How do forces work?
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Splitting? was Re: How do forces work?
 
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Some (semi-serious) suggestions around how to split the list (use
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Philosophy Physics of Quanta and the Continuum Phunny stuff Phuture trends in sociology/crowd sourcing/etc. Sophtware oh and... Complexity and ABM Seems neither Mailman (the current listserv) nor Google Groups support subgroups tho'. FWIW, Lsoft's Listserve might, see http://www.lsoft.com/manuals/maestro/4.0/htmlhelp/data%20administrator/ClassicLSListTargetGroups.html - where they are called Target Groups. Robert C On 4/20/13 10:47 AM, Owen Densmore
wrote:
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Re: Splitting? was Re: How do forces work?
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lists.riseup.net (SYMPA based) allows sub-groups.
http://www.sympa.org/manual/managing-members Sarbajit On 4/21/13, Robert J. Cordingley <[hidden email]> wrote: > Some (semi-serious) suggestions around how to split the list (use > subgroups): > > Philosophy > Physics of Quanta and the Continuum > Phunny stuff > Phuture trends in sociology/crowd sourcing/etc. > Sophtware > oh and... Complexity and ABM > > Seems neither Mailman (the current listserv) nor Google Groups support > subgroups tho'. FWIW, Lsoft's Listserve might, see > http://www.lsoft.com/manuals/maestro/4.0/htmlhelp/data%20administrator/ClassicLSListTargetGroups.html > > - where they are called Target Groups. > > Robert C > > > On 4/20/13 10:47 AM, Owen Densmore wrote: >> On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 5:11 PM, Stephen Guerin >> <[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>>wrote: >> >> Aya, it turns out Bruce recently unsubscribed from FRIAM. I hope >> you guys on the list are happy with your signal to noise ratio ;-) >> Just kidding...keep it up. >> >> >> OT, but: I think we failed a test. Maybe we should split the list? >> Or use wedtech exclusively for physics, programming, etc? >> >> I now simply don't know who is on what list, nor what their interests >> are. I'm sure Russ wanted Bruce's post, right? >> >> -- Owen >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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In reply to this post by Russ Abbott
When I asked AskA{Mathematician, Physicist} the force question, here's the answer I got -- which includes a pointer to the Feynman video mentioned earlier.
-- Russ Abbott _____________________________________________ Professor, Computer Science California State University, Los Angeles On Sat, Apr 20, 2013 at 11:31 PM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:
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In reply to this post by Stephen Guerin
S -
I'd like to think Gil and I could take credit for running Bruce off with our Light/Dark Boson/Lepton nonsensery but I think he's hardier than that! Carry On! - S Aya, it turns out Bruce recently unsubscribed from FRIAM. I hope you guys on the list are happy with your signal to noise ratio ;-) Just kidding...keep it up. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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I know I am not qualified to join this discussion, but may I say just one thing? As we struggle with our data from our accelerators n’ stuff, we bring to bear models from our experience … metaphors. The language of your discussion is full of such metaphors, and full, also, of expressions of pain that these metaphors are not only incomplete -- all metaphors are incomplete – but that they are incompletete in ways that are essential to the phenomena you are trying to account for. Now, it seems to me, that this conversation is like the conversation that would ensure if we were to see a unicorn drinking out of the fountain at St. Johns, but did not have the mythology of unicorns, or even the word, unicorn, to bring to bear. We would instantly start to apply incomplete models. “It’s a whacking great horse!” One of us would say. “Yeah, but, it’s got a narwhale tooth sticking out of its forehead.” Nick From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Steve Smith S -
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I wonder if Russ's question relates to a point that was raised in another thread –one that I tried to follow --unsuccessfully because it was mostly over my head. Nick wrote that:
