Nick, Your welcome. Thanks for allowing me. I'm afraid I don't understand. Why can't enlightenment grow upon soil that enlightenment has succeeded on? Do you mind to explain? (Ever since primary school I was a bit slow to understand)Pieter On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 at 21:13, <[hidden email]> wrote:
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
In reply to this post by gepr
Please see larding below. Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ -----Original Message----- Did Epstein ever respond to your (& Derr's) criticism? [NST===>] Not Epstein himself, but another, and yet another, who took issue with us both. I gather that Epstein is a biggie in your world, but his views on models seemed really odd to my colleague Derr, who is a philosopher of science. To the extent that the response above catches us in the claim that the ONLY value of an explanation is in its predictive power, of course he critique correct, and I regret if we implied that. It’s easy to think of models that make excellent predictions but are totally worthless. Take the Sangre de Cristo Monastery theory of the sunrise: Just to the east of santa fe, up in the mountains, is a ancient monastery whose monks are in charge of raising the sun. Each morning, one of the monks gets up early, consults an astronomic table, and at the precise moment, runs the sun up the flagpole, and that, my friends, is what we experience as “sunrise”. This theory precisely predicts the rising of the sun, but does not cohere with anything else that we know. It’s “unlovely”. I think I want to take the position that if the structure of the a model does not mimic the structure of the phenomenon it models IN SOME IMPORTANT RESPECT, then its predictive value is irrelevant to its explanatory value. I wonder if we could continue this discussion using the Schelling Model as an example. Perhaps we could exemplify the use and impact of the following terms with respect to this familiar, simple, but nonetheless, compelling, model. "Opaque" isn't a perfect substitute for "obtuse", but it's OK. By "obtuse", I really mean "low interpretability", where interpretability is the extent to which one can *read* and *understand* the structure of a model. It's mostly used in the analysis of neural network solutions to various problems. "Opaque" is synonymous with "incomprehensible" ... zero interpretability. "Obtuse" means somewhere in the middle, but probably toward the opaque end of the spectrum. [†] "Expressibility" means "what a model can do", the behaviors it can express. For example a "flying squirrel" can't fly. But it can glide. So, the squirrel cannot express flying. Thus, a flying squirrel is an OK model for some types of airplane like gliders, but not others like jet planes. "Parallax" is the more general concept for "triangulation". In triangulation, 2 perspectives are used to locate a 3rd thing. As far as I know, these two are fairly standard English words. So, all you need to do is look in the dictionary. [†] The terms "black", "white", and "gray" box are sometimes used to indicate this "readability" property. A black box would then be opaque. A gray box would be obtuse. And a white box would be transparent. I don't like that lexicon. But I suppose it's fine for most people. On 1/22/20 10:04 AM, [hidden email] wrote: > I understand what an obtuse model, here, although I understand it because I substitute the word “opaque” for obtuse, so perhaps I don’t understand it. In the extreme, it’s a model that we don’t understand any better than the process it models. It seems to go back to my argument with Epstein <http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/12/1/9.html> who asserted that models are unconnected with explanations. No, not THAT Epstein. > [...] > Can somebody explain to me in Defrocked-english-major-language about parallax and expressibility? Thanks, -- ☣ uǝlƃ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
In reply to this post by Pieter Steenekamp
Oh, Pieter, I allow no rivals in my ability to not understand complex ideas, particularly those deployed on this forum. I think my logic went as follows: All success (by definition) must be self sustaining. (Temporary success is an oxymoron) P S declares, “The Enlightenment requires defense.” Any movement that requires defense is not self sustaining Therefore, the Enlightenment is not successful. You could, of course be questioning my first premise. If, by definition, some success is temporary, then, of course the success of the enlightenment could be merely temporary, and therefore need a contemporary defense. Or, you could be asserting that I misunderstood you and you never voiced the second premise. I confess that drives me stark raving nuts. It’s the way that he confidently tosses his long curly locks. He could been reciting from the Great Quotations of Charles Peirce, and I would still find him obnoxious. So, my resistance to your argument may be based entirely on Pinker’s hair. Nick Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp Nick, About your "if the Enlightenment has worked, it should not need defense, right?" If people do not recognize that it has worked, is it wrong to point out that it has worked? I'm not claiming there are no global problems - there certainly are. But things are getting better, not? I've recently read that during the last decade humanity has for the first time ever progressed to the point where less than 10% of the global population lives in absolute poverty. From wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extreme_poverty I quote from the same wikipedia page: "In public opinion surveys around the world, people surveyed tend to incorrectly think that extreme poverty has not decreased." Then about your "A system that “works” does not sow the seeds or its own destruction, right?" I totally agree, it does not sow the seeds of its own destruction. Or does it? I don't observe it sowing the seeds of its own destruction. Pieter On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 at 19:25, <[hidden email]> wrote:
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In reply to this post by thompnickson2
