Fw: art and science

[Jack Leibowitz]

 

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2008 11:34 AM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] art and science

Russ Abbott's comments are interesting. They remind me of a science fiction movie I saw in my ancient past. A member of a very advanced civilization encountered some earthlings, one of whom was a hotshot mathematical physicist. I found it unbelievable that the Martian -- let's call him that-- could look at the scribbles and immediately say something like, Hmmm . Very interesting ( Why not give that comment a German accent , Hmmm wery eenteresting!)

 

Why was that response of the Martian so surprising? The sheet of paper consisted of nothing but mathematical formulas. No definitions, showing the meanings of the symbols and no explanation of their context in a consistent theory. But , we're expected to conclude, the Martian was, after all, a very advanced intellect.

.

The point is that this would not have helped even that Martian:No definitions, no context. No embedded concepts.

The mathematics is not expected to stand alone in physics. Concept and symbols together.

 

In quantum mechanics, to take an example, the mathematics works. The problem today is not with the symbolic representations of quantum ideas but with the otherwordliness of that microscopic domain; It lies below our experience of this everyday world. Below a certain point, there are no satisfactory metaphors for the behaviors in the microscopic world. Without the mathematics, we couldn't ven have gone there-- or imagined that particular "there".

 

No question that it works. Our present technology, based on quantum mechanics, works famously well. The concepts  are described by the equations. Medical devices, cell phones-- everywhere you turn-- you see evidence that the equiations are concept connected.

 

E.O Wilson's domain in biology, mentioned by Russ, is driven somewhat differently. But, only to touch on another example from biology: Understanding of DNA itself, embedded in modern microbiology, depends on quantum mechanics and its equations. The discovery and exploitation off DNA depend on quantum mechanics, and concept goes hand in hand with the math.

 

Even Newton's laws of motion, described by simple equations, demonstrate that the equations do not stand alone if they are to have any meaning, in the manner described above. And I could now sail into the deep waters of poor education in even simple algebra, and waht that means for the unnecessary "two cultures" we are faced with.

 

I hear again, in response, the refrain that this is not enough. Which makes us tempetd to recognize all that has already been said in these e-mail exchanges.

 

Best New Year to all,

 

Jack

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

--- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email] ; [hidden email]

Sent: Saturday, December 27, 2008 11:03 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] art and science

A fascinating discussion.  E.O. Wilson made much the same point in his book Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, where he argued that a narrow reliance on mathmatics had destroyed philosophy in particular, while in general an increasing reliance on specialization and mathmatics had handicapped scientists, limiting new hypothesis to variation of current thinking in a particular discipline.

 

http://www.amazon.com/Consilience-Knowledge-Edward-O-Wilson/dp/067976867X/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1230443706&sr=8-1

 

cjf

 

Christopher J. Feola

President

nextPression, Inc.

www.nextPression.com

 

---

From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Saturday, December 27, 2008 11:45 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] art and science

Hi Jack,

I'd like to take advantage of your post to raise an issue that is related--but not directly--to what you are discussing. 

You wrote, "What has made mathematics so important in science, especially physics, is the need for replacing word-fuzziness with precision in prediction."

Although no one can doubt the importance of mathematics to physics and the other sciences, what do you think of this somewhat contrary position. The damage mathematics has done to science is that it has substituted numbers for concepts.

Mathematics is a language of equations and numbers. Of course equations operate within frameworks, which themselves involve concepts--such as dimensionality, symmetry, etc. These are important concepts. But the equations themselves are conceptless. They are simply relationships among numbers that match observation. I suspect that this is one of the reasons the general public is turned off to much of science. The equations don't speak to them. I would say that the equations don't speak to scientists either except to the extent that they manage to interpret them in terms of concepts: this is the strength of this field; this is the mass of this object; etc. But the concepts are not part of the equations. And (famously) quantum mechanics has no concepts for its equations! The equations work, but no one can conceptualize what they mean. So how should one think about quantum mechanics? As a black box with dials one can read? What should the public think about quantum mechanics if that's the best that scientists can do?

