Fwd: The Kurds continue fight without support - The Santa Fe New Mexican: Local Columns

[Owen Densmore]

This weeks Bill Stewart opinion piece in the New Mexican discusses the Kurds fighting without support from Turkey: http://goo.gl/PNRTLv

​Turkey has three specific requirements before they join, all based on their view that defeating ISIS would hand Assad a victory.

​1 - ​The establishment of a buffer zone​, at least several miles deep,​​ ​in Syria along the Turkish border, to which many of the more than 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey could return.

​2 - ​​A no-fly zone over the buffer area. 

​3 - ​​Massive support for anti-Assad forces in Syria, something the U.S. has been loathe to consider because of uncertainty over which Syrian rebel hands would wind up with U.S. weapons.

​So, does this match any of the classic game theory paradoxes?  

The situation seems to be deadlock.  I have to say Turkey's three requirements make sense.  But I'm sure there are leaks.​  I think 3) for example, is impossible to define .. it would include ISIS!

​   -- Owen

​In case there is a login required, here's the article:​

The Kurds continue fight without support

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BILL STEWART

Understanding Your World

Posted: Friday, October 10, 2014 7:00 pm | Updated: 11:49 pm, Fri Oct 10, 2014.

Bill Stewart | 1 comment

The struggle for the Kurdish stronghold of Kobani continues, with no end in sight. Kobani, or Ayn al Arab, as it is called in Arabic, sits along the border with Turkey, where Turkish armed forces maintain a powerful watch but so far have refused to move. Turkey has declined to intervene, and without such action, almost all observers say, the city will fall to the murderous forces of the Islamic State, giving it firm control of a long stretch of the Turkish-Syrian border.

The collapse of Kobani has been delayed by repeated airstrikes carried out by U.S. and coalition aircraft, but the fall of Kobani cannot be prevented without the intervention of ground troops. And at this point in the conflict, intervention means Turkey. The Turks, in the meantime, note that America watched for two weeks as Kobani was shelled by the Islamic State before the U.S. launched airstrikes. The Turks are not impressed.

So why has Turkey hung back, when so much is at stake? The question is at once difficult and complex. Turkey has some 70 million people, and more than 10 million are Kurds, a Sunni Muslim minority whose homeland forms a substantial part of eastern Turkey as well as parts of Iraq, Iran and Syria. They were promised their own country in the wake of World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, but it never materialized.

Constant clashes, amounting to low-level warfare, have taken place between Turks and Kurds in the past 90 years or so, and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein killed tens of thousands of Kurds following the first Gulf War in 1991. Nevertheless, a semiautonomous Kurdish state was established in northeastern Iraq under Anglo-American air cover in the wake of the first Gulf War. This Kurdish state has flourished and is everything the U.S. would like to see happen in Iraq, of which Kurdistan is still legally a part. The armed forces of Kurdistan are the Peshmerga, essentially a guerrilla force but still the most effective fighting force facing the Islamic State, also called ISIS. It is the Peshmerga that has stalled but not stopped the ISIS forces, in large part because the Peshmerga is outnumbered and outgunned. Moreover, many of the Kurdish fighters have long been regarded by both Turkey and the U.S. as terrorists.

Because of this contentious and often bloody history, Turkey is reluctant to get involved in a struggle that would see Kurdish forces emerge victorious, even though Turkey itself wishes to see the defeat of the Islamic State and its army. Even more than defeating ISIS, however, Turkey wants to see the end of Syria’s Bashar Assad.

By defeating ISIS without first defeating the Syrian regime would, in Turkey’s view, hand Assad a victory that Turkey is not about to countenance. This is why Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has insisted on three conditions before he commits his forces: The first is the establishment of a buffer zone in Syria along the Turkish border, to which many of the more than 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey could return. How much of the 500-mile-long Turkish border would be included is not clear, but presumably it would be a buffer zone at least several miles deep to be effective. That, in turn, would require his second condition be met — a no-fly zone over the buffer area. And finally, there would need to be massive support for anti-Assad forces in Syria, something the U.S. has been loathe to consider because of uncertainty over which Syrian rebel hands would wind up with U.S. weapons.

Turkey may be forgiven if it feels itself to be in the catbird’s seat. No other country at this point is prepared to put troops on the ground, though the Jordanians, caught in the middle as they are, could be tempted. The U.S., too, might be tempted, because Washington is appalled at the idea of an Islamic State. One deficiency in the airstrikes against ISIS is that there is so little air-ground target coordination. This means airstrikes are far less effective than they could be.

It may well be that the U.S. is considering the covert deployment of Special Forces to Iraq and Syria to remedy the situation But this is risky. In the short run, troops on the ground means Turkish troops. Who else is there? Next in line would be a revitalized Iraqi army, so badly let down by former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. But that deployment would take time. In the meantime, Turkish troops stand silently along their border. What will it take for President Erdogan to give the order? Thousands of the remaining residents in Kobani anxiously await his decision. As do we in America.

Bill Stewart writes about current affairs from Santa Fe. He is a former U.S. Foreign Service officer and was a Time magazine correspondent.

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[Gillian Densmore]

Yes, actually, you'd see these demands in Constituant Polotics all the time. And Consituant polotics roughly follows Comitte games, and Adventure Game modles.