Again, acting in my capacity as the Village Pragmatist, I would assert that science is the only procedure capable of producing lasting consensus. The other methods .... various forms of torture, mostly ... do not produce such enduring results. N. My first thought was that we would first need language –without language it is hard to imagine what consensus would look like and hard to imagine science. How could we say that an experiment disproved a hypothesis, or even that one experiment is a repetition of another? But without consensus, how do we get language? Maybe science and language develop in tandem, --assuming we are programmed to believe that gestures and vocal sounds mean something --which can be determined through experimentation. This would explain why science seems to start with unsophisticated statements such as "Objects tend to fall in a downward direction." And why it seems necessary, when grappling with new, abstract scientific (and mathematical) ideas to reduce them to simpler statements involving ideas we are already comfortable with. And Russ's question might be part of what is needed to understand abstract concepts of modern Physics. In 1962 I had a grad course in quantum mechanics (given by the Math Dept). It started with a discussion of motion in the physical world and a look at some of the questions we would ask. But very soon we adopted the axiom that the set of all questions was isomorphic to the set of all closed subspaces of a Hilbert space. Even the instructor admitted that this was a bit hard to swallow, but once we swallowed all would eventually become clear. I learned a lot about operators on a Hilbert space and even got an A in the course, but I never connected it to any ideas I had about the physical world. ________________________________________ From: Friam [[hidden email]] on behalf of Nicholas Thompson [[hidden email]] Sent: Sunday, April 21, 2013 3:59 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] How do forces work? I know I am not qualified to join this discussion, but may I say just one thing? As we struggle with our data from our accelerators n’ stuff, we bring to bear models from our experience … metaphors. The language of your discussion is full of such metaphors, and full, also, of expressions of pain that these metaphors are not only incomplete -- all metaphors are incomplete – but that they are incompletete in ways that are essential to the phenomena you are trying to account for. Now, it seems to me, that this conversation is like the conversation that would ensure if we were to see a unicorn drinking out of the fountain at St. Johns, but did not have the mythology of unicorns, or even the word, unicorn, to bring to bear. We would instantly start to apply incomplete models. “It’s a whacking great horse!” One of us would say. “Yeah, but, it’s got a narwhale tooth sticking out of its forehead.” Nick From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Steve Smith Sent: Sunday, April 21, 2013 1:40 PM To: [hidden email]; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] How do forces work? S - I'd like to think Gil and I could take credit for running Bruce off with our Light/Dark Boson/Lepton nonsensery but I think he's hardier than that! Carry On! - S Aya, it turns out Bruce recently unsubscribed from FRIAM. I hope you guys on the list are happy with your signal to noise ratio ;-) Just kidding...keep it up. Anyway, Bruce, as I had hoped, had a nice response, albeit offlist. If you want to respond to this thread, please cc: Bruce. I copy his response below. //** Bruce Sherwood response offlist Feynman diagrams give one visualization of "forces". In this picture, consider two electrons moving near each other. With a calculable probability, one of the electrons may emit a photon, the "carrier" of the electromagnetic interaction, and this electron recoils. The other electron absorbs the photon and recoils. At least for electric repulsion, this is a nice way to think about the interaction, but it has obvious problems for talking about attraction. The exchanged photon is a "virtual" photon which unlike unbound photons has mass. At the individual "interaction vertices" (emission event and absorption event) momentum and energy need not be conserved, but for the two-electron system momentum and energy are conserved. For the strong (nuclear) interaction, the interaction carrier is the gluon. It is thought that the gravitational interaction is carried by a "gravitron" but we have no direct evidence for this. The weak interaction is mediated by the W and Z bosons and is so similar to electromagnetism that one speaks of the "electroweak interaction". A key example is neutron decay, and here is the story: http://matterandinteractions.wordpress.com/2012/05/25/neutron-decay/ Or, if you have an up-to-date browser and a graphics card with GPUs, here is a central animation from that article: http://www.glowscript.org/#/user/Bruce_Sherwood/folder/Pub/program/NeutronDecay On the other hand, the March 2013 issue of the American Journal of Physics has a very interesting and perhaps important article by Art Hobson on the modern (last few decades) perspective