Re: Direct conversation

[Nick Thompson]

Russ,

 

I am afraid it is "nyuh blindness".  I certainly know what it is to do happy, and see happy, but "be" happy causes the little hourglass on my screen to freeze.

 

N

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Cc: [hidden email]; [hidden email]

Sent: 6/26/2009 12:14:49 AM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Well, that's one reason I resisted talking about qualia.  The point is that you can't explain what it's like to taste salt. So your first instinct, "well, it's just .....salty!" is the right answer for those of us who talk about qualia. So qualia are experiences about which one can't say much more than "Well it's just  ... <whatever the experience is>" The question then is how do we understand/explain/talk about such phenomena from a scientific perspective.

 

When you way that you don't understand what Qualia mean are you saying that you have no idea what the term is trying to get at or that the defintion as written doesn't do a good job of conveying its meaning, which you more or less understand.  If the former (that you have no idea what the term is trying to get at) would you also say that you don't know what feeling happy, sad, nauseous (again) mean? We've probably been over this too many times, but this seems to be one of the sticking points. 

But if you ignore qualia, what about the rest of what I wrote, that no matter what perspective one is talking about, the simple abiltiy to have a perspective implies a first person?

 

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 1:46 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ --

 

Perhaps the problem is that I don't understand what Qualia means.  Here is the quote from

 

http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/q.htm#qualia

 

"The intrinsic phenomenal features of subjective consciousness, or sense data. Thus, qualia include what it is like to see green grass, to taste salt, to hear birds sing, to have a headache, to feel pain, etc. Providing an adequate account of qualia is sometimes held to be a difficult problem for functionalist explanations of mental states."

 

I just canNOT make sense of this passage. [NB, that behaviorism is sort of a school of functionalism].   Let's take seriously the Question, "What is it like to taste salt? "  As I wrestle with it, I come up with two equally unsatisfying answers.  "well, it's just .....salty!"   Unsatisfying, because no new information added.

 

Or "It's like tasting  sea water."   Which is ok by me, but I am pretty sure wont satisfy you.   Hans Wallach was a senior professor at Swarthmore when I came there to replace their behaviorist for a couple of years.  Whenever he talked about qualia he talked about the "Nyuh" of an experience.  "Nyuh" was always accompanied by forming a cone with the thumb and forefingers of one hand and twitchily inclining the hand toward one's audience.  Ultimately, they had to let me go because I never could figure out what "Nyuh" was.  I would have taken this on myself except the man I replaced  never came back either.   So, it wouldn't surprise me, Russ, if we could never agree on the "Nyuh".   Perhaps I am "Nyuh blind."

 

Nick  

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email];[hidden email]

Sent: 6/25/2009 9:12:05 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Hi Nick,

 

Your reply to Rikus didn't answer my questions. 

 

You're right that I didn't mean knowledge in the sense of true belief.  What I'm really talking about are qualia, but I didn't want to introduce that term.  Besides, it's more than just qualia. And it's not just first vs. third person. It's that to speak of any perspective implies someone/something having that perspective, which seems to me to be first person for that person/thing.  I don't see how one can get away from a first person perspective if one wants to talk about knowledge, belief, experience, perspective, or any other term that we use for abstracted experience. 

 

I'm using the term "abstracted" to refer to virtually any version of experience that has been processed into a more abstract than the lowest level of physics such as photons, electrons, etc. Whatever is doing that processing has its own (unique) abstracted version of that experience.

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 12:45 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Yeah.  I just moved a cleaned up version on the wires. 

 

I am beginning to wonder if the definition of "knowledge" isn't the problem here.  To philosophers, knowledge means "true belief".  (See, for instance http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/k9.htm#know).    So, for something to be knowledge, it has to be true from two points of view: the person who believes the knowledge and .... er ..... um ...God's.  Or at least, some universal point of view like the one imagined in our discussion of "information." 

 

Here is where I may have created a problem. For years I have thought that having to know what God thinks  in order to judge whether somebody knows something or not is really stupid.   God's consciousness, after all, is even more opaque than most.  So, for me, I use knowledge and belief pretty much interchangeably. 

 

Could it be that this is why I don't understand Russ when he speaks of subjective knowledge?   

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email];[hidden email]

Sent: 6/25/2009 8:24:49 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

But I didn't want to exclude you either.

 

Whether it's from a point of view or not, the issue I was getting at is what does it mean to say that someone knows something -- and if you asked him would say that he feels reasonably confident about that knowledge.  And I'm thinking primarily of knowledge derived from direct experience (like the sun being out or the color of the wall he is staring at), not knowlwedge based on having read something.  But Rikus' example gets at the same sort of thing in a much more worked out way. So dealing with his questions would be good way to proceed.

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 12:03 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ,

 

I wasnt invited to answer this one, but... isnt your question incomplete?  Isnt knowledge always from a point of view? 

 

"what about [you, me, he] knowing that the sun is out (assuming that it is)."

 

Professor Buttinski

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Sent: 6/24/2009 8:45:22 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Thanks, Eric. My question had to do with the (f)act of knowing anything rather than what it is that is known.  Your discussion has to do with knowing a mind and the 1st vs 3rd person perspective.  What about simply knowing that the sun is out (assume it is) or that the sky is blue (assume you are under a cloudless blue  sky). From your perspective do you see a 1st/3rd person perspective when the subject matter is not someone's mind?

-- Russ

On Wed, Jun 24, 2009 at 11:57 AM, ERIC P. CHARLES <[hidden email]> wrote:

My understanding is that the terms 1st and 3rd person arose as ways of talking about literary styles - and our use of them is metaphorical. An essential part of the metaphor is that authors writing in 1st person are typically granted privileged license to write about the mind of "I". In contrast, people writing in (a non-omniscient) 3rd person, are typically not granted as much license to write about the minds. This is not entirely true, as people writing in 3rd person write about minds all the time, but their writings are considered more vulnerable to dispute. For example, if Obama wrote an account of his inauguration and said "I was terrified", it would be considered less vulnerable to dispute than if I wrote an account of his inauguration and said "He was terrified". If these linguistic conventions become reified then we can start taking the "I" not merely to denote the speaker/viewer, but to denote an entity in possession of unique powers that justify the privileges commonly granted to the linguistic device. This is suggested as my understanding of the history, independent of any value judgment regarding the reification.

There is a lurking problem, however, as these conventions do not always seem to hold in the real world. The most glairing probelm is that, at least sometimes, "I" can be wrong about my own mind and "He" can be right. (The cause of my error can range from simply not paying attention to what I am doing, to intentional self-delusion, to forgetting - think Alzheimer's.) For some, these problems lead to an urge to collapse categories, to see if the oddness cannot be gotten rid of if we leave behind the notion of uniqueness that goes with having distinct labels. I suppose that on some formal level, when a dichotomy collapses into a monism, it might not be particularly important which category label remains. However, one category may be preferred over another because it originally contained properties that the author wishes to retain as implicit or explicit in the monistic system that remains. These properties are ported along with word into the monistic system, because the term retains sway as a metaphor.

In this case, the historical bias has been to retain only the "I" position. In this move, the "I" retains its unique insight about ourselves, and any insight we think we have about others must be treated purely as insight about ourselves, i.e. the mind that I know as "their mind" is really just a sub-part of my mind. This leads to extreme forms of idealism (where all the world exists merely as an idea), the two mind problem (is it ever possible for two minds to know the some object?), etc., etc. These were huge turn of the 20th century challenges for philosophy, having grown out of a tradition of pushing more and more extreme the distinguished lineage of ideas flowing from Descartes, Kant, Berkeley, etc. The problems, for the most part, remain. In the extreme form, at least, this lineage leads to a heavy intellectual paralysis, as it is not possible for any "I" to know any other "I", nor to know the "real world" (should such a thing even exist).

The alternative (assuming we are to retain one of the original labels), is to have a bias for the "He" position. This leads to extreme forms of realism, and often (but not always) to behaviorism. In this move, the "I" has to get its information about the mind in the same that "He" has to get information. That is, if my brother knows my mind by observing my behavior, then I can only know my mind by observing my behavior. (Note, that the assertion about observing behavior is a secondary postulate, supplimenting the fundamental assertion that the method of knowing must be the same.)

There are, presumably, things that the I-biased position handles well (I don't know what they are, but there must be some). I know there are things the He-biased position handles well. Among other things it allows us to better understand perfectly normal and mundane conversations such as:

A) "You are angry"
B) "No I'm not"
A) "Yes you are dear. I've known you long enough to know when you're angry."
B) "I think I'd know when I was angry"
A) "You usually don't dear"
... several hours later
B) "Wow, you were right, I was angry. I didn't realize it at the time. I'm sorry"

The I-biased position understands these conversations as very elaborate shell games, where the first statement means something like: "The you that is in my head is currently being modeled by me as having a first-person experience of anger which is itself modeled after my unique first-person experience of anger". Worse, the last sentence seems (to me) totally incoherent from the I-biased position. The He-biased position much more simply believes that a person's anger is visible to himself and others if the right things are attended to, and hence the conversation requires no shell game. Person B simply comes to attend aspects of the situation that A was attending from the start.

Now I will admit that the He-biased perspective has trouble in some situations, but those can't really be discussed until the position is at least understood in the situations it handles well.

Eric

On Wed, Jun 24, 2009 04:05 AM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:

Now that we've arrived safely in Canberra, here's my loose end.

A number of people have talked about 1st person vs 3rd person perspectives.  What I'd like to know is what you all mean by a 3rd person perspective.  And what I'd really like to know is why what you mean by a 3rd person perspective isn't the
1st person experience of that perspective. In other words, what does one mean by a perspective or view at all. If someone/something has a view, it's not important (for what I think we're talking about) what the view is viewing. What's important is that someone/something has that view. The viewer then has a 1st person perspective of whatever is being viewed. If what is being viewed has something to do with the viewer, that's neither here nor there.

The more abstract way of saying this is that meaning occurs only in a first person context. Without meaning, all we have are bits, photons, ink on paper, etc. If you want to talk about meaning at all -- whether it's the meaning of a first or third person perspective -- one has already assumed that there is a first person that is understanding that meaning. 

Now since Nick and I seem to have reached an agreement about our positions, I'm not sure whether Nick will disagree with what I've just said.  So, Nick, if you are in agreement, please don't take this as a challenge. In fact, whether or not you agree I think it would be interesting for others on the list to respond to this point. On the other hand, Nick I'm not asking you not to respond -- in agreement of disagreement. I'm always interested in what you have to say.

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles
Cell phone: [phone]
o Check out my blog at http://bluecatblog.wordpress.com/

On Mon, Jun 22, 2009 at 10:03 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Steve,

 

You asked

 

"How (if at all) does this fit into the 3rd/1st person discussion this all started with?"

 

To be honest, I never tried to fit them together before.  You are demanding reflexivity here ... that my principles concerning how to conduct a discussion be consistent with the argument I am presenting within the discussion.   Always a useful demand. The best I can say is that both seem to embody my belief that in all matters of the mind, if we are willing to work hard enough, we can stand shoulder to shoulder and look at the same thing. 

 

By the way, a couple of you have indicated that you didn't get answers to questions you directed at me, and you rose to my defense.  I confess I got a bit over whelmed there for a while and started selecting questions for answer that I thought I could handle cleanly (as opposed to muddily).  Please if there were lose ends, push them at me again. 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Steve Smith

To: [hidden email];The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group

Sent: 6/22/2009 10:13:50 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation

Nicholas Thompson wrote:

Russ, and Glen, and Steve, n all

 

Ironically, I am with Russ on this one!  I believe both in the possibility and the benefits of clarity. 

I expected that when Russ and I were done, we would be able to agree on an articulation of our positions, where they are similar, where different, etc.  In fact, one of the skills I most revere is the ability to state another person's position to that person's satisfaction.  And, in fact, at one point, I thought I had achieved such an articulation, only to have Russ tell me I had got it wrong.   My guess is that Russ has his feet deeply in Kant, and I have neither boots nor courage high enough to go in there after him.  My son, who is a philosopher, has as good as looked me in the eye and said, "You aint man enough to read Kant!"

 

I studied Kant when I was too young and foolish to know better... but then I had been raised on folks like Ayn Rand and Robert Heinlein so Kant was no challenge.   Today I think I would find Kant a bit intimidating.

I am curious about the implications of "one of the skills I most revere is the ability to state another person's position to that person's satisfaction".  It seems to have implications on the root discussion...   The two ways I can obtain a high degree of confidence that I am communicating with another is if I can articulate their position to their satisfaction and vice versa...    I prefer the former over the latter... in the sense that I am almost never satisfied in their articulation... at most I accept it with some reservations.   But if they can keep a straight face while I reel off my version of their understanding of a point, then I try hard not to think too hard about it and call it good.  How (if at all) does this fit into the 3rd/1st person discussion this all started with?

- Steve

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Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601

Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[Russ Abbott]

I was afraid you would say that. But a statement like that raises the dishonest (disingenuous?) flag for me.  If we focus on "salty" you know what it's like to taste something that's salty. You said so yourself. "Well it's ... salty." That's more than just doing salty or seeing salty.  You didn't say that it's not like anything. You said it's salty, implying that you have an experience of saltiness when you taste salt.  That's an example of a qualia.

Furthermore (and I know I'm going to regret giving you two things to reply to), even if you can say you know what it is to do happy (or salty), that still implies a first person perspective. After all, what is it like to know what something is in the sense that you just used that phrase. That's the point I've been trying to make in last few messages. We don't need to insist on qualia.  Just the simple fact of knowing what something is, implies a first person that is doing the knowing. We got stuck on knowledge as true belief when I tried this tack before. Here I'm using know in the sense that you intended it (whatever that sense is) in your statement.  Perhaps it would be useful for you to explain what you meant by that statement. In other words, what is it to know what it is to do happy?