On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 11:19 AM, Owen Densmore <[hidden email]> wrote:

This weeks Bill Stewart opinion piece in the New Mexican discusses the Kurds fighting without support from Turkey: http://goo.gl/PNRTLv

​Turkey has three specific requirements before they join, all based on their view that defeating ISIS would hand Assad a victory.

​1 - ​The establishment of a buffer zone​, at least several miles deep,​​ ​in Syria along the Turkish border, to which many of the more than 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey could return.

​2 - ​​A no-fly zone over the buffer area. 

​3 - ​​Massive support for anti-Assad forces in Syria, something the U.S. has been loathe to consider because of uncertainty over which Syrian rebel hands would wind up with U.S. weapons.

​So, does this match any of the classic game theory paradoxes?  

The situation seems to be deadlock.  I have to say Turkey's three requirements make sense.  But I'm sure there are leaks.​  I think 3) for example, is impossible to define .. it would include ISIS!

​   -- Owen

​In case there is a login required, here's the article:​

The Kurds continue fight without support

Print

Create a hardcopy of this page

Font Size:

Default font size

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BILL STEWART

Understanding Your World

Posted: Friday, October 10, 2014 7:00 pm | Updated: 11:49 pm, Fri Oct 10, 2014.

Bill Stewart | 1 comment

The struggle for the Kurdish stronghold of Kobani continues, with no end in sight. Kobani, or Ayn al Arab, as it is called in Arabic, sits along the border with Turkey, where Turkish armed forces maintain a powerful watch but so far have refused to move. Turkey has declined to intervene, and without such action, almost all observers say, the city will fall to the murderous forces of the Islamic State, giving it firm control of a long stretch of the Turkish-Syrian border.

The collapse of Kobani has been delayed by repeated airstrikes carried out by U.S. and coalition aircraft, but the fall of Kobani cannot be prevented without the intervention of ground troops. And at this point in the conflict, intervention means Turkey. The Turks, in the meantime, note that America watched for two weeks as Kobani was shelled by the Islamic State before the U.S. launched airstrikes. The Turks are not impressed.

So why has Turkey hung back, when so much is at stake? The question is at once difficult and complex. Turkey has some 70 million people, and more than 10 million are Kurds, a Sunni Muslim minority whose homeland forms a substantial part of eastern Turkey as well as parts of Iraq, Iran and Syria. They were promised their own country in the wake of World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, but it never materialized.

Constant clashes, amounting to low-level warfare, have taken place between Turks and Kurds in the past 90 years or so, and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein killed tens of thousands of Kurds following the first Gulf War in 1991. Nevertheless, a semiautonomous Kurdish state was established in northeastern Iraq under Anglo-American air cover in the wake of the first Gulf War. This Kurdish state has flourished and is everything the U.S. would like to see happen in Iraq, of which Kurdistan is still legally a part. The armed forces of Kurdistan are the Peshmerga, essentially a guerrilla force but still the most effective fighting force facing the Islamic State, also called ISIS. It is the Peshmerga that has stalled but not stopped the ISIS forces, in large part because the Peshmerga is outnumbered and outgunned. Moreover, many of the Kurdish fighters have long been regarded by both Turkey and the U.S. as terrorists.

Because of this contentious and often bloody history, Turkey is reluctant to get involved in a struggle that would see Kurdish forces emerge victorious, even though Turkey itself wishes to see the defeat of the Islamic State and its army. Even more than defeating ISIS, however, Turkey wants to see the end of Syria’s Bashar Assad.

By defeating ISIS without first defeating the Syrian regime would, in Turkey’s view, hand Assad a victory that Turkey is not about to countenance. This is why Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has insisted on three conditions before he commits his forces: The first is the establishment of a buffer zone in Syria along the Turkish border, to which many of the more than 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey could return. How much of the 500-mile-long Turkish border would be included is not clear, but presumably it would be a buffer zone at least several miles deep to be effective. That, in turn, would require his second condition be met — a no-fly zone over the buffer area. And finally, there would need to be massive support for anti-Assad forces in Syria, something the U.S. has been loathe to consider because of uncertainty over which Syrian rebel hands would wind up with U.S. weapons.

Turkey may be forgiven if it feels itself to be in the catbird’s seat. No other country at this point is prepared to put troops on the ground, though the Jordanians, caught in the middle as they are, could be tempted. The U.S., too, might be tempted, because Washington is appalled at the idea of an Islamic State. One deficiency in the airstrikes against ISIS is that there is so little air-ground target coordination. This means airstrikes are far less effective than they could be.

It may well be that the U.S. is considering the covert deployment of Special Forces to Iraq and Syria to remedy the situation But this is risky. In the short run, troops on the ground means Turkish troops. Who else is there? Next in line would be a revitalized Iraqi army, so badly let down by former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. But that deployment would take time. In the meantime, Turkish troops stand silently along their border. What will it take for President Erdogan to give the order? Thousands of the remaining residents in Kobani anxiously await his decision. As do we in America.

Bill Stewart writes about current affairs from Santa Fe. He is a former U.S. Foreign Service officer and was a Time magazine correspondent.

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com