Friam

Peirce & Postmordernism

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Prof David West

Peirce & Postmordernism

Peirce:

"To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."

The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to Peirce in general.

1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably, affected by our thoughts:
a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between an external permanency and internal thought?
b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?

2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking, or, at least, human attention."
a. Are there 'Real things'?

3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over another..
a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'?

4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of] reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together, constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, not congruence with any "external permanency."
a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses?
b. What are the "laws of perception?"
c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow, and intolerant, orthodoxy?

davew

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Gary Schiltz-4

Re: Peirce & Postmordernism

The observer problem. Does it require a human to do the observation? What about a parrot? A chimpanzee? An amoeba? A Turing machine?

On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 9:47 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:

Peirce:

"To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."

The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to Peirce in general.

1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably, affected by our thoughts:
a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between an external permanency and internal thought?
b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?

2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking, or, at least, human attention."
a. Are there 'Real things'?

3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over another..
a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'?

4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of] reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together, constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, not congruence with any "external permanency."
a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses?
b. What are the "laws of perception?"
c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow, and intolerant, orthodoxy?

davew

-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
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-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
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Marcus G. Daniels

Re: Peirce & Postmordernism

This experiment involves a post-selection by “Alice”, which is surely a Turing machine.

https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.7790

From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Gary Schiltz <[hidden email]>
Reply-To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Date: Saturday, May 23, 2020 at 8:15 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Peirce & Postmordernism

The observer problem. Does it require a human to do the observation? What about a parrot? A chimpanzee? An amoeba? A Turing machine?

On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 9:47 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:

Peirce:

"To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."

The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to Peirce in general.

1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably, affected by our thoughts:
a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between an external permanency and internal thought?
b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?

2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking, or, at least, human attention."
a. Are there 'Real things'?

3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over another..
a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'?

4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of] reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together, constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, not congruence with any "external permanency."
a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses?
b. What are the "laws of perception?"
c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow, and intolerant, orthodoxy?

davew

-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
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Steve Smith

Re: Peirce & Postmordernism

In reply to this post by Gary Schiltz-4

On 5/23/20 9:15 AM, Gary Schiltz wrote:

The observer problem. Does it require a human to do the observation? What about a parrot? A chimpanzee? An amoeba? A Turing machine?

God, Gawdess, Gaia, Collective Intelligence?

On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 9:47 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:

Peirce:

"To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."

The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to Peirce in general.

1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably, affected by our thoughts:
a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between an external permanency and internal thought?
b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?

2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking, or, at least, human attention."
a. Are there 'Real things'?

3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over another..
a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'?

4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of] reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together, constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, not congruence with any "external permanency."
a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses?
b. What are the "laws of perception?"
c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow, and intolerant, orthodoxy?

davew

-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
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Prof David West

Re: Peirce & Postmordernism

In reply to this post by Gary Schiltz-4

Those are the nuances of the "problem" it might be a non-cognizing entity.

On Sat, May 23, 2020, at 9:15 AM, Gary Schiltz wrote:

The observer problem. Does it require a human to do the observation? What about a parrot? A chimpanzee? An amoeba? A Turing machine?

On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 9:47 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:
Peirce:

"To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."

The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to Peirce in general.

1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably, affected by our thoughts:
a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between an external permanency and internal thought?
b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?

2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking, or, at least, human attention."
a. Are there 'Real things'?

3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over another..
a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'?

4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of] reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together, constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, not congruence with any "external permanency."
a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses?
b. What are the "laws of perception?"
c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow, and intolerant, orthodoxy?

davew

-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
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-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
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Frank Wimberly-2

Re: Peirce & Postmordernism

In reply to this post by Steve Smith

A chimp yes; all the rest no. I had a friend who had an African Gray parrot. He could say a number of things but there was no "there" there.

In my opinion.

On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 1:57 PM Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:

On 5/23/20 9:15 AM, Gary Schiltz wrote:

The observer problem. Does it require a human to do the observation? What about a parrot? A chimpanzee? An amoeba? A Turing machine?

God, Gawdess, Gaia, Collective Intelligence?
On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 9:47 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:

Peirce:

"To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."

The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to Peirce in general.

1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably, affected by our thoughts:
a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between an external permanency and internal thought?
b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?

2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking, or, at least, human attention."
a. Are there 'Real things'?

3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over another..
a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'?

4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of] reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together, constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, not congruence with any "external permanency."
a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses?
b. What are the "laws of perception?"
c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow, and intolerant, orthodoxy?

davew

-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
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-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
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-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
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Frank Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918

David Eric Smith

Re: Peirce & Postmordernism

There was a joke Martin Shubik used to like to tell about academics. Excuse me; about parrots.

A man sells parrots. They have different costs, colors, habits, etc.

This one here’s pretty but not too expensive, he can say 5 words.

This one’s more expensive; he can say 50 words.

This African Grey is really expensive; he can say 250 words.

Customer looks at a very ugly parrot with a very high price. How many words can this one say, to be so expensive?

Salesman: That parrot doesn’t say any words.

Customer: Then why the cost?

Salesman: That parrot can think.

On May 24, 2020, at 6:16 AM, Frank Wimberly <[hidden email]> wrote:
A chimp yes; all the rest no. I had a friend who had an African Gray parrot. He could say a number of things but there was no "there" there.

