Locked
Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences.
CSLI. 2003
Narrating Complexity
 
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Narrative Theory and the Cognitive SciencesSusan Stepney is "a friend of FriAM", currently professor at U.
York but formerly research scientist at Logica, UK nominally a
competitor to Bios Group back in the day. She has visited here
several times over the past two decades. Some of you may have met
her and her team(s) when they visited. She and Richard Walsh have a new book coming out on Narrating Complexity Narrating Complexity
http://www.springer.com/us/book/9783319647128 Background to this work includes: http://susan-stepney.blogspot.com/2017/08/book-review-narrative-theory-and.html Some notable excerpts from Susan's review as well as from the book: Stepney: The problem is this. We understand the world through narrative (allegedly). Complex systems are unnarratable (so it seems). Therefore, we literally cannot understand complex systems. Abbot:
We understand the world through explanatory narratives of entities with agency. Parts of the world that do not have suitable structure are unnarratable, and hence are not easily understood. Evolution is one such process.Herman Narrative can have many cognitive functions. It is a system for structuring patterns of events progressing through time: for structuring processes. It can be used to “chunk” experiences into “frames” of stereotypical experiences, then used to compare this typical against the actual. This helps us to understand the world more, and therefore have to memorise less. It allows us to generate and evaluate what-if scenarios. It allows us to draw coherent system boundaries: to extract and bound a relevant collection of participants, events, and structures from the overall stream of events we experience. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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This was helpful: https://www.academia.edu/4163381/Narrating_Complexity_The_Antipathy_of_Stories_and_Systems Ultimately, I'm a little worried about the idea that narrative is somehow fundamental to thought/understanding. I'm completely ignorant of any official domain called "Narrative". But I tend to associate it with stories, most importantly *including* stories that include concrete detail. And concreteness is antithetic to the type of "conceptual model" I'm inferring from both Stepney's and Walsh's (from the above presentation) sense/use of the term. This is my core concern. But first, I'd like to broach a more peripheral concern. Walsh's defn: "The semiotic articulation of linear temporal sequence" very clearly lays out the sequentiality. But, at least with computation, isn't it relatively accepted that any parallel process can be simulated by a sequential process? And if so, couldn't we claim that this sequentiality isn't that much of a limiting factor? I mean, sure, it may be merely approximate, or inaccurate, or whatever. But, basically, this would mean their research program would become showing which, in particular, types of complex adaptive systems cannot be approximated by narrative and the naive claim that *no* CAS can ever be adequately approximated would be unjustified or too extreme. The more important concern goes back to the accusation of idealism I often lob. I don't believe narrative is core to *my* cognition. Yes, when interacting mostly in symbols (like books, email, etc.), narrative seems dominant. But I would claim that's an artifact, a side effect, of the underlying process(es). A quick way to my point is the accusation of "book learning" vs. doing. It's notoriously difficult to *tell* someone how to, ride a bike or hit a baseball with a bat. Such telling does tend to be narrative, a kind of recipe, I suppose. But is the narrative necessary for *understanding* how to hit a baseball? Or for understanding what it *means* to ride a bicycle? I would say "no." Understanding is a concrete thing, done with the *body*, not with some abstraction in the *mind*. To go a step further, the objects pointed to by the signs in a narrative, are fully complex processes. The narratives really are just lossy models of the complex experiences. So, one person compresses her experience(s) into a word salad. Another person reads that word salad and the signs are interpreted to map to concretely *different* complex processes in the receiver. I like the quote from Herman below. But even that doesn't go far enough. Rather than say it the way Herman does, I'd prefer to say narrative is a justificationist technique for formulating hypotheses (whether testable or not). Then the concrete experiences of executed *tests* of those hypotheses are understanding (like when a child actually slides a block down an incline as opposed to hearing descriptions of blocks sliding down inclines). The experiment is the understanding. The narratives are only related to reality to the extent they cause repeatable experiences (through both inter- and intra-agent repetition). Anyway, none of what I say is probably new to Walsh or Stepney and they probably have answers. But it's curious. I'm intrigued by one of the text boxes in the "Cognition" box of slide 60: "Narrative cognition (relation to other modes of cognition)". It'll be interesting to see if the upcoming book talks about that. On 12/17/2017 09:03 AM, Steven A Smith wrote: > > Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences > > [...] > David Herman, ed. > /Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences/. > CSLI. 2003 > [...] > Herman > > /Narrative can have many cognitive functions. It is a system for structuring patterns of events progressing through time: for structuring processes. It can be used to “chunk” experiences into “frames” of stereotypical experiences, then used to compare this typical against the actual. This helps us to understand the world more, and therefore have to memorise less. It allows us to generate and evaluate what-if scenarios. It allows us to draw coherent system boundaries: to extract and bound a relevant collection of participants, events, and structures from the overall stream of events we experience. / -- ☣ uǝlƃ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Glen,
I would say that the idea of "narrative" is awfully close to Peirce's idea of sign. So to a baseball player, a bat is for hitting baseballs; to a Klansman, it's for smashing heads. Each of these "meanings?" evokes a distinct mini-story in different kinds of people. When people say everything is a narrative, they are saying something very close to Peirce's "we think in signs." All statements of meaning, implication, etc. are tripartite, requiring the mention of an interpretant, i.e. a conception from the point of view of which the thing means what it is said to mean Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of u?l? ? Sent: Monday, December 18, 2017 3:52 PM To: FriAM <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Narrating Complexity This was helpful: https://www.academia.edu/4163381/Narrating_Complexity_The_Antipathy_of_Stories_and_Systems Ultimately, I'm a little worried about the idea that narrative is somehow fundamental to thought/understanding. I'm completely ignorant of any official domain called "Narrative". But I tend to associate it with stories, most importantly *including* stories that include concrete detail. And concreteness is antithetic to the type of "conceptual model" I'm inferring from both Stepney's and Walsh's (from the above presentation) sense/use of the term. This is my core concern. But first, I'd like to broach a more peripheral concern. Walsh's defn: "The semiotic articulation of linear temporal sequence" very clearly lays out the sequentiality. But, at least with computation, isn't it relatively accepted that any parallel process can be simulated by a sequential process? And if so, couldn't we claim that this sequentiality isn't that much of a limiting factor? I mean, sure, it may be merely approximate, or inaccurate, or whatever. But, basically, this would mean their research program would become showing which, in particular, types of complex adaptive systems cannot be approximated by narrative and the naive claim that *no* CAS can ever be adequately approximated would be unjustified or too extreme. The more important concern goes back to the accusation of idealism I often lob. I don't believe narrative is core to *my* cognition. Yes, when interacting mostly in symbols (like books, email, etc.), narrative seems dominant. But I would claim that's an artifact, a side effect, of the underlying process(es). A quick way to my point is the accusation of "book learning" vs. doing. It's notoriously difficult to *tell* someone how to, ride a bike or hit a baseball with a bat. Such telling does tend to be narrative, a kind of recipe, I suppose. But is the narrative necessary for *understanding* how to hit a baseball? Or for understanding what it *means* to ride a bicycle? I would say "no." Understanding is a concrete thing, done with the *body*, not with some abstraction in the *mind*. To go a step further, the objects pointed to by the signs in a narrative, are fully complex processes. The narratives really are just lossy models of the complex experiences. So, one person compresses her experience(s) into a word salad. Another person reads that word salad and the signs are interpreted to map to concretely *different* complex processes in the receiver. I like the quote from Herman below. But even that doesn't go far enough. Rather than say it the way Herman does, I'd prefer to say narrative is a justificationist technique for formulating hypotheses (whether testable or not). Then the concrete experiences of executed *tests* of those hypotheses are understanding (like when a child actually slides a block down an incline as opposed to hearing descriptions of blocks sliding down inclines). The experiment is the understanding. The narratives are only related to reality to the extent they cause repeatable experiences (through both inter- and intra-agent repetition). Anyway, none of what I say is probably new to Walsh or Stepney and they probably have answers. But it's curious. I'm intrigued by one of the text boxes in the "Cognition" box of slide 60: "Narrative cognition (relation to other modes of cognition)". It'll be interesting to see if the upcoming book talks about that. On 12/17/2017 09:03 