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Marcus...
> -- they are not superficially consistent -- but you can be sure their > function applied to those values will be an informative or even novel > result. One can trust that their time is not being wasted. One should not trust the last part... at least not when conversing with me ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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In reply to this post by Steve Smith
On 8/17/13 6:03 PM, Steve Smith wrote:
There was a clause about having to report any "ongoing intimate relations" with foreign nationals (especially from sensitive countries which I seem to remember *any* country which was known to have nuclear capability, and a longer list of countries known to be "inimical" to the US).As an exercise, I thought I'd categorize them. I found two lists (not obvious where to get the authoritative DOE list) http://www.wipp.energy.gov/proc/pdf/sensitivefnc.pdf (dated 2003) http://bss.fnal.gov/travel/SensitiveCountriesList.pdf (dated 2007, tagged "*") Augment the Purchasing power parity GDP info / per capital, I collect the following. Some highlights.. 1) GDP of India exceeds Russia 2) South Korea GDP is within a factor of 2 of Russia 3) UAE per captial is a dead-heat with the United States 4) Living large in Macau, right up there with Luxembourg 5) Dangerous places like Yemen, North Korea, and Afghanistan are poor absolutely and individually. 6) India and China have the most inequity, but the U.S. would be in third in this list. Macau, curiously, has the least -- ratio very close to Luxembourg again. Cuba's ratio of GDP to per capita is low too. South Africa (*) $608e9 / $11750 North Africa Algeria $207e9 / $5693 Libya $66e9/$10129 Sudan $85e9 / $2544 Egypt (*) $559e9 / $6652 Middle East Syria $107e9/$5100 Israel $248e9 / $32312 Iran $999e9 / $13127 Iraq $150e9 / $4272 Jordan (*) $36e9 / $5899 Saudi Arabia (*) $906e9 / $31275 United Arab Emirates (*) $271e9 / $49011 (pop 8e6) Yemen (*) $58e9 / $2249 (pop 23e6) Soviet, et. al.: Russia, $3380e9, $23549 Ukraine, $344e9, $7598 Kazakhstan, $231e9, $13892 Belarus, $146e9, $15633 Uzbekistan, $103e9, $3536 Azerbaijan, $97e9, $10568 Turkmenistan / Turkmen, $43e9, $7846 Georgia / Georgian, $26e9, $5929 Armenia, $19e9, $5838 Tajikistan / Tajik (Persian), $16e9, $2066 Kyrgyzstan / Kyrgyz (Russian), $13e9, $1070 Moldova / Romanian, $12e9, $3415 Cuba, $121e9 / $10200 China, et. al.: China $12405e9 / $9161 Taiwan $903e9 / $38749 Hong Kong (*) $243e9 / $34049 Macau (*) $47e9 / $82400 India $4700e9 / $3851 Afghanistan (*) $33e9 / $1053 Pakistan $514e9 / $2960 Korea North $40e9 / $1800 South (*) $1687e9 / $33580 Indonesia (*) $1314e9 / $5302 Malaysia (*) $521e9 / $17675 ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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On 8/17/13 8:19 PM, Marcus G. Daniels wrote:
> 6) India and China have the most inequity, but the U.S. would be in > third in this list. Macau, curiously, has the least -- ratio very > close to Luxembourg again. Correction: scratch the word "inequity" here, that's the wrong term! (Well from a conservative's point of view it might be called that.) For inequality, the GINI numbers for these are as below (from Wikipedia except where noted): Luxembourg 27.2 Cuba 38.0 Macau 52.0 http://www.levin.com.hk/fileupload/knowledge/Macro-Econ-Study-in-Macau-June-08.pdf India 33.9 China 47.4 United States 47.7 Yemen 37.7 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2172.html Afghanistan 27.8 North Korea 31 For comparison, Santa Fe county (FIPS=35049) had a GINI in 2000 of 46 and Los Alamos (FIPS 35028) had one of 33, which was near the lowest in the country. Which makes sense, because Los Alamos is, shall we say, an `orderly' company town. Manhattan (FIPS 36061) was 58.5 in 2000. https://geodacenter.asu.edu/%5Btermalias-raw%5D/household-incom-0 ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
Marcus G. Daniels wrote at 08/17/2013 03:23 PM:
> For some reason I remember this random instant of my life. Years ago, over a busy weekend, I got an e-mail from a collaborator as a deadline approached. The individual indicated that they were stepping away to stop by church. It wasn't a terribly important project, at least for me. So, instead of reviewing my heuristics for estimating the priorities of my collaborators, I reflected on how social systems grow up around the frailties of the community and concluded (something like) that social systems can just as well reinforce the robot-like optimization methods as they stigmatize them. I'll take this comment as an admonition to stay on topic. 