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In the theater of consciousness

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Jochen Fromm-4

In the theater of consciousness

Nick, what do you think as a Psychologist
of Baars's "Global Workspace Theory" where
he explores the "consciousness is a theater"
metaphor? Is this a modern perspective
suitable for a computational model to bridge
the gap betwen Psychology and Neuroscience?
Do you think there is a layer or mesh between
both disciplines?

Since 2003 there have been attempts from
Baars and Franklin to produce somehow
a common denominator. Franklin apparently
wanted to program conscious agents, and
Baars wanted to confirm his theory
experimentally, but I have the impression
that it never worked out well. Do you
agree?

-J.

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Nick Thompson

Re: In the theater of consciousness

Jochen,

I am touched that you should seek me out for an answer to this question. I
have to warn you that I am forgetting stuff faster than I am learning it
and that I never had a good memory, so please take what I say here with a
grain of salt.

The idea you describe here is familiar to me as the "cartesian theatre",
which I think arises from Daniel Dennet, Consciousness Explained??? It is
also represented, I think, in a book called the User Illusion, which I have
never read. It's a very tempting view because it is deeply imbedded in our
day-to-day conversations about behavior.

It is called the Cartesian Theatre because of Descartes's "brain in the
vat" argument that leads to the conclusion that all we can for sure is the
content of our own minds. On that basis, we start to think of experience
as something we sit and watch played out sort of screen on the inside of
our skulls, watched perhaps by the cyclopean eye of the pineal. As you
know, it is my view that this sort of cartesian skepticism leads further:--
to the conclusion that we cant know anything for sure. On my account, if
we cannot know about the world, we surely cannot know about our own minds.
The argument is as follows: Any knowledge requires a knowledge-gathering
mechanism that uses cues. If we doubt that there are more or less accurate
mechanisms for gathering information about the world, why would we be
confident that there are mechanisms for gtathering information about one's
own mind. This is how I arrive at my position, "O what the fuck, why not
just be realists and get the silliness over at the beginning."

Over the years I wrote several papers that touched on these issues. All
can be found on my website, cited at the bottom of this message. Here are
three of the most relevant.

http://www.clarku.edu/faculty/nthompson/1-websitestuff/Texts/1990-1994/The_m
any_perils_of_ejective_anthropomorphism.pdf. Attacks the idea that we can
use instrospection of our own mental states as a tool to understand the
behavior of animals. Argues that we understand animal's mental states as
directly as we understand our own ... i.e., not very directly.

http://www.clarku.edu/faculty/nthompson/1-websitestuff/Texts/2000-2005/Inten
tionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital.pdf Argues that intentionality -- point
of view-ed-ness -- is a defining feature of any living thing.

http://www.clarku.edu/faculty/nthompson/1-websitestuff/Texts/2000-2005/perce
iving_ones_own_emotions.pdf Argues that emotional self-knowledge is a
specialized cognitive capacity that makes use of the same sorts of
information we use when we gather knowledge of others.

Please let me know if any of the url's are incorrect.

Neuroscience and psychology must ultimately mesh, of course, in some sense,
although the mesh wont be achieved by importing folk psychology into the
brain, any more thhe mesh between development and biochemistry was achieved
by importing little pictures of the completed organism into the molecules
of the developing cell.

All the best,

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> [Original Message]
> From: Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]>
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 10/22/2009 8:18:05 PM
> Subject: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness
>
> Nick, what do you think as a Psychologist
> of Baars's "Global Workspace Theory" where
> he explores the "consciousness is a theater"
> metaphor? Is this a modern perspective
> suitable for a computational model to bridge
> the gap betwen Psychology and Neuroscience?
> Do you think there is a layer or mesh between
> both disciplines?
>
> Since 2003 there have been attempts from
> Baars and Franklin to produce somehow
> a common denominator. Franklin apparently
> wanted to program conscious agents, and
> Baars wanted to confirm his theory
> experimentally, but I have the impression
> that it never worked out well. Do you
> agree?
>
> -J.
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Jochen Fromm-4

Re: In the theater of consciousness

There is a difference between Dennett and Baars,
Dennett says the theater metaphor is not useful
to understand consciousness. He argues in
"consciousness explained" what consciousness
is not: it is not happening in a Catesian theater
where a single person, the self, sits before a
large stage or screen and watches what happens.
It is always easier to say what something
is not (e.g. non-linear, non-equilibrium, etc.)
than to say what it actually is.