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 10:08 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ,

 

I am afraid it is "nyuh blindness".  I certainly know what it is to do happy, and see happy, but "be" happy causes the little hourglass on my screen to freeze.

 

N

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Cc: [hidden email]; [hidden email]

Sent: 6/26/2009 12:14:49 AM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Well, that's one reason I resisted talking about qualia.  The point is that you can't explain what it's like to taste salt. So your first instinct, "well, it's just .....salty!" is the right answer for those of us who talk about qualia. So qualia are experiences about which one can't say much more than "Well it's just  ... <whatever the experience is>" The question then is how do we understand/explain/talk about such phenomena from a scientific perspective.

 

When you way that you don't understand what Qualia mean are you saying that you have no idea what the term is trying to get at or that the defintion as written doesn't do a good job of conveying its meaning, which you more or less understand.  If the former (that you have no idea what the term is trying to get at) would you also say that you don't know what feeling happy, sad, nauseous (again) mean? We've probably been over this too many times, but this seems to be one of the sticking points. 

But if you ignore qualia, what about the rest of what I wrote, that no matter what perspective one is talking about, the simple abiltiy to have a perspective implies a first person?

 

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 1:46 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ --

 

Perhaps the problem is that I don't understand what Qualia means.  Here is the quote from

 

http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/q.htm#qualia

 

"The intrinsic phenomenal features of subjective consciousness, or sense data. Thus, qualia include what it is like to see green grass, to taste salt, to hear birds sing, to have a headache, to feel pain, etc. Providing an adequate account of qualia is sometimes held to be a difficult problem for functionalist explanations of mental states."

 

I just canNOT make sense of this passage. [NB, that behaviorism is sort of a school of functionalism].   Let's take seriously the Question, "What is it like to taste salt? "  As I wrestle with it, I come up with two equally unsatisfying answers.  "well, it's just .....salty!"   Unsatisfying, because no new information added.

 

Or "It's like tasting  sea water."   Which is ok by me, but I am pretty sure wont satisfy you.   Hans Wallach was a senior professor at Swarthmore when I came there to replace their behaviorist for a couple of years.  Whenever he talked about qualia he talked about the "Nyuh" of an experience.  "Nyuh" was always accompanied by forming a cone with the thumb and forefingers of one hand and twitchily inclining the hand toward one's audience.  Ultimately, they had to let me go because I never could figure out what "Nyuh" was.  I would have taken this on myself except the man I replaced  never came back either.   So, it wouldn't surprise me, Russ, if we could never agree on the "Nyuh".   Perhaps I am "Nyuh blind."

 

Nick  

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email];[hidden email]

Sent: 6/25/2009 9:12:05 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Hi Nick,

 

Your reply to Rikus didn't answer my questions. 

 

You're right that I didn't mean knowledge in the sense of true belief.  What I'm really talking about are qualia, but I didn't want to introduce that term.  Besides, it's more than just qualia. And it's not just first vs. third person. It's that to speak of any perspective implies someone/something having that perspective, which seems to me to be first person for that person/thing.  I don't see how one can get away from a first person perspective if one wants to talk about knowledge, belief, experience, perspective, or any other term that we use for abstracted experience. 

 

I'm using the term "abstracted" to refer to virtually any version of experience that has been processed into a more abstract than the lowest level of physics such as photons, electrons, etc. Whatever is doing that processing has its own (unique) abstracted version of that experience.

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 12:45 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Yeah.  I just moved a cleaned up version on the wires. 

 

I am beginning to wonder if the definition of "knowledge" isn't the problem here.  To philosophers, knowledge means "true belief".  (See, for instance http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/k9.htm#know).    So, for something to be knowledge, it has to be true from two points of view: the person who believes the knowledge and .... er ..... um ...God's.  Or at least, some universal point of view like the one imagined in our discussion of "information." 

 

Here is where I may have created a problem. For years I have thought that having to know what God thinks  in order to judge whether somebody knows something or not is really stupid.   God's consciousness, after all, is even more opaque than most.  So, for me, I use knowledge and belief pretty much interchangeably. 

 

Could it be that this is why I don't understand Russ when he speaks of subjective knowledge?   

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email];[hidden email]

Sent: 6/25/2009 8:24:49 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

But I didn't want to exclude you either.

 

Whether it's from a point of view or not, the issue I was getting at is what does it mean to say that someone knows something -- and if you asked him would say that he feels reasonably confident about that knowledge.  And I'm thinking primarily of knowledge derived from direct experience (like the sun being out or the color of the wall he is staring at), not knowlwedge based on having read something.  But Rikus' example gets at the same sort of thing in a much more worked out way. So dealing with his questions would be good way to proceed.

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 12:03 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ,

 

I wasnt invited to answer this one, but... isnt your question incomplete?  Isnt knowledge always from a point of view? 

 

"what about [you, me, he] knowing that the sun is out (assuming that it is)."

 

Professor Buttinski

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Sent: 6/24/2009 8:45:22 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Thanks, Eric. My question had to do with the (f)act of knowing anything rather than what it is that is known.  Your discussion has to do with knowing a mind and the 1st vs 3rd person perspective.  What about simply knowing that the sun is out (assume it is) or that the sky is blue (assume you are under a cloudless blue  sky). From your perspective do you see a 1st/3rd person perspective when the subject matter is not someone's mind?

-- Russ

On Wed, Jun 24, 2009 at 11:57 AM, ERIC P. CHARLES <[hidden email]> wrote:

My understanding is that the terms 1st and 3rd person arose as ways of talking about literary styles - and our use of them is metaphorical. An essential part of the metaphor is that authors writing in 1st person are typically granted privileged license to write about the mind of "I". In contrast, people writing in (a non-omniscient) 3rd person, are typically not granted as much license to write about the minds. This is not entirely true, as people writing in 3rd person write about minds all the time, but their writings are considered more vulnerable to dispute. For example, if Obama wrote an account of his inauguration and said "I was terrified", it would be considered less vulnerable to dispute than if I wrote an account of his inauguration and said "He was terrified". If these linguistic conventions become reified then we can start taking the "I" not merely to denote the speaker/viewer, but to denote an entity in possession of unique powers that justify the privileges commonly granted to the linguistic device. This is suggested as my understanding of the history, independent of any value judgment regarding the reification.

There is a lurking problem, however, as these conventions do not always seem to hold in the real world. The most glairing probelm is that, at least sometimes, "I" can be wrong about my own mind and "He" can be right. (The cause of my error can range from simply not paying attention to what I am doing, to intentional self-delusion, to forgetting - think Alzheimer's.) For some, these problems lead to an urge to collapse categories, to see if the oddness cannot be gotten rid of if we leave behind the notion of uniqueness that goes with having distinct labels. I suppose that on some formal level, when a dichotomy collapses into a monism, it might not be particularly important which category label remains. However, one category may be preferred over another because it originally contained properties that the author wishes to retain as implicit or explicit in the monistic system that remains. These properties are ported along with word into the monistic system, because the term retains sway as a metaphor.

In this case, the historical bias has been to retain only the "I" position. In this move, the "I" retains its unique insight about ourselves, and any insight we think we have about others must be treated purely as insight about ourselves, i.e. the mind that I know as "their mind" is really just a sub-part of my mind. This leads to extreme forms of idealism (where all the world exists merely as an idea), the two mind problem (is it ever possible for two minds to know the some object?), etc., etc. These were huge turn of the 20th century challenges for philosophy, having grown out of a tradition of pushing more and more extreme the distinguished lineage of ideas flowing from Descartes, Kant, Berkeley, etc. The problems, for the most part, remain. In the extreme form, at least, this lineage leads to a heavy intellectual paralysis, as it is not possible for any "I" to know any other "I", nor to know the "real world" (should such a thing even exist).

The alternative (assuming we are to retain one of the original labels), is to have a bias for the "He" position. This leads to extreme forms of realism, and often (but not always) to behaviorism. In this move, the "I" has to get its information about the mind in the same that "He" has to get information. That is, if my brother knows my mind by observing my behavior, then I can only know my mind by observing my behavior. (Note, that the assertion about observing behavior is a secondary postulate, supplimenting the fundamental assertion that the method of knowing must be the same.)

There are, presumably, things that the I-biased position handles well (I don't know what they are, but there must be some). I know there are things the He-biased position handles well. Among other things it allows us to better understand perfectly normal and mundane conversations such as:

A) "You are angry"
B) "No I'm not"
A) "Yes you are dear. I've known you long enough to know when you're angry."
B) "I think I'd know when I was angry"
A) "You usually don't dear"
... several hours later
B) "Wow, you were right, I was angry. I didn't realize it at the time. I'm sorry"

The I-biased position understands these conversations as very elaborate shell games, where the first statement means something like: "The you that is in my head is currently being modeled by me as having a first-person experience of anger which is itself modeled after my unique first-person experience of anger". Worse, the last sentence seems (to me) totally incoherent from the I-biased position. The He-biased position much more simply believes that a person's anger is visible to himself and others if the right things are attended to, and hence the conversation requires no shell game. Person B simply comes to attend aspects of the situation that A was attending from the start.

Now I will admit that the He-biased perspective has trouble in some situations, but those can't really be discussed until the position is at least understood in the situations it handles well.

Eric

On Wed, Jun 24, 2009 04:05 AM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:

Now that we've arrived safely in Canberra, here's my loose end.

A number of people have talked about 1st person vs 3rd person perspectives.  What I'd like to know is what you all mean by a 3rd person perspective.  And what I'd really like to know is why what you mean by a 3rd person perspective isn't the
1st person experience of that perspective. In other words, what does one mean by a perspective or view at all. If someone/something has a view, it's not important (for what I think we're talking about) what the view is viewing. What's important is that someone/something has that view. The viewer then has a 1st person perspective of whatever is being viewed. If what is being viewed has something to do with the viewer, that's neither here nor there.

The more abstract way of saying this is that meaning occurs only in a first person context. Without meaning, all we have are bits, photons, ink on paper, etc. If you want to talk about meaning at all -- whether it's the meaning of a first or third person perspective -- one has already assumed that there is a first person that is understanding that meaning. 

Now since Nick and I seem to have reached an agreement about our positions, I'm not sure whether Nick will disagree with what I've just said.  So, Nick, if you are in agreement, please don't take this as a challenge. In fact, whether or not you agree I think it would be interesting for others on the list to respond to this point. On the other hand, Nick I'm not asking you not to respond -- in agreement of disagreement. I'm always interested in what you have to say.

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles
Cell phone: [phone]
o Check out my blog at http://bluecatblog.wordpress.com/

On Mon, Jun 22, 2009 at 10:03 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Steve,

 

You asked

 

"How (if at all) does this fit into the 3rd/1st person discussion this all started with?"

 

To be honest, I never tried to fit them together before.  You are demanding reflexivity here ... that my principles concerning how to conduct a discussion be consistent with the argument I am presenting within the discussion.   Always a useful demand. The best I can say is that both seem to embody my belief that in all matters of the mind, if we are willing to work hard enough, we can stand shoulder to shoulder and look at the same thing. 

 

By the way, a couple of you have indicated that you didn't get answers to questions you directed at me, and you rose to my defense.  I confess I got a bit over whelmed there for a while and started selecting questions for answer that I thought I could handle cleanly (as opposed to muddily).  Please if there were lose ends, push them at me again. 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Steve Smith

To: [hidden email];The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group

Sent: 6/22/2009 10:13:50 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation

Nicholas Thompson wrote:

Russ, and Glen, and Steve, n all

 

Ironically, I am with Russ on this one!  I believe both in the possibility and the benefits of clarity. 

I expected that when Russ and I were done, we would be able to agree on an articulation of our positions, where they are similar, where different, etc.  In fact, one of the skills I most revere is the ability to state another person's position to that person's satisfaction.  And, in fact, at one point, I thought I had achieved such an articulation, only to have Russ tell me I had got it wrong.   My guess is that Russ has his feet deeply in Kant, and I have neither boots nor courage high enough to go in there after him.  My son, who is a philosopher, has as good as looked me in the eye and said, "You aint man enough to read Kant!"

 

I studied Kant when I was too young and foolish to know better... but then I had been raised on folks like Ayn Rand and Robert Heinlein so Kant was no challenge.   Today I think I would find Kant a bit intimidating.

I am curious about the implications of "one of the skills I most revere is the ability to state another person's position to that person's satisfaction".  It seems to have implications on the root discussion...   The two ways I can obtain a high degree of confidence that I am communicating with another is if I can articulate their position to their satisfaction and vice versa...    I prefer the former over the latter... in the sense that I am almost never satisfied in their articulation... at most I accept it with some reservations.   But if they can keep a straight face while I reel off my version of their understanding of a point, then I try hard not to think too hard about it and call it good.  How (if at all) does this fit into the 3rd/1st person discussion this all started with?

- Steve

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
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Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601

Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

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FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[Nick Thompson]

Dear Friam,

 

this is probably just Abbot and Thompson going around the track again, so you have my permission to disregard.

 

comments below: 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Cc: [hidden email]

Sent: 6/26/2009 2:37:28 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

I was afraid you would say that. But a statement like that raises the dishonest (disingenuous?) flag for me.  If we focus on "salty" you know what it's like to taste something that's salty. You said so yourself. "Well it's ... salty." That's more than just doing salty or seeing salty.  You didn't say that it's not like anything.

You said it's salty, implying that you have an experience of saltiness when you taste salt.  That's an example of a qualia.

nst---> NOOOOOOOO! NO! and NO!.  It just means I have tasted the stuff in the cylindrical blue box with the word SALT on it.  And why can't I just be wrong, by the way.  Why do I have to be a liar. 

Furthermore (and I know I'm going to regret giving you two things to reply to), even if you can say you know what it is to do happy (or salty), that still implies a first person perspective.

 

nst---> Is this a typo?  I said I didnt know.  At least, I said I didnt know the "Nyuh" of happiness.