on quantum mechanics. Maybe this is familiar to you, but it wasn't to me. The basic idea he reviews is that everything is fields; there are no particles. Here is what seems to me a key paragraph in the conclusion: Thus Schrodinger's Psi(x,t) is a spatially extended field representing the probability amplitude for an electron (i.e., the electron-positron field) to interact at x rather than an amplitude for finding, upon measurement, a particle. In fact, the field Psi(x,t) is the so-called "particle." Fields are all there is. There is a popular science book by Rodney Brooks on the subject: At amazon.com<http://amazon.com> search for "Fields of Color: The theory that escaped Einstein". Brooks was a student of Schwinger, a major contributor to quantum field theory. Here are related references, dug out by Stephen: http://physics.uark.edu/Hobson/pubs/05.03.AJP.pdf http://arxiv.org/pdf/1204.4616 http://henry.pha.jhu.edu/henry.hobson.pdf I've finished the Brooks book. It's not very well written and much of it is taken up with material that is familiar to physicists (but needs to be there for the nonphysicist reader). The main message is however very clear. He feels that it is deeply unfortunate that the quantum field theory (QTF) developed especially by Schwinger has been way underappreciated by the physics community in general, and the Feynman emphasis on particles (and particle exchange) has had unfortunate consequences. He makes a convincing case that for several decades the big names (Weinberg, Wilczek, etc.) have all worked within the QTF framework. He stresses that wave-particle duality is a mistake which unnecessarily makes quantum phenomena more paradoxical than they need be. I checked with a powerful theorist colleague at NCSU who agrees with the basic thrust of these arguments, though he's not comfortable with the phrasing, "There are no particles." He says that all reputable quantum field theory texts spend a lot of careful time defining what is meant by a "particle" in this context. Bruce P.S. The Kindle version of the Brooks book had badly mangled format, but a few days ago Amazon updated my copy so that it now looks good. **// Bruce Sherwood response offlist BTW, the book I recommended to Bruce was by Rodney A. Brooks. I was surprised he was writing on QFT and was excited as I assumed it would have a lucid explanation as he tends to write well. The book actually isn't as great as I had hoped. I had assumed it would be the same Rodney Brooks we know from the Alife/robotics world from MIT. Turns out there's another Rodney A. Brooks that was in Cambridge, MA with Schwinger who had a career at NIH and then retired to New Zealand. Oh well. --- -. . ..-. .. ... .... - .-- --- ..-. .. ... .... [hidden email]<mailto:[hidden email]> 1600 Lena St #D1, Santa Fe, NM 87505 office: (505) 995-0206 tollfree: (888) 414-3855 mobile: (505) 577-5828 fax: (505) 819-5952 tw: @redfishgroup skype: redfishgroup gvoice: (505) 216-6226 redfish.com<http://redfish.com> | simtable.com<http://simtable.com> On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 3:09 PM, Stephen Guerin <[hidden email]<mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote: > Along the lines that Lee is mentioning with fields being the first > class objects, Bruce Sherwood may be able to illuminate some of the > current thinking in Quantum Field Theory and how interpretations are > made with respect to forces. > > Bruce? > > -Stephen > > On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 1:36 PM, <[hidden email]<mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote: >> Russ asks: >> >>> Is there a mechanistic-type explanation for how forces work? For example, >>> two electrons repel each other. How does that happen? Other than saying >>> that there are force fields that exert forces, how does the electromagnetic >>> force accomplish its effects. What is the interface/link/connection between >>> the force (field) and the objects on which it acts. Or is all we can say is >>> that it just happens: it's a physics primitive? >> >> I have the impression that the best you can say is that fields act on fields; fields are (the >> only) first-class objects, and what you're calling "objects" are at best second-class--they >> are epiphenomena of fields (or, of *the* field). >> >> There is (or was when I last tried to look into this, about 40 years ago) a concept of >> "current" (which I suppose is a generalization of our familiar "electric current", but if so >> is such a generalization that I was unable to see the connection at all) which was in some way >> involved with interactions of fields. Maybe a Google search on current and Jakiw would turn >> up something useful, but probably not. >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
science and language (was How do forces work?)