Baars says the theater metaphor is useful to
understand consciousness. He argues that
consciousness is like the bright spot cast
by the spotlight on to the stage of theater.
The other actors and those in the backstage
or in the audience represent the unconscious
elements. Dennett's theater is empty except
the little self sitting there, Baars' theater
is full of actors.

I was asking about the latter version of
the theater metaphor. Dennett writes about
it "for those who want to join the race
to model consciousness, this is the starting
line" (on the Back Cover of Baars' earlier book
"A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness"). Is it?
Does anyone agree?

-J.

----- Original Message -----
From: "Nicholas Thompson" <[hidden email]>
To: <[hidden email]>
Sent: Friday, October 23, 2009 6:57 AM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness

> The idea you describe here is familiar to me as the "cartesian theatre",
> which I think arises from Daniel Dennet, Consciousness Explained??? It is
> also represented, I think, in a book called the User Illusion, which I
> have
> never read. It's a very tempting view because it is deeply imbedded in
> our
> day-to-day conversations about behavior.
>
> It is called the Cartesian Theatre because of Descartes's "brain in the
> vat" argument that leads to the conclusion that all we can for sure is the
> content of our own minds. On that basis, we start to think of experience
> as something we sit and watch played out sort of screen on the inside of
> our skulls, watched perhaps by the cyclopean eye of the pineal. As you
> know, it is my view that this sort of cartesian skepticism leads
> further:--
> to the conclusion that we cant know anything for sure. On my account, if
> we cannot know about the world, we surely cannot know about our own minds.
> The argument is as follows: Any knowledge requires a knowledge-gathering
> mechanism that uses cues. If we doubt that there are more or less
> accurate
> mechanisms for gathering information about the world, why would we be
> confident that there are mechanisms for gtathering information about one's
> own mind. This is how I arrive at my position, "O what the fuck, why not
> just be realists and get the silliness over at the beginning."
>

Nick Thompson

Re: In the theater of consciousness

In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4

Jochen,

Oh, I was pretty sure that Dennett didnt LIKE the Cartesian Theatre idea;
but I did think (without much confisdence) that he had invnted the term.

Sounds like I need to read some Baars. Is there a way of getting at it
that doestn require large expenditures of money and effort?

If the idea is that my consciousness is just what my behavior illuminates
(spotlights), then this is not the cartesian theatre at all, but the New
Realism, a la Holt.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> [Original Message]
> From: Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]>
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 10/23/2009 7:03:25 PM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness
>
> There is a difference between Dennett and Baars,
> Dennett says the theater metaphor is not useful
> to understand consciousness. He argues in
> "consciousness explained" what consciousness
> is not: it is not happening in a Catesian theater
> where a single person, the self, sits before a
> large stage or screen and watches what happens.
> It is always easier to say what something
> is not (e.g. non-linear, non-equilibrium, etc.)
> than to say what it actually is.
>
> Baars says the theater metaphor is useful to
> understand consciousness. He argues that
> consciousness is like the bright spot cast
> by the spotlight on to the stage of theater.
> The other actors and those in the backstage
> or in the audience represent the unconscious
> elements. Dennett's theater is empty except
> the little self sitting there, Baars' theater
> is full of actors.
>
> I was asking about the latter version of
> the theater metaphor. Dennett writes about
> it "for those who want to join the race
> to model consciousness, this is the starting
> line" (on the Back Cover of Baars' earlier book
> "A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness"). Is it?
> Does anyone agree?
>
> -J.
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Nicholas Thompson" <[hidden email]>
> To: <[hidden email]>
> Sent: Friday, October 23, 2009 6:57 AM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness
>
>
> > The idea you describe here is familiar to me as the "cartesian