 

 

After all, what is it like to know what something is in the sense that you just used that phrase. That's the point I've been trying to make in last few messages. We don't need to insist on qualia.  Just the simple fact of knowing what something is, implies a first person that is doing the knowing.

 

nst---> No.  I just implies a point of view from which the world appears that way.  But we may be bypassing each other here.  Eric and I have already stipulated that it is possible to include oneself in one's own point of view and thus to "know" onceself;  I think we are denying only that there is anything special about doing so.  No "Nyuh".  Have you seen some the wierd stuff that is coming from these people?  http://www.neuro.ki.se/ehrsson/publications.php  Oddly enough, I am sure you will see it as confirming your view, just as i see it as confirming mine.

 

  We got stuck on knowledge as true belief when I tried this tack before. Here I'm using know in the sense that you intended it (whatever that sense is) in your statement.  Perhaps it would be useful for you to explain what you meant by that statement. In other words, what is it to know what it is to do happy?

 

nst---> The same as to know how to play chess.  

 

 

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 10:08 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ,

 

I am afraid it is "nyuh blindness".  I certainly know what it is to do happy, and see happy, but "be" happy causes the little hourglass on my screen to freeze.

 

N

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Cc: [hidden email]; [hidden email]

Sent: 6/26/2009 12:14:49 AM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Well, that's one reason I resisted talking about qualia.  The point is that you can't explain what it's like to taste salt. So your first instinct, "well, it's just .....salty!" is the right answer for those of us who talk about qualia. So qualia are experiences about which one can't say much more than "Well it's just  ... <whatever the experience is>" The question then is how do we understand/explain/talk about such phenomena from a scientific perspective.

 

When you way that you don't understand what Qualia mean are you saying that you have no idea what the term is trying to get at or that the defintion as written doesn't do a good job of conveying its meaning, which you more or less understand.  If the former (that you have no idea what the term is trying to get at) would you also say that you don't know what feeling happy, sad, nauseous (again) mean? We've probably been over this too many times, but this seems to be one of the sticking points. 

But if you ignore qualia, what about the rest of what I wrote, that no matter what perspective one is talking about, the simple abiltiy to have a perspective implies a first person?

 

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 1:46 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ --

 

Perhaps the problem is that I don't understand what Qualia means.  Here is the quote from

 

http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/q.htm#qualia

 

"The intrinsic phenomenal features of subjective consciousness, or sense data. Thus, qualia include what it is like to see green grass, to taste salt, to hear birds sing, to have a headache, to feel pain, etc. Providing an adequate account of qualia is sometimes held to be a difficult problem for functionalist explanations of mental states."

 

I just canNOT make sense of this passage. [NB, that behaviorism is sort of a school of functionalism].   Let's take seriously the Question, "What is it like to taste salt? "  As I wrestle with it, I come up with two equally unsatisfying answers.  "well, it's just .....salty!"   Unsatisfying, because no new information added.

 

Or "It's like tasting  sea water."   Which is ok by me, but I am pretty sure wont satisfy you.   Hans Wallach was a senior professor at Swarthmore when I came there to replace their behaviorist for a couple of years.  Whenever he talked about qualia he talked about the "Nyuh" of an experience.  "Nyuh" was always accompanied by forming a cone with the thumb and forefingers of one hand and twitchily inclining the hand toward one's audience.  Ultimately, they had to let me go because I never could figure out what "Nyuh" was.  I would have taken this on myself except the man I replaced  never came back either.   So, it wouldn't surprise me, Russ, if we could never agree on the "Nyuh".   Perhaps I am "Nyuh blind."

 

Nick  

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email];[hidden email]

Sent: 6/25/2009 9:12:05 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Hi Nick,

 

Your reply to Rikus didn't answer my questions. 

 

You're right that I didn't mean knowledge in the sense of true belief.  What I'm really talking about are qualia, but I didn't want to introduce that term.  Besides, it's more than just qualia. And it's not just first vs. third person. It's that to speak of any perspective implies someone/something having that perspective, which seems to me to be first person for that person/thing.  I don't see how one can get away from a first person perspective if one wants to talk about knowledge, belief, experience, perspective, or any other term that we use for abstracted experience. 

 

I'm using the term "abstracted" to refer to virtually any version of experience that has been processed into a more abstract than the lowest level of physics such as photons, electrons, etc. Whatever is doing that processing has its own (unique) abstracted version of that experience.

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 12:45 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Yeah.  I just moved a cleaned up version on the wires. 

 

I am beginning to wonder if the definition of "knowledge" isn't the problem here.  To philosophers, knowledge means "true belief".  (See, for instance http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/k9.htm#know).    So, for something to be knowledge, it has to be true from two points of view: the person who believes the knowledge and .... er ..... um ...God's.  Or at least, some universal point of view like the one imagined in our discussion of "information." 

 

Here is where I may have created a problem. For years I have thought that having to know what God thinks  in order to judge whether somebody knows something or not is really stupid.   God's consciousness, after all, is even more opaque than most.  So, for me, I use knowledge and belief pretty much interchangeably. 

 

Could it be that this is why I don't understand Russ when he speaks of subjective knowledge?   

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email];[hidden email]

Sent: 6/25/2009 8:24:49 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

But I didn't want to exclude you either.

 

Whether it's from a point of view or not, the issue I was getting at is what does it mean to say that someone knows something -- and if you asked him would say that he feels reasonably confident about that knowledge.  And I'm thinking primarily of knowledge derived from direct experience (like the sun being out or the color of the wall he is staring at), not knowlwedge based on having read something.  But Rikus' example gets at the same sort of thing in a much more worked out way. So dealing with his questions would be good way to proceed.

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 12:03 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ,

 

I wasnt invited to answer this one, but... isnt your question incomplete?  Isnt knowledge always from a point of view? 

 

"what about [you, me, he] knowing that the sun is out (assuming that it is)."

 

Professor Buttinski

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Sent: 6/24/2009 8:45:22 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Thanks, Eric. My question had to do with the (f)act of knowing anything rather than what it is that is known.  Your discussion has to do with knowing a mind and the 1st vs 3rd person perspective.  What about simply knowing that the sun is out (assume it is) or that the sky is blue (assume you are under a cloudless blue  sky). From your perspective do you see a 1st/3rd person perspective when the subject matter is not someone's mind?

-- Russ

On Wed, Jun 24, 2009 at 11:57 AM, ERIC P. CHARLES <[hidden email]> wrote:

My understanding is that the terms 1st and 3rd person arose as ways of talking about literary styles - and our use of them is metaphorical. An essential part of the metaphor is that authors writing in 1st person are typically granted privileged license to write about the mind of "I". In contrast, people writing in (a non-omniscient) 3rd person, are typically not granted as much license to write about the minds. This is not entirely true, as people writing in 3rd person write about minds all the time, but their writings are considered more vulnerable to dispute. For example, if Obama wrote an account of his inauguration and said "I was terrified", it would be considered less vulnerable to dispute than if I wrote an account of his inauguration and said "He was terrified". If these linguistic conventions become reified then we can start taking the "I" not merely to denote the speaker/viewer, but to denote an entity in possession of unique powers that justify the privileges commonly granted to the linguistic device. This is suggested as my understanding of the history, independent of any value judgment regarding the reification.

There is a lurking problem, however, as these conventions do not always seem to hold in the real world. The most glairing probelm is that, at least sometimes, "I" can be wrong about my own mind and "He" can be right. (The cause of my error can range from simply not paying attention to what I am doing, to intentional self-delusion, to forgetting - think Alzheimer's.) For some, these problems lead to an urge to collapse categories, to see if the oddness cannot be gotten rid of if we leave behind the notion of uniqueness that goes with having distinct labels. I suppose that on some formal level, when a dichotomy collapses into a monism, it might not be particularly important which category label remains. However, one category may be preferred over another because it originally contained properties that the author wishes to retain as implicit or explicit in the monistic system that remains. These properties are ported along with word into the monistic system, because the term retains sway as a metaphor.

In this case, the historical bias has been to retain only the "I" position. In this move, the "I" retains its unique insight about ourselves, and any insight we think we have about others must be treated purely as insight about ourselves, i.e. the mind that I know as "their mind" is really just a sub-part of my mind. This leads to extreme forms of idealism (where all the world exists merely as an idea), the two mind problem (is it ever possible for two minds to know the some object?), etc., etc. These were huge turn of the 20th century challenges for philosophy, having grown out of a tradition of pushing more and more extreme the distinguished lineage of ideas flowing from Descartes, Kant, Berkeley, etc. The problems, for the most part, remain. In the extreme form, at least, this lineage leads to a heavy intellectual paralysis, as it is not possible for any "I" to know any other "I", nor to know the "real world" (should such a thing even exist).

The alternative (assuming we are to retain one of the original labels), is to have a bias for the "He" position. This leads to extreme forms of realism, and often (but not always) to behaviorism. In this move, the "I" has to get its information about the mind in the same that "He" has to get information. That is, if my brother knows my mind by observing my behavior, then I can only know my mind by observing my behavior. (Note, that the assertion about observing behavior is a secondary postulate, supplimenting the fundamental assertion that the method of knowing must be the same.)

There are, presumably, things that the I-biased position handles well (I don't know what they are, but there must be some). I know there are things the He-biased position handles well. Among other things it allows us to better understand perfectly normal and mundane conversations such as:

A) "You are angry"
B) "No I'm not"
A) "Yes you are dear. I've known you long enough to know when you're angry."
B) "I think I'd know when I was angry"
A) "You usually don't dear"
... several hours later
B) "Wow, you were right, I was angry. I didn't realize it at the time. I'm sorry"

The I-biased position understands these conversations as very elaborate shell games, where the first statement means something like: "The you that is in my head is currently being modeled by me as having a first-person experience of anger which is itself modeled after my unique first-person experience of anger". Worse, the last sentence seems (to me) totally incoherent from the I-biased position. The He-biased position much more simply believes that a person's anger is visible to himself and others if the right things are attended to, and hence the conversation requires no shell game. Person B simply comes to attend aspects of the situation that A was attending from the start.

Now I will admit that the He-biased perspective has trouble in some situations, but those can't really be discussed until the position is at least understood in the situations it handles well.

Eric

On Wed, Jun 24, 2009 04:05 AM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:

Now that we've arrived safely in Canberra, here's my loose end.

A number of people have talked about 1st person vs 3rd person perspectives.  What I'd like to know is what you all mean by a 3rd person perspective.  And what I'd really like to know is why what you mean by a 3rd person perspective isn't the
1st person experience of that perspective. In other words, what does one mean by a perspective or view at all. If someone/something has a view, it's not important (for what I think we're talking about) what the view is viewing. What's important is that someone/something has that view. The viewer then has a 1st person perspective of whatever is being viewed. If what is being viewed has something to do with the viewer, that's neither here nor there.

The more abstract way of saying this is that meaning occurs only in a first person context. Without meaning, all we have are bits, photons, ink on paper, etc. If you want to talk about meaning at all -- whether it's the meaning of a first or third person perspective -- one has already assumed that there is a first person that is understanding that meaning. 

Now since Nick and I seem to have reached an agreement about our positions, I'm not sure whether Nick will disagree with what I've just said.  So, Nick, if you are in agreement, please don't take this as a challenge. In fact, whether or not you agree I think it would be interesting for others on the list to respond to this point. On the other hand, Nick I'm not asking you not to respond -- in agreement of disagreement. I'm always interested in what you have to say.

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles
Cell phone: [phone]
o Check out my blog at http://bluecatblog.wordpress.com/

On Mon, Jun 22, 2009 at 10:03 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Steve,

 

You asked

 

"How (if at all) does this fit into the 3rd/1st person discussion this all started with?"

 

To be honest, I never tried to fit them together before.  You are demanding reflexivity here ... that my principles concerning how to conduct a discussion be consistent with the argument I am presenting within the discussion.   Always a useful demand. The best I can say is that both seem to embody my belief that in all matters of the mind, if we are willing to work hard enough, we can stand shoulder to shoulder and look at the same thing. 

 

By the way, a couple of you have indicated that you didn't get answers to questions you directed at me, and you rose to my defense.  I confess I got a bit over whelmed there for a while and started selecting questions for answer that I thought I could handle cleanly (as opposed to muddily).  Please if there were lose ends, push them at me again. 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Steve Smith

To: [hidden email];The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group

Sent: 6/22/2009 10:13:50 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation

Nicholas Thompson wrote:

Russ, and Glen, and Steve, n all

 

Ironically, I am with Russ on this one!  I believe both in the possibility and the benefits of clarity. 

I expected that when Russ and I were done, we would be able to agree on an articulation of our positions, where they are similar, where different, etc.  In fact, one of the skills I most revere is the ability to state another person's position to that person's satisfaction.  And, in fact, at one point, I thought I had achieved such an articulation, only to have Russ tell me I had got it wrong.   My guess is that Russ has his feet deeply in Kant, and I have neither boots nor courage high enough to go in there after him.  My son, who is a philosopher, has as good as looked me in the eye and said, "You aint man enough to read Kant!"

 

I studied Kant when I was too young and foolish to know better... but then I had been raised on folks like Ayn Rand and Robert Heinlein so Kant was no challenge.   Today I think I would find Kant a bit intimidating.

I am curious about the implications of "one of the skills I most revere is the ability to state another person's position to that person's satisfaction".  It seems to have implications on the root discussion...   The two ways I can obtain a high degree of confidence that I am communicating with another is if I can articulate their position to their satisfaction and vice versa...    I prefer the former over the latter... in the sense that I am almost never satisfied in their articulation... at most I accept it with some reservations.   But if they can keep a straight face while I reel off my version of their understanding of a point, then I try hard not to think too hard about it and call it good.  How (if at all) does this fit into the 3rd/1st person discussion this all started with?

- Steve

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601

Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[Russ Abbott]

See below (again)

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles
Cell phone: [phone]
o Check out my blog at http://bluecatblog.wordpress.com/

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 3:18 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Dear Friam,

 

this is probably just Abbot and Thompson going around the track again, so you have my permission to disregard.

