Re: Friam Digest, Vol 155, Issue 13

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Re: Friam Digest, Vol 155, Issue 13

Gary Lee Nelson
Test. I have had trouble posting.  I hope it is now fixed. IGNORE.

On May 17, 2016, at 10:00 AM, [hidden email] wrote:

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Today's Topics:

  1. Re: The Unbearable Asymmetry of Bullshit | Quillette (glen ?)
  2. Strawson on consciousness. (Russ Abbott)
  3. Re: Strawson on consciousness. (Stephen Guerin)
  4. Re: Strawson on consciousness. (Nick Thompson)
  5. Re: The Unbearable Asymmetry of Bullshit | Quillette
     (Roger Critchlow)
  6. Re: Strawson on consciousness. (Russ Abbott)
  7. Re: Strawson on consciousness. (glen ?)
  8. Re: Strawson on consciousness. (Nick Thompson)
  9. Re: Strawson on consciousness. (Nick Thompson)
 10. Re: Strawson on consciousness. (glen ?)

From: glen ⛧ <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The Unbearable Asymmetry of Bullshit | Quillette
Date: May 16, 2016 at 11:09:53 AM MDT
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>



I find the executive actions (EPA, immigration, title 9, etc.) interesting.  If we assume Trump is really just an empty shell trying to get elected by the most convenient means, then an old argument about unelected bureaucrats running the country becomes more relevant.  These entrenched employees high up enough to be considered "executives", yet low enough to avoid the changing of the guard after an election, should be able to wrangle Trump effectively ... ensure that things continue to be done in somewhat traditional, stable, ways.  But if Trump really does hold some core beliefs that he'd be willing to take action on, it would be interesting to see how far he could get.  My cynical guess is he'd go for the high-profile, easier to achieve, actions just so he can maintain and advance "Trump" as a household name, allowing the real governing to be done by the entrenched bureaucrats (or any competent people he may - accidentally - bring with him).

On 05/14/2016 07:04 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
From a machine learning perspective, politics is ensemble weak learning.   His is just without logical constraints between the weak learners.    I think it is more likely his actions are without purpose or coherent ideology.  He's not gaming different constituencies to get his way, he is just looking for a way to be instrumental.  He's a shallow person, a salesman and an aspiring actor. 


-- 
⛧ glen





From: Russ Abbott <[hidden email]>
Subject: [FRIAM] Strawson on consciousness.
Date: May 16, 2016 at 11:47:40 AM MDT
To: FRIAM <[hidden email]>


An antidote for Nick Thompsonism.  I've summarized Galen Strawson's piece in the NYT on consciousness. 



From: Stephen Guerin <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Strawson on consciousness.
Date: May 16, 2016 at 12:14:35 PM MDT
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>


Thanks. Russ. I've sympathetic to that perspective on matter.

Somewhat relatedly to the consciousness research, here's John Horgan's skeptical observation "Dispatch from the Desert" covering the 2016 Consciousness Conference in Tucson in April. Stu was briefly mentioned.

As a reminder, Horgan 1995 wrote the SciAM skeptical article "From Complexity to Perplexity"

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On Mon, May 16, 2016 at 11:47 AM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:
An antidote for Nick Thompsonism.  I've summarized Galen Strawson's piece in the NYT on consciousness. 

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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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From: "Nick Thompson" <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Strawson on consciousness.
Date: May 16, 2016 at 12:50:27 PM MDT
To: "'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'" <[hidden email]>


Geez, Russ, who would have thought you were such a handsome old dog. 
 