AM, Steven A Smith wrote: > > Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences > > [...] > David Herman, ed. > /Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences/. > CSLI. 2003 > [...] > Herman > > /Narrative can have many cognitive functions. It is a system for > structuring patterns of events progressing through time: for > structuring processes. It can be used to “chunk” experiences into > “frames” of stereotypical experiences, then used to compare this > typical against the actual. This helps us to understand the world > more, and therefore have to memorise less. It allows us to generate > and evaluate what-if scenarios. It allows us to draw coherent system > boundaries: to extract and bound a relevant collection of > participants, events, and structures from the overall stream of events > we experience. / -- ☣ uǝlƃ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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Well, my point was that I think we *think* in complex adaptive systems (aka our bodies). So, we don't think in narratives or signs, as far as I'm concerned. But we can infer that Walsh (at least) does NOT claim "everything is a narrative" from the category on slide 60: "Narrative cognition (relation to other modes of cognition)". Clearly narrative is just one mode for him. I think it's safe to say that Stepney would agree, based on her "non-standard computation" page. The real question is whether narrative is incapable of well-representing CAS, which is the "narrating complexity" premise. On 12/18/2017 08:08 PM, Nick Thompson wrote: > I would say that the idea of "narrative" is awfully close to Peirce's idea of sign. So to a baseball player, a bat is for hitting baseballs; to a Klansman, it's for smashing heads. Each of these "meanings?" evokes a distinct mini-story in different kinds of people. When people say everything is a narrative, they are saying something very close to Peirce's "we think in signs." All statements of meaning, implication, etc. are tripartite, requiring the mention of an interpretant, i.e. a conception from the point of view of which the thing means what it is said to mean -- ☣ uǝlƃ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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In reply to this post by gepr
In my opinion, Glen is right to be worried, and more than a little worried about the idea that "narrative" is fundamental to cognition.
Simultaneously, I am a huge fan of "story" and do believe that "story" is fundamental to cognition. My antipathy towards narrative theory, and the resolution of the partial contradiction above, is that I see narrative theorists as a group of academics that are trying to "formalize" something that is fundamentally aformal. That vast majority of what we know, individually and collectively was acquired via story (70-75%); while 20-25% was acquired via direct experience (but shared with others via story); and only 2-5% of what we know was acquired formally as 'book learning'. Ever since we started talking to each other, and telling stories around the fire pit, we have had no difficulty telling intelligible, meaningful, and useful stories about complex systems - after all we have lived in one and interacted with one, pretty successfully, for tens of thousands of years. If narrative theory, as presently formalized, cannot deal with complexity, then the issue is with the formalism - it is fatally flawed. In my opinion, this is the same issue with AI, both classical and the current resurgence of "AI in everything" fad - intelligence is defined as what the machine can do, what the formalisms that drive the machine can handle, and not what goes on in the embodied minds of human beings. When the singularity occurs and the machines take over, it is not because they are 'are cognitively superior and think better than us" it is because we allowed them to define away, as "not cognition," that which is unique to human minds. Narrative theorists, again only in my opinion, do the same thing with story: anything not congruent with the theory is excluded as not cognition. davew On Mon, Dec 18, 2017, at 3:51 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote: > > This was helpful: > > https://www.academia.edu/4163381/ > Narrating_Complexity_The_Antipathy_of_Stories_and_Systems > > Ultimately, I'm a little worried about the idea that narrative is > somehow fundamental to thought/understanding. I'm completely ignorant of > any official domain called "Narrative". But I tend to associate it with > stories, most importantly *including* stories that include concrete > detail. And concreteness is antithetic to the type of "conceptual > model" I'm inferring from both Stepney's and Walsh's (from the above > presentation) sense/use of the term. This is my core concern. > > But first, I'd like to broach a more peripheral concern. Walsh's defn: > "The semiotic articulation of linear temporal sequence" very clearly > lays out the sequentiality. But, at least with computation, isn't it > relatively accepted that any parallel process can be simulated by a > sequential process? And if so, couldn't we claim that this > sequentiality isn't that much of a limiting factor? I