IS: Rhetoric in scientific arguments WAS: FW: Fractal discussion Landscape-bird songs
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IS: Rhetoric in scientific arguments WAS: FW: Fractal discussion Landscape-bird songs
 
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Hi Glen, This sentence raises some issues that are profoundly interesting to me, because I am interested in both terseness and precision in scientific argument. . I should pepper my replies with more social salve like "to me" and "in my opinion". It's difficult, though, because that overhead interferes with the actual content. This is an old issue for me and I have, and probably still am, on both sides of it. From a Pragmatist’s point of view, social salve has nothing to do with it. We are talking about two quite different propositions. When you put the “salve” in, your claim is that this is how the world looks “from here, from now”, but you make no universal claim. When you take the salve out, you are asserting that this is how the world will look from all points of view in the very long run. If, without “salve”, you reply to this note saying, “Nick, this is bloody non-sense!”, you will be saying that “Our colleagues will agree, in the very long run, that what you have written is foolish.” What is irksome about such an unsalved claim is not the personal assertion of disagreement – we all can handle that – but the implicit assertion of universal judgement of all rational “men” upon what we thought was our best possible thought. As scientists, we usually try to speak for the ages, as well as for ourselves, unless we say otherwise. Writing as for the ages is more efficient in the long run: either one qualifies one’s short term opinions with “salve”, or one has to gin up one’s long-term opinions with such words as, “No, this I really believe; I am not kidding here; this is the truth!” So, what you represent as “politesse”, I would describe as a kind of precision about the nature of one’s claims. What I have just written I guess, I really believe … as a pragmatist. (};-\) N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- Oops. I'm sorry if I've offended you. I am contrarian and tend to seek out areas of disagreement, rather than agreement. On 02/24/2017 07:14 PM, Robert Wall wrote: > The "as if" was the key. The "as if" alludes to the behavioral manifestation. Yes? Yes, of course. However, this is the subject of the conversation. If we allow the "as if" to work its magic on us, we can be tricked into taking the illusion seriously. So, by calling out the nonsensical materials surrounding the "as if", I'm trying to avoid that. > I notice that you seem to use the words "useless" and "nonsense" [usually with the adjective /utter /] a lot when you post replies. Yes, you're right. And I apologize if my usage is inferred to mean something more than it is. What I mean by "useless" is that I have no use for it. I can't formulate a use case. What I mean by "nonsense" is that it makes no sense to me. I should pepper my replies with more social salve like "to me" and "in my opinion". It's difficult, though, because that overhead interferes with the actual content. But please don't think my attribution of "useless" and "nonsense" imply that I haven't read or tried to make use/sense of that content. My colleagues constantly mention work like that of Csikszentmihalyi and I've studied what I can to extract elements I can use, often to no avail. I'm certain my failure is due to my own shortcomings. But it is true. I have too much difficulty applying tools that rely fundamentally on thoughts/minds/ideas/etc across tasks and domains. > In a strange way, though, throughout this whole thread, you actually make my point. Thanks! Language can be a problem. Symbolic reference. Imprecision. But the bottom-line is that I feel you really didn't (even try to) understand anything I said, and, apparently, I don't really understand anything you have said in as much as I have tried. And I am not sure it is because of the imprecision of language, though. It is something else that leads you to just find disagreement. As often said, it is much easier to sound smart by tearing something down than to constructively build on something. Maybe that applies here. Not sure. Hope not. I don't intend to tear anything down and am under no illusions regarding my own lack of intelligence. I'm a solid C student and am always outmatched by my friends and colleagues. (That's from a lesson my dad taught me long ago. If you want to improve your game, choose opponents that are better than you are. So I make every attempt to hang out with people far smarter than I am. That they tolerate my idiocy is evidence of their kindness.) But the point, here, is that you offered a solution to the problem I posed. And I believe your solution to be inadequate. So, I'm simply trying to point out that it is inadequate and why/how it is inadequate. ... namely that your concept of optimal or efficient embedding in an environment is too reliant on the vague concept of mind/thought. If birdsong retains its temporal fractality despite the bird being embedded in a non-fractal environment, then we should look elsewhere ... somewhere other than the birds' minds. Vladimyr's argument posted last night may demonstrate that I'm wrong, though. I don't know, yet. -- ␦glen? ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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Well, OK. However, you already know that anything anyone ever says is and can only be from their perspective. Anyone who asserts to speak on behalf of all the authoritative experts in some field for all time is, then, a narcissist or confused. That implies that what you say below supports arguments from authority. I.e. we can't treat a lack of salve as an assertion of objectivity without implicitly asserting that every statement without such salve is fallacious.