In my opinion.
On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 1:57 PM Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:
On 5/23/20 9:15 AM, Gary Schiltz wrote:

The observer problem. Does it require a human to do the observation? What about a parrot? A chimpanzee? An amoeba? A Turing machine?

God, Gawdess, Gaia, Collective Intelligence?
On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 9:47 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:

Peirce:

"To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."

The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to Peirce in general.

1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably, affected by our thoughts:
a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between an external permanency and internal thought?
b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?

2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking, or, at least, human attention."
a. Are there 'Real things'?

3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over another..
a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'?

4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of] reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together, constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, not congruence with any "external permanency."
a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses?
b. What are the "laws of perception?"
c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow, and intolerant, orthodoxy?

davew

-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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--
Frank Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918
-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
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thompnickson2

Re: Peirce & Postmordernism

In reply to this post by Frank Wimberly-2

Why draw lines?

https://alexfoundation.org/about/dr-irene-pepperberg/

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Saturday, May 23, 2020 3:17 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Peirce & Postmordernism

A chimp yes; all the rest no. I had a friend who had an African Gray parrot. He could say a number of things but there was no "there" there.

In my opinion.

On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 1:57 PM Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:

On 5/23/20 9:15 AM, Gary Schiltz wrote:
The observer problem. Does it require a human to do the observation? What about a parrot? A chimpanzee? An amoeba? A Turing machine?
God, Gawdess, Gaia, Collective Intelligence?
On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 9:47 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:
Peirce:

"To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."

The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to Peirce in general.

1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably, affected by our thoughts:
a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between an external permanency and internal thought?
b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?

2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking, or, at least, human attention."
a. Are there 'Real things'?

3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over another..
a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'?

4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of] reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together, constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, not congruence with any "external permanency."
a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses?
b. What are the "laws of perception?"
c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow, and intolerant, orthodoxy?

davew

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Frank Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918

Eric Charles-2

Re: Peirce & Postmordernism

In reply to this post by Prof David West

Dave,

These are very good questions. The Fixation of Belief is one of Peirce's writings that I really like. It is a non-technical piece written very early in his career. If we had serious Peirce scholars amongst us, they would go on for years about how that paper relates to Peirce's later and more precise works. It is a deep rabbit hole. Luckily, we don't have that problem.

1. Is Peirce a dualist? - I think he is trying hard not to be, but he still has some lingering bits that make me wonder if he's fully cut the cord. I suspect that at this stage of his career he would say that beliefs and thoughts are real. Later, in his career, he comes to believe that only "generals" are "real", and that's a whole different can of worms. His work on what we might broadly call "psychology" is probably the weakest part of his work.

2. What about quantum physics and the "observer" problem? I'm not sure this intersects with Peirce's work. I suspect Peirce wouldn't like quantum indeterminacy, but he might be fine with it so long as we held the emphasis on how that doesn't really affect interaction with macro objects.

3. Why does Peirce privileged Reason? (weak post-modernism) In the Fixation of Belief, Peirce is pretty honest that the only thing the scientific method has going for it is that it leads to stable beliefs. If you don't care whether or not your beliefs pan out when tested, there are some good reasons to prefer other methods of fixating beliefs. One of my favorite things about that paper is Peirce's honestly that the other methods for fixating beliefs have things in their favor.

4. Why constrain the 'solution space'? (strong post-modernism) Well, Peirce actually thinks there will not be a solution to almost all questions we might think to ask. The question isn't really how to constrain the solution space though, the question is what gets to count as a solution. You can't solve problems that don't exist, so if we are asking questions about things that are not real, we will never find an answer. There might be perfectly good reasons to pretend there are answers to poorly formed questions - to facilitate social cohesion in various ways, to avoid getting killed by fanatics, etc., etc. - but that's a totally different problem. The assertion that some belief is "true" is an assertion about what would happen if we systematically started examining the consequences of that belief. If you want to talk about some other properties a belief might have, that's fine, just don't pretend you are talking about whether or not it is true. And we may "examine the consequences" of a belief using the full scope of examination methods. There are no preconceived restrictions. "Our senses" is meant in the most generous sense, not a narrow one, and merely acknowledges that we cannot examine anything except via the methods by which humans are capable of examining things.

Does that help?

-----------

Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist

American University - Adjunct Instructor

[hidden email]

On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 10:47 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:

Peirce:

"To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."

The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to Peirce in general.

1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably, affected by our thoughts:
a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between an external permanency and internal thought?
b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?

2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking, or, at least, human attention."
a. Are there 'Real things'?

3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over another..
a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'?

4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of] reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together, constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, not congruence with any "external permanency."
a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses?
b. What are the "laws of perception?"
c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow, and intolerant, orthodoxy?

davew

-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
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Prof David West

Re: Peirce & Postmordernism

Eric,

Thank you for the response, it is useful.

The quantum question, poorly stated, challenges Peirce's definition of an external reality "upon which our thinking has no effect." I assume that Peirce would put things like molecules, atoms, and elementary particles in that category - based upon what was known about them when he was writing. But, if the character of the most fundamental of those things — particle or wave, velocity, spin, location, etc. — is determined by human observation/measurement, then they cannot be Real according to Peirce's definition. This looks like an easy conclusion, but I suspect I am missing a nuance somewhere.

My fourth question, also poorly stated, actually claims that any Truths discovered via use of the method are not Truths about any external reality, but merely Truths about application of the rules (reason, sufficient experience, laws of perception, etc.) of the method. A kind of tautology claim: you (Peirce) define what the Truth must be in the definition of the rules of method.