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That's a _great_ counterfactual suggestion, to imagine science without language. The way I see it, science consists of transpersonal behaviors. I know this definition is (almost) peculiar to me. Sorry about that. But science is unrelated to thought at all. It's all about methods and getting other people to do what you do. And if we can imagine that language is somehow related to grooming, e.g. the reason humans usually don't lick their fingers and wipe smudges from each others' faces on a regular basis is because our language has obviated most of that behavior. We've replaced grooming with moving our jaws up and down and emitting complex sequences of grunts. If we can imagine that, and temporarily accept that science is unrelated to thought, then perhaps we can imagine a language-less science? I suspect it would be similar to the apprenticeship model for education. It might also be similar to the ritualistic oral traditions of people like the Celts. But the problem I'm having imagining it comes down to the definition of language. To what extent is abstraction (symbol manipulation) necessary for us to call something a "language"? At bottom, I think it boils down to the ability to _point_ at things, which requires the ability to see, an appendage with which to point, and the neurological structures to empathize (put yourself in the pointer's shoes). This strikes me as the root of language. If so, a harder counterfactual is: Can we imagine science without the ability to point at things? I think the answer to that is, "No." But as long as we have that root, regardless of the structure and dynamic that might grow from that root, I think the answer is "Yes, science can exist without the implementation details of what we now call language." John Kennison wrote at 04/22/2013 06:49 AM: > My first thought was that we would first need language –without > language it is hard to imagine what consensus would look like and > hard to imagine science. How could we say that an experiment > disproved a hypothesis, or even that one experiment is a repetition > of another? But without consensus, how do we get language? Maybe > science and language develop in tandem, --assuming we are programmed > to believe that gestures and vocal sounds mean something --which can > be determined through experimentation. This would explain why science > seems to start with unsophisticated statements such as "Objects tend > to fall in a downward direction." And why it seems necessary, when > grappling with new, abstract scientific (and mathematical) ideas to > reduce them to simpler statements involving ideas we are already > comfortable with. And Russ's question might be part of what is > needed to understand abstract concepts of modern Physics. In 1962 I > had a grad course in quantum mechanics (given by the Math Dept). It > started with a discussion of motion in the physical world and a look > at some of the questions we would ask. But very soon we adopted the > axiom that the set of all questions was isomorphic to the set of all > closed subspaces of a Hilbert space. Even the instructor admitted > that this was a bit hard to swallow, but once we swallowed all would > eventually become clear. I learned a lot about operators on a Hilbert > space and even got an A in the course, but I never connected it to > any ideas I had about the physical world. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-255-2847, http://tempusdictum.com There is all the difference in the world between treating people equally and attempting to make them equal. -- F.A. Hayek -- =><= glen e. p. ropella The suckers giving up their souls ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
Re: science and language (was How do forces work?)
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Glen, John,
A really interesting exchange. It feeds into my conversation with my Peirce Mentor about science being at its root experimentation and experimentation being, at its root, poking the world with a stick. ("It walks like a duck, it quacks like a duck. Does it squawk like a duck? [poke!] Yes. It's a duck!") I render this in language, but the whole thing could be done without language at all, unless one is one of those people who insists that all thought is in language. -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of glen Sent: Monday, April 22, 2013 9:42 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: [FRIAM] science and language (was How do forces work?) That's a _great_ counterfactual suggestion, to imagine science without language. The way I see it, science consists of transpersonal behaviors. I know this definition is (almost) peculiar to me. Sorry about that. But science is unrelated to thought at all. It's all about methods and getting other people to do what you do. And if we can imagine that language is somehow related to grooming, e.g. the reason humans usually don't lick their fingers and wipe smudges from each others' faces on a regular basis is because our language has obviated most of that behavior. We've replaced grooming with moving our jaws up and down and emitting complex sequences of grunts. If we can imagine that, and temporarily accept that science is unrelated to thought, then perhaps we can imagine a language-less science? I suspect it would be similar to the apprenticeship model for education. It might also be similar to the ritualistic oral traditions of people like the Celts. But the problem I'm having imagining it comes down to the definition of language. To what extent is abstraction (symbol manipulation) necessary for us to call something a "language"? At bottom, I think it boils down to the ability to _point_ at things, which requires the ability to see, an appendage with which to point, and the neurological structures to empathize (put yourself in the pointer's shoes). This strikes me as the root of language. If so, a harder counterfactual is: Can we imagine science without the ability to point at things? I think the answer to that is, "No." But as long as we have that root, regardless of the structure and dynamic that might grow from that root, I think the answer is "Yes, science can exist without the implementation details of what we now call language." John Kennison wrote at 04/22/2013 06:49 AM: > My first thought was that we would first need language -without > language it is hard to imagine what consensus would look like and hard > to imagine science. How could we say that an experiment disproved a > hypothesis, or even that one experiment is a repetition of another? > But without consensus, how do we get language? Maybe science and > language develop in tandem, --assuming we are programmed to believe > that gestures and vocal sounds mean something --which can be > determined through experimentation. This would explain why science > seems to start with unsophisticated statements such as "Objects tend > to fall in a downward direction." And why it seems necessary, when > grappling with new, abstract scientific (and mathematical) ideas to > reduce them to simpler statements involving ideas we are already > comfortable with. And Russ's question might be part of what is needed > to understand abstract concepts of modern Physics. In 1962 I had a > grad course in quantum mechanics (given by the Math Dept). It started > with a discussion of motion in the physical world and a look at some > of the questions we would ask. But very soon we adopted the axiom that > the set of all questions was isomorphic to the set of all closed > subspaces of a Hilbert space. Even the instructor admitted that this > was a bit hard to swallow, but once we swallowed all would eventually > become clear. I learned a lot about operators on a Hilbert space and > even got an A in the course, but I never connected it to any ideas I > had about the physical world. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-255-2847, http://tempusdictum.com There is all the difference in the world between treating people equally and attempting to make them equal. -- F.A. Hayek -- =><= glen e. p. ropella The suckers giving up their souls ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
Re: science and language (was How do forces work?)