8^) Yes, organizations can do both. But, that's the whole point of an organization, to begin with, to externalize, reify, materialize, instantiate ... I don't know a perfect word, processes into a regular, nearly automatic thing. In smaller bite-sized chunks, organizations are ways to "delegate" thoughts, change them from brain farts into machines that do some thing really well. E.g. while I try to avoid the walmarts and amazons like the plague, I have to admit they are canonical examples of what organizations _should_ do ... are ideally intended to do. But this is why Merle's assertion is so interesting. Are we really experiencing a kind of swinging pendulum from big robust established organizations to smaller more fragile organizations? Or is it simply that the names and identifying traits of the big established organizations are changing? Or somewhere in between, that the old big organizations are dying and new big organizations are (slowly) taking their place? If it's the 2nd or 3rd, then there probably aren't any new or different measures/methods of trust. But if it's the 1st, then I would posit that new m/m of trust are already here or coming into existence. Marcus G. Daniels wrote at 08/17/2013 05:00 PM: > A third definition of "trust" is that, whenever something seems "high variance" for the model of the individual, that it can explained directly or indirectly by the trusted person. That there will be an interesting self-consistent explanation or argument that is somehow more penetrating for a new situation that merely being consistent with a previous situation. That person's values may change or evolve -- they are not superficially consistent -- but you can be sure their function applied to those values will be an informative or even novel result. One can trust that their time is not being wasted. Just to keep the sense of the conversation, the first 2 definitions were: 1) distance from a Truth and 2) stability or predictability. That's a great point. There are people I almost always disagree with. But I find I trust them not because I think they're ever right, or because I think I have a bead on them, but because interaction with them is always interesting. And I find this class splits again. There are 3b) those with interesting takes on whatever domain you find them versus 3c) those whose reasoning is sporadically surprising. The former tend to be trustworthy in more than just not being a waste of time, though. The latter is much more attractive to me as I age. But, I can't shake the feeling that it's a contradiction to develop trust based on a subject's ability to surprise you. Perhaps it's only a paradox and I just need to widen my frame? -- ⇒⇐ glen e. p. ropella lion's den, pig juice, crown on the dingo king ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Steve Smith wrote at 08/17/2013 04:40 PM:
> I would say I "trust" people more who I believe to have an empathic response to me, and in general I believe that this is a resonant phenomena, that those whom I am empathetic with, are also more empathetic with me, etc. So a strong empathetic bond with someone leads me to "trust" them in a different way than I trust Rush Limbaugh (or Roger Penrose). My wife, my children, even Steve Guerin (when we are drinking together anyway). Very interesting. You're talking about the _tightness_ of a coupling, I think. Empathy is already a great example of circular reasoning because it consists of you thinking about some thing/person as if you were that thing/person. That opens the door to an infinite regress (you thinking about you thinking about you thinking about ...). But you've added yet another layer of circularity on top of it: you thinking about another as if you were them, thinking about you as if they were you. In the end, that means you're talking about coupling between two objects, rather than a simple iteration within an object. And it's further, practically, reinforced by your mention of sensing the bond with people you have face to face, deeply intimate, or psychoactively induced/enhanced relationships. All three of those (f2f, intimacy, and psychoactive adjuncts) are classically effective methods for building trust. I would maintain, however, ... just to be combative I suppose, that such tight circularity can lead to just as much _distrust_ as it does trust. In particular, systems consisting of lots of feedback (and feedforward) loops would be more likely to exhibit unpredictable transitions from one attractor basin to another. You could quickly go from feeling trusting toward a person/thing to feeling betrayed by that person/thing. (This is why I love my Buell... I will never "trust" the thing to carry me safely across, say, Death Valley. And that's because I trust it to be untrustworthy. ;-) I suppose you might say that betrayal is an _acute_ form of distrust. So, perhaps it's reasonable to say that the tight circularity just changes the character of the trust, from chronic (loose coupling) to acute (tight coupling). -- ⇒⇐ glen e. p. ropella I had my arm around a sundial ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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On 8/19/13 3:36 PM, glen wrote:
> I would maintain, however, ... just to be combative I suppose, that > such tight circularity can lead to just as much _distrust_ as it does > trust. In particular, systems consisting of lots of feedback (and > feedforward) loops would be more likely to exhibit unpredictable > transitions from one attractor basin to another. Hmm. A possible example are mentor/student relationships where the mentor apparently "cares enough" to torture/exploit/haze the talented student, but lets the ordinary student coast through without scrutiny -- a psychological struggle for dominance that is a sort of destabilizing feedback loop... Marcus ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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Marcus G. Daniels wrote at 08/19/2013 02:53 PM:
> Hmm. A possible example are mentor/student relationships where the mentor apparently "cares enough" to torture/exploit/haze the talented student, but lets the ordinary student coast through without scrutiny -- a psychological struggle for dominance that is a sort of destabilizing feedback loop... Precisely! I recently recommended "The Magus" to one of my victims. He bit back by implying to me that he didn't read it. ;-) I saw a copy on his bookshelf... now I'm torturing myself by wondering if he read it or not. Obviously, asking him directly if he read it would clip some of the loops, Yog forbid. -- ⇒⇐ glen e. p. ropella She'll borrow bullets and return em' to your skull ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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In reply to this post by glen ropella
Glen-
Just to match your combative with my own: The circularity is critical in my opinion, to understanding how we actually interact with each other. Our models of stereotypical individuals (e.g. Limbaugh, Penrose, Guerin) do not invoke this so clearly as our more personal relations. The regression is *damped* so there is no strong need to fear ringing in the system, though I *do* think that in intimate relations, people do go into feedback loops, usually near the end of a relationship (or episode of a relationship for the more complex types). This is roughly what I think we call "second guessing" each other. I think your model using basins of attraction is apt. I agree that "closeness" of relation changes the scale, but not necessarily the sense of trust. Strong trust offers the possibility of equally strong betrayal. On the other hand, empathic relations suggest biases. I "trust" people more easily who I perceive to be "like" me, and "distrust" people I perceive to be "unlike" me... thus the basis of xenophobia and ultimately prejudice and bigotry. Con men (and women) use these biases all the time... manipulate other's level of trust (in both directions) in order to gain advantage. I will restate my implied claim that trust based on empathy is qualitatively different than other types of trust. Empathetic trust broken is betrayal, other types of trust broken is just "bad judgement" or "bad luck"? Many here are someone's ex (lover, spouse, friend) and as a result have probably noticed the qualitative change that happens when one finally (though some never go this far) breaks the bond of empathy, they go from an understanding/caring relationship to something else (often cynical analogs of the original empathetic feelings?). I trust you to respond in an argumentative (combative?) manner... which is part of your charm, of course. - Steve > Steve Smith wrote at 08/17/2013 04:40 PM: >> I would say I "trust" people more who I believe to have an empathic >> response to me, and in general I believe that this is a resonant >> phenomena, that those whom I am empathetic with, are also more >> empathetic with me, etc. So a strong empathetic bond with someone >> leads me to "trust" them in a different way than I trust Rush >> Limbaugh (or Roger Penrose). My wife, my children, even Steve Guerin >> (when we are drinking together anyway). > > Very interesting. You're talking about the _tightness_ of a coupling, > I think. Empathy is already a great example of circular reasoning > because it consists of you thinking about some thing/person as if you > were that thing/person. That opens the door to an infinite regress > (you thinking about you thinking about you thinking about ...). > > But you've added yet another layer of circularity on top of it: you > thinking about another as if you were them, thinking about you as if > they were you. In the end, that means you're talking about coupling > between two objects, rather than a simple iteration within an object. > And it's further, practically, reinforced by your mention of sensing > the bond with people you have face to face, deeply intimate, or > psychoactively induced/enhanced relationships. All three of those > (f2f, intimacy, and psychoactive adjuncts) are classically effective > methods for building trust. > > I would maintain, however, ... just to be combative I suppose, that > such tight circularity can lead to just as much _distrust_ as it does > trust. In particular, systems consisting of lots of feedback (and > feedforward) loops would be more likely to exhibit unpredictable > transitions from one attractor basin to another. You could quickly go > from feeling trusting toward a person/thing to feeling betrayed by > that person/thing. (This is why I love my Buell... I will never > "trust" the thing to carry me safely across, say, Death Valley. And > that's because I trust it to be untrustworthy. ;-) > > I suppose you might say that betrayal is an _acute_ form of distrust. > So, perhaps it's reasonable to say that the tight circularity just > changes the character of the trust, from chronic (loose coupling) to > acute (tight coupling). > ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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Steve Smith wrote at 08/19/2013 03:42 PM:
> The circularity is critical in my opinion, to understanding how we actually interact with each other. Our models of stereotypical individuals (e.g. Limbaugh, Penrose, Guerin) do not invoke this so clearly as our more personal relations. The regression is *damped* so there is no strong need to fear ringing in the system, though I *do* think that in intimate relations, people do go into feedback loops, usually near the end of a relationship (or episode of a relationship for the more complex types). This is roughly what I think we call "second guessing" each other. > > [...] > > I will restate my implied claim that trust based on empathy is qualitatively different than other types of trust. Empathetic trust broken is betrayal, other types of trust broken is just "bad judgement" or "bad luck"? Now that you introduced the extra layer of circularity, I completely disagree that empathic trust is qualitatively different from (the 3) other forms. If I can take them each in turn: Trust Type 1) distance from a Truth - Even if we assume Truth exists, we will devolve into an argument about whether or how well we can measure the distance between a source (person, newspaper, company, etc.) and that Truth. So, I can say the whole category of this form of trust reduces to triangulation or parallax. In order to get a sense for how well some source sticks to the Truth, you have to refer to others who have some opinion about it. A great example is the lady at our recent party who claimed that "The Tao of Physics" is a good book and makes a credible case that the (big) ideas in science are the same as the (big) ideas in (some) religions. She expressed incredulity that science came up with the same ancient ideas and disdain for the sanctimonious attitudes of religion-bashing scientists. (It's irrelevant but probably socially responsible to say that I disagreed with her emphatically... at some cost to our relationship, I'm sure.) How does one determine whether or not the similarities presented in "The Tao of Physics" are good, strong similarities? Can you do it by measuring the distance from the religious ideas and the Truth? And the scientific ideas and the Truth? Or do you have to resort to asking the religious and the scientists? If the latter, then this is also a second-order measure of trust, complete with the same sort of circularity you get from empathic trust. TT 2) stability/predictability of an actor's behavior - I'll invoke Shannon's theorem 10, I suppose. ;-) A regulator must be at least as uncertain as the regulated. In the case of TT2, we're talking about system_1 estimating the uncertainty of system_2. If system_1 is less uncertain than system_2, then system_1 will be unable to accurately estimate the uncertainty of system_2. (Yeah, I've leaped from control to estimation, but if that's your best criticism of this part of my argument, then ... well ... we should be having another conversation.) Hence, system_1 must be at least as uncertain as system_2. That means we need a 3rd system to help us estimate the bounds of our estimate. And, *poof*, we now have 2nd order circularity. TT 3) trust that no matter where we end up, it'll be interesting/useful - This one might be more subtle, or more obvious, depending on where you start. Basically, we need a way to judge at least where we are at the beginning and where we are at the ending (if not the entire path between), in order to judge whether or not the latter is, by some measure, better than the former. Ultimately, this reduces to TT1, I think. If you assume we can measure the distance to some Truth, then you can judge the end points by that measure. That Truth could be purely interoceptive or proprioceptive, but it's still a Truth. If you don't assume we can measure distance to a Truth, then you need some sense of "better", and that sense will be derived from social feedback, 2nd order circularity. So, there... Pfffft. 8^) Empathic trust is not qualitatively different from the other 3, at least not because of this 2nd order circularity. If you continue to assert it's qualitative uniqueness, then you have to give me a property other than 2nd order circularity. >Many here are someone's ex (lover, spouse, friend) and as a result have probably noticed the qualitative change that happens when one finally (though some never go this far) breaks the bond of empathy, they go from an understanding/caring relationship to something else (often cynical analogs of the original empathetic feelings?). That's another interesting point. What you seem to be saying is that the semantic ground for the feelings is fragile to some context change, despite many of the physiological processes involved in those feelings staying the same. E.g. I used to think Renee's reorganizing my stuff was a sign of affection. Now I think it's a passive-aggressive way of punishing me for not swapping out the white electrical outlets for black ones before our recent party. I hate the reorganizing, regardless, but the meaning of it has (seems to have) changed. -- ⇒⇐ glen e. p. ropella Looked pretty horny if I do say ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
Some further distinctions:
TT1 has a trivial prescriptive form: Employees receive guidance, and trusted employees are just those that comply with it. Or citizens learn the laws, and follow them. A remark about TT3 relates to your criticism of (non-prescriptive) universality in TT1. Putting on my software hat, I think of this as "diff reading". By that I mean I observe a set of code changes from someone else and relate it to their stated or expected intentions. If they make sense, or solve the problem in a clever way, I've learned something and gained confidence. If they are clumsy, inappropriate in context, internally inconsistent, inelegant, than I am less eager to read them in the future, and have less confidence. Regarding TT4 (introduced notation for empathetic trust), perhaps it can be distinguished by left brain vs. right brain. It feels good so keeping doing it. Betrayal occurs simply because there is no way to quantify the trust; it's not governed by reason and so psychological exposure is higher. I'd also introduce other sort of trust: investment risk reduction, or TT5. e.g. institution of marriage/child-bearing, shared secret or stigmatized behaviors, e.g. historically the LGBT community, criminal enterprises, intelligence community, and so on. Marcus -------------------------------------------------------------------- mail2web.com Enhanced email for the mobile individual based on Microsoft® Exchange - http://link.mail2web.com/Personal/EnhancedEmail ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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In reply to this post by glen ropella
