the answer is because a chook exists (adult chicken). Causation in this sense is closed. When you ask any question about the causation of life, you ultimately come back on youself. The meaning of life is life itself. It exists because it can. I hope this explanation makes some kind of sense. I beleive that much of Rosen's tortured explanation was trying to formalise this fairly simple and obvious idea. It is worth comparing and contrasting it with the notion of autopoiesis, which is a little better developed. Cheers -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpcoder at hpcoders.com.au Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Dear Nick,
have you read this?: http://www.panmere.com/rosen/closed_eff.htm#en01 and this: http://www.panmere.com/rosen/mhout/msg00412.html I think this clears it up - the concept is not so mysterious after all ;-) I think this "organisms are closed to efficient causation" is just a descriptive principle - if Rosen says you can't compute it anyway, in what sense would it be a formalization? Apart from that, I don't yet see why it shouldn't be computable, but I have not yet found the time to read the Chu Ho Paper and the Louie rebuttal. The only thing off the top of my head which comes to my mind is Kleene's Recursion principle - a proof that every formal system can reproduce itself, so why not also an (M,R) system? (But again Caveat: I have not read the above papers yet, maybe I am missing the point ;-)) Regards, G?nther Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > All, > > Ok, so my questions about Rosen are of a really fundamental nature. You > guys are already WAY down the track. > > In fact, could somebody clarify, in terms that a former english major > would understand, what it means to say, > > "organisms are closed to efficient causation." > I read it and I read it and I READ it and it just doesnt STICK! > > Would that amount to saying that Rosen believes that nothing is entailed > by the fact that you just poked a tiger with a pool cue? Whereas, much > is entailed by saying that you have just poked a pool ball with the same > cue? If I changed the words above from "entailed by" to "implied by" > or "inferable from", does Rosen get off the boat? Would anybody who > accepted "organisms are closed" claim be willing to enter a tiger's cage > with a pool cue KNOWING THAT the tiger had just been poked with the same > pool cue? > > For the new year, I dream of a world in which no two people are allowed > to argue in my electronic presence until the key AGREEMENTS that > make their argument possible are made explicit. That is probably > amounts to asking you all to be as dumb as I am. Hey! I can ask! > > Nick > > > > OTHER STUFF FROM THIS THREAD > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 10 > Date: Sat, 29 Dec 2007 08:43:31 -0800 > From: "Gus Koehler" <gus at timestructures.com> > <mailto:<gus at timestructures.com>> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Robert Rosen > To: "'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'" > <friam at redfish.com> <mailto: <friam at redfish.com>> > Message-ID: <000001c84a39$f2e9d0a0$6401a8c0 at EA5E71A6DE4A4D9> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > A Living System Must Have Noncomputable Models > A. H. Louie > > Abstract: Chu and Ho's recent paper in Artificial Life is riddled with > errors. In particular, they > use a wrong definition of Robert Rosen's mechanism. This renders their > "critical assessment" of > Rosen's central proof null and void. > http://www.panmere.com/rosen/Louie_noncomp_pre_rev.pdf > <http://www.panmere.com/rosen/Louie_noncomp_pre_rev.pdf> > > Gus Koehler, Ph.D. > President and Principal > Time Structures, Inc. > 1545 University Ave. > Sacramento, CA 95825 > 916-564-8683, Fax: 916-564-7895 > Cell: 916-716-1740 > www.timestructures.com <http://www.timestructures.com> > Save A Tree - please don't print this unless you really need to. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: friam-bounces at redfish.com <mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com> [ > mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com > <mailto:mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com> ] On Behalf > Of Joost Rekveld > Sent: Saturday, December 29, 2007 5:34 AM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Robert Rosen > > Hi, > > apparently these articles have given rise to rebuttals, see http:// > <http://> > www.panmere.com/?cat=18 <http://www.panmere.com/?cat=18> for a > survey of this discussion. > > I read 'Life Itself' a while ago, found it extremely interesting but > not an > easy read either. Later I read some of the essays from 'Essays on Life > Itself", which helped. The biggest problem with Rosen's writing was > for me > that it is very concise; for a layman (like me) it would have been > good to > have a bit more flesh around his central argument, in the form of > historical > references and examples. > > Later I discovered the writings of Howard Pattee (an essay in the first > Artificial Life proceedings) and Peter Cariani (his thesis from > 1989 < http://homepage.mac.com/cariani/CarianiWebsite/Cariani89.pdf> > <http://homepage.mac.com/cariani/CarianiWebsite/Cariani89.pdf>> > and a later article for example < http://homepage.mac.com/cariani/ > <http://homepage.mac.com/cariani/> > CarianiWebsite/Cariani98.pdf>. > I found both their writings more digestible. > > hope this helps, > > Joost. > > On Dec 29, 2007, at 5:03 AM, Russell