Context _always_ matters, even in that most universal of science domains cosmology. Re: writing for the ages, it would be a mistake to think of a mailing list or discussion forum as if the posters made serious attempt to curate and "deep dive" into their own psyche or professional career arc when they make their posts. As Marcus pointed out awhile back, these low-overhead postings are supposed to be more like a discussion and less like a formal submission to a journal ... or a well-curated indefinitely defensable statement of one's carefully thought out opinion. But I smell what I think is an intention, on your part, to focus on something like "authenticity". And that relates to our long-running thread on realism. To a Socratic post-modernist like myself, knowing only that we know nothing, most of my opinions are fleeting and ill thought out. And I change my mind regularly enough. So, were I to apply the overhead meta-content of "This is what I really believe" for every one of the (often) nonsensical brain farts I emit, that overhead would quickly swamp any potential content. Instead, I try to form self-coherent _arguments_ about this or that, regardless of whether I believe those arguments or not. I also think it's a bit of a mistake to [hyper] focus on any kind of "authenticity" for any particular sentence, post, or set of concepts. While I agree that universality (global coherence, anyway) is a worthy objective, it is far out of reach. (And as the Hilbert program saw, perhaps even fundamentally flawed.) But attempts at regions of local coherence have a long and glorious history of success. Hence, it's irrelevant whether you or I really believe what we're saying at any given time. What's more important is the extent to which the various sayings hang together (or not). On February 25, 2017 9:52:22 AM PST, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote: > >This is an old issue for me and I have, and probably still am, on both >sides of it. From a Pragmatist’s point of view, social salve has >nothing to do with it. We are talking about two quite different >propositions. When you put the “salve” in, your claim is that this is >how the world looks “from here, from now”, but you make no universal >claim. When you take the salve out, you are asserting that this is how >the world will look from all points of view in the very long run. If, >without “salve”, you reply to this note saying, “Nick, this is bloody >non-sense!”, you will be saying that “Our colleagues will agree, in the >very long run, that what you have written is foolish.” What is irksome >about such an unsalved claim is not the personal assertion of >disagreement – we all can handle that – but the implicit assertion of >universal judgement of all rational “men” upon what we thought was our >best possible thought. As scientists, we usually try to speak for the >ages, as well as for ourselves, unless we say otherwise. Writing as >for the ages is more efficient in the long run: either one qualifies >one’s short term opinions with “salve”, or one has to gin up one’s >long-term opinions with such words as, “No, this I really believe; I >am not kidding here; this is the truth!” So, what you represent as >“politesse”, I would describe as a kind of precision about the nature >of one’s claims. > > > >What I have just written I guess, I really believe … as a pragmatist. >(};-\) ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Re: IS: Rhetoric in scientific arguments WAS: FW: Fractal discussion Landscape-bird songs
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Dear Glen, I guess I disagree with you on what you write here in every conceivable way. But I love you like a brother, so there's some local coherence, for ya' . Some larding below. Please stay well, Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- Well, OK. However, you already know that anything anyone ever says is and can only be from their perspective. [NST==>Well, then perspective divides out of the equation, no? “What is in the box has no place in the language.” Wittgenstein. <==nst] Anyone who asserts to speak on behalf of all the authoritative experts in some field for all time is, then, a narcissist or confused. [NST==>No. They have just accepted the point-of-viewedness of things and are getting on with it. <==nst] That implies that what you say below supports arguments from authority. [NST==>I don’t think we can EVER escape arguments from authority. Science is locked in a matrix of trust. Doubt in science is really important, but it has to be relatively rare, or we would never know which of a million doubts to take seriously. <==nst] I.e. we can't treat a lack of salve as an assertion of objectivity without implicitly asserting that every statement without such salve is fallacious.