theatre",
> > which I think arises from Daniel Dennet, Consciousness Explained??? It
is
> > also represented, I think, in a book called the User Illusion, which I
> > have
> > never read. It's a very tempting view because it is deeply imbedded in
> > our
> > day-to-day conversations about behavior.
> >
> > It is called the Cartesian Theatre because of Descartes's "brain in
the
> > vat" argument that leads to the conclusion that all we can for sure is
the
> > content of our own minds. On that basis, we start to think of
experience
> > as something we sit and watch played out sort of screen on the inside
of
> > our skulls, watched perhaps by the cyclopean eye of the pineal. As
you
> > know, it is my view that this sort of cartesian skepticism leads
> > further:--
> > to the conclusion that we cant know anything for sure. On my account,
if
> > we cannot know about the world, we surely cannot know about our own
minds.
> > The argument is as follows: Any knowledge requires a
knowledge-gathering
> > mechanism that uses cues. If we doubt that there are more or less
> > accurate
> > mechanisms for gathering information about the world, why would we be
> > confident that there are mechanisms for gtathering information about
one's
> > own mind. This is how I arrive at my position, "O what the fuck, why
not
> > just be realists and get the silliness over at the beginning."
> >
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Nick Thompson

Re: In the theater of consciousness

In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4

Hmmm. My assertion would be that if you articuilated what you MEAN by the
knowledge relation it would enevitably require those three elements.

But I can see it might be a hard sell.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> [Original Message]
> From: David West <[hidden email]>
> To: nick thompson <[hidden email]>
> Date: 10/23/2009 4:05:22 PM
> Subject: Re: In the theater of consciousness
>
>
> Nick, just a quick private reply until I get back from Florida and can
> participate in a more helpful manner. But to intrigue/annoy you in the
> meantime - you said
>
> > The argument is as follows: Any knowledge requires a

knowledge-gathering
> > mechanism that uses cues.
>
> As a dedicated mystic I would reject this premise outright - there is no
> mechanism and the cues are the knowledge. Of course, the self in the
> audience of the Cartesian Theatre is merely an illusion.
>
> dave west

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Nick Thompson

Re: In the theater of consciousness

In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4

Jochen

I am taking the liberty of moving our conversation into consciousness (See
Jochen's note below). Perhaps the list can do a weekend seminar on it.

thanks for the reference. I have down loaded it, and now I must read it.

I confess I have done that snotty thing of looking in the references before
I read the article ... to discover that Baars does not reference either of
the pinacles of thinking concerning scientific metaphors, George Lakoff or
Mary Brenda Hesse. I fear he will not have found Holt, nor even that guy
who imagines consciousness as the chart table on large tanker trying to
come into San Diego Harbor. (and then tells us in detail about the
polynesians who conceived of navigation on the open water as a project of
moving stars and islands, out of sight over the horizon) (can anybody
remind me of who this was?)

There is an arrogance of working scientists who, when they reach a certain
stature in their fields, feel that they have earned the right to do
philosophy, even though they have read very little of it. Something that,
for instance, they would never attempt with quantum mechanics or
meteorology. So, I am braced to be pissed off by Baars. I am made VERY
cranky by "cognitive scientists."

Somebody will now box my ears, and rightly, too. russ? I suppose I should
stipulate right away that I an not much of a philosopher myself, but a
philosopher-groupie, and that I am, in the bargain, a terrible scholar.
[sigh][sound of air leaking out of a good rant].

