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Pascal's Wager and Kant's Categorical Imperative

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Nick Thompson

Pascal's Wager and Kant's Categorical Imperative

David,

Can you explain this relation a bit further. Sorry if I am being dim, but I did not quite understand your comment. Let's say we are on the QE2 which, for some reason is inclined to be a bit tippy. We notice that the passengers are gathering on the right side of the ship, which is OK so long as the water is calm, but would be disastrous if a storm came. We have no particular reason to believe that a storm is coming, except that half the meteorologists in the Captain's meteorological committee think that there is. You and I get together and decide that it would be a good idea for some of us to move over to the other side of the boat. Now, certainly this is not a CATEGORICAL imperative. I certainly cannot will that EVERYBODY go over to the other side of the boat. So what kind of an imperative is it. How is it possible for everybody to act so that the boat is in balance. This would have everybody constantly moving from one side of the boat to the other, like one of those models of neighborhood integration where either the neighborhood is unintegrated or everybody is unhappy.

How DOES one square Kant with ABM's???

And what did it have to do with Pascal's Wager in the first place?

Nick

----- Original Message -----
From: David Breecker
To: nickthompson at earthlink.net;The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Sent: 8/13/2007 4:31:20 PM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Pascal's Wager and Global Warming

Kant's Categorical Imperative is the answer: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative

He defined an imperative as any proposition that declares a certain action (or inaction) to be necessary. A hypothetical imperative would compel action in a given circumstance: If I wish to satisfy my thirst, then I must drink something. A categorical imperative would denote an absolute, unconditional requirement that exerts its authority in all circumstances, both required and justified as an end in itself. It is best known in its first formulation: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." [1]

db

On Aug 13, 2007, at 3:53 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:

All,

The best argument for worrying about global warming presented so far in
this interesting correspondence is the one that says it costs us relatively
little to worry about it and and costs us LOT if we dont.

Sort of like Pascal's argument for prayer, right?

Nicholas S. Thompson
Research Associate, Redfish Group, Santa Fe, NM (nick at redfish.com)
Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University (nthompson at clarku.edu)
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David Breecker

Pascal's Wager and Kant's Categorical Imperative

Sorry Nick, I inadvertantly omitted your key question to which I was
replying, which was:

>>I do worry about complexity thinking leading to fatalism. If a
goddamned
butterfly can cause a climate crash, why take responsibility for
ANYTHING
we do. We should all be dionysians.

I think Kant offers a solid explanation for why one should (must) act
"responsibly." At the very least, he's the only reason I vote in
Presidential elections. More tomorrow if folks are still interested,
when I'm less Dionysian and more sober-- I mean, Apollonian ;-)

And BTW, I think the Pascal analogy is excellent, with due attention
to Marcus' caveat about measurability.
db

On Aug 13, 2007, at 10:05 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:

>
> David,
>
> Can you explain this relation a bit further. Sorry if I am being
> dim, but I did not quite understand your comment. Let's say we
> are on the QE2 which, for some reason is inclined to be a bit
> tippy. We notice that the passengers are gathering on the right
> side of the ship, which is OK so long as the water is calm, but
> would be disastrous if a storm came. We have no particular reason
> to believe that a storm is coming, except that half the
> meteorologists in the Captain's meteorological committee think that
> there is. You and I get together and decide that it would be a
> good idea for some of us to move over to the other side of the
> boat. Now, certainly this is not a CATEGORICAL imperative. I
> certainly cannot will that EVERYBODY go over to the other side of
> the boat. So what kind of an imperative is it. How is it possible
> for everybody to act so that the boat is in balance. This would
> have everybody constantly moving from one side of the boat to the
> other, like one of those models of neighborhood integration where
> either the neighborhood is unintegrated or everybody is unhappy.
>
> How DOES one square Kant with ABM's???
>
> And what did it have to do with Pascal's Wager in the first place?
>
> Nick
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: David Breecker
> To: nickthompson at earthlink.net;The Friday Morning Applied
> Complexity Coffee Group
> Sent: 8/13/2007 4:31:20 PM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Pascal's Wager and Global Warming
>
> Kant's Categorical Imperative is the answer: http://
> en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative
>
> He defined an imperative as any proposition that declares a certain
> action (or inaction) to be necessary. A hypothetical imperative
> would compel action in a given circumstance: If I wish to satisfy
> my thirst, then I must drink something. A categorical imperative
> would denote an absolute, unconditional requirement that exerts its
> authority in all circumstances, both required and justified as an
> end in itself. It is best known in its first formulation: "Act only
> according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that
> it should become a universal law." [1]
>
> db
>
>
> On Aug 13, 2007, at 3:53 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
>
>> All,
>>
>> The best argument for worrying about global warming presented so
>> far in
>> this interesting correspondence is the one that says it costs us
>> relatively
>> little to worry about it and and costs us LOT if we dont.
>>
>> Sort of like Pascal's argument for prayer, right?
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Research Associate, Redfish Group, Santa Fe, NM (nick at redfish.com)
> Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University
> (nthompson at clarku.edu)
>
>
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

dba | David Breecker Associates, Inc.
Santa Fe: 505-690-2335
Abiquiu: 505-685-4891
www.BreeckerAssociates.com