 

comments below: 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Cc: [hidden email]

Sent: 6/26/2009 2:37:28 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

I was afraid you would say that. But a statement like that raises the dishonest (disingenuous?) flag for me.  If we focus on "salty" you know what it's like to taste something that's salty. You said so yourself. "Well it's ... salty." That's more than just doing salty or seeing salty.  You didn't say that it's not like anything.

You said it's salty, implying that you have an experience of saltiness when you taste salt.  That's an example of a qualia.

nst---> NOOOOOOOO! NO! and NO!.  It just means I have tasted the stuff in the cylindrical blue box with the word SALT on it.  And why can't I just be wrong, by the way.  Why do I have to be a liar. 

But what does it mean to have tasted the stuff?

Furthermore (and I know I'm going to regret giving you two things to reply to), even if you can say you know what it is to do happy (or salty), that still implies a first person perspective.

 

nst---> Is this a typo?  I said I didnt know.  At least, I said I didnt know the "Nyuh" of happiness.

You said (emphasis added), "I am afraid it is "nyuh blindness".  I certainly know what it is to do happy, and see happy, but "be" happy causes the little hourglass on my screen to freeze."

My question is what do you mean by the italicized part?  And especially by the "I certainly know" part?

 

 

After all, what is it like to know what something is in the sense that you just used that phrase. That's the point I've been trying to make in last few messages. We don't need to insist on qualia.  Just the simple fact of knowing what something is, implies a first person that is doing the knowing.

 

nst---> No.  I just implies a point of view from which the world appears that way.  But we may be bypassing each other here.  Eric and I have already stipulated that it is possible to include oneself in one's own point of view and thus to "know" onceself;  I think we are denying only that there is anything special about doing so.  No "Nyuh".  Have you seen some the wierd stuff that is coming from these people?  http://www.neuro.ki.se/ehrsson/publications.php  Oddly enough, I am sure you will see it as confirming your view, just as i see it as confirming mine.

 

  We got stuck on knowledge as true belief when I tried this tack before. Here I'm using know in the sense that you intended it (whatever that sense is) in your statement.  Perhaps it would be useful for you to explain what you meant by that statement. In other words, what is it to know what it is to do happy?

 

nst---> The same as to know how to play chess. 

And what does that mean?

 

 

 

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 10:08 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ,

 

I am afraid it is "nyuh blindness".  I certainly know what it is to do happy, and see happy, but "be" happy causes the little hourglass on my screen to freeze.

 

N

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Cc: [hidden email]; [hidden email]

Sent: 6/26/2009 12:14:49 AM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Well, that's one reason I resisted talking about qualia.  The point is that you can't explain what it's like to taste salt. So your first instinct, "well, it's just .....salty!" is the right answer for those of us who talk about qualia. So qualia are experiences about which one can't say much more than "Well it's just  ... <whatever the experience is>" The question then is how do we understand/explain/talk about such phenomena from a scientific perspective.

 

When you way that you don't understand what Qualia mean are you saying that you have no idea what the term is trying to get at or that the defintion as written doesn't do a good job of conveying its meaning, which you more or less understand.  If the former (that you have no idea what the term is trying to get at) would you also say that you don't know what feeling happy, sad, nauseous (again) mean? We've probably been over this too many times, but this seems to be one of the sticking points. 

But if you ignore qualia, what about the rest of what I wrote, that no matter what perspective one is talking about, the simple abiltiy to have a perspective implies a first person?

 

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 1:46 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ --

 

Perhaps the problem is that I don't understand what Qualia means.  Here is the quote from

 

http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/q.htm#qualia

 

"The intrinsic phenomenal features of subjective consciousness, or sense data. Thus, qualia include what it is like to see green grass, to taste salt, to hear birds sing, to have a headache, to feel pain, etc. Providing an adequate account of qualia is sometimes held to be a difficult problem for functionalist explanations of mental states."

 

I just canNOT make sense of this passage. [NB, that behaviorism is sort of a school of functionalism].   Let's take seriously the Question, "What is it like to taste salt? "  As I wrestle with it, I come up with two equally unsatisfying answers.  "well, it's just .....salty!"   Unsatisfying, because no new information added.

 

Or "It's like tasting  sea water."   Which is ok by me, but I am pretty sure wont satisfy you.   Hans Wallach was a senior professor at Swarthmore when I came there to replace their behaviorist for a couple of years.  Whenever he talked about qualia he talked about the "Nyuh" of an experience.  "Nyuh" was always accompanied by forming a cone with the thumb and forefingers of one hand and twitchily inclining the hand toward one's audience.  Ultimately, they had to let me go because I never could figure out what "Nyuh" was.  I would have taken this on myself except the man I replaced  never came back either.   So, it wouldn't surprise me, Russ, if we could never agree on the "Nyuh".   Perhaps I am "Nyuh blind."

 

Nick  

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email];[hidden email]

Sent: 6/25/2009 9:12:05 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Hi Nick,

 

Your reply to Rikus didn't answer my questions. 

 

You're right that I didn't mean knowledge in the sense of true belief.  What I'm really talking about are qualia, but I didn't want to introduce that term.  Besides, it's more than just qualia. And it's not just first vs. third person. It's that to speak of any perspective implies someone/something having that perspective, which seems to me to be first person for that person/thing.  I don't see how one can get away from a first person perspective if one wants to talk about knowledge, belief, experience, perspective, or any other term that we use for abstracted experience. 

 

I'm using the term "abstracted" to refer to virtually any version of experience that has been processed into a more abstract than the lowest level of physics such as photons, electrons, etc. Whatever is doing that processing has its own (unique) abstracted version of that experience.

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 12:45 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Yeah.  I just moved a cleaned up version on the wires. 

 

I am beginning to wonder if the definition of "knowledge" isn't the problem here.  To philosophers, knowledge means "true belief".  (See, for instance http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/k9.htm#know).    So, for something to be knowledge, it has to be true from two points of view: the person who believes the knowledge and .... er ..... um ...God's.  Or at least, some universal point of view like the one imagined in our discussion of "information." 

 

Here is where I may have created a problem. For years I have thought that having to know what God thinks  in order to judge whether somebody knows something or not is really stupid.   God's consciousness, after all, is even more opaque than most.  So, for me, I use knowledge and belief pretty much interchangeably. 

 

Could it be that this is why I don't understand Russ when he speaks of subjective knowledge?   

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email];[hidden email]

Sent: 6/25/2009 8:24:49 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

But I didn't want to exclude you either.

 

Whether it's from a point of view or not, the issue I was getting at is what does it mean to say that someone knows something -- and if you asked him would say that he feels reasonably confident about that knowledge.  And I'm thinking primarily of knowledge derived from direct experience (like the sun being out or the color of the wall he is staring at), not knowlwedge based on having read something.  But Rikus' example gets at the same sort of thing in a much more worked out way. So dealing with his questions would be good way to proceed.

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 12:03 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ,

 

I wasnt invited to answer this one, but... isnt your question incomplete?  Isnt knowledge always from a point of view? 

 

"what about [you, me, he] knowing that the sun is out (assuming that it is)."

 

Professor Buttinski

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Sent: 6/24/2009 8:45:22 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Thanks, Eric. My question had to do with the (f)act of knowing anything rather than what it is that is known.  Your discussion has to do with knowing a mind and the 1st vs 3rd person perspective.  What about simply knowing that the sun is out (assume it is) or that the sky is blue (assume you are under a cloudless blue  sky). From your perspective do you see a 1st/3rd person perspective when the subject matter is not someone's mind?

-- Russ

On Wed, Jun 24, 2009 at 11:57 AM, ERIC P. CHARLES <[hidden email]> wrote:

My understanding is that the terms 1st and 3rd person arose as ways of talking about literary styles - and our use of them is metaphorical. An essential part of the metaphor is that authors writing in 1st person are typically granted privileged license to write about the mind of "I". In contrast, people writing in (a non-omniscient) 3rd person, are typically not granted as much license to write about the minds. This is not entirely true, as people writing in 3rd person write about minds all the time, but their writings are considered more vulnerable to dispute. For example, if Obama wrote an account of his inauguration and said "I was terrified", it would be considered less vulnerable to dispute than if I wrote an account of his inauguration and said "He was terrified". If these linguistic conventions become reified then we can start taking the "I" not merely to denote the speaker/viewer, but to denote an entity in possession of unique powers that justify the privileges commonly granted to the linguistic device. This is suggested as my understanding of the history, independent of any value judgment regarding the reification.

There is a lurking problem, however, as these conventions do not always seem to hold in the real world. The most glairing probelm is that, at least sometimes, "I" can be wrong about my own mind and "He" can be right. (The cause of my error can range from simply not paying attention to what I am doing, to intentional self-delusion, to forgetting - think Alzheimer's.) For some, these problems lead to an urge to collapse categories, to see if the oddness cannot be gotten rid of if we leave behind the notion of uniqueness that goes with having distinct labels. I suppose that on some formal level, when a dichotomy collapses into a monism, it might not be particularly important which category label remains. However, one category may be preferred over another because it originally contained properties that the author wishes to retain as implicit or explicit in the monistic system that remains. These properties are ported along with word into the monistic system, because the term retains sway as a metaphor.

In this case, the historical bias has been to retain only the "I" position. In this move, the "I" retains its unique insight about ourselves, and any insight we think we have about others must be treated purely as insight about ourselves, i.e. the mind that I know as "their mind" is really just a sub-part of my mind. This leads to extreme forms of idealism (where all the world exists merely as an idea), the two mind problem (is it ever possible for two minds to know the some object?), etc., etc. These were huge turn of the 20th century challenges for philosophy, having grown out of a tradition of pushing more and more extreme the distinguished lineage of ideas flowing from Descartes, Kant, Berkeley, etc. The problems, for the most part, remain. In the extreme form, at least, this lineage leads to a heavy intellectual paralysis, as it is not possible for any "I" to know any other "I", nor to know the "real world" (should such a thing even exist).

The alternative (assuming we are to retain one of the original labels), is to have a bias for the "He" position. This leads to extreme forms of realism, and often (but not always) to behaviorism. In this move, the "I" has to get its information about the mind in the same that "He" has to get information. That is, if my brother knows my mind by observing my behavior, then I can only know my mind by observing my behavior. (Note, that the assertion about observing behavior is a secondary postulate, supplimenting the fundamental assertion that the method of knowing must be the same.)

There are, presumably, things that the I-biased position handles well (I don't know what they are, but there must be some). I know there are things the He-biased position handles well. Among other things it allows us to better understand perfectly normal and mundane conversations such as:

A) "You are angry"
B) "No I'm not"
A) "Yes you are dear. I've known you long enough to know when you're angry."
B) "I think I'd know when I was angry"
A) "You usually don't dear"
... several hours later
B) "Wow, you were right, I was angry. I didn't realize it at the time. I'm sorry"

The I-biased position understands these conversations as very elaborate shell games, where the first statement means something like: "The you that is in my head is currently being modeled by me as having a first-person experience of anger which is itself modeled after my unique first-person experience of anger". Worse, the last sentence seems (to me) totally incoherent from the I-biased position. The He-biased position much more simply believes that a person's anger is visible to himself and others if the right things are attended to, and hence the conversation requires no shell game. Person B simply comes to attend aspects of the situation that A was attending from the start.

Now I will admit that the He-biased perspective has trouble in some situations, but those can't really be discussed until the position is at least understood in the situations it handles well.

Eric

On Wed, Jun 24, 2009 04:05 AM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:

Now that we've arrived safely in Canberra, here's my loose end.

A number of people have talked about 1st person vs 3rd person perspectives.  What I'd like to know is what you all mean by a 3rd person perspective.  And what I'd really like to know is why what you mean by a 3rd person perspective isn't the
1st person experience of that perspective. In other words, what does one mean by a perspective or view at all. If someone/something has a view, it's not important (for what I think we're talking about) what the view is viewing. What's important is that someone/something has that view. The viewer then has a 1st person perspective of whatever is being viewed. If what is being viewed has something to do with the viewer, that's neither here nor there.

The more abstract way of saying this is that meaning occurs only in a first person context. Without meaning, all we have are bits, photons, ink on paper, etc. If you want to talk about meaning at all -- whether it's the meaning of a first or third person perspective -- one has already assumed that there is a first person that is understanding that meaning. 

Now since Nick and I seem to have reached an agreement about our positions, I'm not sure whether Nick will disagree with what I've just said.  So, Nick, if you are in agreement, please don't take this as a challenge. In fact, whether or not you agree I think it would be interesting for others on the list to respond to this point. On the other hand, Nick I'm not asking you not to respond -- in agreement of disagreement. I'm always interested in what you have to say.

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles
Cell phone: [phone]
o Check out my blog at http://bluecatblog.wordpress.com/

On Mon, Jun 22, 2009 at 10:03 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Steve,

 

You asked

 

"How (if at all) does this fit into the 3rd/1st person discussion this all started with?"

 

To be honest, I never tried to fit them together before.  You are demanding reflexivity here ... that my principles concerning how to conduct a discussion be consistent with the argument I am presenting within the discussion.   Always a useful demand. The best I can say is that both seem to embody my belief that in all matters of the mind, if we are willing to work hard enough, we can stand shoulder to shoulder and look at the same thing. 

 

By the way, a couple of you have indicated that you didn't get answers to questions you directed at me, and you rose to my defense.  I confess I got a bit over whelmed there for a while and started selecting questions for answer that I thought I could handle cleanly (as opposed to muddily).  Please if there were lose ends, push them at me again. 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Steve Smith

To: [hidden email];The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group

Sent: 6/22/2009 10:13:50 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation

Nicholas Thompson wrote:

Russ, and Glen, and Steve, n all

 

Ironically, I am with Russ on this one!  I believe both in the possibility and the benefits of clarity. 