Standish wrote: > > > By all means have a discussion. Rosen is not an easy read, nor > easy to > > talk about even. I have some grumbles with Rosen, which I mention in > > my paper "On Complexity and Emergence", but these are fairly muted. > > There've been some interesting articles recently in Artificial > Life by > > Chu & Ho that appear to disprove Rosen's central theorem. I suspect > > their rather more rigourous approach crystalises some of my > grumbles, > > but I haven't found the time yet to try out the analysis more > formally > > myself. > > > > Cheers > > > > On Fri, Dec 28, 2007 at 08:41:43PM -0700, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > >> All, > >> > >> On the recommendation of somebody on this list, I started reading > >> Rosen's Life Itself. It does indeed, as the recommender suggested, > >> seem to relate to my peculiar way of looking at such things as > >> adaptation, motivation, etc. The book is both intriguing and > >> somewhat over my head. Pied Piperish in that regard. So I am > >> wondering if there are folks on the list who wold like to talk > about > >> it. By the way, does the fact that I am attracted to Rosen make > me a > >> category theorist? I am told that that is somewhat to the left of > >> being an astrologer. > >> > >> Nick > >> > > > ------------------------------------------- > > Joost Rekveld > ----------- http://www.lumen.nu/rekveld <http://www.lumen.nu/rekveld> > > ------------------------------------------- > > "This alone I ask you, O reader, that when you peruse the > account of these marvels that you do not set up for yourself > as a standard human intellectual pride, but rather the great > size and vastness of earth and sky; and, comparing with > that Infinity these slender shadows in which miserably and > anxiously we are enveloped, you will easily know that I have > related nothing which is beyond belief." > (Girolamo Cardano) > > ------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > <http://www.friam.org> > > > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Friam mailing list > Friam at redfish.com <mailto:Friam at redfish.com> > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > <http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com> > > > End of Friam Digest, Vol 54, Issue 25 > > ************************************* > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org -- G?nther Greindl Department of Philosophy of Science University of Vienna guenther.greindl at univie.ac.at http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/ Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/ Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org |
In reply to this post by Russell Standish
Nick, what got my interest is the similarity of meaning between 'closed
to efficient causation' and 'have their own behavior', the property of physical organisms we constantly have to remind ourselves of whenever dealing with organisms... Phil Henshaw ????.?? ? `?.???? ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 680 Ft. Washington Ave NY NY 10040 tel: 212-795-4844 e-mail: pfh at synapse9.com explorations: www.synapse9.com > -----Original Message----- > From: friam-bounces at redfish.com > [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish > Sent: Sunday, December 30, 2007 4:56 PM > To: nickthompson at earthlink.net; The Friday Morning Applied > Complexity Coffee Group > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Robert Rosen > > > On Sun, Dec 30, 2007 at 11:32:33AM -0700, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > All, > > > > Ok, so my questions about Rosen are of a really fundamental nature. > > You guys are already WAY down the track. > > > > In fact, could somebody clarify, in terms that a former > english major > > would understand, what it means to say, > > > > "organisms are closed to efficient causation." > > I read it and I read it and I READ it and it just doesnt STICK! > > > > You probably read about Aristotle's four causes - this is the > origin of the term efficient causation. > > "closed to efficient causation" in my mind simply says that > something is its own cause. If we ask why does this chicken > exist, the answer is because of an egg existing. When we ask > why did the egg exist, the answer is because a chook exists > (adult chicken). Causation in this sense is closed. > > When you ask any question about the causation of life, you > ultimately come back on youself. The meaning of life is life > itself. It exists because it can. > > I hope this explanation makes some kind of sense. I beleive > that much of Rosen's tortured explanation was trying to > formalise this fairly simple and obvious idea. It is worth > comparing and contrasting it with the notion of autopoiesis, > which is a little better developed. > > Cheers > > -- > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > -------------- > A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpcoder at hpcoders.com.au > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > -------------------------------------------------------------- > -------------- > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > |
In reply to this post by Russell Standish
Well, feedback loops begin and end too, and that displays an even greater 'inefficiency' for causation... Just plane old bloody gaps. The rub is that systems of loops originate for no efficient cause. That's why I turned the sci method around to warch them since it's clear we can't explain them.