If I am wrong about the "tautology" aspect of my question (high probability), then my position would become: "you (Peirce) have, with your rules of method, so constrained the problem and solution space that your method applies only to a narrowly defined domain. It is not even close to a general method of problem solving or Truth finding; but you (Peirce) seem to be claiming such generality. My counter claim to Peirce: although "the method" might be useful for math, physics, chemistry, etc. it is useless for questions of psychology, cultural anthropology, politics, consciousness, etc.

Ready to be set straight.

davew

On Sat, May 23, 2020, at 7:20 PM, Eric Charles wrote:

Dave,
These are very good questions. The Fixation of Belief is one of Peirce's writings that I really like. It is a non-technical piece written very early in his career. If we had serious Peirce scholars amongst us, they would go on for years about how that paper relates to Peirce's later and more precise works. It is a deep rabbit hole. Luckily, we don't have that problem.

1. Is Peirce a dualist? - I think he is trying hard not to be, but he still has some lingering bits that make me wonder if he's fully cut the cord. I suspect that at this stage of his career he would say that beliefs and thoughts are real. Later, in his career, he comes to believe that only "generals" are "real", and that's a whole different can of worms. His work on what we might broadly call "psychology" is probably the weakest part of his work.

2. What about quantum physics and the "observer" problem? I'm not sure this intersects with Peirce's work. I suspect Peirce wouldn't like quantum indeterminacy, but he might be fine with it so long as we held the emphasis on how that doesn't really affect interaction with macro objects.

3. Why does Peirce privileged Reason? (weak post-modernism) In the Fixation of Belief, Peirce is pretty honest that the only thing the scientific method has going for it is that it leads to stable beliefs. If you don't care whether or not your beliefs pan out when tested, there are some good reasons to prefer other methods of fixating beliefs. One of my favorite things about that paper is Peirce's honestly that the other methods for fixating beliefs have things in their favor.

4. Why constrain the 'solution space'? (strong post-modernism) Well, Peirce actually thinks there will not be a solution to almost all questions we might think to ask. The question isn't really how to constrain the solution space though, the question is what gets to count as a solution. You can't solve problems that don't exist, so if we are asking questions about things that are not real, we will never find an answer. There might be perfectly good reasons to pretend there are answers to poorly formed questions - to facilitate social cohesion in various ways, to avoid getting killed by fanatics, etc., etc. - but that's a totally different problem. The assertion that some belief is "true" is an assertion about what would happen if we systematically started examining the consequences of that belief. If you want to talk about some other properties a belief might have, that's fine, just don't pretend you are talking about whether or not it is true. And we may "examine the consequences" of a belief using the full scope of examination methods. There are no preconceived restrictions. "Our senses" is meant in the most generous sense, not a narrow one, and merely acknowledges that we cannot examine anything except via the methods by which humans are capable of examining things.

Does that help?

-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist
American University - Adjunct Instructor

[hidden email]

On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 10:47 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:
Peirce:

"To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."

The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to Peirce in general.

1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably, affected by our thoughts:
a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between an external permanency and internal thought?
b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?

2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking, or, at least, human attention."
a. Are there 'Real things'?

3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over another..
a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'?

4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of] reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together, constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, not congruence with any "external permanency."
a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses?
b. What are the "laws of perception?"
c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow, and intolerant, orthodoxy?

davew

-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
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Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
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thompnickson2

Re: Peirce & Postmordernism

Hi, dave. See Larding, below.

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 8:58 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Peirce & Postmordernism

Eric,

Thank you for the response, it is useful.

The quantum question, poorly stated, challenges Peirce's definition of an external reality "upon which our thinking has no effect."

[NST=è His formulation was more like “That which is the case, whether or not you, me, or any other finite cognitive system believes it.“ I am not sure there is an important difference there. More important to remember that Peirce’s is an assertion concerning the meaning of the conception “truth”, not an assertion that there is a truth of any matter. It is the definition of truth that makes coherent our behavior with respect to the word.

<===nst]

I assume that Peirce would put things like molecules, atoms, and elementary particles in that category - based upon what was known about them when he was writing.

[NST===>Yes, he would say that they are candidate “reals”. <===nst]

But, if the character of the most fundamental of those things — particle or wave, velocity, spin, location, etc. — is determined by human observation/measurement, then they cannot be Real according to Peirce's definition. This looks like an easy conclusion, but I suspect I am missing a nuance somewhere.

[NST===>Well, here is where I think he would get off the bus. If I can make a true statement of the form, “if I do this procedure, then I will probably get that result, then the elements in that statement are probably real.” Probably true and probably real are all you ever get in Peirce. <===nst]

[NST===>Just keep remembering that the pragmatic maxim is a claim about MEANING, to a metaphysical claim.

Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practicIal bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object..

<===nst]

[NST===>I have a long history in my writing of being allergic to other people’s tautologies, so you have me by the short hair, here. The PragmatiCIst Maxim does place upon you the burden of stating what differences in knowledge-gathering practice your conception of truth makes. If those differences are not practicially obsure, then you have a definition in good standing with Peirce, and science can go on. The opposite of truth in Peirce not falsity (for falsity is a kind of truth) but doubt. If there is nothing upon which we are “fated to agree”, then there is no truth. <===nst]

Ready to be set straight.

