Re: History and subjectivity and intimacy
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Re: History and subjectivity and intimacy
 
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Trying to bring things to this thread... John said: I think Peirce would try to dissolve this controversy . He would say, I think, that the question "Did Charlemagne eat eggs on January 1st, 800 ad?" can only sensibly be understood as the question "Conceive of everything that would be true of the world now, had the event in question occurred. Do all investigations thereby implied pan out?" The crucial questions then, are do you see any talk about "what really happened in the past" as some sort of delusion? Would you go one step further and say the concept that there is a truth about what happened in the past is delusional, for example "We have no way of knowing for certain whether Charlemagne ate eggs on a particulr day during his life(Say January 1, 800 ad) but there is a truth about the matter (either he did or did not) even though it is a truth we can never fully determine? Then quickly, before James could go further and say something upsetting, Peirce would jump back in and ask, "If Charlemagne did it has all the same consequences as Charlemagne didn't do it, then what on earth do YOU think you are getting on about?" That is not to say that nothing is at stake in the investigation about Charlemagne's eating habits, it is simply to say that "truth" does not come into it. Old Peirce would, I think simply declare that. I like younger Peirce better. Younger Peirce often explicitly presents himself as explaining the world view of the scientist. Thus, were this about just the parts of Peirce I like best, I would modify the prior: "Truth" as the scientist understands it does not come into it. Were I to say that, James would smile, and pat me on the back heroically. Meanwhile, Peirce would get to work writing an entire book about how I am an intellectual incompetent, and might well rename his entire system simply to avoid association with anything I had said. Best, Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: [hidden email] On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Eric Charles <[hidden email]> wrote:
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
Re: History and subjectivity and intimacy
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Hi Eric,
Thanks for responding. I didn't follow all that you said, but I like what young Peirce (who might have said) "Truth as the scientist understands it" --and therefore seems to allow for a different kind of truth. And I could have chosen a better example --say the dispute between Bush and Gore about who really won the crucial state of Florida. There the truth didn't seem to affect the decision, but if the court had been divided 4-4 with 1 independent, it might have. The courts do have ways of deciding cases based on truth as the scientist understands it --that is clearly the only way the judicial system can function --but I gather that Old Peirce would say there is no other truth. Am I under a delusion that there may be actual truths about the past that are simply lost? --John ________________________________________ From: Friam [[hidden email]] on behalf of Eric Charles [[hidden email]] Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 3:44 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group; M. D. Bybee; John Shook Subject: Re: [FRIAM] History and subjectivity and intimacy Trying to bring things to this thread... John said: The crucial questions then, are do you see any talk about "what really happened in the past" as some sort of delusion? Would you go one step further and say the concept that there is a truth about what happened in the past is delusional, for example "We have no way of knowing for certain whether Charlemagne ate eggs on a particulr day during his life(Say January 1, 800 ad) but there is a truth about the matter (either he did or did not) even though it is a truth we can never fully determine? I think Peirce would try to dissolve this controversy . He would say, I think, that the question "Did Charlemagne eat eggs on January 1st, 800 ad?" can only sensibly be understood as the question "Conceive of everything that would be true of the world now, had the event in question occurred. Do all investigations thereby implied pan out?" John likely finds that to be an ugly, crude abuse of his idea. In protest he might assert: "That isn't it at all! I am interested in whether Charlemagne ate eggs then, and not about anything now. It makes no difference now!" At that point, Peirce would, in a rare instance of generosity, look towards his friend James with gentle nod. James would get quite excited and proclaim triumphantly that "A difference which makes no difference is no difference at all." Then quickly, before James could go further and say something upsetting, Peirce would jump back in and ask, "If Charlemagne did it has all the same consequences as Charlemagne didn't do it, then what on earth do YOU think you are getting on about?" And.... most likely.... a Wittgensteinian silence would ensue. Now, on the other hand, if you COULD give a list of things that would be distinct about the world, had that event happened, then the conversation might proceed differently. But that is typically not possible. Note, that doesn't make all claims about the past flawed. For example, there are geologists who investigate what rocks will look like at different depths in different locations, based on different hypotheses about how the earth was millennia ago, and how tectonic plates have moved in the meantime. That is good science in Peirce's view. However, that moves us away from claims about individual events (see prior email regarding The Baseball), and towards testing hypotheses that resemble standard scientific hypotheses. That is not to say that nothing is at stake in the investigation about Charlemagne's