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> [Original Message]
> From: Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]>
> To: <[hidden email]>
> Date: 10/24/2009 3:42:06 PM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness
>
> Since the core of his theory is just a metaphor,
> the easiest way to get access to it is maybe his paper
> "Metaphors of consciousness and attention in the brain"
> http://bci.ucsd.edu/~pineda/COGS273/Overheads/Baars.pdf
> John Kennison said in June that one feature about
> metaphors is that we must tolerate inconsistencies.
> I am not sure how big the inconsistencies are here.
>
> However, it is surprising how much conversation
> is going on privately between the members
> of the list. Like unconscious thoughts..
> If you reply to one of those unconscious mails,
> it is drawn in the spotlight of attention.
> What appears on the list are the conscious
> thoughts of the group, the FRIAM mind, while
> the private messages are "unconscious" ones.
> If the FRIAM list discusses itself, it would
> be a form of self-awareness or consciousness
> for the FRIAM mind. I wonder if Baars' theory
> covers this case - actors on stage discussing
> the theater?
>
> Bernard Baars has written two books about
> it which I plan to study in the next weeks,
> "In the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace
> of the Mind" (Oxford University Press, 1997)
> and "A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness"
> (Cambridge University Press, 1988).
>
> -J.
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Nicholas Thompson" <[hidden email]>
> To: "Jochen Fromm" <[hidden email]>
> Cc: "Owen Densmore" <[hidden email]>
> Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2009 1:45 AM
> Subject: FW: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness
>
>
> > Owen has helpfully removed my excuse for not readiung Baars. As a man

of
> > mercy, and knowing of my limitations as a reader, could you help to a
> > passage among the following that woudl get me quickly to the heart of
his

> > theory?
> >
> > Thanks so much,
> >
> > Nick
> >
> > Nicholas S. Thompson
> > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
> > Clark University ([hidden email])
> > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

Stephen Thompson

Re: In the theater of consciousness

Nick:

Without intending to "set you off" can you explain a bit about your
displeasure at
'cognitive scientists'? Are they too loose in their work; an academic
mash-up with no
real direction; something else; or all of the above ?

Just interested to hear your story...

Thanks,
Steph T (lurker)

Nicholas Thompson wrote:

> Jochen
>
> I am taking the liberty of moving our conversation into consciousness (See
> Jochen's note below). Perhaps the list can do a weekend seminar on it.
>
> thanks for the reference. I have down loaded it, and now I must read it.
>
> I confess I have done that snotty thing of looking in the references before
> I read the article ... to discover that Baars does not reference either of
> the pinacles of thinking concerning scientific metaphors, George Lakoff or
> Mary Brenda Hesse. I fear he will not have found Holt, nor even that guy
> who imagines consciousness as the chart table on large tanker trying to
> come into San Diego Harbor. (and then tells us in detail about the
> polynesians who conceived of navigation on the open water as a project of
> moving stars and islands, out of sight over the horizon) (can anybody
> remind me of who this was?)
>
> There is an arrogance of working scientists who, when they reach a certain
> stature in their fields, feel that they have earned the right to do
> philosophy, even though they have read very little of it. Something that,
> for instance, they would never attempt with quantum mechanics or
> meteorology. So, I am braced to be pissed off by Baars. I am made VERY
> cranky by "cognitive scientists."
>
> Somebody will now box my ears, and rightly, too. russ? I suppose I should
> stipulate right away that I an not much of a philosopher myself, but a
> philosopher-groupie, and that I am, in the bargain, a terrible scholar.
> [sigh][sound of air leaking out of a good rant].
>
> Nick
>
>
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
> Clark University ([hidden email])
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
>
>
>> [Original Message]
>> From: Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]>
>> To: <[hidden email]>
>> Date: 10/24/2009 3:42:06 PM
>> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness
>>
>> Since the core of his theory is just a metaphor,
>> the easiest way to get access to it is maybe his paper
>> "Metaphors of consciousness and attention in the brain"
>> http://bci.ucsd.edu/~pineda/COGS273/Overheads/Baars.pdf
>> John Kennison said in June that one feature about
>> metaphors is that we must tolerate inconsistencies.
>> I am not sure how big the inconsistencies are here.
>>
>> However, it is surprising how much conversation
>> is going on privately between the members
>> of the list. Like unconscious thoughts..
>> If you reply to one of those unconscious mails,
>> it is drawn in the spotlight of attention.
>> What appears on the list are the conscious
>> thoughts of the group, the FRIAM mind, while
>> the private messages are "unconscious" ones.
>> If the FRIAM list discusses itself, it would
>> be a form of self-awareness or consciousness
>> for the FRIAM mind. I wonder if Baars' theory
>> covers this case - actors on stage discussing
>> the theater?
>>
>> Bernard Baars has written two books about
>> it which I plan to study in the next weeks,
>> "In the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace
>> of the Mind" (Oxford University Press, 1997)
>> and "A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness"
>> (Cambridge University Press, 1988).
>>
>> -J.
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "Nicholas Thompson" <[hidden email]>
>> To: "Jochen Fromm" <[hidden email]>
>> Cc: "Owen Densmore" <[hidden email]>
>> Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2009 1:45 AM
>> Subject: FW: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness
>>
>>
>>
>>> Owen has helpfully removed my excuse for not readiung Baars. As a man
>>>
> of
>
>>> mercy, and knowing of my limitations as a reader, could you help to a
>>> passage among the following that woudl get me quickly to the heart of
>>>
> his
>
>>> theory?
>>>
>>> Thanks so much,
>>>
>>> Nick
>>>
>>> Nicholas S. Thompson
>>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
>>> Clark University ([hidden email])
>>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>>>
>
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>