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Ha! Nick, you DO understand computer science: Duck Typing has been popular as a way of describing loosely typed dynamic languages. I guess to be fair I'll start calling it Peirce Typing.
-- Owen On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 at 10:41 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote: Glen, John, ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
I agree that the closure of the feedback loop between peeking and poking (experimentation) is the root of science. Of course, perhaps that's not much of a statement _if_ that's the root of everything, as maybe the autopoiesis guys might claim. An interesting question is what would the _medium_ look like for a language-less science? Can we imagine an alternative reality where some form video sprouted from cave paintings, through comic strips, to movies, without written language? Nicholas Thompson wrote at 04/22/2013 09:41 AM: > A really interesting exchange. It feeds into my conversation with my Peirce > Mentor about science being at its root experimentation and experimentation > being, at its root, poking the world with a stick. ("It walks like a duck, > it quacks like a duck. Does it squawk like a duck? [poke!] Yes. It's a > duck!") I render this in language, but the whole thing could be done > without language at all, unless one is one of those people who insists that > all thought is in language. -- =><= glen e. p. ropella Broadcast dead revolution don't pay ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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How would you say "E = MC^2" without language? -- Russ Abbott _____________________________________________ Professor, Computer Science California State University, Los Angeles On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 at 9:51 AM, glen <[hidden email]> wrote:
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Russ Abbott wrote at 04/22/2013 10:21 AM:
> How would you say "E = MC^2" without language? I don't think a scientist would say such a thing. But I also don't think "E = MC^2" is science. Yes, I know. After saying that, you will (again) think to yourself that it's not worth talking to me. ;-) But the point Nick raises remains. Science is about peeking and poking the stuff around you, not idealizing everything down into abstract math. The math is a tool, but not the objective. So, a scientist would not say "E = MC^2". A scientist would say something like "If I manipulate machine X with buttons Y and Z, then A, B, and C obtain." What that experiment _means_, ideologically, is left to the metaphysicians, some of which may trigger new behaviors in the scientists. So, your question boils down to "how would you teach a student to run a particle accelerator without talking or writing anything down?" -- =><= glen e. p. ropella Swan diving off the tongues of crippled giants ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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It sounds like you're saying that theoretical science isn't, i.e., that theory and abstraction isn't part of science. Do you really believe that?
On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 at 10:35 AM, glen <[hidden email]> wrote:
-- Russ Abbott _____________________________________________ Professor, Computer Science California State University, Los Angeles ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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Russ Abbott wrote at 04/22/2013 10:59 AM:
> It sounds like you're saying that theoretical science isn't, i.e., that > theory and abstraction isn't part of science. Do you really believe that? To be as stark as possible, Yes. It's metaphysics, which is how we make sense of, give meaning to, physics. Unlike some, I give metaphysics quite a bit of respect. To be a bit more subtle, there's a difference between "theoretical physics" and "speculative physics". In order to be "scientific", a theory must be testable. So, as long as you can _also_ describe your test, even if it's not yet possible to perform the test, then I'd say that your theory is scientific. But if you hold out the theory _separate_ from the test, then I have to draw a distinction (you FORCED me to draw the distinction) and say that your theory is scientific, but not science. It's related to the science, but it's not the core constituent. "E = MC^2" is a fine thought. But until/unless _you_ (not Bob or Sally, but you) can use it to make reality different, then it's not science. The core constituent is the test, the experiment, the stuff we live in and breathe and manipulate with our fingers. -- =><= glen e. p. ropella A greased up atomic pavillion ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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There isn't much in today's science that I personally can use to manipulate the world. Much of it provides the foundation for devices that other people build through which I manipulate the world. How does all that fit in? Are you saying that only engineering is science? There is a nice definition of engineering to the effect that it's the application of the forces of nature for the benefit of mankind (or something like that). If you remove the "benefit" part and simply talk about the application of the forces of nature, is that what you are calling science?