Phil Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry -----Original Message----- From: Russell Standish <[hidden email]> Date: Mon, 31 Dec 2007 08:56:01 To:nickthompson at earthlink.net, The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam at redfish.com> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Robert Rosen On Sun, Dec 30, 2007 at 11:32:33AM -0700, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > All, > > Ok, so my questions about Rosen are of a really fundamental nature. You guys are already WAY down the track. > > In fact, could somebody clarify, in terms that a former english major would understand, what it means to say, > > "organisms are closed to efficient causation." > I read it and I read it and I READ it and it just doesnt STICK! > You probably read about Aristotle's four causes - this is the origin of the term efficient causation. "closed to efficient causation" in my mind simply says that something is its own cause. If we ask why does this chicken exist, the answer is because of an egg existing. When we ask why did the egg exist, the answer is because a chook exists (adult chicken). Causation in this sense is closed. When you ask any question about the causation of life, you ultimately come back on youself. The meaning of life is life itself. It exists because it can. I hope this explanation makes some kind of sense. I beleive that much of Rosen's tortured explanation was trying to formalise this fairly simple and obvious idea. It is worth comparing and contrasting it with the notion of autopoiesis, which is a little better developed. Cheers -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpcoder at hpcoders.com.au Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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Hash: SHA1 sy at synapse9.com on 01/02/2008 08:51 AM: > Well, feedback loops begin and end too, and that displays an even > greater 'inefficiency' for causation... Just plane old bloody gaps. > The rub is that systems of loops originate for no efficient cause. > That's why I turned the sci method around to warch them since it's > clear we can't explain them. I disagree. First, to say that feedback loops begin and end is an _assumption_ of a discrete ontology. I.e. feedback loops may not have a beginning or an end, they may merely be bounded. Second, most of what people seem to point at when they use the phrase "feedback loop" is an aggregation of phenomena caused by an aggregate set of mechanisms. Hence, even if the ontology is discrete or discretizable, we may not be able to discuss them in the same language (attributes, properties, predicates, operators, etc.) we use to discuss the phenomena and mechanisms of which they're composed. And further, not only may we need a different language, they may not even give rise to the same categorization of actual behaviors. I.e. the components can be very different from the composition. To conflate the two is to commit the fallacy of composition/division. And third, we might posit that "feedback loop" is _merely_ an ascription having nothing to do with the ontology and _everything_ to do with our psychology. I.e. "feedback loops" may not actually exist except as a convenient lexical structure we use to describe the world. In the first case, we can't make the logical leap to say that feedback loops have no efficient cause. In the second case, the cause of the loops is _complex_... and we've had that discussion recently. And in the third case, feedback loops do have an efficient cause... _us_. [grin] I'm not saying that any of these are true; but they are certainly defensible positions... as defensible as the assertion that the loops have no efficient cause. - -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com When buying and selling are controlled by legislation, the first things to be bought and sold are legislators. -- P.J. O'Rourke -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFHe+JXZeB+vOTnLkoRAhrvAKCNlM31w5lG4mLCJdQh6+8KxMAvggCdFb8r v9bMfdkZPoDUCrJTxolKpWs= =Ji8l -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- |
Glen, You write: > > sy at synapse9.com on 01/02/2008 08:51 AM: > > Well, feedback loops begin and end too, and that displays an even > > greater 'inefficiency' for causation... Just plane old bloody gaps. > > The rub is that systems of loops originate for no efficient cause. > > That's why I turned the sci method around to warch them since it's > > clear we can't explain them. > > I disagree. First, to say that feedback loops begin and end > is an _assumption_ of a discrete ontology. I.e. feedback > loops may not have a beginning or an end, they may merely be bounded. Yes, sure, that's an option of interpretation, but does it fit with the rest of what I was saying? I think there's an interpretation that fits the data of nature better than any other, so it's reached as a 'conclusion' not as an 'assumption'. For example, can you offer any example of physical growth (accumulative change) without a beginning and end? > Second, most of what people seem to point at when they use > the phrase "feedback loop" is an aggregation of phenomena > caused by an aggregate set of mechanisms. Hence, even if the > ontology is discrete or discretizable, we may not be able to > discuss them in the same language (attributes, properties, > predicates, operators, etc.) we use to discuss the phenomena > and mechanisms of which they're composed. And further, not > only may we need a different language, they may not even give > rise to the same categorization of actual behaviors. I.e. > the components can be very different from the composition. > To conflate the two is to commit the fallacy of composition/division. Complex systems are always poorly represented by our models, but does that restrict them, or just us? :-) It's completely normal to discover that in describing one physical thing you often need a combination of different languages of description. For example, you might describe something's chemistry, it's appearance and its various roles in its environment. They're all useful, especially together, though