[NST==>Yep. All statements are more or less fallacious. So does that render all statements the same? If I flip the coin once and it comes up heads, what evidence do I have that the coin is biased. None. If I flip it twice, a little. If I get a hundred heads, the probability that the coin flips represent a population of fair coin-flips is finite, but vanishingly small. I’ld bet on it, wouldn’t you? All statements of certainly of that character. <==nst] Context _always_ matters, even in that most universal of science domains cosmology.[NST==>Not quite clear on what is so universal about cosmology. Our experiences of cosmology are much less universal than our experiences of sneezing. <==nst] Re: writing for the ages, it would be a mistake to think of a mailing list or discussion forum as if the posters made serious attempt to curate and "deep dive" into their own psyche or professional career arc when they make their posts. [NST==>I don’t know. I usually try to swing for the fence when I write on FRIAM. I think you do, too. In fact, I think you are, now. <==nst] As Marcus pointed out awhile back, these low-overhead postings are supposed to be more like a discussion and less like a formal submission to a journal ... or a well-curated indefinitely defensable statement of one's carefully thought out opinion.[NST==>Still, at the instant of writing, the intent is usually to speak the truth, right? And what is “speaking the truth” but trying to lay out what one supposes will be believed on the matter a hundred, or a thousand, years from now. <==nst] But I smell what I think is an intention, on your part, [NST==>I think “reek” was the term you were groping for. <==nst] to focus on something like "authenticity". And that relates to our long-running thread on realism. To a Socratic post-modernist like myself, knowing only that we know nothing, most of my opinions are fleeting and ill thought out. [NST==>Stipulated. But some are less so than others, no? If not, then all speech is just grooming. I don’t think, that sober thought directed toward a study of the transcripts of what you have written here over the last 5 years would support the theory that you are just engaged in grooming. A while I am “in”, notice the gap between “knowing nothing and fearing that most of one’s opinions are fleeting…” To ask the questions Socrates asked, he had to know a lot. He tried – and like most teachers failed – to ask questions only about matters of doubt. But mostly he was a phony like all the rest of us Socratic teachers. <==nst] And I change my mind regularly enough. So, were I to apply the overhead meta-content of "This is what I really believe" for every one of the (often) nonsensical brain farts I emit, that overhead would quickly swamp any potential content. [NST==>True. All knowledge is provisional. Yet, the statement that the coin is fair after 100 flips is still more-to-be-believed than after two. <==nst] Instead, I try to form self-coherent _arguments_ about this or that, regardless of whether I believe those arguments or not. I also think it's a bit of a mistake to [hyper] focus on any kind of "authenticity" for any particular sentence, post, or set of concepts.[NST==>Your assertion that your arguments are coherent is no less a swing for the fence than Einstein’s assertion that E=mc^2. You assert that sober opinion, in the long run, would converge on the notion that what you said made sense. <==nst] While I agree that universality (global coherence, anyway) is a worthy objective, it is far out of reach. [NST==>Of course it’s out of reach. Now are we going to strive for it, or not? That’s the only question. And what are the rules of good striving? <==nst] (And as the Hilbert program saw, perhaps even fundamentally flawed.) But attempts at regions of local coherence have a long and glorious history of success. Hence, it's irrelevant whether you or I really believe what we're saying at any given time. What's more important is the extent to which the various sayings hang together (or not).