I expected that when Russ and I were done, we would be able to agree on an articulation of our positions, where they are similar, where different, etc.  In fact, one of the skills I most revere is the ability to state another person's position to that person's satisfaction.  And, in fact, at one point, I thought I had achieved such an articulation, only to have Russ tell me I had got it wrong.   My guess is that Russ has his feet deeply in Kant, and I have neither boots nor courage high enough to go in there after him.  My son, who is a philosopher, has as good as looked me in the eye and said, "You aint man enough to read Kant!"

 

I studied Kant when I was too young and foolish to know better... but then I had been raised on folks like Ayn Rand and Robert Heinlein so Kant was no challenge.   Today I think I would find Kant a bit intimidating.

I am curious about the implications of "one of the skills I most revere is the ability to state another person's position to that person's satisfaction".  It seems to have implications on the root discussion...   The two ways I can obtain a high degree of confidence that I am communicating with another is if I can articulate their position to their satisfaction and vice versa...    I prefer the former over the latter... in the sense that I am almost never satisfied in their articulation... at most I accept it with some reservations.   But if they can keep a straight face while I reel off my version of their understanding of a point, then I try hard not to think too hard about it and call it good.  How (if at all) does this fit into the 3rd/1st person discussion this all started with?

- Steve

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601

Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[Nick Thompson]

 

 

Russ,

 

As you have discovered by now, one of my fondest bits of ideology is that if two people that  disagree talk long enough and honestly enough,  they will come, eventually, at least to a characterization of the difference between them with which they can both agree.  Yet that characterization eludes me.  This discourages me more than any of the many weaknesses and oversights in my position that I have discovered during our conversation. 

 

I keep hoping that some one of the lurkers ... if there still are any ... might come up with a characterization of the difference of opinion that would put both of us out of our misery ... .  Perhaps that person might be [hidden email]

 ?

But until that happens, I think I have to concede the floor to you.   In any case, medical stuff next week and then a long family trip will keep me pretty quiet for the foreseeable future. 

 

All the best,

 

Nick

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Cc: [hidden email]; [hidden email]

Sent: 6/26/2009 5:05:49 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

See below (again)

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles
Cell phone: [phone]
o Check out my blog at http://bluecatblog.wordpress.com/

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 3:18 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Dear Friam,

 

this is probably just Abbot and Thompson going around the track again, so you have my permission to disregard.

 

comments below: 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Cc: [hidden email]

Sent: 6/26/2009 2:37:28 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

I was afraid you would say that. But a statement like that raises the dishonest (disingenuous?) flag for me.  If we focus on "salty" you know what it's like to taste something that's salty. You said so yourself. "Well it's ... salty." That's more than just doing salty or seeing salty.  You didn't say that it's not like anything.

You said it's salty, implying that you have an experience of saltiness when you taste salt.  That's an example of a qualia.

nst---> NOOOOOOOO! NO! and NO!.  It just means I have tasted the stuff in the cylindrical blue box with the word SALT on it.  And why can't I just be wrong, by the way.  Why do I have to be a liar. 

But what does it mean to have tasted the stuff?

Furthermore (and I know I'm going to regret giving you two things to reply to), even if you can say you know what it is to do happy (or salty), that still implies a first person perspective.

 

nst---> Is this a typo?  I said I didnt know.  At least, I said I didnt know the "Nyuh" of happiness.

You said (emphasis added), "I am afraid it is "nyuh blindness".  I certainly know what it is to do happy, and see happy, but "be" happy causes the little hourglass on my screen to freeze."

My question is what do you mean by the italicized part?  And especially by the "I certainly know" part?

 

 

After all, what is it like to know what something is in the sense that you just used that phrase. That's the point I've been trying to make in last few messages. We don't need to insist on qualia.  Just the simple fact of knowing what something is, implies a first person that is doing the knowing.

 

nst---> No.  I just implies a point of view from which the world appears that way.  But we may be bypassing each other here.  Eric and I have already stipulated that it is possible to include oneself in one's own point of view and thus to "know" onceself;  I think we are denying only that there is anything special about doing so.  No "Nyuh".  Have you seen some the wierd stuff that is coming from these people?  http://www.neuro.ki.se/ehrsson/publications.php  Oddly enough, I am sure you will see it as confirming your view, just as i see it as confirming mine.

 

  We got stuck on knowledge as true belief when I tried this tack before. Here I'm using know in the sense that you intended it (whatever that sense is) in your statement.  Perhaps it would be useful for you to explain what you meant by that statement. In other words, what is it to know what it is to do happy?

 

nst---> The same as to know how to play chess. 

And what does that mean?

 

 

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 10:08 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ,

 

I am afraid it is "nyuh blindness".  I certainly know what it is to do happy, and see happy, but "be" happy causes the little hourglass on my screen to freeze.

 

N

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Cc: [hidden email]; [hidden email]

Sent: 6/26/2009 12:14:49 AM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Well, that's one reason I resisted talking about qualia.  The point is that you can't explain what it's like to taste salt. So your first instinct, "well, it's just .....salty!" is the right answer for those of us who talk about qualia. So qualia are experiences about which one can't say much more than "Well it's just  ... <whatever the experience is>" The question then is how do we understand/explain/talk about such phenomena from a scientific perspective.

 

When you way that you don't understand what Qualia mean are you saying that you have no idea what the term is trying to get at or that the defintion as written doesn't do a good job of conveying its meaning, which you more or less understand.  If the former (that you have no idea what the term is trying to get at) would you also say that you don't know what feeling happy, sad, nauseous (again) mean? We've probably been over this too many times, but this seems to be one of the sticking points. 

But if you ignore qualia, what about the rest of what I wrote, that no matter what perspective one is talking about, the simple abiltiy to have a perspective implies a first person?

 

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 1:46 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ --

 

Perhaps the problem is that I don't understand what Qualia means.  Here is the quote from

 

http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/q.htm#qualia

 

"The intrinsic phenomenal features of subjective consciousness, or sense data. Thus, qualia include what it is like to see green grass, to taste salt, to hear birds sing, to have a headache, to feel pain, etc. Providing an adequate account of qualia is sometimes held to be a difficult problem for functionalist explanations of mental states."

 

I just canNOT make sense of this passage. [NB, that behaviorism is sort of a school of functionalism].   Let's take seriously the Question, "What is it like to taste salt? "  As I wrestle with it, I come up with two equally unsatisfying answers.  "well, it's just .....salty!"   Unsatisfying, because no new information added.

 

Or "It's like tasting  sea water."   Which is ok by me, but I am pretty sure wont satisfy you.   Hans Wallach was a senior professor at Swarthmore when I came there to replace their behaviorist for a couple of years.  Whenever he talked about qualia he talked about the "Nyuh" of an experience.  "Nyuh" was always accompanied by forming a cone with the thumb and forefingers of one hand and twitchily inclining the hand toward one's audience.  Ultimately, they had to let me go because I never could figure out what "Nyuh" was.  I would have taken this on myself except the man I replaced  never came back either.   So, it wouldn't surprise me, Russ, if we could never agree on the "Nyuh".   Perhaps I am "Nyuh blind."

 

Nick  

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email];[hidden email]

Sent: 6/25/2009 9:12:05 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Hi Nick,

 

Your reply to Rikus didn't answer my questions. 

 

You're right that I didn't mean knowledge in the sense of true belief.  What I'm really talking about are qualia, but I didn't want to introduce that term.  Besides, it's more than just qualia. And it's not just first vs. third person. It's that to speak of any perspective implies someone/something having that perspective, which seems to me to be first person for that person/thing.  I don't see how one can get away from a first person perspective if one wants to talk about knowledge, belief, experience, perspective, or any other term that we use for abstracted experience. 

 

I'm using the term "abstracted" to refer to virtually any version of experience that has been processed into a more abstract than the lowest level of physics such as photons, electrons, etc. Whatever is doing that processing has its own (unique) abstracted version of that experience.

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 12:45 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Yeah.  I just moved a cleaned up version on the wires. 

 

I am beginning to wonder if the definition of "knowledge" isn't the problem here.  To philosophers, knowledge means "true belief".  (See, for instance http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/k9.htm#know).    So, for something to be knowledge, it has to be true from two points of view: the person who believes the knowledge and .... er ..... um ...God's.  Or at least, some universal point of view like the one imagined in our discussion of "information." 

 

Here is where I may have created a problem. For years I have thought that having to know what God thinks  in order to judge whether somebody knows something or not is really stupid.   God's consciousness, after all, is even more opaque than most.  So, for me, I use knowledge and belief pretty much interchangeably. 

 

Could it be that this is why I don't understand Russ when he speaks of subjective knowledge?   

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email];[hidden email]

Sent: 6/25/2009 8:24:49 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

But I didn't want to exclude you either.

 

Whether it's from a point of view or not, the issue I was getting at is what does it mean to say that someone knows something -- and if you asked him would say that he feels reasonably confident about that knowledge.  And I'm thinking primarily of knowledge derived from direct experience (like the sun being out or the color of the wall he is staring at), not knowlwedge based on having read something.  But Rikus' example gets at the same sort of thing in a much more worked out way. So dealing with his questions would be good way to proceed.

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 12:03 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ,

 

I wasnt invited to answer this one, but... isnt your question incomplete?  Isnt knowledge always from a point of view? 

 

"what about [you, me, he] knowing that the sun is out (assuming that it is)."

 

Professor Buttinski

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Sent: 6/24/2009 8:45:22 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Thanks, Eric. My question had to do with the (f)act of knowing anything rather than what it is that is known.  Your discussion has to do with knowing a mind and the 1st vs 3rd person perspective.  What about simply knowing that the sun is out (assume it is) or that the sky is blue (assume you are under a cloudless blue  sky). From your perspective do you see a 1st/3rd person perspective when the subject matter is not someone's mind?

-- Russ

On Wed, Jun 24, 2009 at 11:57 AM, ERIC P. CHARLES <[hidden email]> wrote:

My understanding is that the terms 1st and 3rd person arose as ways of talking about literary styles - and our use of them is metaphorical. An essential part of the metaphor is that authors writing in 1st person are typically granted privileged license to write about the mind of "I". In contrast, people writing in (a non-omniscient) 3rd person, are typically not granted as much license to write about the minds. This is not entirely true, as people writing in 3rd person write about minds all the time, but their writings are considered more vulnerable to dispute. For example, if Obama wrote an account of his inauguration and said "I was terrified", it would be considered less vulnerable to dispute than if I wrote an account of his inauguration and said "He was terrified". If these linguistic conventions become reified then we can start taking the "I" not merely to denote the speaker/viewer, but to denote an entity in possession of unique powers that justify the privileges commonly granted to the linguistic device. This is suggested as my understanding of the history, independent of any value judgment regarding the reification.

There is a lurking problem, however, as these conventions do not always seem to hold in the real world. The most glairing probelm is that, at least sometimes, "I" can be wrong about my own mind and "He" can be right. (The cause of my error can range from simply not paying attention to what I am doing, to intentional self-delusion, to forgetting - think Alzheimer's.) For some, these problems lead to an urge to collapse categories, to see if the oddness cannot be gotten rid of if we leave behind the notion of uniqueness that goes with having distinct labels. I suppose that on some formal level, when a dichotomy collapses into a monism, it might not be particularly important which category label remains. However, one category may be preferred over another because it originally contained properties that the author wishes to retain as implicit or explicit in the monistic system that remains. These properties are ported along with word into the monistic system, because the term retains sway as a metaphor.

In this case, the historical bias has been to retain only the "I" position. In this move, the "I" retains its unique insight about ourselves, and any insight we think we have about others must be treated purely as insight about ourselves, i.e. the mind that I know as "their mind" is really just a sub-part of my mind. This leads to extreme forms of idealism (where all the world exists merely as an idea), the two mind problem (is it ever possible for two minds to know the some object?), etc., etc. These were huge turn of the 20th century challenges for philosophy, having grown out of a tradition of pushing more and more extreme the distinguished lineage of ideas flowing from Descartes, Kant, Berkeley, etc. The problems, for the most part, remain. In the extreme form, at least, this lineage leads to a heavy intellectual paralysis, as it is not possible for any "I" to know any other "I", nor to know the "real world" (should such a thing even exist).

The alternative (assuming we are to retain one of the original labels), is to have a bias for the "He" position. This leads to extreme forms of realism, and often (but not always) to behaviorism. In this move, the "I" has to get its information about the mind in the same that "He" has to get information. That is, if my brother knows my mind by observing my behavior, then I can only know my mind by observing my behavior. (Note, that the assertion about observing behavior is a secondary postulate, supplimenting the fundamental assertion that the method of knowing must be the same.)

There are, presumably, things that the I-biased position handles well (I don't know what they are, but there must be some). I know there are things the He-biased position handles well. Among other things it allows us to better understand perfectly normal and mundane conversations such as:

A) "You are angry"
B) "No I'm not"
A) "Yes you are dear. I've known you long enough to know when you're angry."
B) "I think I'd know when I was angry"
A) "You usually don't dear"
... several hours later
B) "Wow, you were right, I was angry. I didn't realize it at the time. I'm sorry"

The I-biased position understands these conversations as very elaborate shell games, where the first statement means something like: "The you that is in my head is currently being modeled by me as having a first-person experience of anger which is itself modeled after my unique first-person experience of anger". Worse, the last sentence seems (to me) totally incoherent from the I-biased position. The He-biased position much more simply believes that a person's anger is visible to himself and others if the right things are attended to, and hence the conversation requires no shell game. Person B simply comes to attend aspects of the situation that A was attending from the start.

Now I will admit that the He-biased perspective has trouble in some situations, but those can't really be discussed until the position is at least understood in the situations it handles well.

Eric

On Wed, Jun 24, 2009 04:05 AM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:

Now that we've arrived safely in Canberra, here's my loose end.

