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Re: EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?

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Nick Thompson

Re: EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?

I think they are trying to turn into a not-very-interesting characteristic. Like astronomy before Kepler. Or whatever.

Myself, I am a realist about emergence, or I aint interested in it.

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email];[hidden email]
Cc: [hidden email]; [hidden email]; [hidden email]; [hidden email]; [hidden email]; [hidden email]; [hidden email]

Sent: 10/5/2009 2:55:29 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?

Quoting Nick,

For [Hempel and Oppenheim], a characteristic of on object is emergent relative to a theory and relative to a particular list of part attributes when that characteristic cannot be deduced from the part attributes using that theory. So, to say that a property is emergent is only to say something about the state of our theory with respect to the data we have already gathered.

That seems to mean that a characteristic is emergent or not depending on the theory and the part attributes considered. So based on this view any characteristic is emergent if one ignores all the part attributes. Is that a correct conclusion? Similarly no characteristic is emergent if one creates a theory that maps part attributes to it -- no matter how arbitrary and ad hoc that mapping may be. Neither of these seem like very attractive positions. They make the notion of emergence subject to all sorts of manipulation.

Or is the point simply to define the term "emergence" in terms of this sort of formalism? If that's the point, i.e., to define the term "emergence" formally like this, then what do they do with this definition once created? Does this definition yield any insights, or is it just a definition?

-- Russ A

On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 1:00 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Glen,

My colleagues have already told you what the assignment is, so what follows
is little more than spin.

In our attempts to understand what is going on in this tangled literature,
we have come up with only one way to characterize the different views of
emergence that seems to endure more than a week: that is the
epistemological vs ontological distinction. Hempel and Oppenheim fall
soundly on the epistemological side. For them, a characteristic of on
object is emergent relative to a theory and relative to a particular list
of part attributes when that characteristic cannot be deduced from the part
attributes using that theory. So, to say that a property is emergent is
only to say something about the state of our theory with respect to the
data we have already gathered.

Dennett seems to come down in the middle of our distinction. His argument
concerns what beliefs are REALLY. His answer -- that beliefs are really
features of the world as seen from a point of view -- implies a position on
the nature of emergence. Like Hemple and Oppenheim, Dennett would concede
that seeing emergence requires one to take a point of view.... a STANCE, if
you will. But taking that stance is like looking through binoculars ... it
may limit your field of vision, but it also tells you something that is
true of the world. In fact, every stance tells you something that is true
of the world.

A personal note: those who tried to follow my ravings concerning Holt and
the New Realism this summer wont be surprized to hear me say that Dennett
is sounding awfully like a New Realist.

See you Thursday at 4pm.

Sorry for duplicate posting.

N

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> [Original Message]
> From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]>
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 10/5/2009 9:38:53 AM
> Subject: [FRIAM] emergence seminar: what's next?
>
>
> What's next on the reading list?
>
> --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Nick Thompson

Re: EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?

As I have often demonstrated before, I am smart enough to get us into a mess, but not smart enough to get us out.

But.... Hempel and Oppenheim are big on the deductiive nomological account of explanation.

So let it be the case that I am curious why the brick fell on my toe when I let go of it

If I have a theory that says that all unsupported objects fall, and the observations that I let go of the brick and my toe was under it, then I have an adequate explanation for my damaged toe. Notice I didnt have to mention gravity once.

But you know more about this than I do, dont you?

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]
Cc: [hidden email]; [hidden email]; [hidden email]; [hidden email]; [hidden email]; [hidden email]; [hidden email]; [hidden email]

Sent: 10/5/2009 3:59:15 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?

What do they do about characteristics that don't have descriptions in T? For example, a house has the characteristic of having 3 bedrooms. That characteristic doesn't exist in theories describing 2 x 4's, PVC, drywall, nails, stucco, etc. What would they do with that? If it's emergent, then no "better" theory will eliminate it. If it's not emergent, then how can anything else be emergent but not this?

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles
Cell phone: 310-621-3805
o Check out my blog at http://russabbott.blogspot.com/

On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 2:24 PM, Roger Critchlow <[hidden email]> wrote:

H&O are quite methodical: "emergence: The occurrence of a characteristic W in an object w is emergent relative to a theory T, a part relation Pt, and a class G of attributes if that occurrence cannot be deduced by means of T from a characterization of the Pt-parts of w with respect to all the attributes in G."

I suspect that the proper characteristics of T are the treated in other parts of Hempel's book, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, so it isn't fair to assume that it's entirely arbitrary and ad hoc.

However, the purpose of the definition is to exterminate emergence, it is a temporary state of ignorance which will be remedied by an improved theory. That the improved theory might be entirely stated in relations between "emergent" ontologies -- eg molecules, cells, organisms, populations, etc -- is of no concern, they are no longer emergent if they're in the theory.