[NST===>I am not sure I am in a condition to set anybody straight about anything. You seem to be able to read, during this crisis. I can no more read anything right now than I could during a bad hurricane in a rickety New England farm house. Congratulations. If your MDMA will help me get back to reading, I am for it. <===nst]

davew

On Sat, May 23, 2020, at 7:20 PM, Eric Charles wrote:

Dave,
These are very good questions. The Fixation of Belief is one of Peirce's writings that I really like. It is a non-technical piece written very early in his career. If we had serious Peirce scholars amongst us, they would go on for years about how that paper relates to Peirce's later and more precise works. It is a deep rabbit hole. Luckily, we don't have that problem.

1. Is Peirce a dualist? - I think he is trying hard not to be, but he still has some lingering bits that make me wonder if he's fully cut the cord. I suspect that at this stage of his career he would say that beliefs and thoughts are real. Later, in his career, he comes to believe that only "generals" are "real", and that's a whole different can of worms. His work on what we might broadly call "psychology" is probably the weakest part of his work.

2. What about quantum physics and the "observer" problem? I'm not sure this intersects with Peirce's work. I suspect Peirce wouldn't like quantum indeterminacy, but he might be fine with it so long as we held the emphasis on how that doesn't really affect interaction with macro objects.

3. Why does Peirce privileged Reason? (weak post-modernism) In the Fixation of Belief, Peirce is pretty honest that the only thing the scientific method has going for it is that it leads to stable beliefs. If you don't care whether or not your beliefs pan out when tested, there are some good reasons to prefer other methods of fixating beliefs. One of my favorite things about that paper is Peirce's honestly that the other methods for fixating beliefs have things in their favor.

4. Why constrain the 'solution space'? (strong post-modernism) Well, Peirce actually thinks there will not be a solution to almost all questions we might think to ask. The question isn't really how to constrain the solution space though, the question is what gets to count as a solution. You can't solve problems that don't exist, so if we are asking questions about things that are not real, we will never find an answer. There might be perfectly good reasons to pretend there are answers to poorly formed questions - to facilitate social cohesion in various ways, to avoid getting killed by fanatics, etc., etc. - but that's a totally different problem. The assertion that some belief is "true" is an assertion about what would happen if we systematically started examining the consequences of that belief. If you want to talk about some other properties a belief might have, that's fine, just don't pretend you are talking about whether or not it is true. And we may "examine the consequences" of a belief using the full scope of examination methods. There are no preconceived restrictions. "Our senses" is meant in the most generous sense, not a narrow one, and merely acknowledges that we cannot examine anything except via the methods by which humans are capable of examining things.

Does that help?

-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist
American University - Adjunct Instructor

On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 10:47 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:
Peirce:

"To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."

The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to Peirce in general.

1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably, affected by our thoughts:
a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between an external permanency and internal thought?
b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?

2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking, or, at least, human attention."
a. Are there 'Real things'?

3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over another..
a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'?

4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of] reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together, constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, not congruence with any "external permanency."
a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses?
b. What are the "laws of perception?"
c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow, and intolerant, orthodoxy?

davew

-- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. . ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
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Frank Wimberly-2

Re: Peirce & Postmordernism

That which is the case, whether or not you, me, or any other finite cognitive system believes it.

Did Peirce write that? Shouldn't it be "whether you, I, or any other..."

Nick, don't take Ecstasy.

Frank

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Sun, May 24, 2020, 11:21 AM <[hidden email]> wrote:

Hi, dave. See Larding, below.

Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
[hidden email]
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 8:58 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Peirce & Postmordernism

Eric,

Thank you for the response, it is useful.

The quantum question, poorly stated, challenges Peirce's definition of an external reality "upon which our thinking has no effect."

[NST=è His formulation was more like “That which is the case, whether or not you, me, or any other finite cognitive system believes it.“ I am not sure there is an important difference there. More important to remember that Peirce’s is an assertion concerning the meaning of the conception “truth”, not an assertion that there is a truth of any matter. It is the definition of truth that makes coherent our behavior with respect to the word.
<===nst]
I assume that Peirce would put things like molecules, atoms, and elementary particles in that category - based upon what was known about them when he was writing.
[NST===>Yes, he would say that they are candidate “reals”. <===nst]
But, if the character of the most fundamental of those things — particle or wave, velocity, spin, location, etc. — is determined by human observation/measurement, then they cannot be Real according to Peirce's definition. This looks like an easy conclusion, but I suspect I am missing a nuance somewhere.
[NST===>Well, here is where I think he would get off the bus. If I can make a true statement of the form, “if I do this procedure, then I will probably get that result, then the elements in that statement are probably real.” Probably true and probably real are all you ever get in Peirce. <===nst]

My fourth question, also poorly stated, actually claims that any Truths discovered via use of the method are not Truths about any external reality, but merely Truths about application of the rules (reason, sufficient experience, laws of perception, etc.) of the method. A kind of tautology claim: you (Peirce) define what the Truth must be in the definition of the rules of method.
[NST===>Just keep remembering that the pragmatic maxim is a claim about MEANING, to a metaphysical claim.

Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practicIal bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object..