On 1/22/20 12:23 PM, [hidden email] wrote: > [*/NST===>] Not Epstein himself, but another <https://www.google.com/url?client=internal-element-cse&cx=006433492719462442300:_7mu_xxuwwu&q=http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/12/1/10.html&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwiTuKne9ZfnAhVXK80KHfufBS8QFjAJegQIBRAC&usg=AOvVaw17l4TL-F4470Z31g-ieHBv>, and yet another <http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/15/3/1.html>, who took issue with us both. Thanks. I've read those two responses. > */I think I want to take the position that if the structure of the a model does not mimic the structure of the phenomenon it models IN SOME IMPORTANT RESPECT, then its predictive value is irrelevant to its explanatory value./* I tend to agree. But I don't fully agree. You've just kicked the can down the road with your "some important respect". Important when? To whom? For what purpose? Etc. What kind of respect? How much of that respect? Etc. It turns into one of those statements that's SOOOOO general as to be useless. This is why "models as artifacts absent their modeling context" is a critical concept. And studying models as 1st class objects, in themselves, regardless of their referent, is a critical thing to do. > */I wonder if we could continue this discussion using the Schelling Model <http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/models/Segregation> as an example. Perhaps we could exemplify the use and impact of the following terms with respect to this familiar, simple, but nonetheless, compelling, model. /* Why choose the Schelling Model? It's way more complex than my example of a wooden sphere modeling a baseball ... it gives you all sorts of wiggle room to get confused and to confuse others. You may *think* it's simple. But it's not. -- ☣ uǝlƃ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
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Please see larding larding Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ -----Original Message----- On 1/22/20 12:23 PM, [hidden email] wrote: > [*/NST===>] Not Epstein himself, but another <https://www.google.com/url?client=internal-element-cse&cx=006433492719462442300:_7mu_xxuwwu&q=http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/12/1/10.html&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwiTuKne9ZfnAhVXK80KHfufBS8QFjAJegQIBRAC&usg=AOvVaw17l4TL-F4470Z31g-ieHBv>, and yet another <http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/15/3/1.html>, who took issue with us both. Thanks. I've read those two responses. [NST===>] Glen, you ARE amazing. > */I think I want to take the position that if the structure of the a > model does not mimic the structure of the phenomenon it models IN SOME > IMPORTANT RESPECT, then its predictive value is irrelevant to its > explanatory value./* I tend to agree. But I don't fully agree. You've just kicked the can down the road with your "some important respect". Important when? To whom? For what purpose? Etc. What kind of respect? How much of that respect? Etc. [NST===>] I am trying to catch up the the damned can as quick as I am able. It turns into one of those statements that's SOOOOO general as to be useless. This is why "models as artifacts absent their modeling context" is a critical concept. And studying models as 1st class objects, in themselves, regardless of their referent, is a critical thing to do. [NST===>] Of course, I value the relation between the logical structure of models and their products, irrespective of what use they might be put to. Isn’t that mathematics? > */I wonder if we could continue this discussion using the Schelling > Model <http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/models/Segregation> as an > example. Perhaps we could exemplify the use and impact of the > following terms with respect to this familiar, simple, but > nonetheless, compelling, model. /* Why choose the Schelling Model? It's way more complex than my example of a wooden sphere modeling a baseball ... it gives you all sorts of wiggle room to get confused and to confuse others. You may *think* it's simple. But it's not.[NST===>] Is a wooden sphere less complex than the Schelling Model? It all depends upon “surplus” meaning. If you stipulate that the wood sphere is “perfect” then you have stripped away anything about a wooden sphere that makes it a WOODEN sphere. [NST===>] I once modeled for a class the fact that if you pet a cat, it arches its back, by nailing a piece of fox fur to aboard and showing them that if you petted the pinned fur, it arched its back. If true, why is that interesting? Why EXACTLY is it interesting. What work is the model doing here? It seems to me that the Schelling Model has the same kind of impact. Years ago, I tried to get a discussion of emergence going on this site using the model of three one by twos, connected with hinges as my model. I asserted that we did not have to talk about life, or consciousness, or any of the mysteries that we so like to discuss here, in order to get at the fundamental issues in emergence. All we need three hinges with removable pins and three sticks of wood, and we can be just as confused as we are when we discuss the “Origins of Life”. -- ☣ uǝlƃ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
On 1/22/20 1:27 PM, [hidden email] wrote: > */[NST===>] Of course, I value the relation between the logical structure of models and their products, irrespective of what use they might be put to. Isn’t that mathematics? /* I'm not that interested in defining math. But it is interesting that you use the word "logical". I'd rather talk about physical models than symbolic models. So, e.g. the wooden ball has no a priori _logical_ structure (without going into yahoo metaphysics). > */[NST===>] /* Is a wooden sphere less complex than the Schelling Model? Yes! At first blush, the Schelling Model needs an implementation (e.g. a computer, a computer program, tinker toys, etc.). The wooden ball comes with its own implementation ... provided by the universe. If you're worried about the person who carved the wooden ball, then we can use a river rock instead. River rock models baseball. (I swapped out "sphere" for "ball", also to help eliminate your academic issues around "perfect".) > */[NST===>] I once modeled for a class the fact that if you pet a cat, it arches its back, by nailing a piece of fox fur to aboard and showing them that if you petted the pinned fur, it arched its back. If true, why is that interesting? Why EXACTLY is it interesting. What work is the model doing here? It seems to me that the Schelling Model has the same kind of impact. /* > > > */Years ago, I tried to get a discussion of emergence going on this site using the model of three one by twos, connected with hinges as my model. I asserted that we did not have to talk about life, or consciousness, or any of the mysteries that we so like to discuss here, in order to get at the fundamental issues in emergence. All we need three hinges with removable pins and three sticks of wood, and we can be just as confused as we are when we discuss the “Origins of Life”. /* There's nothing interesting we can say about "emergence" or "back arching" that can't also be said about river rock models baseball. All you're doing by using those more complicated examples is muddying the water with dynamism. The elegance of the river rock models baseball example is that, at baseball scales, they're not dynamic. It's much easier to compare the *behavior* of a river rock to the behavior of a baseball, preferably as they sit next to each other on the dining room table. -- ☣ uǝlƃ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
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