-- rec --

If it's in the theory, it's in the theory!

On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 2:55 PM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:

Quoting Nick,

For [Hempel and Oppenheim], a characteristic of on object is emergent relative to a theory and relative to a particular list of part attributes when that characteristic cannot be deduced from the part attributes using that theory. So, to say that a property is emergent is only to say something about the state of our theory with respect to the data we have already gathered.

That seems to mean that a characteristic is emergent or not depending on the theory and the part attributes considered. So based on this view any characteristic is emergent if one ignores all the part attributes. Is that a correct conclusion? Similarly no characteristic is emergent if one creates a theory that maps part attributes to it -- no matter how arbitrary and ad hoc that mapping may be. Neither of these seem like very attractive positions. They make the notion of emergence subject to all sorts of manipulation.

Or is the point simply to define the term "emergence" in terms of this sort of formalism? If that's the point, i.e., to define the term "emergence" formally like this, then what do they do with this definition once created? Does this definition yield any insights, or is it just a definition?

-- Russ A

On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 1:00 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Glen,

My colleagues have already told you what the assignment is, so what follows
is little more than spin.

In our attempts to understand what is going on in this tangled literature,
we have come up with only one way to characterize the different views of
emergence that seems to endure more than a week: that is the
epistemological vs ontological distinction. Hempel and Oppenheim fall
soundly on the epistemological side. For them, a characteristic of on
object is emergent relative to a theory and relative to a particular list
of part attributes when that characteristic cannot be deduced from the part
attributes using that theory. So, to say that a property is emergent is
only to say something about the state of our theory with respect to the
data we have already gathered.

Dennett seems to come down in the middle of our distinction. His argument
concerns what beliefs are REALLY. His answer -- that beliefs are really
features of the world as seen from a point of view -- implies a position on
the nature of emergence. Like Hemple and Oppenheim, Dennett would concede
that seeing emergence requires one to take a point of view.... a STANCE, if
you will. But taking that stance is like looking through binoculars ... it
may limit your field of vision, but it also tells you something that is
true of the world. In fact, every stance tells you something that is true
of the world.

A personal note: those who tried to follow my ravings concerning Holt and
the New Realism this summer wont be surprized to hear me say that Dennett
is sounding awfully like a New Realist.

See you Thursday at 4pm.

Sorry for duplicate posting.

N

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> [Original Message]
> From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]>
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 10/5/2009 9:38:53 AM
> Subject: [FRIAM] emergence seminar: what's next?
>
>
> What's next on the reading list?
>
> --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Owen Densmore

Re: EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?

Administrator

On Oct 5, 2009, at 6:12 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:

> <snip>
> But.... Hempel and Oppenheim are big on the deductiive nomological
> account of explanation.

Could you clarify the above? .. and maybe add "nomological" to the
Nictionary?

Thanks!

-- Owen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Robert Cordingley

Re: EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?

It's already there:
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nomological
Robert C

Owen Densmore wrote:

> On Oct 5, 2009, at 6:12 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
>
>> <snip>
>> But.... Hempel and Oppenheim are big on the deductiive nomological
>> account of explanation.
>
> Could you clarify the above? .. and maybe add "nomological" to the
> Nictionary?
>
> Thanks!
>
> -- Owen
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>

Owen Densmore

Re: EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?

Administrator

The specific phrase I believe we are discussing is, on page 64:
"The preceding considerations suggest the following redeﬁnition of
emergence: The occurrence of a characteristic W in an object w is
emergent relative to a theory T, a part relation Pt, and a class G of
attributes if that occurrence cannot be deduced by means of T from a
characterization of the Pt-parts of w with respect to all the
attributes in G."

> Main Entry: no·mo·log·i·cal
> Function: adjective
> Etymology: nomology science of physical and logical laws, from Greek
> nomos + English -logy
> : relating to or expressing basic physical laws or rules of
> reasoning <nomological universals>

We have found that the discussions within the book use words in ways
specific to their context. Thus Nick's "deductive nomological account
of explanation" is likely to mean more than the individual words might
imply.

Possibly we are failing to use the word "logic"?

I still think we should add it to the Nictionary if it is of use. It
seems to be.

-- Owen

On Oct 6, 2009, at 5:17 PM, Robert Cordingley wrote:

> It's already there:
> http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nomological
> Robert C
>
> Owen Densmore wrote:
>> On Oct 5, 2009, at 6:12 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
>>
>>> <snip>
>>> But.... Hempel and Oppenheim are big on the deductiive nomological
>>> account of explanation.
>>
>> Could you clarify the above? .. and maybe add "nomological" to the
>> Nictionary?
>>
>> Thanks!
>>
>> -- Owen

Owen Densmore

Re: EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?

Administrator

BTW: I believe this may be more in the line of Nick's statement:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deductive-nomological_model

Nick?