I can think of two primary goals for science: to understand nature and to give us some leverage over nature. Equations give us the leverage; concepts give us the understanding.

-- Russ

On Sat, Dec 27, 2008 at 7:33 PM, Jack Leibowitz <[hidden email]> wrote:

 

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[Russell Standish]

Russ Abbott wrote >

> > Mathematics is a language of equations and
> numbers. Of course equations operate within frameworks, which
> themselves involve concepts--such as dimensionality, symmetry,
> etc. These are important concepts. But the equations themselves are
> conceptless. They are simply relationships among numbers that match
> observation. I suspect that this is one of the reasons the general
> public is turned off to much of science. The equations don't speak to
> them. I would say that the equations don't speak to scientists either
> except to the extent that they manage to interpret them in terms of
> concepts: this is the strength of this field; this is the mass of this
> object; etc. But the concepts are not part of the equations. And
> (famously) quantum mechanics has no concepts for its equations! The
> equations work, but no one can conceptualize what they mean. So how
> should one think about quantum mechanics? As a black box with dials
> one can read? What should the public think about quantum mechanics if
> that's the best that scientists can do?  > > I can think of two
> primary goals for science: to understand nature and to give us some
> leverage over nature. Equations give us the leverage; concepts give us
> the understanding.  > > -- Russ > > > > On Sat, Dec 27, 2008 at 7:33

I disagree completely with this. Mathematics is not just about
equations, but about concepts and expressing those concepts. The
equations are like the letters and words that make up the play Romeo &
Juliet. If that is all you see, you miss a fantastic story!

Truly, this is important. When I studied linear algebra in first year
university, the lecturer could not recommend a single text
book. Instead, he taught the concepts of linear algebra, and how one
might imagine them in one's mind's eye. (Linear Algebra is basically
about rotations and stretching in n-dimensional spaces - we can easily
imagine the 3D ones, and handle the other dimensions by analogy. Only
infinite dimensional spaces get a little tricky!). Using this
technique, significant theorems become obvious. Translating the
theorems into algebra often required a page or more of terse equations
to express. I once proved a theorem on a necessary condition for
"permanence" (an ecological stability concept) in generalised
Lotka-Volterra equations one sleepless night using this conceptual way
of thinking about linear algebra. In the morning, I translated the
proof into algebra, and found it to be correct. Unfortunately, I then
discovered that the theorem had been proved and published about 15
years before :(.

In quantum mechanics, the concepts are just that of linear algebra
(rotations and stretches), complex arithmetic (which are planar
rotations and stretches) and Fourier transforms (spectral analysis of
a wave form - familiar to all users of "graphic equalisers" in Hi Fi
systems.).


Cheers

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A/Prof Russell Standish                  Phone [phone] (mobile)
Mathematics                        
UNSW SYDNEY 2052                 [hidden email]
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[Russ Abbott]

I think you're agreeing with me. It's the concepts that are important, not the equations. To the extent that you can read the equations as statements about concepts the equations talk to you. But a computer can read and calculate with those same equations without the concepts. The concepts are in the mind of the person reading the equations, not in the equations themselves.

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles
o Check out my blog at http://russabbott.blogspot.com/

On Mon, Dec 29, 2008 at 3:03 AM, Russell Standish <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ Abbott wrote >

> > Mathematics is a language of equations and
> numbers. Of course equations operate within frameworks, which
> themselves involve concepts--such as dimensionality, symmetry,
> etc. These are important concepts. But the equations themselves are
> conceptless. They are simply relationships among numbers that match
> observation. I suspect that this is one of the reasons the general
> public is turned off to much of science. The equations don't speak to
> them. I would say that the equations don't speak to scientists either
> except to the extent that they manage to interpret them in terms of
> concepts: this is the strength of this field; this is the mass of this
> object; etc. But the concepts are not part of the equations. And
> (famously) quantum mechanics has no concepts for its equations! The
> equations work, but no one can conceptualize what they mean. So how
> should one think about quantum mechanics? As a black box with dials
> one can read? What should the public think about quantum mechanics if
> that's the best that scientists can do?  > > I can think of two
> primary goals for science: to understand nature and to give us some
> leverage over nature. Equations give us the leverage; concepts give us
> the understanding.  > > -- Russ > > > > On Sat, Dec 27, 2008 at 7:33

I disagree completely with this. Mathematics is not just about
equations, but about concepts and expressing those concepts. The
equations are like the letters and words that make up the play Romeo &
Juliet. If that is all you see, you miss a fantastic story!