each is highly incomplete and they hardly connect at all in terms of the formalities of each mode of description. > > And third, we might posit that "feedback loop" is _merely_ an > ascription having nothing to do with the ontology and > _everything_ to do with our psychology. I.e. "feedback > loops" may not actually exist except as a convenient lexical > structure we use to describe the world. Well, certainly a term needs to be understood so that when one persons uses it another person can know what is being referred to. But isn't that a normal problem with language, not an inherent flaw in language? In this case I'm using 'feedback loop' in a way I thought would be understood, from your referring to the physical model of the 'chicken & egg' cycle. It wasn't that clear perhaps. I meant it to refer to the type of feedbacks we commonly find in nature, not a theoretical construct. Like the chicken & egg cycle, all cycles in natural systems seem to develop and decay by transient accumulative change processes. The name 'feedback' gets attached since they generally fit the model of exponential-like accumulative change. Can you think of any regular cycle that does not begin and end with accumulative processes on scales that make them untraceable? > > In the first case, we can't make the logical leap to say that > feedback loops have no efficient cause. In the second case, > the cause of the loops is _complex_... and we've had that > discussion recently. And in the third case, feedback loops > do have an efficient cause... _us_. [grin] I draw the conclusion that natural system feedbacks have no efficient cause since it's 'inefficient' to have causes separated from effects. With growth systems there are usually time lags between cause and effect, so any 'cause' is instrumentally disconnected from the process that follows it. Growth systems also usually have complex emergent properties with a complexity not evident in the original environment, and so outside cause fails to be 'efficient' for requisite variety too. In the case of a real physical growth system you'd be quite right to say that any feedback loop we can define has us as its efficient cause. A physical system's own feedback loops are indeed complex. For talking about them it seems you need words that take their meaning from what they refer to rather than be defined so they can't. That's an issue, of course. Then I think the best of all evidence is the myriad physical systems that hide their designs inside themselves. That's very 'inefficient' isn't it, to have things designed and operating according to principles that are universally invisible from outside? Isn't that typical for physical systems though? > > I'm not saying that any of these are true; but they are > certainly defensible positions... as defensible as the > assertion that the loops have no efficient cause. When you talk about 'defensible' but ambiguous positions I'm reminded of questions like whether trees falling in the woods make a sound if no one hears them. The interest in that question seems to rest entirely on the argument for either position being completely 'incontrovertible', i.e. defensible by being impossible to contradict. To me people seem interested in that because it turns on whether the universe is composed of information or things. If just information, then the unobserved falling tree makes no sound. If you approach the world as composed of things, then it does. Why anyone would even wonder about that might be that our mental pointers to physical things get mazes of self-references attached to them, so our thoughts can wander without end looking for what's real, and find nothing but themselves to connect to. When you strip the interpretations from the pointers, they can work again. I find it gives reality great substance, and having pointers reliably lead to where there are new things to discover very useful. Do you think Rosen is thinking at all about this issue? It sounds like he's looking at an equally central problem of explanation I think. Cheers, Phil > > - -- > glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com > When buying and selling are controlled by legislation, the > first things to be bought and sold are legislators. -- P.J. O'Rourke > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org > > iD8DBQFHe+JXZeB+vOTnLkoRAhrvAKCNlM31w5lG4mLCJdQh6+8KxMAvggCdFb8r > v9bMfdkZPoDUCrJTxolKpWs= > =Ji8l > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > |
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Hash: SHA1 Phil Henshaw on 01/02/2008 09:25 PM: > Yes, sure, that's an option of interpretation, but does it fit with > the rest of what I was saying? I think there's an interpretation > that fits the data of nature better than any other, so it's reached > as a 'conclusion' not as an 'assumption'. For example, can you > offer any example of physical growth (accumulative change) without a > beginning and end? Hmmm. I suppose that depends on the way "beginning" and "ending" are measured. It seems to me that _nothing_ real has a beginning or end. Our models of things begin and end; but, the things themselves don't seem to. For example, I can say that "my dad" was born. Then many years later, he died. But when did "my dad" begin? Was he "my dad" when he was a zygote? A fetus? A gleam in my grand dad's eye? Same questions apply about when he ended. In fact, the difference between an embryo and a fetus presents just such an example of physical growth without a beginning or an end. We don't know when the fetus "began" and our cut-off point for "fetus" is artificially designed to coincide with birth. The same is true of any unit you can think of. Sure, by measuring the thing according to some model, you can point to a beginning and end... according to your _model_. But, is the thing being measured actually beginning and ending? Or is it just the way you measure it that results in the measurements? By that reasoning, I can simply pick a model of the world where nothing ever ends and nothing ever begins... i.e. a model that says the world is everywhere continuous. Forces