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Robert Holmes

Pascal's Wager and Kant's Categorical Imperative

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Nick,

The good idea is a hypothetical imperative as it compels actions in a given
circumstance (not all circumstances): if it will aid the boat's stability, I
should move to the opposite side.

If you want a categorical imperative that would be applicable, I'd suggest: I
should not act like a twonk. This is something that is necessary and
universal: not only do I not want to act like a twonk but I do not want
anyone else to either (qv.
http://www.bbcamerica.com/content/141/dictionary.jsp for translation)

Most rules in ABMs are examples of hypothetical imperatives as they are
usually contingent on the state of neighbours and the environment.

Robert

On 8/13/07, Nicholas Thompson <nickthompson at earthlink.net> wrote:

>
> David,
>
> Can you explain this relation a bit further. Sorry if I am being dim, but
> I did not quite understand your comment. Let's say we are on the QE2
> which, for some reason is inclined to be a bit tippy. We notice that the
> passengers are gathering on the right side of the ship, which is OK so long
> as the water is calm, but would be disastrous if a storm came. We have no
> particular reason to believe that a storm is coming, except that half the
> meteorologists in the Captain's meteorological committee think that there
> is. You and I get together and decide that it would be a good idea for
> some of us to move over to the other side of the boat. Now, certainly this
> is not a CATEGORICAL imperative. I certainly cannot will that EVERYBODY go
> over to the other side of the boat. So what kind of an imperative is it.
> How is it possible for everybody to act so that the boat is in balance.
> This would have everybody constantly moving from one side of the boat to the
> other, like one of those models of neighborhood integration where either the
> neighborhood is unintegrated or everybody is unhappy.
>
> How DOES one square Kant with ABM's???
>
> And what did it have to do with Pascal's Wager in the first place?
>
> Nick
>
>
>

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Ian P. Cook

Pascal's Wager and Kant's Categorical Imperative

In reply to this post by David Breecker

David,

>And BTW, I think the Pascal analogy is excellent, with due attention to
Marcus' caveat about measurability.
>db

I guess I'd seen Marcus' point as demonstrating why Pascal's wager wasn't at
all applicable. As I understand it, the wager is entirely dependent on the
payoff to believing in God's existence (and God existing) being infinite.
It's the only way it totally dominates all other actions (vs non belief
whether God does or does not exist, that is). Otherwise it's just a
cost-benefit calculation. And while we can certainly talk about the benefits
of acting in regards to climate change now even if the change isn't
primarily anthropogenic vs non-action when it is, the only way to make the
analogy, I would think, is to suggest that action now has an infinite
payoff. The trouble with that, though, is that it means we should accept ANY
further wager that might result in the outcome with the infinite payoff
being realized. One should, it seems, be willing to take my wager on whether
or not I can personally reverse climate change in exchange for all your
wealth. Whether or not I could do it, there just might be a non-zero
subjective probability that I COULD, which means you should take the bet --
since the expected payoff is still infinite -- and hand over everything. In
terms of Pascal's wager, that is the argument for doubters: if you are even
willing to entertain a tiny belief that there is some non-zero probability
that God exists, you should still pray/become a "believer". No matter the
personal effort and cost of belief, there is no way it will surpass the
expected value of the bet. This doesn't work if the payoff isn't infinite,
since some countervailing return to tip things back towards the non-believer
side.