Truly, this is important. When I studied linear algebra in first year
university, the lecturer could not recommend a single text
book. Instead, he taught the concepts of linear algebra, and how one
might imagine them in one's mind's eye. (Linear Algebra is basically
about rotations and stretching in n-dimensional spaces - we can easily
imagine the 3D ones, and handle the other dimensions by analogy. Only
infinite dimensional spaces get a little tricky!). Using this
technique, significant theorems become obvious. Translating the
theorems into algebra often required a page or more of terse equations
to express. I once proved a theorem on a necessary condition for
"permanence" (an ecological stability concept) in generalised
Lotka-Volterra equations one sleepless night using this conceptual way
of thinking about linear algebra. In the morning, I translated the
proof into algebra, and found it to be correct. Unfortunately, I then
discovered that the theorem had been proved and published about 15
years before :(.

In quantum mechanics, the concepts are just that of linear algebra
(rotations and stretches), complex arithmetic (which are planar
rotations and stretches) and Fourier transforms (spectral analysis of
a wave form - familiar to all users of "graphic equalisers" in Hi Fi
systems.).


Cheers

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A/Prof Russell Standish                  Phone [phone] (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052                         [hidden email]
Australia                                http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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[glen e. p. ropella-2]

Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 11/01/09 11:21 PM:
> I think you're agreeing with me. It's the concepts that are important, not
> the equations. To the extent that you can read the equations as statements
> about concepts the equations talk to you. But a computer can read and
> calculate with those same equations without the concepts. The concepts are
> in the mind of the person reading the equations, not in the equations
> themselves.

The truth is that _both_ the formalisms and the concepts are integral to
math.  Equations without concepts is not math and concepts without
automatically transformable sentences (e.g. equations) is not math.  The
same is true with any language, including English.

The point is that math (like science) consists largely of an effort to
formalize things so that we can think (as well as delegate, teach, and
repeat) clearly about those things.  I don't know what the percentage of
artists is who feel themselves in the business of formalizing the
creation of artifacts; but an artist who understands how important
formalization is to large-scale cooperation will have no trouble
understanding the relationship between equations (or, more generally,
automated deduction) and mathematical concepts.

My guess about art is that most people who self identify as artists are
against relying on consensus methods, i.e. art is a very personal thing
both for the artist and the audience.  (Note that I used "personal"
rather than "subjective".)  To rigorize (rigorify?, rigorate?) art is to
remove the art.  But I also guess that each artist (or art lineage) has
a set of, fairly rigorous, methods associated with her (it).  The rigor
may be contained in the fingers instead of in symbols on paper, but the
rigor would be there somewhere for any artist capable of repeating their
work.  (Unless one believes in luck and a "good artist" is just a lucky
person.)

This tacit vs. explicit methodological dichotomy may be the major cause
for incommensurance between any of the more intuitive human activities
(like entrepreneurship, art, scientific speculation) vs. the more
inferential/reasoned activities (like accounting, manufacturing,
falsification), and those people proficient in one but not the other.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


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[Russ Abbott]

I think there's an important distinction between symbols and meaning. The famous Symbol Grounding Problem asks how (or whether) a symbol manipulating device can ever associate a semantics with the symbols it manipulates. The consensus is that it's not possible, which has resulted in research in situated and embedded systems as an alternative.