in distant galaxies impact me to some non-zero extent (though they may be _negligible_ for any given purpose). Events in the distant past caused me to, say, get some more coffee... at least to some extent. So my answer is: Sure. Tell me what model you'd like me to use and I can pick a growth process that has neither a beginning nor an end. > Complex systems are always poorly represented by our models, but does > that restrict them, or just us? :-) That's easy: Both, because we are part of the super-system that includes the sub-system being studied. > Well, certainly a term needs to be understood so that when one > persons uses it another person can know what is being referred to. > But isn't that a normal problem with language, not an inherent flaw > in language? In this case I'm using 'feedback loop' in a way I > thought would be understood, from your referring to the physical > model of the 'chicken & egg' cycle. It wasn't that clear perhaps. It's not that it's unclear. It's that the meaning you're using isn't concrete. It's abstract. A "feedback loop" cannot be picked up, manipulated, eaten, twisted into a pretzel, etc. Hence, it is not concrete. As an abstract thing, all that remains is to figure out whether the thoughts triggered by others by the phrase "feedback loop" are roughly equivalent to the thoughts triggered in you when you see the phrase "feedback loop". Now, concrete things have a natural mechanism for correcting errors in the thoughts of those that manipulate them. E.g. if you pick up a rock, roll it around in your hands, toss it up in the air, drop it on your foot, etc. Then I pick it up, roll it around, etc. There's a good chance that equivalent thoughts pop up when we think about that rock. And we can use the concreteness of the rock to whittle down any differences by designing standard methods for handling the rock. But with abstract things like "feedback loop", it's much more difficult. The only methods for ensuring our thoughts are equivalent when the phrase is uttered is to talk about it for extended periods, probably with several conversations (possibly including quizzing each other). We can also help bring the thoughts closer by indirectly using concrete artifacts like drawings, computers, etc. ("Point to the feedback loop!" ;-) I posit that, in most people, the thoughts evoked by "feedback loop" are going to be very different, primarily because most people don't work very closely together with most other people. Sure, some people work closely with some other people. But, by and large, an abstract thing like a "feedback loop" will mean very different things to different people. And one of the main differences will be in thinking about the beginning and the ending of any given feedback loop. > Can you think of any regular cycle that does not begin and end with > accumulative processes on scales that make them untraceable? I don't really understand what you're asking for. Perhaps if you gave me an example of a regular cycle that has a clear beginning and a clear ending? > I draw the conclusion that natural system feedbacks have no efficient > cause since it's 'inefficient' to have causes separated from > effects. With growth systems there are usually time lags between > cause and effect, so any 'cause' is instrumentally disconnected from > the process that follows it. Growth systems also usually have > complex emergent properties with a complexity not evident in the > original environment, and so outside cause fails to be 'efficient' > for requisite variety too. > > In the case of a real physical growth system you'd be quite right to > say that any feedback loop we can define has us as its efficient > cause. A physical system's own feedback loops are indeed complex. > For talking about them it seems you need words that take their > meaning from what they refer to rather than be defined so they can't. > That's an issue, of course. > > Then I think the best of all evidence is the myriad physical systems > that hide their designs inside themselves. That's very 'inefficient' > isn't it, to have things designed and operating according to > principles that are universally invisible from outside? Isn't that > typical for physical systems though? You seem to be using the word "efficient" as it's used in everyday language rather than as the peculiar meaning it takes on when used in the phrase "efficient cause". An "efficient cause" need not be efficient. Such a cause needs only to meet Aristotle's (or Robert Rosen's) definition of such causes. >> I'm not saying that any of these are true; but they are certainly >> defensible positions... as defensible as the assertion that the >> loops have no efficient cause. > > When you talk about 'defensible' but ambiguous positions I'm reminded > of questions like whether trees falling in the woods make a sound if > no one hears them. The interest in that question seems to rest > entirely on the argument for either position being completely > 'incontrovertible', i.e. defensible by being impossible to > contradict. I apologize. That's not how I intend it. When I say something is defensible or reasonable, I mean that a diligent person can make a persuasive argument that it's true. The introduction of a contrary fact can demolish such defensible positions, turning them indefensible. But absent such contrary facts, the position is defensible. And any given topic can tolerate several defensible but contradictory positions. > To me people seem interested in that because it turns on whether the > universe is composed of information or things. If just information, > then the unobserved falling tree makes no sound. If you approach the > world as composed of things, then it does. Not necessarily. If the whole universe is information, then we (observers) are information. And if we're information, then other things (also information) might also be like us. Hence, if a tree falls in the forest and no human is there but some non-human information globule with the power to observe is present, then it still makes a sound. So, even if the world is composed entirely of information, the