A number of people have talked about 1st person vs 3rd person perspectives.  What I'd like to know is what you all mean by a 3rd person perspective.  And what I'd really like to know is why what you mean by a 3rd person perspective isn't the
1st person experience of that perspective. In other words, what does one mean by a perspective or view at all. If someone/something has a view, it's not important (for what I think we're talking about) what the view is viewing. What's important is that someone/something has that view. The viewer then has a 1st person perspective of whatever is being viewed. If what is being viewed has something to do with the viewer, that's neither here nor there.

The more abstract way of saying this is that meaning occurs only in a first person context. Without meaning, all we have are bits, photons, ink on paper, etc. If you want to talk about meaning at all -- whether it's the meaning of a first or third person perspective -- one has already assumed that there is a first person that is understanding that meaning. 

Now since Nick and I seem to have reached an agreement about our positions, I'm not sure whether Nick will disagree with what I've just said.  So, Nick, if you are in agreement, please don't take this as a challenge. In fact, whether or not you agree I think it would be interesting for others on the list to respond to this point. On the other hand, Nick I'm not asking you not to respond -- in agreement of disagreement. I'm always interested in what you have to say.

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles
Cell phone: [phone]
o Check out my blog at http://bluecatblog.wordpress.com/

On Mon, Jun 22, 2009 at 10:03 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Steve,

 

You asked

 

"How (if at all) does this fit into the 3rd/1st person discussion this all started with?"

 

To be honest, I never tried to fit them together before.  You are demanding reflexivity here ... that my principles concerning how to conduct a discussion be consistent with the argument I am presenting within the discussion.   Always a useful demand. The best I can say is that both seem to embody my belief that in all matters of the mind, if we are willing to work hard enough, we can stand shoulder to shoulder and look at the same thing. 

 

By the way, a couple of you have indicated that you didn't get answers to questions you directed at me, and you rose to my defense.  I confess I got a bit over whelmed there for a while and started selecting questions for answer that I thought I could handle cleanly (as opposed to muddily).  Please if there were lose ends, push them at me again. 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Steve Smith

To: [hidden email];The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group

Sent: 6/22/2009 10:13:50 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation

Nicholas Thompson wrote:

Russ, and Glen, and Steve, n all

 

Ironically, I am with Russ on this one!  I believe both in the possibility and the benefits of clarity. 

I expected that when Russ and I were done, we would be able to agree on an articulation of our positions, where they are similar, where different, etc.  In fact, one of the skills I most revere is the ability to state another person's position to that person's satisfaction.  And, in fact, at one point, I thought I had achieved such an articulation, only to have Russ tell me I had got it wrong.   My guess is that Russ has his feet deeply in Kant, and I have neither boots nor courage high enough to go in there after him.  My son, who is a philosopher, has as good as looked me in the eye and said, "You aint man enough to read Kant!"

 

I studied Kant when I was too young and foolish to know better... but then I had been raised on folks like Ayn Rand and Robert Heinlein so Kant was no challenge.   Today I think I would find Kant a bit intimidating.

I am curious about the implications of "one of the skills I most revere is the ability to state another person's position to that person's satisfaction".  It seems to have implications on the root discussion...   The two ways I can obtain a high degree of confidence that I am communicating with another is if I can articulate their position to their satisfaction and vice versa...    I prefer the former over the latter... in the sense that I am almost never satisfied in their articulation... at most I accept it with some reservations.   But if they can keep a straight face while I reel off my version of their understanding of a point, then I try hard not to think too hard about it and call it good.  How (if at all) does this fit into the 3rd/1st person discussion this all started with?

- Steve

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601

Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[Russ Abbott]

Nick,

I'm sorry you won't be available. After all, you provided the material we were all railing against. But even more, I like talking to you. I hope that the medical stuff goes well. My best wishes on that--and I hope the family trip is enjoyable.

Of course, it's completely unfair of you to flake out of the conversation just when I asked the key questions--the ones about what it means to know in the sense that you used it.  I had a whole reply prepared for the answer I expected, which had to do with rules.  That is I thought you would be talking about rules that reflect/contain/represent your knowledge.  I was then going to talk about how that sounded like a Cartesian Theater if there was some sort of agent processing those rules. But now I can't use it -- although of course I just did.

Anyway, best wishes for the next couple of seeks.

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 8:10 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

 

 

Russ,

 

As you have discovered by now, one of my fondest bits of ideology is that if two people that  disagree talk long enough and honestly enough,  they will come, eventually, at least to a characterization of the difference between them with which they can both agree.  Yet that characterization eludes me.  This discourages me more than any of the many weaknesses and oversights in my position that I have discovered during our conversation. 

 

I keep hoping that some one of the lurkers ... if there still are any ... might come up with a characterization of the difference of opinion that would put both of us out of our misery ... .  Perhaps that person might be [hidden email]

 ?

But until that happens, I think I have to concede the floor to you.   In any case, medical stuff next week and then a long family trip will keep me pretty quiet for the foreseeable future. 

 

All the best,

 

Nick

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Cc: [hidden email]; [hidden email]

Sent: 6/26/2009 5:05:49 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

See below (again)

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles
Cell phone: [phone]
o Check out my blog at http://bluecatblog.wordpress.com/

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 3:18 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Dear Friam,

 

this is probably just Abbot and Thompson going around the track again, so you have my permission to disregard.

 

comments below: 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Cc: [hidden email]

Sent: 6/26/2009 2:37:28 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

I was afraid you would say that. But a statement like that raises the dishonest (disingenuous?) flag for me.  If we focus on "salty" you know what it's like to taste something that's salty. You said so yourself. "Well it's ... salty." That's more than just doing salty or seeing salty.  You didn't say that it's not like anything.

You said it's salty, implying that you have an experience of saltiness when you taste salt.  That's an example of a qualia.

nst---> NOOOOOOOO! NO! and NO!.  It just means I have tasted the stuff in the cylindrical blue box with the word SALT on it.  And why can't I just be wrong, by the way.  Why do I have to be a liar. 

But what does it mean to have tasted the stuff?

Furthermore (and I know I'm going to regret giving you two things to reply to), even if you can say you know what it is to do happy (or salty), that still implies a first person perspective.

 

nst---> Is this a typo?  I said I didnt know.  At least, I said I didnt know the "Nyuh" of happiness.

You said (emphasis added), "I am afraid it is "nyuh blindness".  I certainly know what it is to do happy, and see happy, but "be" happy causes the little hourglass on my screen to freeze."

My question is what do you mean by the italicized part?  And especially by the "I certainly know" part?

 

 

After all, what is it like to know what something is in the sense that you just used that phrase. That's the point I've been trying to make in last few messages. We don't need to insist on qualia.  Just the simple fact of knowing what something is, implies a first person that is doing the knowing.

 

nst---> No.  I just implies a point of view from which the world appears that way.  But we may be bypassing each other here.  Eric and I have already stipulated that it is possible to include oneself in one's own point of view and thus to "know" onceself;  I think we are denying only that there is anything special about doing so.  No "Nyuh".  Have you seen some the wierd stuff that is coming from these people?  http://www.neuro.ki.se/ehrsson/publications.php  Oddly enough, I am sure you will see it as confirming your view, just as i see it as confirming mine.

 

  We got stuck on knowledge as true belief when I tried this tack before. Here I'm using know in the sense that you intended it (whatever that sense is) in your statement.  Perhaps it would be useful for you to explain what you meant by that statement. In other words, what is it to know what it is to do happy?

 

nst---> The same as to know how to play chess. 

And what does that mean?

 

 

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 10:08 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ,

 

I am afraid it is "nyuh blindness".  I certainly know what it is to do happy, and see happy, but "be" happy causes the little hourglass on my screen to freeze.

 

N

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Cc: [hidden email]; [hidden email]

Sent: 6/26/2009 12:14:49 AM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Well, that's one reason I resisted talking about qualia.  The point is that you can't explain what it's like to taste salt. So your first instinct, "well, it's just .....salty!" is the right answer for those of us who talk about qualia. So qualia are experiences about which one can't say much more than "Well it's just  ... <whatever the experience is>" The question then is how do we understand/explain/talk about such phenomena from a scientific perspective.

 

When you way that you don't understand what Qualia mean are you saying that you have no idea what the term is trying to get at or that the defintion as written doesn't do a good job of conveying its meaning, which you more or less understand.  If the former (that you have no idea what the term is trying to get at) would you also say that you don't know what feeling happy, sad, nauseous (again) mean? We've probably been over this too many times, but this seems to be one of the sticking points. 

But if you ignore qualia, what about the rest of what I wrote, that no matter what perspective one is talking about, the simple abiltiy to have a perspective implies a first person?

 

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 1:46 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ --

 

Perhaps the problem is that I don't understand what Qualia means.  Here is the quote from

 

http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/q.htm#qualia

 

"The intrinsic phenomenal features of subjective consciousness, or sense data. Thus, qualia include what it is like to see green grass, to taste salt, to hear birds sing, to have a headache, to feel pain, etc. Providing an adequate account of qualia is sometimes held to be a difficult problem for functionalist explanations of mental states."

 

I just canNOT make sense of this passage. [NB, that behaviorism is sort of a school of functionalism].   Let's take seriously the Question, "What is it like to taste salt? "  As I wrestle with it, I come up with two equally unsatisfying answers.  "well, it's just .....salty!"   Unsatisfying, because no new information added.

 

Or "It's like tasting  sea water."   Which is ok by me, but I am pretty sure wont satisfy you.   Hans Wallach was a senior professor at Swarthmore when I came there to replace their behaviorist for a couple of years.  Whenever he talked about qualia he talked about the "Nyuh" of an experience.  "Nyuh" was always accompanied by forming a cone with the thumb and forefingers of one hand and twitchily inclining the hand toward one's audience.  Ultimately, they had to let me go because I never could figure out what "Nyuh" was.  I would have taken this on myself except the man I replaced  never came back either.   So, it wouldn't surprise me, Russ, if we could never agree on the "Nyuh".   Perhaps I am "Nyuh blind."

 

Nick  

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email];[hidden email]

Sent: 6/25/2009 9:12:05 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Hi Nick,

 

Your reply to Rikus didn't answer my questions. 

 

You're right that I didn't mean knowledge in the sense of true belief.  What I'm really talking about are qualia, but I didn't want to introduce that term.  Besides, it's more than just qualia. And it's not just first vs. third person. It's that to speak of any perspective implies someone/something having that perspective, which seems to me to be first person for that person/thing.  I don't see how one can get away from a first person perspective if one wants to talk about knowledge, belief, experience, perspective, or any other term that we use for abstracted experience. 

 

I'm using the term "abstracted" to refer to virtually any version of experience that has been processed into a more abstract than the lowest level of physics such as photons, electrons, etc. Whatever is doing that processing has its own (unique) abstracted version of that experience.

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 12:45 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Yeah.  I just moved a cleaned up version on the wires. 

 

I am beginning to wonder if the definition of "knowledge" isn't the problem here.  To philosophers, knowledge means "true belief".  (See, for instance http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/k9.htm#know).    So, for something to be knowledge, it has to be true from two points of view: the person who believes the knowledge and .... er ..... um ...God's.  Or at least, some universal point of view like the one imagined in our discussion of "information." 

 

Here is where I may have created a problem. For years I have thought that having to know what God thinks  in order to judge whether somebody knows something or not is really stupid.   God's consciousness, after all, is even more opaque than most.  So, for me, I use knowledge and belief pretty much interchangeably. 

 

Could it be that this is why I don't understand Russ when he speaks of subjective knowledge?   

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email];[hidden email]

Sent: 6/25/2009 8:24:49 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

But I didn't want to exclude you either.

 

Whether it's from a point of view or not, the issue I was getting at is what does it mean to say that someone knows something -- and if you asked him would say that he feels reasonably confident about that knowledge.  And I'm thinking primarily of knowledge derived from direct experience (like the sun being out or the color of the wall he is staring at), not knowlwedge based on having read something.  But Rikus' example gets at the same sort of thing in a much more worked out way. So dealing with his questions would be good way to proceed.

-- Russ

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 12:03 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ,

 

I wasnt invited to answer this one, but... isnt your question incomplete?  Isnt knowledge always from a point of view? 

 

"what about [you, me, he] knowing that the sun is out (assuming that it is)."

 

Professor Buttinski

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Sent: 6/24/2009 8:45:22 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

Thanks, Eric. My question had to do with the (f)act of knowing anything rather than what it is that is known.  Your discussion has to do with knowing a mind and the 1st vs 3rd person perspective.  What about simply knowing that the sun is out (assume it is) or that the sky is blue (assume you are under a cloudless blue  sky). From your perspective do you see a 1st/3rd person perspective when the subject matter is not someone's mind?

-- Russ

On Wed, Jun 24, 2009 at 11:57 AM, ERIC P. CHARLES <[hidden email]> wrote:

My understanding is that the terms 1st and 3rd person arose as ways of talking about literary styles - and our use of them is metaphorical. An essential part of the metaphor is that authors writing in 1st person are typically granted privileged license to write about the mind of "I". In contrast, people writing in (a non-omniscient) 3rd person, are typically not granted as much license to write about the minds. This is not entirely true, as people writing in 3rd person write about minds all the time, but their writings are considered more vulnerable to dispute. For example, if Obama wrote an account of his inauguration and said "I was terrified", it would be considered less vulnerable to dispute than if I wrote an account of his inauguration and said "He was terrified". If these linguistic conventions become reified then we can start taking the "I" not merely to denote the speaker/viewer, but to denote an entity in possession of unique powers that justify the privileges commonly granted to the linguistic device. This is suggested as my understanding of the history, independent of any value judgment regarding the reification.