eating habits, it is simply to say that "truth" does not come into it. Old Peirce would, I think simply declare that. I like younger Peirce better. Younger Peirce often explicitly presents himself as explaining the world view of the scientist. Thus, were this about just the parts of Peirce I like best, I would modify the prior: "Truth" as the scientist understands it does not come into it. Were I to say that, James would smile, and pat me on the back heroically. Meanwhile, Peirce would get to work writing an entire book about how I am an intellectual incompetent, and might well rename his entire system simply to avoid association with anything I had said. Best, Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: [hidden email]<mailto:[hidden email]> On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Eric Charles <[hidden email]<mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote: John, First, the sad part, it is unclear how any of this relates to gaining consensus about individual events. I think it should, but others shouldn't. Let me lay out the problem: We wonder whether a given baseball is the one thrown for a particular strike during a particular game. What unique properties would such a ball have? There are two types of answers we might seek. One is a unique configuration of differences, i.e., the ball had a mixture of resin and spit used by a particular pitcher to doctor their pitch, and was the only one of its kind to have been made at the factory with a one-off improper spelling of the company name. In such a case we may apply the scientific process to determine if the ball in question has those properties, and (potentially) determine the extent to which those properties are actually unique. That is, we could test through empirical method, all consequences of the claim that the ball in question is The Ball. The other type of answer we might seek is via "providence"; i.e., there is nothing unique about the ball itself, but there is other evidence it might be of historic importance. We might have a picture of the ump tossing a ball to a particular kid, record of that kid giving it over to an auction house several years later, that auction house selling it to Rich Guy A, who owned a storage unit, in which Rich Guy B found a ball (after A's death) along with the paperwork referenced and associated photos. Here we could test, through the empirical method, all sorts of claims about the providence itself (was it printed on the right type of paper, does the signature look authentic, etc.) but there is nothing to test about the ball pre se. In either case it is unclear that investigating history would resemble making a scientific claim, because scientific claims are about generalities, not individual events. To claim that vinegar will dissolve calcium build ups is a very different type of thing than to claim that this ball is The Ball. The science above is not direct at the veracity of the historical claims, but rather it is directed at some things that would be true about the objects in front of us, were those historic claims true. Even worse, I think Peirce would assert that unless there is something about the ball itself that is in question, the question of whether it is The Ball is nonsensical. Whew! I hope some of that was relevant. Best, Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867<tel:%28202%29%20885-3867> fax: (202) 885-1190<tel:%28202%29%20885-1190> email: [hidden email]<mailto:[hidden email]> On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 2:51 AM, John Kennison <[hidden email]<mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote: I don't know it I am following all this correctly, but I would like to apply it to the question of doing History scientifically. At the start all we have are relics from the past --maybe we are uncertain which objects and/or documents really go back to a historical period under examination--but we have some way of testing for various relations between these relics. Se then look for a theory of the past which best accounts for the relics that we have. We may be able to measure how well different theories do this accounting. And the set opf measutres we arrive at is then history. But would some historian be dualists if they say there is a real truth about what happened in the past, it's just that we this real truth may not be recoverable. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
Re: History and subjectivity and intimacy
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Hi, John,
Not sure Peirce would go with "truths". I think he regarded scientific explanation as the formalization of a universal human cognitive capacity and therefore we are all fated to believe what scientists are fated to believe. Truth is what we will all come to believe in the very long run. Others may correct me on this. But notice how we are proceeding -- as if there is some state of belief with respect to Peirce's beliefs that will, in time, settle the matter. If there is such a settling belief, than there is, by definition, a truth; if there is no such ultimate settling of belief, than there is no truth of the matter. Take note of Eric's observation that, according to Peirce, order in experience is kind of a miracle. A rarity in a world that is essentially random. We are still in the weeds, here. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 5:33 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] History and subjectivity and intimacy Hi Eric, Thanks for responding. I didn't follow all that you said, but I like what young Peirce (who might have said) "Truth as the scientist understands it" --and therefore seems to allow for a different kind of truth. And I could have chosen a better example --say the dispute between Bush and Gore about who really won the crucial state of Florida. There the truth didn't seem to affect the decision, but if the court had been divided 4-4 with 1 independent, it might have. The courts do have ways of deciding cases based on truth as the scientist understands it --that is clearly the only way the judicial system can function --but I gather that Old Peirce would say there is no other truth. Am I under a delusion that there may be actual truths about the past that are simply lost? --John ________________________________________ From: Friam [[hidden email]] on behalf of Eric Charles [[hidden email]] Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 3:44 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group; M. D. Bybee; John Shook Subject: Re: [FRIAM] History and subjectivity and intimacy Trying to bring things to this thread... John said: The crucial questions then, are do you see any talk about "what really happened in the past" as some sort of delusion? Would you go one step further and say the concept that there is a truth about what happened in the past is delusional, for example "We have no way of knowing for certain whether Charlemagne ate eggs on a particulr day during his life(Say January 1, 800 ad) but there is a truth about the matter (either he did or did not) even though it is a truth we can never fully determine? I think Peirce would try to dissolve this controversy . He would say, I think, that the question "Did Charlemagne eat eggs on January 1st, 800 ad?" can only sensibly be understood as the question "Conceive of everything that would be true of the world now, had the event in question occurred. Do all investigations thereby implied pan out?" John likely finds that to be an ugly, crude abuse of his idea. In protest he might assert: "That isn't it at all! I am interested in whether Charlemagne ate eggs then, and not about anything now. It makes no difference now!" At that point, Peirce would, in a rare instance of generosity, look towards his friend James with gentle nod. James would get quite excited and proclaim triumphantly that "A difference which makes no difference is no difference at all." Then quickly, before James could go further and say something upsetting, Peirce would jump back in and ask, "If Charlemagne did it has all the same consequences as Charlemagne didn't do it, then what on earth do YOU think you are getting on about?" And.... most likely.... a Wittgensteinian silence would ensue. Now, on the other hand, if you COULD give a list of things that would be distinct about the world, had that event happened, then the conversation might proceed differently. But that is typically not possible. Note, that doesn't make all claims about the past flawed. For example, there are geologists who investigate what rocks will look like at different depths in different locations, based on different hypotheses about how the earth was millennia ago, and how tectonic plates have moved in the meantime. That is good science in Peirce's view. However, that moves us away from claims about individual events (see prior email regarding The Baseball), and towards testing hypotheses that resemble standard scientific hypotheses. That is not to say that nothing is at stake in the investigation about Charlemagne's eating habits, it is simply to say that "truth" does not come into it. Old Peirce would, I think simply declare that. I like younger Peirce better. Younger Peirce often explicitly presents himself as explaining the world view of the scientist. Thus, were this about just the parts of Peirce I like best, I would modify the prior: "Truth" as the scientist understands it does not come into it. Were I to say that, James would smile, and pat me on the back heroically. Meanwhile, Peirce would get to work writing an entire book about how I am an intellectual incompetent, and might well rename his entire system simply to avoid association with anything I had said. Best, Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: [hidden email]<mailto:[hidden email]> On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Eric Charles <[hidden email]<mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote: John, First, the sad part, it is unclear how any of this relates to gaining consensus about individual events. I think it should, but others shouldn't. Let me lay out the problem: We wonder whether a given baseball is the one thrown for a particular strike during a particular game. What unique properties would such a ball have? There are two types of answers we might seek. One is a unique configuration of differences, i.e., the ball had a mixture of resin and spit used by a particular pitcher to doctor their pitch, and was the only one of its kind to have been made at the factory with a one-off improper spelling of the company name. In such a case we may apply the scientific process to determine if the ball in question has those properties, and (potentially) determine the extent to which those properties are actually unique. That is, we could test through empirical method, all consequences of the claim that the ball in question is The Ball. The other type of answer we might seek is via "providence"; i.e., there is nothing unique about the ball itself, but there is other evidence it might be of historic importance. We might have a picture of the ump tossing a ball to a particular kid, record of that kid giving it over to an auction house several years later, that auction house selling it to Rich Guy A, who owned a storage unit, in which Rich Guy B found a ball (after A's death) along with the paperwork referenced and associated photos. Here we could test, through the empirical method, all sorts of claims about the providence itself (was it printed on the right type of paper, does the signature look authentic, etc.) but there is nothing to test about the ball pre se. In either case it is unclear that investigating history would resemble making a scientific claim, because scientific claims are about generalities, not individual events. To claim that vinegar will dissolve calcium build ups is a very different type of