tree (information) may make a sound even if no "one" is there to hear it. For example, even though wood molecules (also information) can't _hear_, they can certainly react to the physical pressures (also information) that might result from the falling tree. I.e. the tree, itself, is an observer or is composed of observers .... even if it's dead. In short, everything being information doesn't change the answer. Events can either be sensed by an observer or they can't, regardless of what the universe is composed of. > Why anyone would even wonder about that might be > that our mental pointers to physical things get mazes of > self-references attached to them, so our thoughts can wander without > end looking for what's real, and find nothing but themselves to > connect to. When you strip the interpretations from the pointers, > they can work again. I find it gives reality great substance, and > having pointers reliably lead to where there are new things to > discover very useful. > > Do you think Rosen is thinking at all about this issue? It sounds > like he's looking at an equally central problem of explanation I > think. Yes. He explicitly talks about this (meters and observables) in Fundamentals ... as well as Life Itself. The presentation in Fundamentals ... is more explicit. - -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com There's no sense in being precise when you don't even know what you're talking about. -- John Von Neumann -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFHfWaGZeB+vOTnLkoRAp3uAKDbRaRWXNT0OJvEABZBe4BtnJIMNACgnfSl vKe+CHfNs+Ka3dGkTBXElpw= =xcZh -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- |
Glen
> > Phil Henshaw on 01/02/2008 09:25 PM: > > Yes, sure, that's an option of interpretation, but does it fit with > > the rest of what I was saying? I think there's an interpretation > > that fits the data of nature better than any other, so it's reached > > as a 'conclusion' not as an 'assumption'. For example, can you > > offer any example of physical growth (accumulative change) > without a > > beginning and end? > > Hmmm. I suppose that depends on the way "beginning" and > "ending" are measured. It seems to me that _nothing_ real > has a beginning or end. Our models of things begin and end; > but, the things themselves don't seem to. There are several ways, but since they involve physical things rather than definable things the reasoning is different. With physical things there are recognizable ridges and valleys. An inflection point on a curve is a ridge or valley in the derivative. Like with ( ??.o? ? and ? `o.?? ) the o's of the beginning and ending developmental phases can be considered the definable beginning and end and. Then the indefinable part attached includes all you can find connected to them. That provides an efficiently reconstructable natural definition of beginning and end. The more useful part may come later, when you realize that once you have (??.o) there's simply no avoiding ( o? ? `o.??)coming right along. Once you see growth you can expect to see the other three phases of a whole system life-cycle. > For example, I can say that "my dad" was born. Then many > years later, he died. But when did "my dad" begin? Was he > "my dad" when he was a zygote? A fetus? A gleam in my grand > dad's eye? Same questions apply about when he ended. In > fact, the difference between an embryo and a fetus presents > just such an example of physical growth without a beginning > or an end. We don't know when the fetus "began" and our > cut-off point for "fetus" is artificially designed to > coincide with birth. Well, you can choose. Do you want to apply the rule to your dad as a whole or to some part? One of the unobservable but theoretically real thresholds I like for the beginning of an organism is the time when the egg opens its cell wall for just one sperm. I don't know how many organisms that actually works for, but I think it works for humans. > > The same is true of any unit you can think of. Sure, by > measuring the thing according to some model, you can point to > a beginning and end... according to your _model_. But, is > the thing being measured actually beginning and ending? Or > is it just the way you measure it that results in the measurements? What you're talking about is the maturation of your concept of beginning and ending and hoping that it settles down with something reliable and definite and not just some arbitrary opinion measure or something. For the many things that begin with growth it's fairly easy to be clear about it. That then provides a very large set of examples that other things can be judged by. I think, though I'm not completely sure, that everything that begins and ends some other way will turn out to be trivial, but that needs remain undetermined until it is. > By that reasoning, I can simply pick a model of the world > where nothing ever ends and nothing ever begins... i.e. a > model that says the world is everywhere continuous. Forces > in distant galaxies impact me to some non-zero extent (though > they may be _negligible_ for any given purpose). Events in > the distant past caused me to, say, get some more coffee... > at least to some extent. What would be wrong with considering the world without beginnings or ends is that you're establishing fact without evidence. I choose to avoid that since it is clearly unproductive. Otherwise you're just dwelling on incontrovertible conjectures for which there is no evidence, and that gets boring. > So my answer is: Sure. Tell me what model you'd like me to > use and I can pick a growth process that has neither a > beginning nor an end. Try one, any one. If all your data shows is the beginning and end of your recorder being turned on, then you can indeed say that you have not found the beginning or end of the system in question, just of your record. All you can ever associate with anything identifiable is what's connected to it, and that never proves much about what's not connected. > > Complex systems are always poorly represented by our > models, but does > > that restrict them, or just