-- Owen

On Oct 6, 2009, at 8:51 PM, Owen Densmore wrote:

> The specific phrase I believe we are discussing is, on page 64:
> "The preceding considerations suggest the following redeﬁnition of
> emergence: The occurrence of a characteristic W in an object w is
> emergent relative to a theory T, a part relation Pt, and a class G
> of attributes if that occurrence cannot be deduced by means of T
> from a characterization of the Pt-parts of w with respect to all the
> attributes in G."
>
>> Main Entry: no·mo·log·i·cal
>> Function: adjective
>> Etymology: nomology science of physical and logical laws, from
>> Greek nomos + English -logy
>> : relating to or expressing basic physical laws or rules of
>> reasoning <nomological universals>
>
> We have found that the discussions within the book use words in ways
> specific to their context. Thus Nick's "deductive nomological
> account of explanation" is likely to mean more than the individual
> words might imply.
>
> Possibly we are failing to use the word "logic"?
>
> I still think we should add it to the Nictionary if it is of use.
> It seems to be.
>
> -- Owen
>
>
> On Oct 6, 2009, at 5:17 PM, Robert Cordingley wrote:
>
>> It's already there:
>> http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nomological
>> Robert C
>>
>> Owen Densmore wrote:
>>> On Oct 5, 2009, at 6:12 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
>>>
>>>> <snip>
>>>> But.... Hempel and Oppenheim are big on the deductiive
>>>> nomological account of explanation.
>>>
>>> Could you clarify the above? .. and maybe add "nomological" to the
>>> Nictionary?
>>>
>>> Thanks!
>>>
>>> -- Owen
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Nick Thompson

Re: EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Owen,

The answer to your question was meant to be in the post. I have added
some stuff to try to make it clearer.

Hempel and Oppenheim are big on the deductiive nomological account of
explanation.

For example, let it be the case that I am curious why the brick fell on my
toe when I let go of it

If I have a theory that says that all unsupported objects fall, and the
observations that I let go of the brick and my toe was under it, then I
have an adequate explanation for my damaged toe. Notice I didnt have to
mention gravity once

The form of the explanation is deductive syllogism:

LAW:All sunsupported oBjects fall (This is the nomological part). e
ANTECEDENT: This brick was an unsupported object
ANTECEDENT: My toe was under the brick
CONCLUSION: Therefore, this brick fell on my toe.

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> [Original Message]
> From: Owen Densmore <[hidden email]>
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 10/6/2009 9:01:20 PM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al;WAS: emergence
seminar: what's next?
>
> BTW: I believe this may be more in the line of Nick's statement:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deductive-nomological_model

Nick?

-- Owen

On Oct 6, 2009, at 8:51 PM, Owen Densmore wrote:

> The specific phrase I believe we are discussing is, on page 64:
> "The preceding considerations suggest the following redeï¬nition of
> emergence: The occurrence of a characteristic W in an object w is
> emergent relative to a theory T, a part relation Pt, and a class G
> of attributes if that occurrence cannot be deduced by means of T
> from a characterization of the Pt-parts of w with respect to all the
> attributes in G."
>
>> Main Entry: noÂ·moÂ·logÂ·iÂ·cal
>> Function: adjective
>> Etymology: nomology science of physical and logical laws, from
>> Greek nomos + English -logy
>> : relating to or expressing basic physical laws or rules of
>> reasoning <nomological universals>
>
> We have found that the discussions within the book use words in ways
> specific to their context. Thus Nick's "deductive nomological
> account of explanation" is likely to mean more than the individual
> words might imply.
>
> Possibly we are failing to use the word "logic"?
>
> I still think we should add it to the Nictionary if it is of use.
> It seems to be.
>
> -- Owen
>
>
> On Oct 6, 2009, at 5:17 PM, Robert Cordingley wrote:
>
>> It's already there:
>> http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nomological
>> Robert C
>>
>> Owen Densmore wrote:
>>> On Oct 5, 2009, at 6:12 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
>>>
>>>> <snip>
>>>> But.... Hempel and Oppenheim are big on the deductiive
>>>> nomological account of explanation.
>>>
>>> Could you clarify the above? .. and maybe add "nomological" to the
>>> Nictionary?
>>>
>>> Thanks!
>>>
>>> -- Owen
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Nick Thompson

Re: EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Jim,

I couldn't find the word subsumption in Hemple and Oppenheim, so pending
your locating it for me, I will just blather on aimlessly concerning my
prejudices:

Speaking as the seminar Convener. The "heartland" of supervenience is
hypothetical relationship between mind states and brain states. "Mind
states supervene upon brain states". The need for the term arises because
people want to think that brain states CAUSE inind states, but they now
full well that there is no single, particular, brain state necessary to any
particualr mind state. Just as there are many ways to skin a cat, there
are many ways for your neurons to arrange themselves where you are
"thinking about your grandmother". This all has to do with ambiguities in
our notions of causality. C is said (by some) to cause E when C is prior
to E, C "touches" E (in some sense), and C is necessary for or sufficient
to E. Supervenience captures the case in which each C is sufficient for E
but no C(i) is necessary for it. It is such an embedded term of art in
the philosophy that no matter how difficult we find it, we HAVE to learn
it.