Roger Critchlow-2

Re: In the theater of consciousness

So, this Baars fellow who you're discussing, this is the Bernard J Baars whose home page at http://vesicle.nsi.edu/users/baars/ links to copies of all the books and papers under discussion?

-- rec --

On Sat, Oct 24, 2009 at 12:36 PM, Stephen Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick:
Without intending to "set you off" can you explain a bit about your displeasure at
'cognitive scientists'? Are they too loose in their work; an academic mash-up with no
real direction; something else; or all of the above ?
Just interested to hear your story...

Thanks,
Steph T (lurker)

Nicholas Thompson wrote:

Jochen

I am taking the liberty of moving our conversation into consciousness (See
Jochen's note below). Perhaps the list can do a weekend seminar on it.
thanks for the reference. I have down loaded it, and now I must read it.
I confess I have done that snotty thing of looking in the references before
I read the article ... to discover that Baars does not reference either of
the pinacles of thinking concerning scientific metaphors, George Lakoff or
Mary Brenda Hesse. I fear he will not have found Holt, nor even that guy
who imagines consciousness as the chart table on large tanker trying to
come into San Diego Harbor. (and then tells us in detail about the
polynesians who conceived of navigation on the open water as a project of
moving stars and islands, out of sight over the horizon) (can anybody
remind me of who this was?)

There is an arrogance of working scientists who, when they reach a certain
stature in their fields, feel that they have earned the right to do
philosophy, even though they have read very little of it. Something that,
for instance, they would never attempt with quantum mechanics or
meteorology. So, I am braced to be pissed off by Baars. I am made VERY
cranky by "cognitive scientists."

Somebody will now box my ears, and rightly, too. russ? I suppose I should
stipulate right away that I an not much of a philosopher myself, but a
philosopher-groupie, and that I am, in the bargain, a terrible scholar. [sigh][sound of air leaking out of a good rant].
Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

[Original Message]
From: Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]>
To: <[hidden email]>
Date: 10/24/2009 3:42:06 PM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness

Since the core of his theory is just a metaphor, the easiest way to get access to it is maybe his paper
"Metaphors of consciousness and attention in the brain"
http://bci.ucsd.edu/~pineda/COGS273/Overheads/Baars.pdf
John Kennison said in June that one feature about metaphors is that we must tolerate inconsistencies. I am not sure how big the inconsistencies are here.