[NST==>No. And I don’t think your behavior is consistent with that position. If you did not think I was going to swing for the fence, you would never throw me a pitch. Only a fool would ask Donald Trump a question of fact. <==nst] [NST==>A post-modernist is like a disappointed lover. You WILL find love again. But only if you try. <==nst] On February 25, 2017 9:52:22 AM PST, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote: > >This is an old issue for me and I have, and probably still am, on both >sides of it. From a Pragmatist’s point of view, social salve has >nothing to do with it. We are talking about two quite different >propositions. When you put the “salve” in, your claim is that this is >how the world looks “from here, from now”, but you make no universal >claim. When you take the salve out, you are asserting that this is how >the world will look from all points of view in the very long run. If, >without “salve”, you reply to this note saying, “Nick, this is bloody >non-sense!”, you will be saying that “Our colleagues will agree, in the >very long run, that what you have written is foolish.” What is irksome >about such an unsalved claim is not the personal assertion of >disagreement – we all can handle that – but the implicit assertion of >universal judgement of all rational “men” upon what we thought was our >best possible thought. As scientists, we usually try to speak for the >ages, as well as for ourselves, unless we say otherwise. Writing as >for the ages is more efficient in the long run: either one qualifies >one’s short term opinions with “salve”, or one has to gin up one’s >long-term opinions with such words as, “No, this I really believe; I >am not kidding here; this is the truth!” So, what you represent as >“politesse”, I would describe as a kind of precision about the nature >of one’s claims. > > > >What I have just written I guess, I really believe … as a pragmatist. >(};-\) ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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Heh, your lack of social salve has left me unclear on whether I should respond or which parts to respond to. >8^D So, I'll just respond to what I think is the most important point. > That implies that what you say below supports arguments from authority. [NST==>I don’t think we can EVER escape arguments from authority. Science is locked in a matrix of trust. Doubt in science is really important, but it has to be relatively rare, or we would never know which of a million doubts to take seriously. <==nst] I think you use "doubt" differently than I do. Even if we replace "doubt" with "falsified", it's not a binary thing. When I doubt something an authority says, I'm not refuting, denying, or rejecting it. I'm simply expressing that the saying probably has caveats, some of which I might know about, some of which I might not. The same is true of (critical rationalist) falsification. Even though we know Newtonian physics isn't end-all, be-all True with a capital T. It's satisficing in most circumstances. To (When I) say it's been falsified simply means it has caveats. And, in this sense of the two terms, doubt and falsification are _rampant_ in science. When you try to replicate some other lab's experiment, you must doubt, say, the methods section in their paper, usually because you don't have the exact same equipment and the exact same people ... doubt is what promotes reproducibility to replicability. ... at least in this non-scientist's opinion. > I.e. we can't treat a lack of salve as an assertion of objectivity without implicitly asserting that every statement without such salve is fallacious. [NST==>Yep. All statements are more or less fallacious. So does that render all statements the same? If I flip the coin once and it comes up heads, what evidence do I have that the coin is biased. None. If I flip it twice, a little. If I get a hundred heads, the probability that the coin flips represent a population of fair coin-flips is finite, but vanishingly small. I’ld bet on it, wouldn’t you? All statements of certainly of that character. <==nst] No, not all fallacies are the same. Different statements are fallacious in different ways. And the argument from authority fallacy, in my opinion, is the worst one because it's opaque. You can't learn from it. At least with, say, assuming the conclusion, it encourages us to understand the relationship between premises and conclusion... it helps us grok deduction as well as the host of concepts surrounding languages, formal systems, algebras, etc. Your inductive argument, by the way, isn't obviously an argument from authority (obvious to me, anyway -- see how annoying it is), particularly with (as someone recently phrased it) interpersonally assessable things like coin flipping. Anyone with the usual complement of sensorimotor manifolds (!) can put in place the kernel and carry out the iteration. The only authorities involved are whatever physical structures are required for coin flipping and counting. But, more importantly, self-consistency (local coherence) is the governor of induction. Can you imagine if "successor" were redefined at each iteration? So, it helps make my larger point that it's irrelevant what you or I believe or state with authority. What matters is whether the method(s) hang(s) together. -- ☣ glen ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Re: IS: Rhetoric in scientific arguments WAS: FW: Fractal discussion Landscape-bird songs