us? :-) > > That's easy: Both, because we are part of the super-system > that includes the sub-system being studied. > > > Well, certainly a term needs to be understood so that when > one persons > > uses it another person can know what is being referred to. > But isn't > > that a normal problem with language, not an inherent flaw > in language? > > In this case I'm using 'feedback loop' in a way I thought would be > > understood, from your referring to the physical model of > the 'chicken > > & egg' cycle. It wasn't that clear perhaps. > > It's not that it's unclear. It's that the meaning you're > using isn't concrete. It's abstract. A "feedback loop" > cannot be picked up, manipulated, eaten, twisted into a > pretzel, etc. Hence, it is not concrete. One of the puzzling enduring experiences of nature is looking inside things to see how they work only to find a whole lot of empty space and an impossible puzzle. For centuries now we've been looking at systems that way, seeing the people and unable to find the community, for example. Then we look in people and find a whole lot of things that know exactly what to do and have no instructions. We expect to find inside nature's machines something like the mechanisms of the machines we build, and only find what mostly looks like an empty box. The feedback loops I'm talking about are highly concrete, but they're in the animation of the whole, and vanish from view when you only look at the parts. They don't work on paper, and they don't have any particular dimensionality at all, unless you project an image of them. You can see where they operate from growth curves and you can trace them as far as your budget allows. They're physical things. In the same way as economies are money in motion, that don't exist if it stops, so are physical things all energy in motion. It sounds all wrong, but the apparent fact is that nothing has any parts, only movement. > > As an abstract thing, all that remains is to figure out > whether the thoughts triggered by others by the phrase > "feedback loop" are roughly equivalent to the thoughts > triggered in you when you see the phrase "feedback loop". But even more important is to look at WHEN the responding thoughts arise. There's always a time lag, a class 'A' gap in efficient causation. What that means is the 'received' thought is not received at all, but reinvented, and the gap in efficient cause prevents determining whether the sent and received message are even similar. There do seem to be some higher orders involved, of course. With repetition we can agree on appropriate choices of words for commonly observable things, for our mental pointers to physical things, but we'll never know each other's thoughts it seems, and without a physical world for each of our pointers to point to, then no cross check at all. > Now, concrete things have a natural mechanism for correcting > errors in the thoughts of those that manipulate them. E.g. > if you pick up a rock, roll it around in your hands, toss it > up in the air, drop it on your foot, etc. Then I pick it up, > roll it around, etc. There's a good chance that equivalent > thoughts pop up when we think about that rock. And we can use > the concreteness of the rock to whittle down any differences > by designing standard methods for handling the rock. > > But with abstract things like "feedback loop", it's much more > difficult. The only methods for ensuring our thoughts are > equivalent when the phrase is uttered is to talk about it for > extended periods, probably with several conversations > (possibly including quizzing each other). We can also help > bring the thoughts closer by indirectly using concrete > artifacts like drawings, computers, etc. ("Point to the > feedback loop!" ;-) To me ??.?? ? `?.?? is a sign to a physical object that classifies 4 types of feedback loops. If those familiar irreversible kinds of become recognized it will be as useful for checking each other's pointers to complex systems that do that as tossing around a rock. > > I posit that, in most people, the thoughts evoked by > "feedback loop" are going to be very different, primarily > because most people don't work very closely together with > most other people. Sure, some people work closely with some > other people. But, by and large, an abstract thing like a > "feedback loop" will mean very different things to different people. Sure, most people don't watch to see how things begin and end. Thinking in circles that get somewhere is quite difficult, and rational minds were maybe not made for that. When we see circular causation that is getting somewhere it does often trigger visceral experience though, so I'll employ that too. > And one of the main differences will be in thinking about the > beginning and the ending of any given feedback loop. > > > Can you think of any regular cycle that does not begin and end with > > accumulative processes on scales that make them untraceable? > > I don't really understand what you're asking for. Perhaps if > you gave me an example of a regular cycle that has a clear > beginning and a clear ending? A bell, perhaps, you whack it and it rings. Any measure you have of it will display ??.?? ? `?.?? and those turning points will be traceable to changes in the emergent mechanisms of energy flow. > > > I draw the conclusion that natural system feedbacks have no > efficient > > cause since it's 'inefficient' to have causes separated > from effects. > > With growth systems there are usually time lags between cause and > > effect, so any 'cause' is instrumentally disconnected from > the process > > that follows it. Growth systems also usually have complex emergent > > properties with a complexity not evident in the original > environment, > > and so outside cause fails to be 'efficient' for requisite variety > > too. > > > > In the case of a real physical growth system you'd be quite > right to > > say that any feedback loop we can define has us as its efficient > > cause. A physical system's own feedback loops are indeed complex. > > For talking about them it seems you need words that take > their