thing than to claim that this ball is The Ball. The science above is not direct at the veracity of the historical claims, but rather it is directed at some things that would be true about the objects in front of us, were those historic claims true. Even worse, I think Peirce would assert that unless there is something about the ball itself that is in question, the question of whether it is The Ball is nonsensical. Whew! I hope some of that was relevant. Best, Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867<tel:%28202%29%20885-3867> fax: (202) 885-1190<tel:%28202%29%20885-1190> email: [hidden email]<mailto:[hidden email]> On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 2:51 AM, John Kennison <[hidden email]<mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote: I don't know it I am following all this correctly, but I would like to apply it to the question of doing History scientifically. At the start all we have are relics from the past --maybe we are uncertain which objects and/or documents really go back to a historical period under examination--but we have some way of testing for various relations between these relics. Se then look for a theory of the past which best accounts for the relics that we have. We may be able to measure how well different theories do this accounting. And the set opf measutres we arrive at is then history. But would some historian be dualists if they say there is a real truth about what happened in the past, it's just that we this real truth may not be recoverable. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
Re: History and subjectivity and intimacy
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Hi Nick,
At one point you suggested I work on digesting some things that eric Charles said. The part that I think I understood was the distinction between Young Peirce and Old Peirce, That young Peirce would say " 'Truth' as the scientist understands it does not come into it." while Old Peirce would say " 'Truth' does not come into it". You sound like a Old Peirecian, Eric seems to like young Peirce and I would prefer Young Peirce but long to go beyond that to assert that there are truths that are not scientifically comprehensible. As an example, suppose I am a night watchman for a building and at 10pm I hear a funny sound in the basement. It occurs to me that I can check the continuous video surveillance to see if it caught anything that might have produced the sound. So the question is: "Did the video record anything that might have produced the funny sound?" . The question makes sense because I can resolve it by viewing the video. But further suppose that I get involved in helping someone in need (for example, a person stuck in the elevator. When I have finished doing that, I realize the video is on a continuous loop which erases over and reuses the tape unless new tape is installed. Now there is no longer a way to ascertain whether the (old) video recorded anything that might have produced the funny noise. It seems to say that a question about the past may once have been a reasonable question but later was no longer a legitimate question. Why can't I ask whether the video, at one time, caught a relevant im age? ________________________________________ From: Friam [[hidden email]] on behalf of Nick Thompson [[hidden email]] Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 10:38 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] History and subjectivity and intimacy Hi, John, Not sure Peirce would go with "truths". I think he regarded scientific explanation as the formalization of a universal human cognitive capacity and therefore we are all fated to believe what scientists are fated to believe. Truth is what we will all come to believe in the very long run. Others may correct me on this. But notice how we are proceeding -- as if there is some state of belief with respect to Peirce's beliefs that will, in time, settle the matter. If there is such a settling belief, than there is, by definition, a truth; if there is no such ultimate settling of belief, than there is no truth of the matter. Take note of Eric's observation that, according to Peirce, order in experience is kind of a miracle. A rarity in a world that is essentially random. We are still in the weeds, here. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 5:33 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] History and subjectivity and intimacy Hi Eric, Thanks for responding. I didn't follow all that you said, but I like what young Peirce (who might have said) "Truth as the scientist understands it" --and therefore seems to allow for a different kind of truth. And I could have chosen a better example --say the dispute between Bush and Gore about who really won the crucial state of Florida. There the truth didn't seem to affect the decision, but if the court had been divided 4-4 with 1 independent, it might have. The courts do have ways of deciding cases based on truth as the scientist understands it --that is clearly the only way the judicial system can function --but I gather that Old Peirce would say there is no other truth. Am I under a delusion that there may be actual truths about the past that are simply lost? --John ________________________________________ From: Friam [[hidden email]] on behalf of Eric Charles [[hidden email]] Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 3:44 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group; M. D. Bybee; John Shook Subject: Re: [FRIAM] History and subjectivity and intimacy Trying to bring things to this thread... John said: The crucial questions then, are do you see any talk about "what really happened in the past" as some sort of delusion? Would you go one step further and say the concept that there is a truth about what happened in the past is delusional, for example "We have no way of knowing for certain whether Charlemagne ate eggs on a particulr day during his life(Say