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Glen, To "Peirce-up" the discussion of doubt a touch. To doubt something is to be unable to act as-if-it-were-true without reservation. So, for example, you do not doubt Newtonian mechanics under a wide range of conditions (you are willing to act as if it is true under many circumstances), however, there are conditions under which you would be nervous acting as if they were true. Your doubt is not absolute, and the "caveats" you refer to, could be expressed as a description of the circumstances under which you start to get nervous. Your description of replication is good, but non-typical (particularly among the chemists, which are Peirce's favorite scientist). We now think of replication as part of the falsification process, but that is actually a weird way to think about (a symptom of the degenerate state of many current fields). The most natural reasons to replicate a research report is a) because the outcome is itself useful or b) because you intend to build upon it. For example, if someone publishes a novel synthesis for artificial rubber, I would probably try to replicate it because I need artificial rubber, or because I intended to start with that artificial rubber and try to synthesize something new. Under those conditions, anyone trying to replicate would be very frustrated by a failure (given some tolerance for first attempts). Nick, I think Glen is prodding, in his second part at an extremely important point, and one that I have been wrestling with quite a bit lately. It is quite unclear why "trusting the work of other scientists" - as currently practiced - is not simply another deference to authority. The current resurgence of assertions that people shouldn't argue with scientists (e.g., that we should care what an astrophysicists thinks about vaccines, or what a geneticist thinks about psychology) is bad, and "science-skeptics" are not wrong when they attach a negative valence to such examples. Let us ignore those flagrant examples, however. How do I determine how much weight to give to a report in a "top journal" in psychology? Does it matter that I know full well most articles in top journals turn out to have problems (as flashy reports of unexpected results are prone to do)? And if I am suspicious of that, what do I make of the opinion of a Harvard full professor of psychology vs. a bartender who has been helping people with their problem for 5 decades? Etc. etc. etc. I think there is a very deep issue here, which I'm not sure I've ever seen explained well. I think, in part, it is a challenge that was not as prevalent even 50 years ago, but that may just be imagined nostalgia. On Wed, Mar 1, 2017 at 4:13 PM, glen ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:
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On 03/02/2017 11:04 AM, Eric Charles wrote:
> To "Peirce-up" the discussion of doubt a touch. To doubt something is to be unable to act as-if-it-were-true without reservation. So, for example, you do not doubt Newtonian mechanics under a wide range of conditions (you are willing to act as if it is true under many circumstances), Personally, I don't think this is true. It's not doubt that gives one pause. It's the expected consequences. But that requires a disambiguation of types of uncertainty. Regardless, I do low-consequence things without reservation every day all day, independent of any doubt I have about a) the truth of my conceptions or b) whether my actions will pay off. I think you make the point about consequences nicely in your discussion of replication. To be concrete, let's say we're all in certain agreement that chopping off our ear trumpets will help us hear better. My guess is most of us won't do it, not because we doubt the truth of our theory, but because it _hurts_. Compare that to, say, typing log(0) into your calculator. It's irrelevant whether you doubt the makers of the calculator as to whether you'll do it or not. -- ☣ glen ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Re: IS: Rhetoric in scientific arguments WAS: FW: Fractal discussion Landscape-bird songs