On 8/14/07, David Breecker <david at breeckerassociates.com> wrote:

>
> Sorry Nick, I inadvertantly omitted your key question to which I was
> replying, which was:
> >>I do worry about complexity thinking leading to fatalism. If a
> goddamnedbutterfly can cause a climate crash, why take responsibility for
> ANYTHING
> we do. We should all be dionysians.
>
> I think Kant offers a solid explanation for why one should (must) act
> "responsibly." At the very least, he's the only reason I vote in
> Presidential elections. More tomorrow if folks are still interested, when
> I'm less Dionysian and more sober-- I mean, Apollonian ;-)
>
> And BTW, I think the Pascal analogy is excellent, with due attention to
> Marcus' caveat about measurability.
> db
>
>
> On Aug 13, 2007, at 10:05 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
>
>
> David,
>
> Can you explain this relation a bit further. Sorry if I am being dim, but
> I did not quite understand your comment. Let's say we are on the QE2
> which, for some reason is inclined to be a bit tippy. We notice that the
> passengers are gathering on the right side of the ship, which is OK so long
> as the water is calm, but would be disastrous if a storm came. We have no
> particular reason to believe that a storm is coming, except that half the
> meteorologists in the Captain's meteorological committee think that there
> is. You and I get together and decide that it would be a good idea for
> some of us to move over to the other side of the boat. Now, certainly this
> is not a CATEGORICAL imperative. I certainly cannot will that EVERYBODY go
> over to the other side of the boat. So what kind of an imperative is it.
> How is it possible for everybody to act so that the boat is in balance.
> This would have everybody constantly moving from one side of the boat to the
> other, like one of those models of neighborhood integration where either the
> neighborhood is unintegrated or everybody is unhappy.
>
> How DOES one square Kant with ABM's???
>
> And what did it have to do with Pascal's Wager in the first place?
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* David Breecker <david at breeckerassociates.com>
> *To: *nickthompson at earthlink.net;The Friday Morning Applied Complexity
> Coffee Group <friam at redfish.com>
> *Sent:* 8/13/2007 4:31:20 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Pascal's Wager and Global Warming
>
> Kant's Categorical Imperative is the answer:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative
> He defined an imperative as any proposition that declares a certain action
> (or inaction) to be necessary<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_possibility>.
> A hypothetical imperative<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_imperative>would compel action in a given circumstance:
> *If I wish to satisfy my thirst, then I must drink something*. A
> categorical imperative would denote an absolute, unconditional requirement
> that exerts its authority in all circumstances, both required and justified
> as an end in itself. It is best known in its first formulation: "Act only
> according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should
> become a universal law." [1]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative#_note-Ellington>
>
> db
>
>
> On Aug 13, 2007, at 3:53 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
>
> All,
>
> The best argument for worrying about global warming presented so far in
> this interesting correspondence is the one that says it costs us
> relatively
> little to worry about it and and costs us LOT if we dont.
>
> Sort of like Pascal's argument for prayer, right?
>
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Research Associate, Redfish Group, Santa Fe, NM (nick at redfish.com)
> Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University (
> nthompson at clarku.edu)
>
>
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>
> dba | David Breecker Associates, Inc.
> Santa Fe: 505-690-2335
> Abiquiu: 505-685-4891
> www.BreeckerAssociates.com
>
>
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>

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David Breecker

Pascal's Wager and Kant's Categorical Imperative

Yes, that's well argued Ian and makes sense to me (Marcus, your
thoughts?). I have a lingering intuitive sense that there is still
some analog-worthy insight available; perhaps it's this:

If truly catastrophic climate change could result (with some non-zero
probability) in a truly inhospitable world, or even the extinction of
homo sapiens, does its avoidance constitute something approaching
"infinite" value to us as a species?
db

On Aug 14, 2007, at 5:01 AM, Ian P. Cook wrote:

>
> I guess I'd seen Marcus' point as demonstrating why Pascal's wager
> wasn't at all applicable. As I understand it, the wager is entirely
> dependent on the payoff to believing in God's existence (and God
> existing) being infinite. It's the only way it totally dominates
> all other actions (vs non belief whether God does or does not
> exist, that is). Otherwise it's just a cost-benefit calculation.
> And while we can certainly talk about the benefits of acting in
> regards to climate change now even if the change isn't primarily
> anthropogenic vs non-action when it is, the only way to make the
> analogy, I would think, is to suggest that action now has an
> infinite payoff. The trouble with that, though, is that it means we
> should accept ANY further wager that might result in the outcome
> with the infinite payoff being realized. One should, it seems, be
> willing to take my wager on whether or not I can personally reverse
> climate change in exchange for all your wealth. Whether or not I
> could do it, there just might be a non-zero subjective probability
> that I COULD, which means you should take the bet -- since the
> expected payoff is still infinite -- and hand over everything. In
> terms of Pascal's wager, that is the argument for doubters: if you
> are even willing to entertain a tiny belief that there is some non-
> zero probability that God exists, you should still pray/become a
> "believer". No matter the personal effort and cost of belief, there
> is no way it will surpass the expected value of the bet. This
> doesn't work if the payoff isn't infinite, since some
> countervailing return to tip things back towards the non-believer
> side.