-- Russ Abbott _____________________________________________ Professor, Computer Science California State University, Los Angeles On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 at 11:09 AM, glen <[hidden email]> wrote: Russ Abbott wrote at 04/22/2013 10:59 AM: ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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The implied division of labor in the preceding is that science figures out what the forces of nature are and how they work; engineering uses that knowledge to manipulate those forces (for the benefit of mankind). Would you say it differently?
-- Russ Abbott _____________________________________________ Professor, Computer Science California State University, Los Angeles On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 at 11:15 AM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:
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I would say that the product of the scientific enterprise is knowledge. If that's the case, then the question becomes how one expresses that knowledge. Is it possible to express knowledge without language? Doesn't any expression of knowledge imply a language?
-- Russ Abbott _____________________________________________ Professor, Computer Science California State University, Los Angeles On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:
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In reply to this post by Russ Abbott
Russ Abbott wrote at 04/22/2013 11:19 AM:
> The implied division of labor in the preceding is that science figures out > what the forces of nature are and how they work; engineering uses that > knowledge to manipulate those forces (for the benefit of mankind). Would > you say it differently? Yes. Science is the set of behaviors we use to refine our behaviors for future behaving. Engineering is the set of behaviors we use to (semi)permanently modify our surroundings. Science is a process of self-modification, where the self is us, not just me. Engineering is a process of other-modification. Hence, medicine is in an interesting position. It's a little bit science and a little bit engineering. Unfortunately, it's approached as purely engineering. > On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 at 11:15 AM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote: > >> There isn't much in today's science that I personally can use to >> manipulate the world. I disagree. I'd say that something like 90% of today's science is something any individual can use to manipulate the world. The trick is that you have to think scientifically. How can you _test_ E=MC^2? Most people don't even think about how they might actually test that, because they're _programmed_ to think it's some high-falutin' idea that they can't use. Russ Abbott wrote at 04/22/2013 11:26 AM: > Is it possible to express knowledge without language? Doesn't > any expression of knowledge imply a language? As I said before, the question boils down to the definition of language. Is it "expressing knowledge" to, without writing or talking, bake a cake while another person watches? -- =><= glen e. p. ropella I'm living free because the rent's never due ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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What is Language?
What is Science? What is Engineering? What is Metaphysics? It seems that Glen is confronting us to sort these out a bit more/differently than usual. I find your (Glen) presentation of these concepts idiosyncratic but generally to good effect. I almost always flinch and want to disagree at your first sentences, but by the end of the paragraph or post, I usually appreciate the point you are making or position you are taking. It almost always provides parallax and sometimes clarification. Language: I *think* you (Glen) made the point that what *most of us* call language would be the spoken/written tip of the proverbial iceberg, and that you would claim that language is much more than that. I think using the notion of "pointing at" only barely opens the can of language worms by essentially coining "nouns" or "subject" and/or "object" symbols. While I think that your definition of language is probably a good motivation for the kernel or core of language or maybe only "proto" language. I don't know that the ability to name things sufficiently covers the span of language, but it is a "good start". I defer to Bohm's Rheomode on what might perhaps be the next step in complexity, perhaps that of defining (only symmetric?) relations (predicates) between what we conventionally call Subject/Object. The non-dualists here (of which Rich is the only hard-core one I have seen self-identify, though I think Tory might accept that same term?) would probably want our elaboration of "language" to stop at that point... and not allow for the differentiation between subject and object... I'm unclear on whether dualism is a valuable tool or an illusion or if I'm thinking like Glen, maybe both? Sidenote...