Glen -
I *knew* I could trust you to respond in this manner ;) . > >> >> I will restate my implied claim that trust based on empathy is >> qualitatively different than other types of trust. Empathetic trust >> broken is betrayal, other types of trust broken is just "bad >> judgement" or "bad luck"? > > Now that you introduced the extra layer of circularity, I completely > disagree that empathic trust is qualitatively different from (the 3) > other forms. "reflexive" in the sense you imply. I don't (always) trust people because they trust me, nor do I expect them to trust me simply because I express my trust in them (trust me on this one). > If I can take them each in turn: very well. > > Trust Type 1) distance from a Truth - ... > If the latter, then this is also a second-order measure of trust, > complete with the same sort of circularity you get from empathic trust. Given that you and I agree that the nature of Religious *and* Scientific Truth is that they are not the kind of fully objective Idealized Truth they often purport to achieve (in the former) or approach (in the latter), I concede that this form of "trust" is based on circular arguments. But I contend that this is not the same as empathetic trust. Empathetic trust is not about Truth, but about Belief. When I have empathetic trust with someone, I trust that I understand what they believe, not how close they are to an imagined (or declared?) absolute Truth. > > TT 2) stability/predictability of an actor's behavior - > That means we need a 3rd system to help us estimate the bounds of our > estimate. And, *poof*, we now have 2nd order circularity. Once again, my use of the term Empathic Trust is trust in someone's beliefs, not necessarily in their actions. Actions arise from a combination of beliefs and context. > TT 3) trust that no matter where we end up, it'll be > interesting/useful - This one might be more subtle, or more obvious, > depending on where you start. > > So, there... Pfffft. 8^) Empathic trust is not qualitatively > different from the other 3, at least not because of this 2nd order > circularity. If you continue to assert it's qualitative uniqueness, > then you have to give me a property other than 2nd order circularity. Yes, you have demonstrated that other forms/sources of trust include circularity. The "qualitative" difference is in *what* is being circularized. In empathic trust, I trust because I *believe* that I understand the world view of the other, often because I *share* large parts of it (to the best of my ability to know the other's world view, always limited). > E.g. I used to think Renee's reorganizing my stuff was a sign of > affection. Now I think it's a passive-aggressive way of punishing me > for not swapping out the white electrical outlets for black ones > before our recent party. I hate the reorganizing, regardless, but the > meaning of it has (seems to have) changed. I claim this supports my case: Your *belief* that Renee was exhibiting affection for you when she reorganized your stuff *allowed* you an empathic trust (by my definition) with her because you know (for yourself) what affection for another feels like, and you "trust" it as a motivation, etc.. Coming to another conclusion (regarding black vs white electrical outlets... btw... did you consider a cardboard mask and a can of black spray paint? And would the aerosol cause an arc and explosion if you didn't flip your breakers first?) about passive aggressive punishment for your refusal is another empathic response (assuming you have any of your own passive aggressive punishing tendencies that you recognize at least intuitively) even if in the negative sense? In my experience (I choose Cat Stevens-esque hard headed women myself) such behaviour can be both passive aggressive punishment *and* a sign of affection. Perhaps this is the kind of rationalization required of those of us who chose hard-headed partners... we have to see the punishments that come our way as signs of affection (as well?). You sound like great fun at a party. - Steve ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
[hidden email] wrote at 08/20/2013 09:47 AM:
> Some further distinctions: > > TT1 has a trivial prescriptive form: Employees receive guidance, and > trusted employees are just those that comply with it. Or citizens learn the > laws, and follow them. Ideally, yes. But practice is never ideal. (<grin>Nothing is ever ideal... Ideals are dangerous fictions.</grin>) I've almost always found it to be the case that guidance and laws are subject to interpretation. And even if they're not, there's still the problem of measurement (did he comply or didn't he). And there's also the impact of situation, special cases. Even further, there is the problem if consequences. Let's say Tim and Joan break the same law, but Tim gets probation and Joan gets the max penalty. In all three (measurement, specialty, and sentencing), there's an implication that "distance from a Truth" is not well defined. > A remark about TT3 relates to your criticism of (non-prescriptive) > universality in TT1. Putting on my software hat, I think of this as "diff > reading". By that I mean I observe a set of code changes from someone > else and relate it to their stated or expected intentions. If they make > sense, or solve the problem in a clever way, I've learned something and > gained confidence. If they are clumsy, inappropriate in context, > internally inconsistent, inelegant, than I am less eager to read them in > the future, and have less confidence. Excellent! You've given us a nice set of bounding concepts from which we might define a Truth {clever, consistent, elegant, purposeful/non-clumsy, appropriate-to-context}. The question is whether or not this set of ascriptors can lead to something transpersonal. I assume most people would say "yes", since it's an oft-invoked set. But do they lead to some thing that's robust (if not True)? E.g. some thing that may seem inelegant in one century may seem elegant in another century. Ideally, I will claim that these ascriptors _fail_ to lead to a transpersonal or robust thing we might call True. But, practically, I obviously agree. Otherwise, I wouldn't waste my time learning things like Satanism. > Regarding TT4 (introduced notation for empathetic trust), perhaps it can be > distinguished by left brain vs. right brain. It feels good so keeping > doing it. Betrayal occurs simply because there is no way to quantify the > trust; it's not governed by reason and so psychological exposure is higher. I don't have a good handle on the left/right brain distinction. I normally translate it into something like uni- vs. multi-dimensional, singular vs. systemic, etc. To some extent that further translates to thought vs. feelings. If that's the case, then it might be possible to quantify it, just not in a simple way. It will take a complex model, probably with hidden states as well as interactive aspects, but at least multiple inputs and outputs. And if that's the case, then the qualitative difference Steve sees might reduce to some measure of complexity, some irreducible logical depth. > I'd also introduce other sort of trust: investment risk reduction, or TT5. > e.g. institution of marriage/child-bearing, shared secret or stigmatized > behaviors, e.g. historically the LGBT community, criminal enterprises, > intelligence community, and so on. I don't understand. Do you mean positive trust, e.g. I trust in the criminal enterprise so I will invest? Or do you mean a kind of negative trust, e.g. the LGBT community is not strong/prominent enough, so I'll remain in the closet? Or perhaps both? -- ⇒⇐ glen e. p. ropella Now the water's rushing in up through the planks made out of skin ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
Grin... I wonder how TT1-5 line up
with the larger literature on the topic of "trust"... seems like
a topic for evolutionary psychologists (Nick, et al?).
- Steve PS. Some may be satisfied to note my preference for "empathic" to "empathetic" in the following reference: http://grammarist.com/usage/empathetic-empathic/ Meanwhile, empathic has developed the latter-day sense very in tune with the thoughts and feelings of others, which it does not share with empathetic. This sense is mostly confined to pseudoscientific writing about supposed psychic powers. Some further distinctions: TT1 has a trivial prescriptive form: Employees receive guidance, and trusted employees are just those that comply with it. Or citizens learn the laws, and follow them. A remark about TT3 relates to your criticism of (non-prescriptive) universality in TT1. Putting on my software hat, I think of this as "diff reading". By that I mean I observe a set of code changes from someone else and relate it to their stated or expected intentions. If they make sense, or solve the problem in a clever way, I've learned something and gained confidence. If they are clumsy, inappropriate in context, internally inconsistent, inelegant, than I am less eager to read them in the future, and have less confidence. Regarding TT4 (introduced notation for empathetic trust), perhaps it can be distinguished by left brain vs. right brain. It feels good so keeping doing it. Betrayal occurs simply because there is no way to quantify the trust; it's not governed by reason and so psychological exposure is higher. I'd also introduce other sort of trust: investment risk reduction, or TT5. e.g. institution of marriage/child-bearing, shared secret or stigmatized behaviors, e.g. historically the LGBT community, criminal enterprises, intelligence community, and so on. Marcus -------------------------------------------------------------------- mail2web.com – Enhanced email for the mobile individual based on Microsoft® Exchange - http://link.mail2web.com/Personal/EnhancedEmail ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Steve Smith wrote at 08/20/2013 10:13 AM:
> Empathetic trust is not about Truth, but about Belief. When I have empathetic trust with someone, I trust that I understand what they believe, not how close they are to an imagined (or declared?) absolute Truth. > [...] > Once again, my use of the term Empathic Trust is trust in someone's beliefs, not necessarily in their actions. Actions arise from a combination of beliefs and context. Well, I'll take a minor detour and claim that beliefs _are_ actions. I might concede that beliefs are very finely grained actions and what we normally call "actions", like drinking a glass of water, are coarse in comparison. And in that sense, I would agree that coarse actions arise from fine actions. But, also in that context, I'd argue there is no magic threshold between fine and coarse actions resulting in a qualitative difference between a belief and an "action" ... or TT[1235] versus TT4. > Yes, you have demonstrated that other forms/sources of trust include circularity. The "qualitative" difference is in *what* is being circularized. In empathic trust, I trust because I *believe* that I understand the world view of the other, often because I *share* large parts of it (to the best of my ability to know the other's world view, always limited). I think this results nicely in (my interpretation of) Marcus' left vs. right brain distinction. If empathic trust is systemic (incorporating lots of different channels and signals), whereas other forms of trust can be more singular, more linear, then it makes a lot of sense. It also folds quite nicely into the idea that beliefs are simply fine-grained actions. With finely grained actions, the context can matter more. Lots of various, subtle, small inputs can accrete into a coarse grained action, including a feeling. I think I'm coming around to agree with you that empathic trust might be qualitatively different... the question is whether I'm still talking nonsense or not. 8^) > I claim this supports my case: Your *belief* that Renee was exhibiting affection for you when she reorganized your stuff *allowed* you an empathic trust (by my definition) with her because you know (for yourself) what affection for another feels like, and you "trust" it as a motivation, etc.. Coming to another conclusion (regarding black vs white electrical outlets... btw... did you consider a cardboard mask and a can of black spray paint? And would the aerosol cause an arc and explosion if you didn't flip your breakers first?) about passive aggressive punishment for your refusal is another empathic response (assuming you have any of your own passive aggressive punishing tendencies that you recognize at least intuitively) even if in the negative sense? Yes, my example was offered in crypto-agreement. Machismo forbids me from outright agreeing. I have to disguise it. Re: spray-painting... that would be even more effort than simply replacing them! Plus, we have an old house whose outlets are not grounded. So, they (properly) only have the ac/dc slots, no ground. No maintenance man we've asked will replace them with 3 prong plugs, without also grounding them. So, I have to do it. If the house burns down, Renee' probably won't sue me. (She owns the house... I just pay rent.) > You sound like great fun at a party. Heh, that probably depends on what you mean by "fun". I do know that I have a short fuse. There's only so much small talk I can handle ... after which I have to make a drastic intervention and take it somewhere interesting. (I mean really, how many times can we say the same nothing? This is what convinces me that language is a placeholder for grooming. It's also probably why I went bald at age 19.) I usually cross the threshold about 2 hours into a party ... sooner or later depending on the psychoactive chemicals involved. -- ⇒⇐ glen e. p. ropella I got an itch in my cosmic pocket and it won't go away, ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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In reply to this post by glen ropella
On 8/20/13 2:36 PM, glen wrote:
>> I'd also introduce other sort of trust: investment risk reduction, or >> TT5. >> e.g. institution of marriage/child-bearing, shared secret or stigmatized >> behaviors, e.g. historically the LGBT community, criminal enterprises, >> intelligence community, and so on. > > I don't understand. Do you mean positive trust, e.g. I trust in the > criminal enterprise so I will invest? Or do you mean a kind of > negative trust, e.g. the LGBT community is not strong/prominent > enough, so I'll remain in the closet? Or perhaps both? environment, there is a benefit in sticking together and creating organizations that facilitate the desired interaction. They don't really have any other *reason* to trust one other than that they have a shared interest to protect. An individual is high dimensional and sexual orientation/preference is just one dimension, but one that has been known to take on exaggerated importance in social contexts. In the case of mobsters, they know that they are criminals and risk punishment if they don't protect each other and their information. In relevant situations, individuals in such groups can predict, in a positive and reinforcing way, what their peers in this group will do in certain situations better than they would of other people, even if the others are people, say, that they have more complex cognitive interactions and other kinds of trust relationships... say day-to-day work relationships.. Marcus ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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On Tue, Aug 20, 2013 at 4:51 PM, Marcus G. Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:
An obituary for Elmore Leonard noted that his characters, when stressed, would suddenly act. But you never knew whether they were going to solve a crime or commit a crime or both at once until the act played out.