However, it is surprising how much conversation
is going on privately between the members
of the list. Like unconscious thoughts..
If you reply to one of those unconscious mails,
it is drawn in the spotlight of attention.
What appears on the list are the conscious thoughts of the group, the FRIAM mind, while
the private messages are "unconscious" ones.
If the FRIAM list discusses itself, it would be a form of self-awareness or consciousness for the FRIAM mind. I wonder if Baars' theory covers this case - actors on stage discussing the theater?

Bernard Baars has written two books about it which I plan to study in the next weeks,
"In the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind" (Oxford University Press, 1997)
and "A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness" (Cambridge University Press, 1988).
-J.

----- Original Message ----- From: "Nicholas Thompson" <[hidden email]>
To: "Jochen Fromm" <[hidden email]>
Cc: "Owen Densmore" <[hidden email]>
Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2009 1:45 AM
Subject: FW: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness

Owen has helpfully removed my excuse for not readiung Baars. As a man

of

mercy, and knowing of my limitations as a reader, could you help to a
passage among the following that woudl get me quickly to the heart of

his

theory?
Thanks so much,
Nick
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Jochen Fromm-4

Re: In the theater of consciousness

Yes. You can find the text of his 1988 book
"A cognitive theory of consciousness" there.
I borrowed it this week from the university
library (we have got a new one here in Berlin,
see here http://bit.ly/2ELIaK ).

The theory seems to be rather weak,
I think the best thing in his "theory" is the theater
metaphor. But if you want to model consciousness
and self-awareness by an ABM, then this
seems to be the starting line, as Dennett says.

-J.

----- Original Message -----
From: Roger Critchlow
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2009 9:06 PM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness

So, this Baars fellow who you're discussing, this is the Bernard J Baars
whose home page at http://vesicle.nsi.edu/users/baars/ links to copies of
all the books and papers under discussion?

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Eric Charles

Re: In the theater of consciousness

Jochen,
I have not read Baars, but... One of the problems with the cognitive theatre metaphor (and most other dualistic metaphors) is that it makes the modeler's life harder NOT easier.

Let us assume that, at the most fundamental level, my consciousness is about my keeping in touch with the world (i.e., my consciousness might well do other things, but for now we will stick with a presumably primitive function).

It is very hard to model exactly how this works, but psychologists and systems biologists are making good headway. Sensory information (spread over space and time) is quite complex, but does specify a significant amount of world-properties we are interested in. A sensory system, properly integrated with an action system, can therefore allow us to act intelligently towards the world. That coupling, through complex/dynamic physiological systems, should form the heart of any model of consciousness. For simplicity, lets call that the "realist's model".

Many people think we can simplify the problem by going inside the Cartesian theartre. That is, maybe things will be simpler if we only worry about how mental images relate to intended actions. The problem is that such a model has to be just about as complicated as the realist's model. Then, even once you have a completely satisfactory model, you will still find that you have two mysteries to solve: First, how physical interaction with the world forms the mental ideas. Second, how intended actions "in the mind" become physical actions. This mysteries must be solved, because even if you are a dualist, it is still the case that consciousness is about keeping in touch with the world. So, for the slight bit that the theatre metaphor simplifies your initial problem, it greatly complicates the final solution, by requiring at least three complex models where before you only needed one. Modifying my sentence in the prior paragraph, in a satisfactory dualistic model: A sensory system integrates with the mind such that a complex/dynamic processes projects "ideas" on a stage (only some of which correspond in anyway to the world); watching those "ideas" play out a complex/dynamic process leads us to form "hypotheses" both about the causes of those "ideas" and the consequences of our actions upon those "ideas" and whatever caused those ideas; then we must have a complex/dynamic process that leads from our hypotheses to action in a world, by which I mean action of the me on the stage and the me watching the stage and the me whose head the stage is in. Yuck!

That's not the only problem with dualism, but from a modeling perspective, I think it might be the main one.