It seems to me that classical procedural programmers would prefer the modern definition of "predicate" while the OO programmers would prefer the more classical (where the grammarial object is part of the predicate, but the OO Object is the grammarial subject)? Seems like Glen/Marcus and a few others might have an opinion/observation on this little sidenote... Science: I think you (again Glen) are saying that the core of science is the Scientific Method? I agree that without the act (including the will, the means and the ability?) to test hypotheses, I'm not sure what we would have... possibly magick or alchemy? Possibly less than that. I also accept your contention that much of what we call Science is Metaphysics. I also share Glen's appreciation of metaphysics as a context-provider for science itself. Engineering: A great deal of the *rest* of what we call Science is instead Engineering. I'd contend that most of what passes for experimental science is *engineering* in the sense that it is about constructing and crafting various apparatti to establish a controlled context for testing an hypothesis. The generation of the hypothesis (aside from the intrinsic iterative nature of science) is outside of this engineering, as is the interpretation of the results. In summary... We discuss (here and many other places) the role of Science without distinction between what is Metaphysics, what is Mathematics, and what is and what is Engineering. For the most part that is not a problem, as we all share a common vernacular use of the term "Science" to roughly mean "all things which touch Science". Medicine (a great deal of Engineering/Technology and Social Practice) we tend to call Science. Anything involving technology we tend to refer to as Science. And anything requiring (or benefitting from?) Mathematics we tend to want to refer to as Science. I think this is not that interesting of a question... in Nick's terms I think all that might be wanted here is some *local* (within this community?) convergence on the use of the terms: "Science, Engineering, Mathematics, Metaphysics". I think this has all been settled long ago and all we are asking for between each other is some "you know what I meant" class of understanding. As for Language... I think *this* is a more interesting question of which the former question(s) are strongly influenced. Just my $US.02 (e.g. adjust downward in other currencies) - Steve Russ Abbott wrote at 04/22/2013 11:19 AM:The implied division of labor in the preceding is that science figures out what the forces of nature are and how they work; engineering uses that knowledge to manipulate those forces (for the benefit of mankind). Would you say it differently?Yes. Science is the set of behaviors we use to refine our behaviors for future behaving. Engineering is the set of behaviors we use to (semi)permanently modify our surroundings. Science is a process of self-modification, where the self is us, not just me. Engineering is a process of other-modification. Hence, medicine is in an interesting position. It's a little bit science and a little bit engineering. Unfortunately, it's approached as purely engineering.On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 at 11:15 AM, Russ Abbott [hidden email] wrote:There isn't much in today's science that I personally can use to manipulate the world.I disagree. I'd say that something like 90% of today's science is something any individual can use to manipulate the world. The trick is that you have to think scientifically. How can you _test_ E=MC^2? Most people don't even think about how they might actually test that, because they're _programmed_ to think it's some high-falutin' idea that they can't use. Russ Abbott wrote at 04/22/2013 11:26 AM:Is it possible to express knowledge without language? Doesn't any expression of knowledge imply a language?As I said before, the question boils down to the definition of language. Is it "expressing knowledge" to, without writing or talking, bake a cake while another person watches? ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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Steve Smith wrote at 04/22/2013 12:49 PM:
> *Language:* > I *think* you (Glen) made the point that what *most of us* call language > would be the spoken/written tip of the proverbial iceberg, and that you > would claim that language is much more than that. I think using the > notion of "pointing at" only barely opens the can of language worms by > essentially coining "nouns" or "subject" and/or "object" symbols. Right. I tried to say that the root of language is the ability to "point at", but that what we call language is built on top of that root. But I subsequently admitted that, if _everything_ we do as living organisms is built atop that root, then saying it's also the root of language is useless. My subsequent caveat is based on my (massively ignorant) reading of people like Rosen and such who claim a closure of some kind is the definition of life. Note that I included not just the appendage with which to point, but the neurological structure that allows us to empathize. That's critical. E.g. Sometimes my cats will look where I point. But not very often. For the most part, they look at the tip of my finger. Do cats have "language" ... well, it all depends on your definition. I would say No, because they don't have the root of language I'm looking for ... or at least mine don't seem to. ;-) I'd be interested in the neural mechanisms of the pointing dog breeds. > *Science:* > I think you (again Glen) are saying that the core of science is the > Scientific Method? Perhaps. But "scientific method" is a hoity-toity word intended (or accidentally) used to intimidate people. There really is no Grand Unified Scientific Method. There are methodS, emphasis on the S. There are people who log what they do and people who don't. A scientist is a person who logs what they do in such a way that others can repeat what they've done. So, a) you have to do stuff, not just think. And b) you have to do it in such a way so that others can also do it. -- =><= glen e. p. ropella Instead of dragging your swamp for your lost love ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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