mean, sure, it > may be merely approximate, or inaccurate, or whatever. But, basically, > this would mean their research program would become showing which, in > particular, types of complex adaptive systems cannot be approximated by > narrative and the naive claim that *no* CAS can ever be adequately > approximated would be unjustified or too extreme. > > The more important concern goes back to the accusation of idealism I > often lob. I don't believe narrative is core to *my* cognition. Yes, > when interacting mostly in symbols (like books, email, etc.), narrative > seems dominant. But I would claim that's an artifact, a side effect, of > the underlying process(es). A quick way to my point is the accusation of > "book learning" vs. doing. It's notoriously difficult to *tell* someone > how to, ride a bike or hit a baseball with a bat. Such telling does > tend to be narrative, a kind of recipe, I suppose. But is the narrative > necessary for *understanding* how to hit a baseball? Or for > understanding what it *means* to ride a bicycle? I would say "no." > > Understanding is a concrete thing, done with the *body*, not with some > abstraction in the *mind*. To go a step further, the objects pointed to > by the signs in a narrative, are fully complex processes. The narratives > really are just lossy models of the complex experiences. So, one person > compresses her experience(s) into a word salad. Another person reads > that word salad and the signs are interpreted to map to concretely > *different* complex processes in the receiver. I like the quote from > Herman below. But even that doesn't go far enough. Rather than say it > the way Herman does, I'd prefer to say narrative is a justificationist > technique for formulating hypotheses (whether testable or not). Then > the concrete experiences of executed *tests* of those hypotheses are > understanding (like when a child actually slides a block down an incline > as opposed to hearing descriptions of blocks sliding down inclines). The > experiment is the understanding. The narratives are only related to > reality to the extent they cause repeatable experiences (through both > inter- and intra-agent repetition). > > Anyway, none of what I say is probably new to Walsh or Stepney and they > probably have answers. But it's curious. I'm intrigued by one of the > text boxes in the "Cognition" box of slide 60: "Narrative cognition > (relation to other modes of cognition)". It'll be interesting to see if > the upcoming book talks about that. > > > On 12/17/2017 09:03 AM, Steven A Smith wrote: > > > > Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences > > > > [...] > > David Herman, ed. > > /Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences/. > > CSLI. 2003 > > [...] > > Herman > > > > /Narrative can have many cognitive functions. It is a system for structuring patterns of events progressing through time: for structuring processes. It can be used to “chunk” experiences into “frames” of stereotypical experiences, then used to compare this typical against the actual. This helps us to understand the world more, and therefore have to memorise less. It allows us to generate and evaluate what-if scenarios. It allows us to draw coherent system boundaries: to extract and bound a relevant collection of participants, events, and structures from the overall stream of events we experience. / > > > -- > ☣ uǝlƃ > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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On Dec 19, 2017 5:45 PM, "Prof David West" <[hidden email]> wrote: In my opinion, Glen is right to be worried, and more than a little worried about the idea that "narrative" is fundamental to cognition. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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In reply to this post by Prof David West
I think "aformal" is too strong a word, assuming you mean "without formality" or without any kind of regularizable structure whatsoever. Things like archetypes, and typical story structures, as well as tropes and banally formulaic things like romance novels or prime time TV all argue that there ARE formal elements to stories. We may not be able to define a good story (or story teller), but we know it when we see/hear/read it. That argues that it's not (completely) aformal. I'd argue that they're open/unbound in some sense, that stories have some (perhaps formalizable) constraining structure within which they can wiggle quite a bit.
On 12/19/2017 04:44 PM, Prof David West wrote: > My antipathy towards narrative theory, and the resolution of the partial contradiction above, is that I see narrative theorists as a group of academics that are trying to "formalize" something that is fundamentally aformal. -- ☣ uǝlƃ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Glen, aformal is too strong if we admit 'patterns', 'regularities', 'heuristics', etc. as kinds of "formalisms;" which I agree with. However, my absolutism in speaking as if aformal really meant without formality, is a reaction to those who are equally fanatical about the idea that everything is formalizable (not a word) in "principle" and in time a pure, formal, system will account for everything.