Eric

On Sat, Oct 24, 2009 04:42 PM, "Jochen Fromm" <[hidden email]> wrote:

Yes. You can find the text of his 1988 book
"A cognitive theory of consciousness" there.
I  borrowed it this week from the university
library (we have got a new one here in Berlin,
see here http://bit.ly/2ELIaK ).

The theory seems to be rather weak,
I think the best thing in his "theory" is the theater
metaphor. But if you want to model consciousness
and self-awareness by an ABM, then this
seems to be the starting line, as Dennett says.

-J.

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Roger Critchlow
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2009 9:06 PM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness

So, this Baars fellow who you're discussing, this is the Bernard J Baars 
whose home page at http://vesicle.nsi.edu/users/baars/ links to copies of 
all the books and papers under discussion?



============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601

Jochen Fromm-4

Re: In the theater of consciousness

In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4

A thoughtful response. You are right,
one inconsistency for the theater
metaphor is the missing distinction
between sensoric and motoric regions.
The coupling between them is also
completely neglected.

Another one is the missing distinction
between different levels of abstraction
for the various actors on the stage,
ranging from concrete perceptions to
abstract perception and beliefs, and
from concrete actions to abstract actions
and intentions.

Perhaps one could imagine a theater
with multiple stages, like a disco or club
with multiple dance floors. Theaters and
clubs are similar, in both of them there are
always a lot of people watching (the
unconscious elements), and only a
few are moving around in the spotlight
(the conscious ones).

-J.

----- Original Message -----
From: "ERIC P. CHARLES" <[hidden email]>
To: "Jochen Fromm" <[hidden email]>
Cc: "The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group" <[hidden email]>
Sent: Sunday, October 25, 2009 12:52 AM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness

> I have not read Baars, but... One of the problems with the cognitive
> theatre
> metaphor (and most other dualistic metaphors) is that it makes the
> modeler's
> life harder NOT easier.
>
> Let us assume that, at the most fundamental level, my consciousness is
> about my
> keeping in touch with the world (i.e., my consciousness might well do
> other
> things, but for now we will stick with a presumably primitive function).
>
> It is very hard to model exactly how this works, but psychologists and
> systems
> biologists are making good headway. Sensory information (spread over space
> and
> time) is quite complex, but does specify a significant amount of
> world-properties we are interested in. A sensory system, properly
> integrated
> with an action system, can therefore allow us to act intelligently towards
> the
> world. That coupling, through complex/dynamic physiological systems,
> should
> form the heart of any model of consciousness. For simplicity, lets call
> that
> the "realist's model".
>
> Many people think we can simplify the problem by going inside the
> Cartesian
> theartre. That is, maybe things will be simpler if we only worry about how
> mental images relate to intended actions. The problem is that such a model
> has
> to be just about as complicated as the realist's model. Then, even once
> you
> have a completely satisfactory model, you will still find that you have
> two
> mysteries to solve: First, how physical interaction with the world forms
> the
> mental ideas. Second, how intended actions "in the mind" become physical
> actions. This mysteries must be solved, because even if you are a dualist,
> it
> is still the case that consciousness is about keeping in touch with the
> world.
> So, for the slight bit that the theatre metaphor simplifies your initial
> problem, it greatly complicates the final solution, by requiring at least
> three
> complex models where before you only needed one. Modifying my sentence in
> the
> prior paragraph, in a satisfactory dualistic model: A sensory system
> integrates
> with the mind such that a complex/dynamic processes projects "ideas" on a
> stage
> (only some of which correspond in anyway to the world); watching those
> "ideas"
> play out a complex/dynamic process leads us to form "hypotheses" both
> about the
> causes of those "ideas" and the consequences of our actions upon those
> "ideas"
> and whatever caused those ideas; then we must have a complex/dynamic
> process
> that leads from our hypotheses to action in a world, by which I mean
> action of
> the me on the stage and the me watching the stage and the me whose head
> the
> stage is in. Yuck!
>
> That's not the only problem with dualism, but from a modeling perspective,
> I
> think it might be the main one.
>
> Eric