There is a lurking problem, however, as these conventions do not always seem to hold in the real world. The most glairing probelm is that, at least sometimes, "I" can be wrong about my own mind and "He" can be right. (The cause of my error can range from simply not paying attention to what I am doing, to intentional self-delusion, to forgetting - think Alzheimer's.) For some, these problems lead to an urge to collapse categories, to see if the oddness cannot be gotten rid of if we leave behind the notion of uniqueness that goes with having distinct labels. I suppose that on some formal level, when a dichotomy collapses into a monism, it might not be particularly important which category label remains. However, one category may be preferred over another because it originally contained properties that the author wishes to retain as implicit or explicit in the monistic system that remains. These properties are ported along with word into the monistic system, because the term retains sway as a metaphor.

In this case, the historical bias has been to retain only the "I" position. In this move, the "I" retains its unique insight about ourselves, and any insight we think we have about others must be treated purely as insight about ourselves, i.e. the mind that I know as "their mind" is really just a sub-part of my mind. This leads to extreme forms of idealism (where all the world exists merely as an idea), the two mind problem (is it ever possible for two minds to know the some object?), etc., etc. These were huge turn of the 20th century challenges for philosophy, having grown out of a tradition of pushing more and more extreme the distinguished lineage of ideas flowing from Descartes, Kant, Berkeley, etc. The problems, for the most part, remain. In the extreme form, at least, this lineage leads to a heavy intellectual paralysis, as it is not possible for any "I" to know any other "I", nor to know the "real world" (should such a thing even exist).

The alternative (assuming we are to retain one of the original labels), is to have a bias for the "He" position. This leads to extreme forms of realism, and often (but not always) to behaviorism. In this move, the "I" has to get its information about the mind in the same that "He" has to get information. That is, if my brother knows my mind by observing my behavior, then I can only know my mind by observing my behavior. (Note, that the assertion about observing behavior is a secondary postulate, supplimenting the fundamental assertion that the method of knowing must be the same.)

There are, presumably, things that the I-biased position handles well (I don't know what they are, but there must be some). I know there are things the He-biased position handles well. Among other things it allows us to better understand perfectly normal and mundane conversations such as:

A) "You are angry"
B) "No I'm not"
A) "Yes you are dear. I've known you long enough to know when you're angry."
B) "I think I'd know when I was angry"
A) "You usually don't dear"
... several hours later
B) "Wow, you were right, I was angry. I didn't realize it at the time. I'm sorry"

The I-biased position understands these conversations as very elaborate shell games, where the first statement means something like: "The you that is in my head is currently being modeled by me as having a first-person experience of anger which is itself modeled after my unique first-person experience of anger". Worse, the last sentence seems (to me) totally incoherent from the I-biased position. The He-biased position much more simply believes that a person's anger is visible to himself and others if the right things are attended to, and hence the conversation requires no shell game. Person B simply comes to attend aspects of the situation that A was attending from the start.

Now I will admit that the He-biased perspective has trouble in some situations, but those can't really be discussed until the position is at least understood in the situations it handles well.

Eric

On Wed, Jun 24, 2009 04:05 AM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:

Now that we've arrived safely in Canberra, here's my loose end.

A number of people have talked about 1st person vs 3rd person perspectives.  What I'd like to know is what you all mean by a 3rd person perspective.  And what I'd really like to know is why what you mean by a 3rd person perspective isn't the
1st person experience of that perspective. In other words, what does one mean by a perspective or view at all. If someone/something has a view, it's not important (for what I think we're talking about) what the view is viewing. What's important is that someone/something has that view. The viewer then has a 1st person perspective of whatever is being viewed. If what is being viewed has something to do with the viewer, that's neither here nor there.

The more abstract way of saying this is that meaning occurs only in a first person context. Without meaning, all we have are bits, photons, ink on paper, etc. If you want to talk about meaning at all -- whether it's the meaning of a first or third person perspective -- one has already assumed that there is a first person that is understanding that meaning. 

Now since Nick and I seem to have reached an agreement about our positions, I'm not sure whether Nick will disagree with what I've just said.  So, Nick, if you are in agreement, please don't take this as a challenge. In fact, whether or not you agree I think it would be interesting for others on the list to respond to this point. On the other hand, Nick I'm not asking you not to respond -- in agreement of disagreement. I'm always interested in what you have to say.

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles
Cell phone: [phone]
o Check out my blog at http://bluecatblog.wordpress.com/

On Mon, Jun 22, 2009 at 10:03 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Steve,

 

You asked

 

"How (if at all) does this fit into the 3rd/1st person discussion this all started with?"

 

To be honest, I never tried to fit them together before.  You are demanding reflexivity here ... that my principles concerning how to conduct a discussion be consistent with the argument I am presenting within the discussion.   Always a useful demand. The best I can say is that both seem to embody my belief that in all matters of the mind, if we are willing to work hard enough, we can stand shoulder to shoulder and look at the same thing. 

 

By the way, a couple of you have indicated that you didn't get answers to questions you directed at me, and you rose to my defense.  I confess I got a bit over whelmed there for a while and started selecting questions for answer that I thought I could handle cleanly (as opposed to muddily).  Please if there were lose ends, push them at me again. 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Steve Smith

To: [hidden email];The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group

Sent: 6/22/2009 10:13:50 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation

Nicholas Thompson wrote:

Russ, and Glen, and Steve, n all

 

Ironically, I am with Russ on this one!  I believe both in the possibility and the benefits of clarity. 

I expected that when Russ and I were done, we would be able to agree on an articulation of our positions, where they are similar, where different, etc.  In fact, one of the skills I most revere is the ability to state another person's position to that person's satisfaction.  And, in fact, at one point, I thought I had achieved such an articulation, only to have Russ tell me I had got it wrong.   My guess is that Russ has his feet deeply in Kant, and I have neither boots nor courage high enough to go in there after him.  My son, who is a philosopher, has as good as looked me in the eye and said, "You aint man enough to read Kant!"

 

I studied Kant when I was too young and foolish to know better... but then I had been raised on folks like Ayn Rand and Robert Heinlein so Kant was no challenge.   Today I think I would find Kant a bit intimidating.

I am curious about the implications of "one of the skills I most revere is the ability to state another person's position to that person's satisfaction".  It seems to have implications on the root discussion...   The two ways I can obtain a high degree of confidence that I am communicating with another is if I can articulate their position to their satisfaction and vice versa...    I prefer the former over the latter... in the sense that I am almost never satisfied in their articulation... at most I accept it with some reservations.   But if they can keep a straight face while I reel off my version of their understanding of a point, then I try hard not to think too hard about it and call it good.  How (if at all) does this fit into the 3rd/1st person discussion this all started with?

- Steve

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Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601

Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601

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[Russ Abbott]

Hi Eric,

Sorry to be so blunt, but bullshit.  You have completely misrepresented my position.  It's a lot of fun and I'm sure you feel quite righteous arguing against dualism. And of course the best way to do that is to assert that what you are taking arms against is a version of dualism.  But that's not what I'm saying. I'll reply briefly to your comments below.

-- Russ

P.S. Since this is heating up again, I've added the list back to the addressees.

On Wed, Jul 1, 2009 at 9:07 AM, Eric Charles <[hidden email]> wrote:

Greetings all,
I have just discovered that this conversation was happening off list, and being sent to an email that gets checked less frequently. Weighing in on the difference between positions, I am tempted to say that at this point it has distilled to a simple and straightforward axiomatic difference as follows:

Russ asserts, on principle, that experiencing an object always and necessarily involves more than just an experience of the object. Whereas Nick asserts, on principle, that experiencing an object involves nothing more than you and the object in a relation.

I have no idea what you mean by saying that I assert "that experiencing an object always and necessarily involves more than just an experience of the object."  I assert that experiencing an object is what the word "qualia" refers to. Qualia are the experiencings of an object.

It seems to me that the issue comes down to what we mean by "to experience." Since you and Nick use the word, I assume you don't object to it as part of your position.  I challenge you to tell me what you mean by it.  I'll even go first.

My basic position is that experiencing occurs in the brain while in a state of wakeful alertness.  You won't experience salt by cutting out your tongue and touching it to salt. Similarly you won't experience salt by having your tongue touched to it while you are asleep. (One could argue about having a dream that is triggered by that touching, but let's not go there at least now.) If you prefer, I would say that you don't experience salt when under anesthetic. 

I can imagine many more refined test cases against which to ask whether experiencing occurs,.   But lets start with these.  Do you agree or disagree?  And in either case, what is your definition of "to experience"?

Of course I really just put off the hard question by using the term "wakeful alertness."  What do I mean by wakeful alertness? That's very difficult, and what that means is another way of characterizing what we are talking about. My position is that we don't know enough to fully say what we mean by wakeful alertness. What is your position on that? Does wakeful alertness come into your version of experiencing? If so what you mean by it? 

More generally it sounds like you are claiming to know all the answers to these questions. Is that true? If not, what do you think is left to be better understood?

Russ asserts the existence of qualia. Qualia are things about the objects of our experience that are not themselves part of the objects of our experience. That is, Russ admits that we taste salt through the physical/physiological process indicated by "taste salt", but asserts that the taste of salt itself is not a property of salt, nor even of salt in relation to ourselves.

I have no idea what you mean by saying that I assert that the taste of salt is not a property of salt, nor even of salt in relation to ourselves.  Please don't misrepresent what I said.
 

Nick asserts that what you taste when tasting salt... is salt. Thus Nick denies the existence of qualia, in so much as the term refers to something apart from the events themselves. Whatever people are referring to when they say "qualia", Nick believes it must be either something about the physical object itself or something objectively present in the relation between the perceiver and the object, and thus it is not otherworldly or additional in any way.

Thus, both Russ and Nick taste salt, that is NOT the point of disagreement! Nick's position is a modern version of the ancient one - a monistic-realist stance. Russ's position is the traditional western-philosophy one - a dualistic-idealist stance.

As I said, I'm sure you feel righteous arguing against dualism. And to do that you have to paint whatever it is you are arguing against as dualism.  How about giving up the labels and discussing the actual issues.
 

It usually takes at least a little effort to convince people to take up the dualistic position, sometimes a lot of effort. (Did you know that before Western Philosophy was introduced to Japan in the 1870's, there were no words with which to express a subjective-objective distinction?!? Once the terms were introduced, the public had to be actively lobbied to accept the distinction. Takasuna, 2007) However, the dualistic position is considered such a basic unit of philosophical discourse today, that most learned men and woman in have been convinced of it at some point in their schooling. I know from my own experience that, once convinced, it is a difficult thought to let go of. However, just because the realist position it is hard to (re)accept, should not mean that it is this hard to understand.

Eric

Takasuna, M. (2007). Proliferation of Western methodological thought in psychology in Japan: Ways to objectification. Integrative Physiological and Behavioral Science, 41


Russ Abbott wrote:

I agree with you absolutely. This is not a meta issue. Qualia are not claims about meta-anything. You keep trying to pin that label on it. But it's not.  Qualia is your experience as the tongue comes in contact with salt. You cannot tell me with a straight face that you don't have an experience of salt when that happens. More is happening than your tongue physically touching salt. It wouldn't be the same if one cut out your tongue and touched it to salt.

It seems to me that you are mis-representing me when you say

*  "The [between us] question is, "Does one need to know "salty" to know salt:  R says, " Yes"; Nick says "No"**"*
**
You are playing with words. You seems to want the high ground of direct experience. Well you can't have it. Whatever it is that happens in your awareness as your tongue touches salt and you are alive and alert is the quale of salt. I imagine you can twist that around to make it sound meta. If you do, you are being dishonest. Unless you can say that nothing happens in your awareness as your tongue touches salt, then you know what qualia are. To deny it is to be a dishonest conversational partner,

-- Russ

On Sun, Jun 28, 2009 at 6:53 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote:

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[Robert Holmes]

On Wed, Jul 1, 2009 at 5:35 PM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:

<snip>

P.S. Since this is heating up again, I've added the list back to the addressees.

 

Please God no.

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[Eric Charles]

Assuming most on the list are in agreement with Robert, I will reply through the smaller group that seems to have maintained interest in this issue. If any are interested in being included, let me know.

Eric

P.S. As many seemed to have expressed interest in Rikus's questions, I would still be interest to know if my answers satisfied anyone.


On Wed, Jul 1, 2009 07:41 PM, Robert Holmes <[hidden email]> wrote:

On Wed, Jul 1, 2009 at 5:35 PM, Russ Abbott <russ.abbott@...> wrote:

<snip>

P.S. Since this is heating up again, I've added the list back to the addressees.

 

Please God no.

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Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601

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[Rikus Combrinck]

Thanks for the care that went into your reply, Eric.  I'm working on a response, but it may take a little while.  In answer to Robert's prayer, I'll post to the smaller group.

 

Regards,

Rikus

 

From: [hidden email]

Sent: Thursday, July 02, 2009 6:43 AM

To: [hidden email]

Cc: [hidden email]

Subject: [FRIAM] "Please God no"

Assuming most on the list are in agreement with Robert, I will reply through the smaller group that seems to have maintained interest in this issue. If any are interested in being included, let me know.

Eric

P.S. As many seemed to have expressed interest in Rikus's questions, I would still be interest to know if my answers satisfied anyone.

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[Nick Thompson]

Dear List,

 

Does one grumpy comment a consensus make?

 

I can see how the philosophy of mind, a qualia, etc., might not be everybody's cup of tea, but certainly it's well within FRIAM's domain and the discussion has drawn out some new and interesting folks.  Eh? (As we Canadians say?).

 

Back in a week.

 

N

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

 

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Sent: 7/1/2009 5:42:59 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person

On Wed, Jul 1, 2009 at 5:35 PM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:

<snip>

P.S. Since this is heating up again, I've added the list back to the addressees.

 

Please God no.

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[Owen Densmore]

Please understand that the majority of FRIAM folks simply delete these  
and press on.

Please understand that one or more FRIAMers politely asked for  
summaries and did not receive them.

Please understand that "Please God no" is a form of netiquette.  It is  
a vote, not a censure.

I for one would expect more formalism in this discussion.  I believe  
most of your discussion could be placed in a set-theoretic framework  
and I would prefer that.