Anyway, not sure how the Strawson thing  is an antidote to “Thompsonism”.  And which, Thompson, by the way.  During the time we have been corresponding, you and I, I have gone from being a materialist monist a la E. B  Holt (“all that exists consists of matter and its relations”) to being neutral monist at la CS Peirce (“all that exists is experience, and all distinctions we make – mind, matter, your mind, my mind, past, present, future – arise as patterns in experience.”  )  There is not a lot of daylight between experience monism and any other kind, but the Peirce way feels just a tad more honest and radical in its monism.  On that view, there is nothing outside of experience-- talk of “experience of X” is all nonsense, unless, of course, X is another experience – nor is there any place for experience to be, no brain, no mind, unless these manifest themselves as patterns in experience.  Thus, our obligation as scientists is to describe the experiences  that anchor our references tomind, and brain, and anything else that we might claim to be outside, or beyond, experience.  So, how would one anchor in experience, such claims as “consciousness is nothing but brain activity”?  
 
Nick   
 
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
 
From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Monday, May 16, 2016 11:48 AM
To: FRIAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: [FRIAM] Strawson on consciousness.
 
An antidote for Nick Thompsonism.  I've summarized Galen Strawson's piece in the NYT on consciousness. 



From: Roger Critchlow <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The Unbearable Asymmetry of Bullshit | Quillette
Date: May 16, 2016 at 1:06:23 PM MDT
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>


There was a great sound bite from Mark Cuban to the effect that Trump is that guy who goes into a bar and will say whatever it takes to get laid.

-- rec --

On Mon, May 16, 2016 at 1:09 PM, glen ⛧ <[hidden email]> wrote:

I find the executive actions (EPA, immigration, title 9, etc.) interesting.  If we assume Trump is really just an empty shell trying to get elected by the most convenient means, then an old argument about unelected bureaucrats running the country becomes more relevant.  These entrenched employees high up enough to be considered "executives", yet low enough to avoid the changing of the guard after an election, should be able to wrangle Trump effectively ... ensure that things continue to be done in somewhat traditional, stable, ways.  But if Trump really does hold some core beliefs that he'd be willing to take action on, it would be interesting to see how far he could get.  My cynical guess is he'd go for the high-profile, easier to achieve, actions just so he can maintain and advance "Trump" as a household name, allowing the real governing to be done by the entrenched bureaucrats (or any competent people he may - accidentally - bring with him).

On 05/14/2016 07:04 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> From a machine learning perspective, politics is ensemble weak learning.   His is just without logical constraints between the weak learners.    I think it is more likely his actions are without purpose or coherent ideology.  He's not gaming different constituencies to get his way, he is just looking for a way to be instrumental.  He's a shallow person, a salesman and an aspiring actor.


--
⛧ glen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com




From: Russ Abbott <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Strawson on consciousness.
Date: May 16, 2016 at 4:16:52 PM MDT
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>


That sounds a lot like what Strawson was saying.

Did becoming an experience monist change your life in any way?

On Mon, May 16, 2016 at 11:50 AM Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:
Geez, Russ, who would have thought you were such a handsome old dog. 
 
Anyway, not sure how the Strawson thing  is an antidote to “Thompsonism”.  And which, Thompson, by the way.  During the time we have been corresponding, you and I, I have gone from being a materialist monist a la E. B  Holt (“all that exists consists of matter and its relations”) to being neutral monist at la CS Peirce (“all that exists is experience, and all distinctions we make – mind, matter, your mind, my mind, past, present, future – arise as patterns in experience.”  )  There is not a lot of daylight between experience monism and any other kind, but the Peirce way feels just a tad more honest and radical in its monism.  On that view, there is nothing outside of experience-- talk of “experience of X” is all nonsense, unless, of course, X is another experience – nor is there any place for experience to be, no brain, no mind, unless these manifest themselves as patterns in experience.  Thus, our obligation as scientists is to describe the experiences  that anchor our references tomind, and brain, and anything else that we might claim to be outside, or beyond, experience.  So, how would one anchor in experience, such claims as “consciousness is nothing but brain activity”?  
 
Nick   
 
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
 
From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Monday, May 16, 2016 11:48 AM
To: FRIAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: [FRIAM] Strawson on consciousness.
 