-- rec -- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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In reply to this post by glen ropella
On 8/20/13 2:36 PM, glen wrote:
> You've given us a nice set of bounding concepts from which we might > define a Truth {clever, consistent, elegant, purposeful/non-clumsy, > appropriate-to-context}. The question is whether or not this set of > ascriptors can lead to something transpersonal. Rather than the software diffs example, judicial opinions might be a better example. How all of contemporary U.S. law unfolds from the Constitution is a big pill to swallow. It's less opaque to read an opinion and identify the concepts it appeals to and ensure that at least the logic is sound, and that the scope of the interpolations / extrapolations are evident. I can learn to trust the person making the legal opinion on the basis of the content of his or her opinions, but not have to trust that all of the original premises are also sound. The delta from the configuration that was given can often be found to be the right delta, even if the starting configuration is arbitrary. Marcus ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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Marcus -
> On 8/20/13 2:36 PM, glen wrote: >> You've given us a nice set of bounding concepts from which we might >> define a Truth {clever, consistent, elegant, purposeful/non-clumsy, >> appropriate-to-context}. The question is whether or not this set of >> ascriptors can lead to something transpersonal. > Rather than the software diffs example, judicial opinions might be a > better example. How all of contemporary U.S. law unfolds from the > Constitution is a big pill to swallow. It's less opaque to read an > opinion and identify the concepts it appeals to and ensure that at > least the logic is sound, and that the scope of the interpolations / > extrapolations are evident. I can learn to trust the person making > the legal opinion on the basis of the content of his or her opinions, > but not have to trust that all of the original premises are also > sound. The delta from the configuration that was given can often be > found to be the right delta, even if the starting configuration is > arbitrary. > > Marcus proofs like the early example of the 4 color problem. It might be almost good enough to be able to verify each "step" of the proof and the "logic" that it all hangs together with, even if no human can claim to actually intuitively grasp the entireity of it? It also reminds me of Aboriginal Song Lines and the Polynesian Stick Charts for Navigation. In some sense, these might be complex and obscure enough that the only way to apprehend them is to go through them (en-route) and "experience" them. My own experience with US law is that case law is a series of elaborations and fine-tunings, and contextualizings of the original legislation which itself has a similar relation to the constitution, etc. I depend on what you say about the way it works, but that doesn't stop me from seizing up when an opinion or decision is handed down that is "just plain wrong". Lawyers, i suppose will try to trace back it's provenance to find where the flaw occurred. Me, I just want to hold a mirror up to, or shine a light on, it's flaws. - Steve ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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On 8/20/13 8:18 PM, Steve Smith wrote:
> This sounds a lot like the problem of verifying computer-generated > proofs like the early example of the 4 color problem. It might be > almost good enough to be able to verify each "step" of the proof and > the "logic" that it all hangs together with, even if no human can > claim to actually intuitively grasp the entireity of it? > Not a constructive proof, I'm claiming that from a bunch of wonky premises the `candidate for proposed trust mode 3' can iterate a argument forward in a useful, convincing, or subjectively interesting way that causes me to listen for more. It might just be because they're a good at sales and that I'm a sucker. The Kool-Aid is tasty, may I have another glass?! Marcus ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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On 8/20/13 9:02 PM, Marcus G. Daniels wrote:
> On 8/20/13 8:18 PM, Steve Smith wrote: >> This sounds a lot like the problem of verifying computer-generated >> proofs like the early example of the 4 color problem. It might be >> almost good enough to be able to verify each "step" of the proof and >> the "logic" that it all hangs together with, even if no human can >> claim to actually intuitively grasp the entireity of it? >> > Not a constructive proof, I'm claiming that from a bunch of wonky > premises the `candidate for proposed trust mode 3' can iterate a > argument forward in a useful, convincing, or subjectively interesting > way that causes me to listen for more. It might just be because > they're a good at sales and that I'm a sucker. The Kool-Aid is tasty, > may I have another glass?! > displaced with best-effort transactional scrutiny. Passing transactional scrutiny I argue is form of trust mode 1. It's only a good as the available eyes on the problem -- the trust giver's. Trust mode 3 is where "subjectively interesting" lands. Trust Mode 1 = Convince, Trust Mode 3 = Entertain / Motivate Marcus ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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