Most philosophical discussions of this ilk simply end in semantic  
deadly embrace.  They are eventually resolved, if ever, at great cost  
of word length.  The Kolmodorov complexity is quite low:
   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity
in that much compression could be attained.

That said, you must understand that "Please God no" is a very high  
information content string that should be considered, not as censure,  
but as information.

Do with it what you will.

     -- Owen


On Jul 2, 2009, at 7:07 AM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:

> Dear List,
>
> Does one grumpy comment a consensus make?
>
> I can see how the philosophy of mind, a qualia, etc., might not be  
> everybody's cup of tea, but certainly it's well within FRIAM's  
> domain and the discussion has drawn out some new and interesting  
> folks.  Eh? (As we Canadians say?).
>
> Back in a week.
>
> N
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
> Clark University ([hidden email])
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Robert Holmes
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Sent: 7/1/2009 5:42:59 PM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person
>
>
> On Wed, Jul 1, 2009 at 5:35 PM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]>  
> wrote:
> <snip>
>
> P.S. Since this is heating up again, I've added the list back to the  
> addressees.
>
>
> Please God no.
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

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[Steve Smith]

Owen Densmore wrote:
> I for one would expect more formalism in this discussion.  I believe
> most of your discussion could be placed in a set-theoretic framework
> and I would prefer that.
Please god no!  <grin>


Seriously... as one of the guilty parties in the aforementioned
discussion, I am happy either way....  on or off list.   This could be
because I've mostly lost my own momentum on this one, and it could be
because I am very facile with skipping FRIAM discussions I don't find
engaging.

In any case, I think Owen's assessment is good...  Robert's comment did
appear to be very high-information content (layers of literality, irony,
sarcasm, humor, etc.) and as Owen suggested, "a vote", not a censure.

I appreciate Nick's contributions to FRIAM and hope that he is not
discouraged by the lack of consensus interest in some of his topics and
modes of discussion.  

- Steve

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[Nick Thompson]

Owen,

(1)Yes,  I do assume that most people delete these messages and press on,
as I delete  most (but not all) messages  about ... say ... the the latest
4.0.17a.alpha version of Groovy on Rails.  

Different stroke for different folks.

(2)Lord we tried on the summaries.  Unfortunately we couldnt agree
sufficiently to produce a synopsis.  

(3) I am aware that you believe the following:

> Most philosophical discussions of this ilk simply end in semantic  
> deadly embrace.  They are eventually resolved, if ever, at great cost  
> of word length.  The Kolmodorov complexity is quite low:
>    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity
> in that much compression could be attained.

And, accordingly,  our inabiliity to produce such a summary distressed me
deeply.  This  I take to be not as a failiure of philosphy but a failure on
my (our) part to do it right, but I fear you will draw another conclusion.
.  

all the best,

nick



 

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/




> [Original Message]
> From: Owen Densmore <[hidden email]>
> To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity
Coffee Group <[hidden email]>

> Date: 7/2/2009 8:45:41 AM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person
>
> Please understand that the majority of FRIAM folks simply delete these  
> and press on.
>
> Please understand that one or more FRIAMers politely asked for  
> summaries and did not receive them.
>
> Please understand that "Please God no" is a form of netiquette.  It is  
> a vote, not a censure.
>
> I for one would expect more formalism in this discussion.  I believe  
> most of your discussion could be placed in a set-theoretic framework  
> and I would prefer that.
>
> Most philosophical discussions of this ilk simply end in semantic  
> deadly embrace.  They are eventually resolved, if ever, at great cost  
> of word length.  The Kolmodorov complexity is quite low:
>    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity
> in that much compression could be attained.
>
> That said, you must understand that "Please God no" is a very high  
> information content string that should be considered, not as censure,  
> but as information.
>
> Do with it what you will.
>
>      -- Owen
>
>
> On Jul 2, 2009, at 7:07 AM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
>
> > Dear List,
> >
> > Does one grumpy comment a consensus make?
> >
> > I can see how the philosophy of mind, a qualia, etc., might not be  
> > everybody's cup of tea, but certainly it's well within FRIAM's  
> > domain and the discussion has drawn out some new and interesting  
> > folks.  Eh? (As we Canadians say?).
> >
> > Back in a week.
> >
> > N
> >
> > Nicholas S. Thompson
> > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
> > Clark University ([hidden email])
> > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: Robert Holmes
> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> > Sent: 7/1/2009 5:42:59 PM
> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Jul 1, 2009 at 5:35 PM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]>  
> > wrote:
> > <snip>
> >
> > P.S. Since this is heating up again, I've added the list back to the  
> > addressees.
> >
> >
> > Please God no.
> > ============================================================
> > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

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[Steve Smith]

Owen -

Most philosophical discussions of this ilk simply end in semantic deadly embrace.  They are eventually resolved, if ever, at great cost of word length.

I agree with the sentiment, but if we were to caste this into a set-theoretic (or algebraic) framework, I think we would find some interesting features.   I'm not sure, however, that such discussions can truly be placed into a formalism.   I would find it interesting (entertaining, instructive) if you could elaborate how you think such a mapping would be done.   I believe these discussions to (naturally, inherently) transcend formal logic.

The Kolmodorov complexity is quite low:
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity
in that much compression could be attained.

I think someone did try to formulate an algorithmic description of the discussion:

1.     Read everything written in the Western Philosophical Tradition
2.     Focus on Kant
3.     Focus on the New Realists
4.     Think real hard about all of the above
5.     Lay in the grass and intend to get up without doing so (my contribution)
6.     Discuss your interpretation of 3, 2, 1
7.     Go to 4

But methinks this is tantamount to getting several large carpets to cover up the many small ones already hiding large piles of dust and litter swept under them.

Apologies to Nick, Russ, Eric, et al.  for (perhaps) being too flip here.   I respect the earnestness and the information content that is in the discussion, despite the difficulty in finding any convergence.

Carry On!

- Steve



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[Marcus G. Daniels]

Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> (1)Yes,  I do assume that most people delete these messages and press on,
> as I delete  most (but not all) messages  about ... say ... the the latest
> 4.0.17a.alpha version of Groovy on Rails.  
>  
Firefox 3.5 is released with the trace-tree jitting implementation of
JavaScript and native Ogg video!

:-)


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[Owen Densmore]

Thank you Nick, good explanation.  And Steve -- we actually started  
down this road on the thermodynamic formulation of ABM .. Guerin-
Speak .. with some success.

Much more generally: There is a rift between the formal and  
philosophic that I have a partial solution for.  Both are VSI (Very  
Short Introduction) books.
   http://www.amazon.com/dp/0192853619/
   http://www.amazon.com/dp/0192854119/

The first is the Mathematics VSI.  It is written by Timothy Gowers and  
really does get the reader into the mind of mathematics folks.  Gowers  
is a Fields Medalist -- the Nobel for math.  And he is driven by a  
Wittgenstein understanding of abstraction.  Gowers' discussion of a  
5th dimensional cube is a wonderful example. He constantly comes back  
to the type of abstraction he prefers: very clean and focused on the  
properties under discussion.

The second is the Wittgenstein VSI, to bind Gowers' math with his  
inspiration, Wittgenstein.  I've not finished this one (I've got a  
digital version and have just sent for the paper one) but there is  
hope we might actually find a connection between the more  
philosophical discussions and a formalism for them.

I'd be very interested in this endeavor.

     -- Owen


On Jul 2, 2009, at 9:14 AM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:

> Owen,
>
> (1)Yes,  I do assume that most people delete these messages and  
> press on,
> as I delete  most (but not all) messages  about ... say ... the the  
> latest
> 4.0.17a.alpha version of Groovy on Rails.
>
> Different stroke for different folks.
>
> (2)Lord we tried on the summaries.  Unfortunately we couldnt agree
> sufficiently to produce a synopsis.
>
> (3) I am aware that you believe the following:
>
>> Most philosophical discussions of this ilk simply end in semantic
>> deadly embrace.  They are eventually resolved, if ever, at great cost
>> of word length.  The Kolmodorov complexity is quite low:
>>   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity
>> in that much compression could be attained.
>
> And, accordingly,  our inabiliity to produce such a summary  
> distressed me
> deeply.  This  I take to be not as a failiure of philosphy but a  
> failure on
> my (our) part to do it right, but I fear you will draw another  
> conclusion.
> .
>
> all the best,
>
> nick

On Jul 2, 2009, at 9:27 AM, Steve Smith wrote:

> Owen -
>> Most philosophical discussions of this ilk simply end in semantic  
>> deadly embrace.  They are eventually resolved, if ever, at great  
>> cost of word length.
> I agree with the sentiment, but if we were to caste this into a set-
> theoretic (or algebraic) framework, I think we would find some  
> interesting features.   I'm not sure, however, that such discussions  
> can truly be placed into a formalism.   I would find it interesting  
> (entertaining, instructive) if you could elaborate how you think  
> such a mapping would be done.   I believe these discussions to  
> (naturally, inherently) transcend formal logic.
>> The Kolmodorov complexity is quite low:
>>   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity
>> in that much compression could be attained.
> I think someone did try to formulate an algorithmic description of  
> the discussion:
>
> •     Read everything written in the Western Philosophical Tradition
> •     Focus on Kant
> •     Focus on the New Realists
> •     Think real hard about all of the above
> •     Lay in the grass and intend to get up without doing so (my  
> contribution)
> •     Discuss your interpretation of 3, 2, 1
> •     Go to 4
> But methinks this is tantamount to getting several large carpets to  
> cover up the many small ones already hiding large piles of dust and  
> litter swept under them.
>
> Apologies to Nick, Russ, Eric, et al.  for (perhaps) being too flip  
> here.   I respect the earnestness and the information content that  
> is in the discussion, despite the difficulty in finding any  
> convergence.
>
> Carry On!
>
> - Steve

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[Steve Smith]

Owen Densmore wrote:

Thank you Nick, good explanation.  And Steve -- we actually started down this road on the thermodynamic formulation of ABM .. Guerin-Speak .. with some success.

Much more generally: There is a rift between the formal and philosophic that I have a partial solution for.  Both are VSI (Very Short Introduction) books.
  http://www.amazon.com/dp/0192853619/
  http://www.amazon.com/dp/0192854119/

The first is the Mathematics VSI.  It is written by Timothy Gowers and really does get the reader into the mind of mathematics folks.  Gowers is a Fields Medalist -- the Nobel for math.  And he is driven by a Wittgenstein understanding of abstraction.  Gowers' discussion of a 5th dimensional cube is a wonderful example. He constantly comes back to the type of abstraction he prefers: very clean and focused on the properties under discussion.

The second is the Wittgenstein VSI, to bind Gowers' math with his inspiration, Wittgenstein.  I've not finished this one (I've got a digital version and have just sent for the paper one) but there is hope we might actually find a connection between the more philosophical discussions and a formalism for them.

I'd be very interested in this endeavor.

Count me in... I'll go dust off my  Witty Wittgenstein and take a Gander at Gowers .  

I am a *total* sucker for formalisms about interesting things even though all of my philosophy professors, and at least one (each) of my math/physics professors beat me about the head and shoulder's with Godel (and others) to try to break me of that bad habit.

Let's check back in after we (myself and anyone else) has done some (more) homework...

- Sieve




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[Nick Thompson]

Hey!  I am ALL over that!  I am THERE!

N

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/




> [Original Message]
> From: Marcus G. Daniels <[hidden email]>
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 7/2/2009 9:29:20 AM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person
>
> Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> > (1)Yes,  I do assume that most people delete these messages and press
on,
> > as I delete  most (but not all) messages  about ... say ... the the
latest

> > 4.0.17a.alpha version of Groovy on Rails.  
> >  
> Firefox 3.5 is released with the trace-tree jitting implementation of
> JavaScript and native Ogg video!
>
> :-)
>
>
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[Victoria Hughes]

Subtitled  "So where's that blender about Epistomology?"

Hello all-

As a lurker and occasional leaper in frays herein, an open question,

re discussions that involve philosophy, perception, paradigms, etc:

> If the desire is to know and then to know more, to find things out by asking and referring to others who have asked, why does the conversation only draw from a particular tradition, generally identifiable as western philosophical  eurocentric thought ? 

There is so much information, applicable and important to these discussions from other areas of western science - neuroscience, developmental biology, cognitive psychology, and more. 

Then, of course, there is the entire rest of the world, with vast fields of empirical investigation and scientific methodology in other cultures and eras. 

Those examinations themselves have influenced the discussion here, whether you are aware of it in the moment or not. Humans everywhere have been arguing about all this since we could communicate. Arguments and philosophies arose, then traders and explorers would travel and exchange ideas, and then the church somewhere would say no, which galvanized others' interests, who then took the knowledge further...

Their jargon is as specialized as yours, but the desire to know, and the areas explored, are the same.

The desire to understand these concepts seems to be a fundamental human urge.

This is a genuine question, because I have spent a lifetime investigating with great rigor the same questions you all discuss here.  I am driven to look everywhere for answers, since my goal is knowledge of the world, and of myself in it. Limiting myself is not intellectually defensible to me.

That youall, intelligent and educated persons, seem to contain your investigations must have a reason.  

If I know your reason, then my leaps into the fray here can be more germane to your conversation and not just to my own  (and perhaps to those other lurkers who write, but do not 'send' as quickly as me).

I have attempted to phrase this in as non-judgemental a way as possible: I am not interested in trying to exert my viewpoint, but to understand your choice of platform for these discussions. 

Thank you-

Tory

In philosophy, empiricism is a theory of knowledge which asserts that knowledge arises from experience. Empiricism is one of several competing views about how we know "things," part of the branch of philosophy called epistemology, or "the Theory of Knowledge". Empiricism emphasizes the role of experience and evidence, especiallysensory perception, in the formation of ideas, while discounting the notion of innate ideas (except in so far as these might be inferred from empirical reasoning, as in the case of genetic predisposition).^[1]

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