January 1, 800 ad) but there is a truth about the matter (either he did or did not) even though it is a truth we can never fully determine? I think Peirce would try to dissolve this controversy . He would say, I think, that the question "Did Charlemagne eat eggs on January 1st, 800 ad?" can only sensibly be understood as the question "Conceive of everything that would be true of the world now, had the event in question occurred. Do all investigations thereby implied pan out?" John likely finds that to be an ugly, crude abuse of his idea. In protest he might assert: "That isn't it at all! I am interested in whether Charlemagne ate eggs then, and not about anything now. It makes no difference now!" At that point, Peirce would, in a rare instance of generosity, look towards his friend James with gentle nod. James would get quite excited and proclaim triumphantly that "A difference which makes no difference is no difference at all." Then quickly, before James could go further and say something upsetting, Peirce would jump back in and ask, "If Charlemagne did it has all the same consequences as Charlemagne didn't do it, then what on earth do YOU think you are getting on about?" And.... most likely.... a Wittgensteinian silence would ensue. Now, on the other hand, if you COULD give a list of things that would be distinct about the world, had that event happened, then the conversation might proceed differently. But that is typically not possible. Note, that doesn't make all claims about the past flawed. For example, there are geologists who investigate what rocks will look like at different depths in different locations, based on different hypotheses about how the earth was millennia ago, and how tectonic plates have moved in the meantime. That is good science in Peirce's view. However, that moves us away from claims about individual events (see prior email regarding The Baseball), and towards testing hypotheses that resemble standard scientific hypotheses. That is not to say that nothing is at stake in the investigation about Charlemagne's eating habits, it is simply to say that "truth" does not come into it. Old Peirce would, I think simply declare that. I like younger Peirce better. Younger Peirce often explicitly presents himself as explaining the world view of the scientist. Thus, were this about just the parts of Peirce I like best, I would modify the prior: "Truth" as the scientist understands it does not come into it. Were I to say that, James would smile, and pat me on the back heroically. Meanwhile, Peirce would get to work writing an entire book about how I am an intellectual incompetent, and might well rename his entire system simply to avoid association with anything I had said. Best, Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: [hidden email]<mailto:[hidden email]> On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Eric Charles <[hidden email]<mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote: John, First, the sad part, it is unclear how any of this relates to gaining consensus about individual events. I think it should, but others shouldn't. Let me lay out the problem: We wonder whether a given baseball is the one thrown for a particular strike during a particular game. What unique properties would such a ball have? There are two types of answers we might seek. One is a unique configuration of differences, i.e., the ball had a mixture of resin and spit used by a particular pitcher to doctor their pitch, and was the only one of its kind to have been made at the factory with a one-off improper spelling of the company name. In such a case we may apply the scientific process to determine if the ball in question has those properties, and (potentially) determine the extent to which those properties are actually unique. That is, we could test through empirical method, all consequences of the claim that the ball in question is The Ball. The other type of answer we might seek is via "providence"; i.e., there is nothing unique about the ball itself, but there is other evidence it might be of historic importance. We might have a picture of the ump tossing a ball to a particular kid, record of that kid giving it over to an auction house several years later, that auction house selling it to Rich Guy A, who owned a storage unit, in which Rich Guy B found a ball (after A's death) along with the paperwork referenced and associated photos. Here we could test, through the empirical method, all sorts of claims about the providence itself (was it printed on the right type of paper, does the signature look authentic, etc.) but there is nothing to test about the ball pre se. In either case it is unclear that investigating history would resemble making a scientific claim, because scientific claims are about generalities, not individual events. To claim that vinegar will dissolve calcium build ups is a very different type of thing than to claim that this ball is The Ball. The science above is not direct at the veracity of the historical claims, but rather it is directed at some things that would be true about the objects in front of us, were those historic claims true. Even worse, I think Peirce would assert that unless there is something about the ball itself that is in question, the question of whether it is The Ball is nonsensical. Whew! I hope some of that was relevant. Best, Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867<tel:%28202%29%20885-3867> fax: (202) 885-1190<tel:%28202%29%20885-1190> email: [hidden email]<mailto:[hidden email]> On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 2:51 AM, John Kennison <[hidden email]<mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote: I don't know it I am following all this correctly, but I would like to apply it to the question of doing History scientifically. At the start all we have are relics from the past --maybe we are uncertain which objects and/or documents really go back to a historical period under examination--but we have some way of testing for various relations between these relics. Se then look for a theory of the past which best accounts for the relics that we have. We may be able to measure how well different theories do this accounting. And the set opf measutres we arrive at is then history. But would some historian be dualists if they say there is a real truth about what happened in the past, it's just that we this real truth may not be recoverable. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