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In reply to this post by Eric Charles-2
Eric, I doubt an idea before I ever apply for a grant. Then I deceptively claim to be trying to replicate an authorities claims. But the devil within me recalls that at least once maybe more often , I have noticed that the authority’s prediction failed. That knowledge is my group’s secret until publication. Then it becomes everyone’s knowledge. I have in my memory a perfect “Black Swan” event. I suppose that I have more faith in water birds than in statisticians. Perhaps we often hide behind obscure math to shield our superstitious insights. Some times using the math first reveals an outcome that is used as a gloss to hide the unknown. For instance the Griffith’s Crack Theory widely held in Classic Mechanics. Exactly what is the use of a singularity zone when a crack propagates in wild directions? The material does not use it but then at that scale the material uses Quantum Mechanics but the engineer favours The Classic Mechanics. So indeed certain materials do emit light from crack tips. At the edges of any discipline anomalies will define limits or boundaries for paradigms. Without doubt and secret devilish memories Science would not evolve so quickly. At this point I am reminded of an eminent chemist , Polanyi? who received the Nobel Prize and afterward became a philosopher who suspected something like superstition, drives many scientists much like Isaac Newton. I think as civilized people we prefer to stick with conduct rules knowing perfectly well how to violate them and the consequences of doing so. vib I guess we should never believe the whole of PR. From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Eric Charles Glen, To "Peirce-up" the discussion of doubt a touch. To doubt something is to be unable to act as-if-it-were-true without reservation. So, for example, you do not doubt Newtonian mechanics under a wide range of conditions (you are willing to act as if it is true under many circumstances), however, there are conditions under which you would be nervous acting as if they were true. Your doubt is not absolute, and the "caveats" you refer to, could be expressed as a description of the circumstances under which you start to get nervous. Your description of replication is good, but non-typical (particularly among the chemists, which are Peirce's favorite scientist). We now think of replication as part of the falsification process, but that is actually a weird way to think about (a symptom of the degenerate state of many current fields). The most natural reasons to replicate a research report is a) because the outcome is itself useful or b) because you intend to build upon it. For example, if someone publishes a novel synthesis for artificial rubber, I would probably try to replicate it because I need artificial rubber, or because I intended to start with that artificial rubber and try to synthesize something new. Under those conditions, anyone trying to replicate would be very frustrated by a failure (given some tolerance for first attempts). Nick, I think Glen is prodding, in his second part at an extremely important point, and one that I have been wrestling with quite a bit lately. It is quite unclear why "trusting the work of other scientists" - as currently practiced - is not simply another deference to authority. The current resurgence of assertions that people shouldn't argue with scientists (e.g., that we should care what an astrophysicists thinks about vaccines, or what a geneticist thinks about psychology) is bad, and "science-skeptics" are not wrong when they attach a negative valence to such examples. Let us ignore those flagrant examples, however. How do I determine how much weight to give to a report in a "top journal" in psychology? Does it matter that I know full well most articles in top journals turn out to have problems (as flashy reports of unexpected results are prone to do)? And if I am suspicious of that, what do I make of the opinion of a Harvard full professor of psychology vs. a bartender who has been helping people with their problem for 5 decades? Etc. etc. etc. I think there is a very deep issue here, which I'm not sure I've ever seen explained well. I think, in part, it is a challenge that was not as prevalent even 50 years ago, but that may just be imagined nostalgia.