meaning > > from what they refer to rather than be defined so they > can't. That's > > an issue, of course. > > > > Then I think the best of all evidence is the myriad physical systems > > that hide their designs inside themselves. That's very > 'inefficient' > > isn't it, to have things designed and operating according to > > principles that are universally invisible from outside? Isn't that > > typical for physical systems though? > > You seem to be using the word "efficient" as it's used in > everyday language rather than as the peculiar meaning it > takes on when used in the phrase "efficient cause". An > "efficient cause" need not be efficient. Such a cause needs > only to meet Aristotle's (or Robert > Rosen's) definition of such causes. > > >> I'm not saying that any of these are true; but they are certainly > >> defensible positions... as defensible as the assertion > that the loops > >> have no efficient cause. > > > > When you talk about 'defensible' but ambiguous positions > I'm reminded > > of questions like whether trees falling in the woods make a sound if > > no one hears them. The interest in that question seems to rest > > entirely on the argument for either position being completely > > 'incontrovertible', i.e. defensible by being impossible to > contradict. > > I apologize. That's not how I intend it. When I say > something is defensible or reasonable, I mean that a diligent > person can make a persuasive argument that it's true. The > introduction of a contrary fact can demolish such defensible > positions, turning them indefensible. But absent such > contrary facts, the position is defensible. And any given > topic can tolerate several defensible but contradictory positions. > > > To me people seem interested in that because it turns on > whether the > > universe is composed of information or things. If just > information, > > then the unobserved falling tree makes no sound. If you > approach the > > world as composed of things, then it does. > > Not necessarily. If the whole universe is information, then we > (observers) are information. And if we're information, then > other things (also information) might also be like us. > Hence, if a tree falls in the forest and no human is there > but some non-human information globule with the power to > observe is present, then it still makes a sound. But if the universe were 'information' would its missing pieces exist when they're unknown? They shouldn't should they? Otherwise you no longer have a useful definition of information. If they exist when they're unknown then they must be physical. Certainly one of the most enduring features of nature is that good hints of where to look helps you find stuff, and anywhere you look closely you find much more than you initially realized was there. These are features of ordinary physical stuff, no? > > So, even if the world is composed entirely of information, the tree > (information) may make a sound even if no "one" is there to > hear it. For example, even though wood molecules (also > information) can't _hear_, they can certainly react to the > physical pressures (also information) that might result from > the falling tree. I.e. the tree, itself, is an observer or > is composed of observers .... even if it's dead. So you seem to be calling physical things, that are discoverably complex beyond our imagination, to be information. That seems to be discarding the useful definition of information, as either located in a mind or conveying an aspect of one thing to another. Now you're talking about information as physical stuff, and positing that information is not only a pointer to where the cookie jar is, but also the cookies. Anything that is everything is nothing in particular as far as I can tell. > In short, everything being information doesn't change the > answer. Events can either be sensed by an observer or they > can't, regardless of what the universe is composed of. It seems to be composed of organized motion, which may disappoint a common 100,000 year old assumption, perhaps, but seems to be correct none the less. > > Why anyone would even wonder about that might be > > that our mental pointers to physical things get mazes of > > self-references attached to them, so our thoughts can > wander without > > end looking for what's real, and find nothing but themselves to > > connect to. When you strip the interpretations from the pointers, > > they can work again. I find it gives reality great substance, and > > having pointers reliably lead to where there are new things to > > discover very useful. > > > > Do you think Rosen is thinking at all about this issue? It sounds > > like he's looking at an equally central problem of explanation I > > think. > > Yes. He explicitly talks about this (meters and observables) > in Fundamentals ... as well as Life Itself. The presentation > in Fundamentals ... is more explicit. I should read it... What's 'Fundamentals'? For me fundamentals are the pointers out into the fog that I learn to trust will connect me with something I didn't make up on my own. I can invent an ontology around them, but that's artificial, and not what they are, where to find them or where they come from. I don't think they come from my discovery of them either (over and over and over!) but are just ordinary stuff. What would Ocham not like about that? When I'm curious I can even observe the 'non-efficient' causation of my own ideas. How they develop exposes their independent growth eruptions and fading decays. Since they develop and decay on their own in the same manner as every other kind of organization they seem made of ordinary stuff too. :-) Phil > > - -- > glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com > There's no sense in being precise when you don't even know > what you're talking about. -- John Von Neumann > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org > > iD8DBQFHfWaGZeB+vOTnLkoRAp3uAKDbRaRWXNT0OJvEABZBe4BtnJIMNACgnfSl > vKe+CHfNs+Ka3dGkTBXElpw= > =xcZh > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > |
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