Speaking as a Member of the Seminar: Mind/body philosophers are being
driven gah-gah by their resistance to the obvious: brain states are
neither mind states by another name nor their causal antecedents. It is
neither true that any particular neuronal pattern is required for thinking
about your grandmother nor that any particular neuronal pattern is
sufficient for thinking about your grandmother. As we all know, complex
systems don't work that way. In addition, "thinking about your
grandmother" is a doing. (It is fun to watch my grandchildren when they
are called upon to "remember" something. They dont just say stuff; they DO
stuff. To "remember" is to stand in relation to the world.). The
relationship of behavior activities to neural activities is much like the
relationship of the shape of your nose to the transmissional machinery of
development. A whole lot went into shaping your nose and even though your
nose looks a lot like your grandpa Eddy's, there was no nose-unculus that
grew to be your present nose nor any blueprint of Eddy's nose that guided
the creation of yours. If you want to understand the relationship between
mind (behavior) states and brain (physiological) states, I recommend that
we all read Sean Carroll's Endless Forms Most Beautiful. The notion of a
"thought of X" is a lot like the notion of a "gene for X": it is an
illusion to be dispelled.

Does subsumption help?

There are two definitions of subsumption on Dic dot com, one general, one
technical.

GENERAL ( courtesy of Collins) subsume
Verb
[-suming, -sumed] Formal to include (something) under a larger
classification or group: an attempt to subsume fascism and communism under
a general concept of totalitarianism [Latin sub- under + sumere to take]

So, if I were to substitute subsume for supervene above, I would come out
with "Mental states subsume brain states." Hmmm! I dont think it means
the same thing at all. In fact, I think (as a member of the seminar, not
its Convener) tha tit makes a lot more sense than "mental states supervene
upon brain states."

TECHNICAL (noun) subsumption

2. Logic The minor premise of a syllogism.

Major Premise: All Swans are White
MINOR premise: this bird is a swan.
Conclusion: This bird is white.

(I hope I have this right). Since Hempel is deep into the
logico-deductive method, we would expect that he has THIS meaning of
subsumption in "mind". (But until I find the place where the word occurs,
I cannot be sure.) It is the part of the deductive nomological syllogism
that connects the particular case to the law. Sometimes called the
Antecedent. Notice that it does SUBSUME the bird in hand under the
category "swans" just as in the brick-on-toe example, YOUR brick is
subsumed under the category "unsupported objects". Once subsumed, it
becomes subject to the law laid out in the major premise.

But, I still don't quite see what this has to do with supervenience.

So, after all that, I think my answer is "no".

Nick

PS: I finally found where the word is used. Gawd I am a blind old bat!
No, I don't think its a substitute.

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> [Original Message]
> From: Jim Gattiker <[hidden email]>
> To: <[hidden email]>
> Cc: Chip Garner <[hidden email]>; Frank Wimberly
<[hidden email]>; maryl <[hidden email]>; merle
<[hidden email]>; michel bloch <[hidden email]>; nthompson
<[hidden email]>; Owen Densmore <[hidden email]>; Roger E
Critchlow Jr <[hidden email]>; <[hidden email]>
> Date: 10/7/2009 10:23:23 AM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence
seminar: what's next?
>
> I've been having trouble with the term 'supervenience'; I don't feel
> comfortable using it in a sentence. Hempel & Oppenheim use the term
> 'subsumption', which I'm happy with. Would I be OK thinking of this as
> a substitute term?
>
> --j

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Roger Critchlow-2

Re: EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?

And, to add to the confusion, there is the question of brain states vs. measured brain states.

Here's the Wired article about doing fMRI experiments on a dead salmon, and getting a result that could have been easily published if the subject had been a live human being:

http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/09/fmrisalmon/

And here's the poster that the researchers have been presenting:

http://prefrontal.org/files/posters/Bennett-Salmon-2009.pdf

fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) uses treatment/control comparisons of brain imagery on the assumption that the active parts will have more oxygen in them so they can tell which parts of the brain are more/less active under the treatment condition.

In the experiment described the researchers asked the dead salmon to identify what the people in the pictures were feeling and compared the imagery taken during rest states to the imagery taken while the salmon was analyzing pictures.

So, whatever the relationship between brain states and mind states, the relationship between brain states and fMRI results is not obvious. (To be fair, the point of the poster is that researchers should apply tests for chance correlations that they could but often don't bother with.)

-- rec --

============================================================
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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