Nick Thompson

Re: In the theater of consciousness

In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4

Jochen, et al,

I have now read Baars, as best I can, and he seems to be headed in
precisely the direction you suggest. Stages within stages; theatres all the
way down.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> [Original Message]
> From: Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]>
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 10/25/2009 5:53:58 AM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness
>
> A thoughtful response. You are right,
> one inconsistency for the theater
> metaphor is the missing distinction
> between sensoric and motoric regions.
> The coupling between them is also
> completely neglected.
>
> Another one is the missing distinction
> between different levels of abstraction
> for the various actors on the stage,
> ranging from concrete perceptions to
> abstract perception and beliefs, and
> from concrete actions to abstract actions
> and intentions.
>
> Perhaps one could imagine a theater
> with multiple stages, like a disco or club
> with multiple dance floors. Theaters and
> clubs are similar, in both of them there are
> always a lot of people watching (the
> unconscious elements), and only a
> few are moving around in the spotlight
> (the conscious ones).
>
> -J.
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "ERIC P. CHARLES" <[hidden email]>
> To: "Jochen Fromm" <[hidden email]>
> Cc: "The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group"

<[hidden email]>

> Sent: Sunday, October 25, 2009 12:52 AM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness
>
>
> > I have not read Baars, but... One of the problems with the cognitive
> > theatre
> > metaphor (and most other dualistic metaphors) is that it makes the
> > modeler's
> > life harder NOT easier.
> >
> > Let us assume that, at the most fundamental level, my consciousness is
> > about my
> > keeping in touch with the world (i.e., my consciousness might well do
> > other
> > things, but for now we will stick with a presumably primitive function).
> >
> > It is very hard to model exactly how this works, but psychologists and
> > systems
> > biologists are making good headway. Sensory information (spread over

space
> > and
> > time) is quite complex, but does specify a significant amount of
> > world-properties we are interested in. A sensory system, properly
> > integrated
> > with an action system, can therefore allow us to act intelligently
towards

> > the
> > world. That coupling, through complex/dynamic physiological systems,
> > should
> > form the heart of any model of consciousness. For simplicity, lets call
> > that
> > the "realist's model".
> >
> > Many people think we can simplify the problem by going inside the
> > Cartesian
> > theartre. That is, maybe things will be simpler if we only worry about

how
> > mental images relate to intended actions. The problem is that such a
model
> > has
> > to be just about as complicated as the realist's model. Then, even once
> > you
> > have a completely satisfactory model, you will still find that you have
> > two
> > mysteries to solve: First, how physical interaction with the world forms
> > the
> > mental ideas. Second, how intended actions "in the mind" become physical
> > actions. This mysteries must be solved, because even if you are a
dualist,
> > it
> > is still the case that consciousness is about keeping in touch with the
> > world.
> > So, for the slight bit that the theatre metaphor simplifies your initial
> > problem, it greatly complicates the final solution, by requiring at
least
> > three
> > complex models where before you only needed one. Modifying my sentence
in
> > the
> > prior paragraph, in a satisfactory dualistic model: A sensory system
> > integrates
> > with the mind such that a complex/dynamic processes projects "ideas" on
a

> > stage
> > (only some of which correspond in anyway to the world); watching those
> > "ideas"
> > play out a complex/dynamic process leads us to form "hypotheses" both
> > about the
> > causes of those "ideas" and the consequences of our actions upon those
> > "ideas"
> > and whatever caused those ideas; then we must have a complex/dynamic
> > process
> > that leads from our hypotheses to action in a world, by which I mean
> > action of
> > the me on the stage and the me watching the stage and the me whose head
> > the
> > stage is in. Yuck!
> >
> > That's not the only problem with dualism, but from a modeling

perspective,

> > I
> > think it might be the main one.
> >
> > Eric
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org