We have concepts in our heads; computers manipulate symbols.  Of course the only reason we program computers to manipulate symbols the way we have them do it is because of the concepts in our heads. But that doesn't mean that the symbols themselves embody the concepts or that a device capable of manipulating those symbols (no matter how successfully) necessarily understands the concepts.

No doubt both are important. The symbols (and formalisms) keep us honest. The concepts, though, are what the symbols are about. By themselves they are not about anything.

-- Russ

On Mon, Jan 12, 2009 at 3:41 PM, glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> wrote:

Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 11/01/09 11:21 PM:
> I think you're agreeing with me. It's the concepts that are important, not
> the equations. To the extent that you can read the equations as statements
> about concepts the equations talk to you. But a computer can read and
> calculate with those same equations without the concepts. The concepts are
> in the mind of the person reading the equations, not in the equations
> themselves.

The truth is that _both_ the formalisms and the concepts are integral to
math.  Equations without concepts is not math and concepts without
automatically transformable sentences (e.g. equations) is not math.  The
same is true with any language, including English.

The point is that math (like science) consists largely of an effort to
formalize things so that we can think (as well as delegate, teach, and
repeat) clearly about those things.  I don't know what the percentage of
artists is who feel themselves in the business of formalizing the
creation of artifacts; but an artist who understands how important
formalization is to large-scale cooperation will have no trouble
understanding the relationship between equations (or, more generally,
automated deduction) and mathematical concepts.

My guess about art is that most people who self identify as artists are
against relying on consensus methods, i.e. art is a very personal thing
both for the artist and the audience.  (Note that I used "personal"
rather than "subjective".)  To rigorize (rigorify?, rigorate?) art is to
remove the art.  But I also guess that each artist (or art lineage) has
a set of, fairly rigorous, methods associated with her (it).  The rigor
may be contained in the fingers instead of in symbols on paper, but the
rigor would be there somewhere for any artist capable of repeating their
work.  (Unless one believes in luck and a "good artist" is just a lucky
person.)

This tacit vs. explicit methodological dichotomy may be the major cause
for incommensurance between any of the more intuitive human activities
(like entrepreneurship, art, scientific speculation) vs. the more
inferential/reasoned activities (like accounting, manufacturing,
falsification), and those people proficient in one but not the other.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


============================================================
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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[glen e. p. ropella-2]

Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 12/01/09 04:18 PM:
> No doubt both are important. The symbols (and formalisms) keep us honest.
> The concepts, though, are what the symbols are about. By themselves they are
> not about anything.

I disagree.  I think the emphasis on concepts is a peculiar form of
anthropocentrism (or, at worst, narcissism ;-).  An explicit and eminent
objective in both math and science is to make processes explicit so that
those processes can be argued about, falsified, justified, repeated, and
taught.

So, while any particular symbol may be ancillary, the methods of
extracting and symbolizing the peculiar and particular "concepts" in any
given occult process is critical.  Symbolization is not just a necessary
evil.  It is what scientists and mathematicians do for a living.  It's
their job.

For science, this is especially true because the goal is to reify
processes out there in the world, to permanently and consistently remove
the "concepts" peculiar and particular to any one (small collection of)
person(s) and make them available for everyone to play with.

>From that perspective, the symbols (as a tool for externalizing the
internal) are way more important than the concepts.

Looked at from another perspective, the syntax any given person chooses
to represent their concepts has a huge and lasting impact on the
external (somewhat objective) artifacts she creates, e.g. the battle
between Leibniz and Newton.  A more modern example is the Baez and Stay
paper cited by Roger back in August:

  http://www.mail-archive.com/friam@.../msg04285.html

I don't pretend to understand it; but it seems to me that much of the
unification attempted by that paper revolves around the symbols they're
using to represent the concepts peculiar to each domain.  Further, it's
entirely possible that, although we _think_ the concepts are actually
the _same_ and unifying the domains around monoidal categories may be a
more general "notation" for the same concepts, it's possible that the
instantiation of the common "notation" for all these different concepts
is really just building _consensus_ between the various (peculiar and
particular) minds involved.

I.e. the notation _causes_ the concepts, not vice versa.