<===nst]

If I am wrong about the "tautology" aspect of my question (high probability), then my position would become: "you (Peirce) have, with your rules of method, so constrained the problem and solution space that your method applies only to a narrowly defined domain. It is not even close to a general method of problem solving or Truth finding; but you (Peirce) seem to be claiming such generality. My counter claim to Peirce: although "the method" might be useful for math, physics, chemistry, etc. it is useless for questions of psychology, cultural anthropology, politics, consciousness, etc.
[NST===>I have a long history in my writing of being allergic to other people’s tautologies, so you have me by the short hair, here. The PragmatiCIst Maxim does place upon you the burden of stating what differences in knowledge-gathering practice your conception of truth makes. If those differences are not practicially obsure, then you have a definition in good standing with Peirce, and science can go on. The opposite of truth in Peirce not falsity (for falsity is a kind of truth) but doubt. If there is nothing upon which we are “fated to agree”, then there is no truth. <===nst]

Ready to be set straight.
[NST===>I am not sure I am in a condition to set anybody straight about anything. You seem to be able to read, during this crisis. I can no more read anything right now than I could during a bad hurricane in a rickety New England farm house. Congratulations. If your MDMA will help me get back to reading, I am for it. <===nst]

davew

On Sat, May 23, 2020, at 7:20 PM, Eric Charles wrote:
Dave,
These are very good questions. The Fixation of Belief is one of Peirce's writings that I really like. It is a non-technical piece written very early in his career. If we had serious Peirce scholars amongst us, they would go on for years about how that paper relates to Peirce's later and more precise works. It is a deep rabbit hole. Luckily, we don't have that problem.

1. Is Peirce a dualist? - I think he is trying hard not to be, but he still has some lingering bits that make me wonder if he's fully cut the cord. I suspect that at this stage of his career he would say that beliefs and thoughts are real. Later, in his career, he comes to believe that only "generals" are "real", and that's a whole different can of worms. His work on what we might broadly call "psychology" is probably the weakest part of his work.

2. What about quantum physics and the "observer" problem? I'm not sure this intersects with Peirce's work. I suspect Peirce wouldn't like quantum indeterminacy, but he might be fine with it so long as we held the emphasis on how that doesn't really affect interaction with macro objects.

3. Why does Peirce privileged Reason? (weak post-modernism) In the Fixation of Belief, Peirce is pretty honest that the only thing the scientific method has going for it is that it leads to stable beliefs. If you don't care whether or not your beliefs pan out when tested, there are some good reasons to prefer other methods of fixating beliefs. One of my favorite things about that paper is Peirce's honestly that the other methods for fixating beliefs have things in their favor.

4. Why constrain the 'solution space'? (strong post-modernism) Well, Peirce actually thinks there will not be a solution to almost all questions we might think to ask. The question isn't really how to constrain the solution space though, the question is what gets to count as a solution. You can't solve problems that don't exist, so if we are asking questions about things that are not real, we will never find an answer. There might be perfectly good reasons to pretend there are answers to poorly formed questions - to facilitate social cohesion in various ways, to avoid getting killed by fanatics, etc., etc. - but that's a totally different problem. The assertion that some belief is "true" is an assertion about what would happen if we systematically started examining the consequences of that belief. If you want to talk about some other properties a belief might have, that's fine, just don't pretend you are talking about whether or not it is true. And we may "examine the consequences" of a belief using the full scope of examination methods. There are no preconceived restrictions. "Our senses" is meant in the most generous sense, not a narrow one, and merely acknowledges that we cannot examine anything except via the methods by which humans are capable of examining things.

Does that help?

-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist
American University - Adjunct Instructor

On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 10:47 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:
Peirce:

"To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."

The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to Peirce in general.

1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably, affected by our thoughts:
a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between an external permanency and internal thought?
b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?

2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking, or, at least, human attention."
a. Are there 'Real things'?

3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over another..
a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'?

4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of] reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together, constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, not congruence with any "external permanency."
a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses?
b. What are the "laws of perception?"
c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow, and intolerant, orthodoxy?

davew

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Eric Charles-2

Re: Peirce & Postmordernism

In reply to this post by Prof David West

Quantum question, taking out the implication that there is anything special about humans: "if the character of the most fundamental of those things — particle or wave, velocity, spin, location, etc. — is determined by ... measurement, then they cannot be Real according to Peirce's definition."

The answer is: Yes, in a sense, and No, in a different sense. There was a thing that we believed would be real, and we found out that thing is not real. In finding that out, we came to think some other, higher-level thing was real, and so far the experiments seem to bear that other thing out. I'm not an expert in quantum mechanics, so I don't know the currently trendy terminology, but I understand the new "real" to be something like: At a small enough scale, all "objects" exist as probability cloud, and those clouds collapse partially or fully when they interact with other probability clouds.

Of course, like anyone else, Peirce would find that very unintuitive, but I don't see any reason Peirce would rule it out as a candidate Real, assuming it could be .

The question about what Truth means is a different issue all together, as Peirce thinks that is simply a matter of clear thinking. This is spelled out better in "How to Make Your Ideas Clear." All we can ever know about the things we interact with is what happens when they are interacted with. Our conceptions are therefore (to use my phrasing) bundles of anticipated-consequences given different methods of possible interaction. Some of those bundles prove stable despite intense scrutiny. For example, "combustible air" proved unstable as a concept, when put under scrutiny, but "hydrogen" has proven far more stable. The mistake is to think that we can conceive of the inconceivable, to always want to talk about that-of-which-we-cannot-speak.

IF it is the case that there ARE stabilities within the domains of psychology, cultural anthropology, politics, etc., that are every bit as stable as those in chemistry, then there are truths there to be discovered, and we will be in a writhing mess until we get our concepts and methods straightened out much further. That isn't an inherently bad thing in Peirce's view, it is just the current state of the field. We are like chemistry before Lavoisier and his cohort, doing perfectly good systematic work but not yet settled upon the insights we need.