An antidote for Nick Thompsonism.  I've summarized Galen Strawson's piece in the NYT on consciousness. 
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com



From: glen ⛧ <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Strawson on consciousness.
Date: May 16, 2016 at 6:18:02 PM MDT
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>



What's missing are the methods for relating the patterns (including reachability - can you get there from here).  It's fideistic to assert monism without giving some hypothetical method by which to resolve even 2 (much less billions) into 1.  Consciousness seems to me to be at least a 2nd order effect of experience, i.e. the ability to relate a prior experience to a present experience.  There are other higher order effects, too, over and above moment-to-moment continuity of an individual identity ... e.g. across individuals (see someone else grimace in disgust and you experience an empathetic sense of disgust) and across "what-if" scenarios (the ability to expect/anticipate what you might experience in counterfactual circumstances).

By saying an experience is nothing but brain activity, one is also saying that relations (e.g. continuity) between experiences is also brain activity.  But transitions between experiences, while still experiences, are of a different kind.  So even if (or especially if?) you're a monist, it's naive and wholly inadequate to flatten everything out and just call it all "experience" ... that would be tantamount to claiming hearing the roar of a lion is the same as taking a bubble bath. Pfft.


On 05/16/2016 11:50 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:
Anyway, not sure how the Strawson thing  is an antidote to “Thompsonism”.  And which, Thompson, by the way.  During the time we have been corresponding, you and I, I have gone from being a materialist monist a la E. B  Holt (“all that exists consists of matter and its relations”) to being neutral monist at la CS Peirce (“all that exists is experience, and all distinctions we make – mind, matter, your mind, my mind, past, present, future – arise as patterns in experience.”  )  There is not a lot of daylight between experience monism and any other kind, but the Peirce way feels just a tad more honest and radical in its monism.  On that view, there is nothing outside of experience-- talk of “experience of X” is all nonsense, unless, of course, X is another experience – nor is there any place for experience to be, no brain, no mind, unless these manifest themselves as patterns in experience.  Thus, our obligation as scientists is to describe the experiences  that 
a

nchor our references tomind, and brain, and anything else that we might claim to be outside, or beyond, experience.  So, how would one anchor in experience, such claims as “consciousness is nothing but brain activity”?

-- 
⛧ glen





From: "Nick Thompson" <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Strawson on consciousness.
Date: May 16, 2016 at 8:55:50 PM MDT
To: "'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'" <[hidden email]>


I agree, glen, that defining structures of experience to which we advert when we speak is the task.  I don't think I have to believe that these structures are "flat".  At the very least, I get first order, second order, and third order experiences.  

Pfft?

Nick 

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of glen ?
Sent: Monday, May 16, 2016 6:18 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Strawson on consciousness.


What's missing are the methods for relating the patterns (including reachability - can you get there from here).  It's fideistic to assert monism without giving some hypothetical method by which to resolve even 2 (much less billions) into 1.  Consciousness seems to me to be at least a 2nd order effect of experience, i.e. the ability to relate a prior experience to a present experience.  There are other higher order effects, too, over and above moment-to-moment continuity of an individual identity ... e.g. across individuals (see someone else grimace in disgust and you experience an empathetic sense of disgust) and across "what-if" scenarios (the ability to expect/anticipate what you might experience in counterfactual circumstances).

By saying an experience is nothing but brain activity, one is also saying that relations (e.g. continuity) between experiences is also brain activity.  But transitions between experiences, while still experiences, are of a different kind.  So even if (or especially if?) you're a monist, it's naive and wholly inadequate to flatten everything out and just call it all "experience" ... that would be tantamount to claiming hearing the roar of a lion is the same as taking a bubble bath. Pfft.