I know that's reaching; but, it's at least reasonable that the language
in which we choose to represent something modifies/guides the concepts
in our heads.  And it's a primary goal of math and science to remove the
peculiarities and particularities associated with any single (small
collection of) human(s).

Any attempt to make symbols more or less important than concepts in math
will fail because they are both part of the same thing.  The concepts
are Yin and the symbols are Yang.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


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[Russ Abbott]

On Mon, Jan 12, 2009 at 5:14 PM, glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> wrote:

Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 12/01/09 04:18 PM:

> No doubt both are important. The symbols (and formalisms) keep us honest.
> The concepts, though, are what the symbols are about. By themselves they are
> not about anything.

I disagree.  I think the emphasis on concepts is a peculiar form of
anthropocentrism (or, at worst, narcissism ;-).  An explicit and eminent
objective in both math and science is to make processes explicit so that
those processes can be argued about, falsified, justified, repeated, and
taught.

...  

 

"concepts is a peculiar form of anthropocentrism" is a very interesting point. You raise the issue of consciousness and in particular what it means to have concepts. Are you saying that having concepts is limited to humans? Perhaps it is.  If that's the case, do you expect to find symbols generated elsewhere in the universe through non-conscious processes?

You might point to DNA as an example. It's digital, but is it symbolic? Are symbols being manipulated? Perhaps--although that seems a stretch. But even if one grants that symbols are being manipulated in the use of DNA, I think it would be hard to make the case that the symbols are being used referentially the way we use our symbols.

And that seems to me to be a basic point. If symbols are used referentially how are their referents associated with them?  That's the symbol grounding problem again.

>From that perspective, the symbols (as a tool for externalizing the
internal) are way more important than the concepts.

...

You say that you disagree, but what you are saying is very much what I said -- but you seem to be taking it negatively

We use symbols to externalize concepts. (In fact I wrote a paper to that effect: "If a tree casts a shadow is it telling the time?") I agree. The concepts come before the symbols in that case. The symbols help us be clear and keep us honest about our concepts. I don't understand why you say you disagree with that. Symbols by themselves have no meaning.  I'm not sure if you are agreeing about that or not. And in order for something to have meaning, it must have meaning in the mind of a conceptualizing being.



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[glen e. p. ropella-2]

Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 12/01/09 07:58 PM:
> On Mon, Jan 12, 2009 at 5:14 PM, glen e. p. ropella <
> [hidden email]> wrote:
>> I disagree.  I think the emphasis on concepts is a peculiar form of
>> anthropocentrism (or, at worst, narcissism ;-).  An explicit and eminent
>
> "concepts is a peculiar form of anthropocentrism" is a very interesting
> point. You raise the issue of consciousness and in particular what it means
> to have concepts. Are you saying that having concepts is limited to humans?
> Perhaps it is.

No, sorry.  I wasn't clear.  The _emphasis_ on concepts is
anthropocentric.  It's a natural consequence of our being very
reflective animals.  I suspect each animal has its own degree of
reflection.  An animal that acts purely "on instinct", and doesn't
engage in much self-reflection, doesn't spend a lot of time wondering
about their concepts.  So, no, concepts are definitely NOT limited to
humans.  But humans spend an extraordinary amount of time talking and
thinking about their concepts.

Hence, the _emphasis_ on concepts is anthropocentric.  The point being
that concepts are trivial and it's the symbols that are important.

>  If that's the case, do you expect to find symbols generated
> elsewhere in the universe through non-conscious processes?

Yes.  A symbol can occur anywhere there is some sort of "proxy",
"placeholder", or "agent" mechanism.  Symbols are just special cases of
networks.  Any indirect effect can be said to be symbolic.  Perhaps the
example of a line of dominoes would make it clear what I mean.  The
force exerted on the first domino knocks over the last domino.  The
first domino can be a means to knocking over the last domino.  Hence,
the first domino can be a symbol for the last domino.