On the other hand, it might be that there ARE NOT such stabilities within the domains of psychology, cultural anthropology, politics, etc. If so, then there is no Truth there to be discovered. In the long run, we will presumably form a consensus that those fields are too poorly conceived for their to be truths in them. This would put us in the same situation as the astrologers, who despite their systematic efforts could find no stable relationship between the locations of the stars in the sky on a particular day and the earthly happenings they wished to predict; all apparent patterns were, at best, temporary stabilities within an ultimately random relationship.

Of course, people still talk about astrology, some with intense seriousness, and others as a form of idle entertainment. When you enjoy a juggling show, you aren't on a quest for truth, and there is no reason you can't enjoy an astrological reading just because nothing about it is true. Maybe that is what all of psychology, cultural anthropology, and politics will be one day? Or maybe not. I don't think psychology as a whole has ever been given a fair shot to science its subject matter domain, certainly the current mainstream of the field is mostly smoke and mirrors. I think it can be done.

-----------

Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist

American University - Adjunct Instructor

[hidden email]

On Sun, May 24, 2020 at 10:59 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:

Eric,

Thank you for the response, it is useful.

The quantum question, poorly stated, challenges Peirce's definition of an external reality "upon which our thinking has no effect." I assume that Peirce would put things like molecules, atoms, and elementary particles in that category - based upon what was known about them when he was writing. But, if the character of the most fundamental of those things — particle or wave, velocity, spin, location, etc. — is determined by human observation/measurement, then they cannot be Real according to Peirce's definition. This looks like an easy conclusion, but I suspect I am missing a nuance somewhere.

My fourth question, also poorly stated, actually claims that any Truths discovered via use of the method are not Truths about any external reality, but merely Truths about application of the rules (reason, sufficient experience, laws of perception, etc.) of the method. A kind of tautology claim: you (Peirce) define what the Truth must be in the definition of the rules of method.

If I am wrong about the "tautology" aspect of my question (high probability), then my position would become: "you (Peirce) have, with your rules of method, so constrained the problem and solution space that your method applies only to a narrowly defined domain. It is not even close to a general method of problem solving or Truth finding; but you (Peirce) seem to be claiming such generality. My counter claim to Peirce: although "the method" might be useful for math, physics, chemistry, etc. it is useless for questions of psychology, cultural anthropology, politics, consciousness, etc.

Ready to be set straight.

davew

On Sat, May 23, 2020, at 7:20 PM, Eric Charles wrote:
Dave,
These are very good questions. The Fixation of Belief is one of Peirce's writings that I really like. It is a non-technical piece written very early in his career. If we had serious Peirce scholars amongst us, they would go on for years about how that paper relates to Peirce's later and more precise works. It is a deep rabbit hole. Luckily, we don't have that problem.

1. Is Peirce a dualist? - I think he is trying hard not to be, but he still has some lingering bits that make me wonder if he's fully cut the cord. I suspect that at this stage of his career he would say that beliefs and thoughts are real. Later, in his career, he comes to believe that only "generals" are "real", and that's a whole different can of worms. His work on what we might broadly call "psychology" is probably the weakest part of his work.

2. What about quantum physics and the "observer" problem? I'm not sure this intersects with Peirce's work. I suspect Peirce wouldn't like quantum indeterminacy, but he might be fine with it so long as we held the emphasis on how that doesn't really affect interaction with macro objects.

3. Why does Peirce privileged Reason? (weak post-modernism) In the Fixation of Belief, Peirce is pretty honest that the only thing the scientific method has going for it is that it leads to stable beliefs. If you don't care whether or not your beliefs pan out when tested, there are some good reasons to prefer other methods of fixating beliefs. One of my favorite things about that paper is Peirce's honestly that the other methods for fixating beliefs have things in their favor.

4. Why constrain the 'solution space'? (strong post-modernism) Well, Peirce actually thinks there will not be a solution to almost all questions we might think to ask. The question isn't really how to constrain the solution space though, the question is what gets to count as a solution. You can't solve problems that don't exist, so if we are asking questions about things that are not real, we will never find an answer. There might be perfectly good reasons to pretend there are answers to poorly formed questions - to facilitate social cohesion in various ways, to avoid getting killed by fanatics, etc., etc. - but that's a totally different problem. The assertion that some belief is "true" is an assertion about what would happen if we systematically started examining the consequences of that belief. If you want to talk about some other properties a belief might have, that's fine, just don't pretend you are talking about whether or not it is true. And we may "examine the consequences" of a belief using the full scope of examination methods. There are no preconceived restrictions. "Our senses" is meant in the most generous sense, not a narrow one, and merely acknowledges that we cannot examine anything except via the methods by which humans are capable of examining things.

Does that help?

-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist
American University - Adjunct Instructor

[hidden email]

On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 10:47 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:
Peirce:

"To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."

The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to Peirce in general.

1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably, affected by our thoughts:
a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between an external permanency and internal thought?
b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?

2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking, or, at least, human attention."
a. Are there 'Real things'?

3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over another..
a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'?

4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of] reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together, constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, not congruence with any "external permanency."
a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses?
b. What are the "laws of perception?"
c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow, and intolerant, orthodoxy?

davew

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thompnickson2

Re: Peirce & Postmordernism

In reply to this post by Frank Wimberly-2

And I am the one around here who is supposed to be snippy about language? Sheesh!