U.S. Marine Corps On Wed, Mar 1, 2017 at 4:13 PM, glen ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
Re: IS: Rhetoric in scientific arguments WAS: FW: Fractal discussion Landscape-bird songs
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Here's a spin on Eric's question about how is trusting a scientist different from trusting an authority or a scholar. http://sometimesimwrong.typepad.com/wrong/2017/03/looking-under-the-hood.html concludes but, you might say, scientists are more trustworthy than used car dealers! sure,****** but we are also supposed to be more committed to transparency. indeed, transparency is a hallmark of science - it's basically what makes science different from other ways of knowing (e.g., authority, intuition, etc.). in other words, it's what makes us better than used car dealers. The proposal is that authors of papers need to share more about the context of the paper so journals and readers get stuck with fewer lemons. -- rec -- On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 9:25 PM, Vladimyr Burachynsky <[hidden email]> wrote:
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Re: IS: Rhetoric in scientific arguments WAS: FW: Fractal discussion Landscape-bird songs
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The article referenced in that blog post turns out to be open access and pretty pertinent, too. The natural selection of bad science, Paul E. Smaldino, Richard McElreath, -- rec -- On Fri, Mar 3, 2017 at 12:25 PM, Roger Critchlow <[hidden email]> wrote:
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This one too ... though for some reason I thought someone had already posted it. Incentive Malus http://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21707513-poor-scientific-methods-may-be-hereditary-incentive-malus On 03/03/2017 09:37 AM, Roger Critchlow wrote: > The article referenced in that blog post turns out to be open access and > pretty pertinent, too. > > http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/3/9/160384 > > The natural selection of bad science, Paul E. Smaldino, Richard McElreath, > > -- rec -- > > On Fri, Mar 3, 2017 at 12:25 PM, Roger Critchlow <[hidden email]> wrote: > >> Here's a spin on Eric's question about how is trusting a scientist >> different from trusting an authority or a scholar. >> >> http://sometimesimwrong.typepad.com/wrong/2017/03/ >> looking-under-the-hood.html >> >> concludes >> >> but, you might say, scientists *are *more trustworthy than used car >>> dealers! sure,****** but we are also supposed to be more committed to >>> transparency. indeed, transparency is a hallmark of science - it's >>> basically what makes science different from other ways of knowing (e.g., >>> authority, intuition, etc.). in other words, it's what makes us better >>> than used car dealers. >> >> >> The proposal is that authors of papers need to share more about the >> context of the paper so journals and readers get stuck with fewer lemons. -- ☣ glen ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Re: IS: Rhetoric in scientific arguments WAS: FW: Fractal discussion Landscape-bird songs
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Glen ,
I had a favorite student once that I favored and explained this business like selling fast- food... Give the managers and accountants what they want. vib Is that with or without mayo sir? -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of glen ? Sent: March-03-17 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] IS: Rhetoric in scientific arguments WAS: FW: Fractal discussion Landscape-bird songs This one too ... though for some reason I thought someone had already posted it. Incentive Malus http://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21707513-poor-scientific-methods-may-be-hereditary-incentive-malus On 03/03/2017 09:37 AM, Roger Critchlow wrote: > The article referenced in that blog post turns out to be open access > and pretty pertinent, too. > > http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/3/9/160384 > > The natural selection of bad science, Paul E. Smaldino, Richard > McElreath, > > -- rec -- > > On Fri, Mar 3, 2017 at 12:25 PM, Roger Critchlow <[hidden email]> wrote: > >> Here's a spin on Eric's question about how is trusting a scientist >> different from trusting an authority or a scholar. >> >> http://sometimesimwrong.typepad.com/wrong/2017/03/ >> looking-under-the-hood.html >> >> concludes >> >> but, you might say, scientists *are *more trustworthy than used car >>> dealers! sure,****** but we are also supposed to be more committed >>> to transparency. indeed, transparency is a hallmark of science - >>> it's basically what makes science different from other ways of >>> knowing (e.g., authority, intuition, etc.). in other words, it's >>> what makes us better than used car dealers. >> >> >> The proposal is that authors of papers need to share more about the >> context of the paper so journals and readers get stuck with fewer lemons. -- ☣ glen ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
Re: IS: Rhetoric in scientific arguments WAS: FW: Fractal discussion Landscape-bird songs
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In reply to this post by gepr
Sorry, I certainly might have overlooked an earlier posting, even if I made it myself. And I'm following McElreath on twitter, but he's a very unproductive tweeter, so his messages often get lost in the spume. -- rec -- On Fri, Mar 3, 2017 at 12:49 PM, glen ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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