The grounding doesn't have to be made by a conscious observer.  The
first domino is networked to the last domino through the objective rules
of physics.  Hence, it's physical cause-effect that makes the first
domino a symbol or stand-in for the last.

If your definition for "symbol" requires a conscious observer, then
that's fine.  I'll change my usage from "symbol" to "potential symbol".
 One object is a potential symbol for another when there is some network
of connections between them.

In the context of math (and other languages), the network of connections
is spanned by the alphabet and rules of the language.  When one
(simpler) formal system is embedded in another (more complex), we can
say that the simpler language is grounded in the more complex one.  And
this would be true regardless of whether there are humans using the
language to map sentences to concepts.

>>From that perspective, the symbols (as a tool for externalizing the
>> internal) are way more important than the concepts.
>>
>> ...
>>
>>
> You say that you disagree, but what you are saying is very much what I said
> -- but you seem to be taking it negatively
>
> We use symbols to externalize concepts. (In fact I wrote a paper to that
> effect: "If a tree casts a shadow is it telling the
> time?<http://cs.calstatela.edu/wiki/images/6/66/If_a_tree_casts_a_shadow_is_it_telling_the_time.pdf>")
> I agree. The concepts come before the symbols in that case.

I'm very strongly disagreeing with that statement.  (Note that I am
playing Devil's Advocate... but pretend that I am disagreeing strongly
for the moment.)  The concepts do NOT ever come before the symbols.  The
concepts are trivial or epiphenomenal.  The symbols are what's real.
The symbols come before the concepts.  In fact, the symbols cause the
concepts.

We can see this quite well by imagining the origins of language.  When
we started using our paws/fins to _point_ at things, "concepts" were
born.  Prior to that, it was just symbols (or "potential symbols" -- see
above -- ... artifacts that can be used as symbols).

> The symbols help
> us be clear and keep us honest about our concepts. I don't understand why
> you say you disagree with that. Symbols by themselves have no meaning.  I'm
> not sure if you are agreeing about that or not. And in order for something
> to have meaning, it must have meaning in the mind of a conceptualizing
> being.

Symbols by themselves have ALL the meaning.  It's the abstract concepts
in our minds that have no meaning.

To go back to math and science, one can sit around all day _thinking_
and it doesn't matter at all.  Thinking is totally and completely
useless without the languages into which we translate our thoughts.
Concepts are NOT important in this context.  The external, objective,
language is the important thing.

Math and science have, as a primary objective, the task of constructing
linguistic objects that at least guide the thoughts of others, if not
outright _create_ thoughts in others.  Hence, the symbols (e.g.
equations) are the most important part of math.  Similarly, the most
important part of science is the _stuff_ ... the beakers, telescopes,
dosage protocols, etc... everything you find in the "methods" section of
the papers.  That's the most important part, not the random, bizarre,
baroque, peculiar, and particular concepts in any given scientist's mind.

(Remember that I'm arguing this _strongly_ just to make my point clear.
 What is actually true is that symbols and concepts are two aspects of
the exact same thing.  Neither precedes the other.  Neither is more
important than the other.  I'm making the strong case for the eminence
of symbols just to make my point clear.)

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


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[Russ Abbott]

Jack, Glen,  Thanks for your comments.

I think Jack's position is closer to what I am saying that Glen's.  Although I'm not sure I understand Glen's perspective, it seems to reverse the roles of symbols and reality from how I'm understanding those terms.

Jack's position is the model theoretic framework.  Whether or not you think that framework is useful, at least it offers a fairly well defined way to understand the way we are using terminology. In that framework, symbols are not reality; they are opaque. They get meaning only when mapped to a model.

I hesitate to impose on you, but I've written a draft paper that discusses these issues along with emergence and reduction. It claims that computer science thinking is grounded and that philosophical thinking isn't. It attempts to express the argument using model-theoretic language -- even though I'm not a mathematician or mathematical logician. (I don't make any use of model theory results, just the terminological framework.) One of the reasons I claim we (CS) are grounded and the Philosophy isn't is because we think of reduction differently. We think of reduction constructively; they think of it, well, reductively.