Re: History and subjectivity and intimacy
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John, For a scientist, "the truth of the matter" is whatever bears out in experiment, over the long haul, when testing all possible implications of "the truth" that is in question (this is an anthropological claim, based on extensive study of the actual doing of science). When crucial experiments are not possible, there are two possibilities. Young Peirce here: 1) Sometimes we don't have the means to do a particular experiment at a particular time, and in such cases we must do our best without the knowledge said experiments would gain us. That is sad, but mundane. It is of our finite nature that we often must do our best under such circumstances. 2) It would be another thing to claim that there are no experiments that could be possible. Under such circumstance it would be best to admit that there is no truth in question. Because what would it mean to argue over whether something was true or false if there was no consequence of its being true or false? How would we go about determining "the truth"? The notion itself is preposterous. To put it differently: Any time you think you have two idea to choose between, but the ideas have all the same consequences, then you are confused, and there are not really two ideas. To pick a provocative example: ~~~~~ Peirce 1878, emphasis added ~~~~~ To see what this principle leads to, consider in the light of it such
a doctrine as that of transubstantiation. The Protestant churches
generally hold that the elements of the sacrament are flesh and blood
only in a tropical sense; they nourish our souls as meat and the juice
of it would our bodies. But the Catholics maintain that they are
literally just meat and blood; although they possess all the sensible
qualities of wafercakes and diluted wine. But we can have no conception
of wine except what may enter into a belief, either --
1. That this, that, or the other, is wine; or, 2. That wine possesses certain properties. Such beliefs are nothing but self-notifications that we should, upon occasion, act in regard to such things as we believe to be wine according to the qualities which we believe wine to possess. The occasion of such action would be some sensible perception, the motive of it to produce some sensible result. Thus our action has exclusive reference to what affects the senses, our habit has the same bearing as our action, our belief the same as our habit, our conception the same as our belief; and we can consequently mean nothing by wine but what has certain effects, direct or indirect, upon our senses; and to talk of something as having all the sensible characters of wine, yet being in reality blood, is senseless jargon. Now, it is not my object to pursue the theological question; and having used it as a logical example I drop it, without caring to anticipate the theologian's reply. I only desire to point out how impossible it is that we should have an idea in our minds which relates to anything but conceived sensible effects of things. Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have any other we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself. It is absurd to say that thought has any meaning unrelated to its only function. It is foolish for Catholics and Protestants to fancy themselves in disagreement about the elements of the sacrament, if they agree in regard to all their sensible effects, here and hereafter. ~~~~ Note above that it matters not how long ago the communion in question took place. The question of whether your communion wafer transubstantiated is exactly the same as the question of whether the communion taken by Chrlamagne at his coronation transubstantiated. If there is no way to differentiate between transubstantiated and non-transubstantiated wafers, then there is, in fact, nothing under debate. "Truth" is not at issue. The debate may still
be fun, taking part in it may still have educational value, the answer you purport to believe may
still have important social consequence, and coming to resolve the issue
in your own mind may even help you sleep better at night and give you
the greatest sense of relief... but in no sense, at the end of the day,
are you interested in "truth" as the scientist understands it. Thus, whether or not "truth" is at stake is exactly a matter of the in-principle investigatable consequences that your idea has. To return to your direct question, if there were means for investigation at Time A, then we could have engaged in a quest for the truth at Time A. But if you are honestly telling me that now, at Time B, your claim has no consequences that could possibly be investigated, with any amount of time, resources, or ingenuity, then you are the one telling me that there is no quest-for-truth to be made. Hope that helps! Old Peirce here: That is not just "the view of the scientist", it is the view that we would all agree upon if we investigated the matter honestly (as I have)! That is, the view of the scientist is itself an example of truth. Anyone who disagrees with me is thus either an incompetent or is being intellectually dishonest. Harumph! ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: [hidden email] On Wed, Feb 24, 2016 at 10:02 AM, John Kennison <[hidden email]> wrote: Hi Nick, ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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