But let me put that in context as my issue with the formal / aformal is mostly as it concerns software development, and particularly what it is we want the software to do. The idea that we can best discover what a software system is supposed to do is to tell stories about the problem space, what it is that we want to 'improve' in the world. We also tell stories about how the computer/software system might resolve those problem space stories, and yet more stories about how the computer (executing software) might realize those solutions. Peter Naur is notable for advocating this kind of approach. But even mainstream "software engineering" texts and practitioners like Yourdon and Constantine insisted that less than formal (as opposed to aformal and informal) story telling was essential. The idea never gained traction because it was immediately beset for forces of formalism. Nevertheless the idea keeps coming back, I have personal experience re objects and later agile, only to be suppressed by the forces of formalism. Even tools (from data flow diagrams to user story cards) that were developed to support the telling of stories were subverted by, mostly, academics determined to get a Ph.D. with a thesis formalizing, preferably with lots of math/logic software "requirements" or aspects of UML models. There is a wonderful book, Data and Reality, or Reality and Data -whose author I cannot cite because all my books are in a steel container on top of a mountain in Utah - who illustrates the problem wonderfully. I remember being able to tell stories about "data" "information" and "knowledge with hierarchical and network databases that became impossible once Codd formalized the relational model and the math behind it. So I have gotten used to telling computer scientists and software engineers that stories are aformal within the context of their efforts. davew On Tue, Dec 19, 2017, at 6:18 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote: > I think "aformal" is too strong a word, assuming you mean "without > formality" or without any kind of regularizable structure whatsoever. > Things like archetypes, and typical story structures, as well as tropes > and banally formulaic things like romance novels or prime time TV all > argue that there ARE formal elements to stories. We may not be able to > define a good story (or story teller), but we know it when we see/hear/ > read it. That argues that it's not (completely) aformal. I'd argue > that they're open/unbound in some sense, that stories have some (perhaps > formalizable) constraining structure within which they can wiggle quite > a bit. > > On 12/19/2017 04:44 PM, Prof David West wrote: > > My antipathy towards narrative theory, and the resolution of the partial contradiction above, is that I see narrative theorists as a group of academics that are trying to "formalize" something that is fundamentally aformal. > > -- > ☣ uǝlƃ > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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David, Distributed hash tables comes to mind. After Napster and BitTorrent it became a popular area of research. Let academics hold onto a specialty, they will happily do so their entire career. The field will become inpenetrable without a community of professors that feed their carefully-indoctrinated students into the pool of workers in the field. Conversely, when feasible, it is useful to wade into their community and take their tools or their people. The diversification of the field of functional programming into industry is one example, as well as SQL.
Marcus From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Prof David West <[hidden email]>
Sent: Tuesday, December 19, 2017 7:30:42 PM To: [hidden email] Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Narrating Complexity Glen, aformal is too strong if we admit 'patterns', 'regularities', 'heuristics', etc. as kinds of "formalisms;" which I agree with. However, my absolutism in speaking as if aformal really meant without formality, is a reaction to those
who are equally fanatical about the idea that everything is formalizable (not a word) in "principle" and in time a pure, formal, system will account for everything.
But let me put that in context as my issue with the formal / aformal is mostly as it concerns software development, and particularly what it is we want the software to do. The idea that we can best discover what a software system is supposed to do is to tell stories about the problem space, what it is that we want to 'improve' in the world. We also tell stories about how the computer/software system might resolve those problem space stories, and yet more stories about how the computer (executing software) might realize those solutions. Peter Naur is notable for advocating this kind of approach. But even mainstream "software engineering" texts and practitioners like Yourdon and Constantine insisted that less than formal (as opposed to aformal and informal) story telling was essential. The idea never gained traction because it was immediately beset for forces of formalism. Nevertheless the idea keeps coming back, I have personal experience re objects and later agile, only to be suppressed by the forces of formalism. Even tools (from data flow diagrams to user story cards) that were developed to support the telling of stories were subverted by, mostly, academics determined to get a Ph.D. with a thesis formalizing, preferably with lots of math/logic software "requirements" or aspects of UML models. There is a wonderful book, Data and Reality, or Reality and Data -whose author I cannot cite because all my books are in a steel container on top of a mountain in Utah - who illustrates the problem wonderfully. I remember being able to tell stories about "data" "information" and "knowledge with hierarchical and network databases that became impossible once Codd formalized the relational model and the math behind it. So I have gotten used to telling computer scientists and software engineers that stories are aformal within the context of their efforts. davew On Tue, Dec 19, 2017, at 6:18 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote: > I think "aformal" is too strong a word, assuming you mean "without > formality" or without any kind of regularizable structure whatsoever. > Things like archetypes, and typical story structures, as well as tropes > and banally formulaic things like romance novels or prime time TV all > argue that there ARE formal elements to stories. We may not be able to > define a good story (or story teller), but we know it when we see/hear/ > read it. That argues that it's not (completely) aformal. I'd argue > that they're open/unbound in some sense, that stories have some (perhaps > formalizable) constraining structure within which they can wiggle quite > a bit. > > On 12/19/2017 04:44 PM, Prof David West wrote: > > My antipathy towards narrative theory, and the resolution of the partial contradiction above, is that I see narrative theorists as a group of academics that are trying to "formalize" something that is fundamentally aformal. > > -- > ☣ uǝlƃ > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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