No, that’s not a direct quote from Peirce.

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 11:39 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Peirce & Postmordernism

That which is the case, whether or not you, me, or any other finite cognitive system believes it.

Did Peirce write that? Shouldn't it be "whether you, I, or any other..."

Nick, don't take Ecstasy.

Frank

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Sun, May 24, 2020, 11:21 AM <[hidden email]> wrote:

Hi, dave. See Larding, below.

Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
[hidden email]
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 8:58 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Peirce & Postmordernism

Eric,

Thank you for the response, it is useful.

The quantum question, poorly stated, challenges Peirce's definition of an external reality "upon which our thinking has no effect."

[NST=è His formulation was more like “That which is the case, whether or not you, me, or any other finite cognitive system believes it.“ I am not sure there is an important difference there. More important to remember that Peirce’s is an assertion concerning the meaning of the conception “truth”, not an assertion that there is a truth of any matter. It is the definition of truth that makes coherent our behavior with respect to the word.
<===nst]
I assume that Peirce would put things like molecules, atoms, and elementary particles in that category - based upon what was known about them when he was writing.
[NST===>Yes, he would say that they are candidate “reals”. <===nst]
But, if the character of the most fundamental of those things — particle or wave, velocity, spin, location, etc. — is determined by human observation/measurement, then they cannot be Real according to Peirce's definition. This looks like an easy conclusion, but I suspect I am missing a nuance somewhere.
[NST===>Well, here is where I think he would get off the bus. If I can make a true statement of the form, “if I do this procedure, then I will probably get that result, then the elements in that statement are probably real.” Probably true and probably real are all you ever get in Peirce. <===nst]

My fourth question, also poorly stated, actually claims that any Truths discovered via use of the method are not Truths about any external reality, but merely Truths about application of the rules (reason, sufficient experience, laws of perception, etc.) of the method. A kind of tautology claim: you (Peirce) define what the Truth must be in the definition of the rules of method.
[NST===>Just keep remembering that the pragmatic maxim is a claim about MEANING, to a metaphysical claim.
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practicIal bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object..

<===nst]

If I am wrong about the "tautology" aspect of my question (high probability), then my position would become: "you (Peirce) have, with your rules of method, so constrained the problem and solution space that your method applies only to a narrowly defined domain. It is not even close to a general method of problem solving or Truth finding; but you (Peirce) seem to be claiming such generality. My counter claim to Peirce: although "the method" might be useful for math, physics, chemistry, etc. it is useless for questions of psychology, cultural anthropology, politics, consciousness, etc.
[NST===>I have a long history in my writing of being allergic to other people’s tautologies, so you have me by the short hair, here. The PragmatiCIst Maxim does place upon you the burden of stating what differences in knowledge-gathering practice your conception of truth makes. If those differences are not practicially obsure, then you have a definition in good standing with Peirce, and science can go on. The opposite of truth in Peirce not falsity (for falsity is a kind of truth) but doubt. If there is nothing upon which we are “fated to agree”, then there is no truth. <===nst]

Ready to be set straight.
[NST===>I am not sure I am in a condition to set anybody straight about anything. You seem to be able to read, during this crisis. I can no more read anything right now than I could during a bad hurricane in a rickety New England farm house. Congratulations. If your MDMA will help me get back to reading, I am for it. <===nst]

davew

On Sat, May 23, 2020, at 7:20 PM, Eric Charles wrote:
Dave,
These are very good questions. The Fixation of Belief is one of Peirce's writings that I really like. It is a non-technical piece written very early in his career. If we had serious Peirce scholars amongst us, they would go on for years about how that paper relates to Peirce's later and more precise works. It is a deep rabbit hole. Luckily, we don't have that problem.

1. Is Peirce a dualist? - I think he is trying hard not to be, but he still has some lingering bits that make me wonder if he's fully cut the cord. I suspect that at this stage of his career he would say that beliefs and thoughts are real. Later, in his career, he comes to believe that only "generals" are "real", and that's a whole different can of worms. His work on what we might broadly call "psychology" is probably the weakest part of his work.

2. What about quantum physics and the "observer" problem? I'm not sure this intersects with Peirce's work. I suspect Peirce wouldn't like quantum indeterminacy, but he might be fine with it so long as we held the emphasis on how that doesn't really affect interaction with macro objects.

3. Why does Peirce privileged Reason? (weak post-modernism) In the Fixation of Belief, Peirce is pretty honest that the only thing the scientific method has going for it is that it leads to stable beliefs. If you don't care whether or not your beliefs pan out when tested, there are some good reasons to prefer other methods of fixating beliefs. One of my favorite things about that paper is Peirce's honestly that the other methods for fixating beliefs have things in their favor.

4. Why constrain the 'solution space'? (strong post-modernism) Well, Peirce actually thinks there will not be a solution to almost all questions we might think to ask. The question isn't really how to constrain the solution space though, the question is what gets to count as a solution. You can't solve problems that don't exist, so if we are asking questions about things that are not real, we will never find an answer. There might be perfectly good reasons to pretend there are answers to poorly formed questions - to facilitate social cohesion in various ways, to avoid getting killed by fanatics, etc., etc. - but that's a totally different problem. The assertion that some belief is "true" is an assertion about what would happen if we systematically started examining the consequences of that belief. If you want to talk about some other properties a belief might have, that's fine, just don't pretend you are talking about whether or not it is true. And we may "examine the consequences" of a belief using the full scope of examination methods. There are no preconceived restrictions. "Our senses" is meant in the most generous sense, not a narrow one, and merely acknowledges that we cannot examine anything except via the methods by which humans are capable of examining things.