On 05/16/2016 11:50 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:
Anyway, not sure how the Strawson thing  is an antidote to 
“Thompsonism”.  And which, Thompson, by the way.  During the time we 
have been corresponding, you and I, I have gone from being a 
materialist monist a la E. B  Holt (“all that exists consists of 
matter and its relations”) to being neutral monist at la CS Peirce 
(“all that exists is experience, and all distinctions we make – mind, 
matter, your mind, my mind, past, present, future – arise as patterns 
in experience.”  )  There is not a lot of daylight between experience 
monism and any other kind, but the Peirce way feels just a tad more 
honest and radical in its monism.  On that view, there is nothing 
outside of experience-- talk of “experience of X” is all nonsense, 
unless, of course, X is another experience – nor is there any place 
for experience to be, no brain, no mind, unless these manifest 
themselves as patterns in experience.  Thus, our obligation as 
scientists is to describe the experiences  that a

nchor our references tomind, and brain, and anything else that we might claim to be outside, or beyond, experience.  So, how would one anchor in experience, such claims as “consciousness is nothing but brain activity”?

--
⛧ glen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com






From: "Nick Thompson" <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Strawson on consciousness.
Date: May 16, 2016 at 9:05:23 PM MDT
To: "'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'" <[hidden email]>


Russ,
 
You asked:  Did becoming an experience monist change your life in any way?
 
Exactly the right question to ask a pragmatist.  If there is one thing a pragmatist should not be caught asserting is a distinction that does not make a difference. 
 
I don’t think, as I said, there is a lot of difference in what follows from different sorts of monism.  What I will argue is that being a monist rather than a dualist  makes a difference.  But I won’t argue it now, because I am frantically getting ready to return to New England.  You and I have had our most useful arguments in June, when I am stuck in the clammy fogs that can sometimes press in from the Atlantic.  When the wind goes NE, you will hear from me.  
 
Nick 
 
 
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
 
From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Monday, May 16, 2016 4:17 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Strawson on consciousness.
 
That sounds a lot like what Strawson was saying.
 
Did becoming an experience monist change your life in any way?
 
On Mon, May 16, 2016 at 11:50 AM Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:
Geez, Russ, who would have thought you were such a handsome old dog. 
 
Anyway, not sure how the Strawson thing  is an antidote to “Thompsonism”.  And which, Thompson, by the way.  During the time we have been corresponding, you and I, I have gone from being a materialist monist a la E. B  Holt (“all that exists consists of matter and its relations”) to being neutral monist at la CS Peirce (“all that exists is experience, and all distinctions we make – mind, matter, your mind, my mind, past, present, future – arise as patterns in experience.”  )  There is not a lot of daylight between experience monism and any other kind, but the Peirce way feels just a tad more honest and radical in its monism.  On that view, there is nothing outside of experience-- talk of “experience of X” is all nonsense, unless, of course, X is another experience – nor is there any place for experience to be, no brain, no mind, unless these manifest themselves as patterns in experience.  Thus, our obligation as scientists is to describe the experiences  that anchor our references tomind, and brain, and anything else that we might claim to be outside, or beyond, experience.  So, how would one anchor in experience, such claims as “consciousness is nothing but brain activity”?  
 
Nick   
 
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
 
From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Monday, May 16, 2016 11:48 AM
To: FRIAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: [FRIAM] Strawson on consciousness.
 
An antidote for Nick Thompsonism.  I've summarized Galen Strawson's piece in the NYT on consciousness. 
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com



From: glen ⛧ <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Strawson on consciousness.
Date: May 17, 2016 at 9:18:32 AM MDT
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>



On 05/16/2016 07:55 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
Pfft?

Sorry.  That's my attempt to write a raspberry ... I don't know the emoticon... =P  maybe ... :-r ?  Of course, pfft is a "dry" raspberry.  To get the right effect, you have to stick your tongue out ... but you can't do that in polite company.  Plus, a dry raspberry is like throwing up your hands or shrugging.  "Pfft, I don't know where to go from here."  A wet raspberry is more playful, more context- and less content-driven.

-- 
⛧ glen




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