Does that help?

-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist
American University - Adjunct Instructor

On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 10:47 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:
Peirce:

"To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."

The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to Peirce in general.

1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably, affected by our thoughts:
a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between an external permanency and internal thought?
b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?

2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking, or, at least, human attention."
a. Are there 'Real things'?

3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over another..
a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'?

4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of] reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together, constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, not congruence with any "external permanency."
a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses?
b. What are the "laws of perception?"
c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow, and intolerant, orthodoxy?

davew

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thompnickson2

Re: Peirce & Postmordernism

In reply to this post by Eric Charles-2

I agree with everything Eric says EXCEPT when he says that the first thing he says is unrelated to the second thing he says.

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 11:43 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Peirce & Postmordernism

Of course, like anyone else, Peirce would find that very unintuitive, but I don't see any reason Peirce would rule it out as a candidate Real, assuming it could be .

-----------

Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist

American University - Adjunct Instructor

On Sun, May 24, 2020 at 10:59 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:

Eric,

Thank you for the response, it is useful.

The quantum question, poorly stated, challenges Peirce's definition of an external reality "upon which our thinking has no effect." I assume that Peirce would put things like molecules, atoms, and elementary particles in that category - based upon what was known about them when he was writing. But, if the character of the most fundamental of those things — particle or wave, velocity, spin, location, etc. — is determined by human observation/measurement, then they cannot be Real according to Peirce's definition. This looks like an easy conclusion, but I suspect I am missing a nuance somewhere.

My fourth question, also poorly stated, actually claims that any Truths discovered via use of the method are not Truths about any external reality, but merely Truths about application of the rules (reason, sufficient experience, laws of perception, etc.) of the method. A kind of tautology claim: you (Peirce) define what the Truth must be in the definition of the rules of method.

If I am wrong about the "tautology" aspect of my question (high probability), then my position would become: "you (Peirce) have, with your rules of method, so constrained the problem and solution space that your method applies only to a narrowly defined domain. It is not even close to a general method of problem solving or Truth finding; but you (Peirce) seem to be claiming such generality. My counter claim to Peirce: although "the method" might be useful for math, physics, chemistry, etc. it is useless for questions of psychology, cultural anthropology, politics, consciousness, etc.

Ready to be set straight.

davew

On Sat, May 23, 2020, at 7:20 PM, Eric Charles wrote:
Dave,
These are very good questions. The Fixation of Belief is one of Peirce's writings that I really like. It is a non-technical piece written very early in his career. If we had serious Peirce scholars amongst us, they would go on for years about how that paper relates to Peirce's later and more precise works. It is a deep rabbit hole. Luckily, we don't have that problem.

1. Is Peirce a dualist? - I think he is trying hard not to be, but he still has some lingering bits that make me wonder if he's fully cut the cord. I suspect that at this stage of his career he would say that beliefs and thoughts are real. Later, in his career, he comes to believe that only "generals" are "real", and that's a whole different can of worms. His work on what we might broadly call "psychology" is probably the weakest part of his work.

2. What about quantum physics and the "observer" problem? I'm not sure this intersects with Peirce's work. I suspect Peirce wouldn't like quantum indeterminacy, but he might be fine with it so long as we held the emphasis on how that doesn't really affect interaction with macro objects.

3. Why does Peirce privileged Reason? (weak post-modernism) In the Fixation of Belief, Peirce is pretty honest that the only thing the scientific method has going for it is that it leads to stable beliefs. If you don't care whether or not your beliefs pan out when tested, there are some good reasons to prefer other methods of fixating beliefs. One of my favorite things about that paper is Peirce's honestly that the other methods for fixating beliefs have things in their favor.

4. Why constrain the 'solution space'? (strong post-modernism) Well, Peirce actually thinks there will not be a solution to almost all questions we might think to ask. The question isn't really how to constrain the solution space though, the question is what gets to count as a solution. You can't solve problems that don't exist, so if we are asking questions about things that are not real, we will never find an answer. There might be perfectly good reasons to pretend there are answers to poorly formed questions - to facilitate social cohesion in various ways, to avoid getting killed by fanatics, etc., etc. - but that's a totally different problem. The assertion that some belief is "true" is an assertion about what would happen if we systematically started examining the consequences of that belief. If you want to talk about some other properties a belief might have, that's fine, just don't pretend you are talking about whether or not it is true. And we may "examine the consequences" of a belief using the full scope of examination methods. There are no preconceived restrictions. "Our senses" is meant in the most generous sense, not a narrow one, and merely acknowledges that we cannot examine anything except via the methods by which humans are capable of examining things.

Does that help?

-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist
American University - Adjunct Instructor

On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 10:47 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:
Peirce:

"To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."

The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to Peirce in general.

1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably, affected by our thoughts:
a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between an external permanency and internal thought?
b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?

2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking, or, at least, human attention."
a. Are there 'Real things'?

3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over another..
a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'?

4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of] reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together, constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, not congruence with any "external permanency."
a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses?
b. What are the "laws of perception?"
c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow, and intolerant, orthodoxy?

davew

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