If any of you have the time and patience to look at the paper, I would greatly appreciate comments. It's (currently) called "Emergence, reduction, and concept grounding in philosphy and computer science.." It's only about 5,000 words.

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles
o Check out my blog at http://russabbott.blogspot.com/

On Tue, Jan 13, 2009 at 10:10 AM, glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> wrote:

Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 12/01/09 07:58 PM:

> On Mon, Jan 12, 2009 at 5:14 PM, glen e. p. ropella <
> [hidden email]> wrote:

>> I disagree.  I think the emphasis on concepts is a peculiar form of
>> anthropocentrism (or, at worst, narcissism ;-).  An explicit and eminent
>

> "concepts is a peculiar form of anthropocentrism" is a very interesting
> point. You raise the issue of consciousness and in particular what it means
> to have concepts. Are you saying that having concepts is limited to humans?
> Perhaps it is.

No, sorry.  I wasn't clear.  The _emphasis_ on concepts is
anthropocentric.  It's a natural consequence of our being very
reflective animals.  I suspect each animal has its own degree of
reflection.  An animal that acts purely "on instinct", and doesn't
engage in much self-reflection, doesn't spend a lot of time wondering
about their concepts.  So, no, concepts are definitely NOT limited to
humans.  But humans spend an extraordinary amount of time talking and
thinking about their concepts.

Hence, the _emphasis_ on concepts is anthropocentric.  The point being
that concepts are trivial and it's the symbols that are important.

>  If that's the case, do you expect to find symbols generated
> elsewhere in the universe through non-conscious processes?

Yes.  A symbol can occur anywhere there is some sort of "proxy",
"placeholder", or "agent" mechanism.  Symbols are just special cases of
networks.  Any indirect effect can be said to be symbolic.  Perhaps the
example of a line of dominoes would make it clear what I mean.  The
force exerted on the first domino knocks over the last domino.  The
first domino can be a means to knocking over the last domino.  Hence,
the first domino can be a symbol for the last domino.

The grounding doesn't have to be made by a conscious observer.  The
first domino is networked to the last domino through the objective rules
of physics.  Hence, it's physical cause-effect that makes the first
domino a symbol or stand-in for the last.

If your definition for "symbol" requires a conscious observer, then
that's fine.  I'll change my usage from "symbol" to "potential symbol".
 One object is a potential symbol for another when there is some network
of connections between them.

In the context of math (and other languages), the network of connections
is spanned by the alphabet and rules of the language.  When one
(simpler) formal system is embedded in another (more complex), we can
say that the simpler language is grounded in the more complex one.  And
this would be true regardless of whether there are humans using the
language to map sentences to concepts.

>>From that perspective, the symbols (as a tool for externalizing the
>> internal) are way more important than the concepts.
>>
>> ...
>>
>>
> You say that you disagree, but what you are saying is very much what I said
> -- but you seem to be taking it negatively
>
> We use symbols to externalize concepts. (In fact I wrote a paper to that
> effect: "If a tree casts a shadow is it telling the

> time?<http://cs.calstatela.edu/wiki/images/6/66/If_a_tree_casts_a_shadow_is_it_telling_the_time.pdf>")

> I agree. The concepts come before the symbols in that case.

I'm very strongly disagreeing with that statement.  (Note that I am
playing Devil's Advocate... but pretend that I am disagreeing strongly
for the moment.)  The concepts do NOT ever come before the symbols.  The
concepts are trivial or epiphenomenal.  The symbols are what's real.
The symbols come before the concepts.  In fact, the symbols cause the
concepts.

We can see this quite well by imagining the origins of language.  When
we started using our paws/fins to _point_ at things, "concepts" were
born.  Prior to that, it was just symbols (or "potential symbols" -- see
above -- ... artifacts that can be used as symbols).

> The symbols help
> us be clear and keep us honest about our concepts. I don't understand why
> you say you disagree with that. Symbols by themselves have no meaning.  I'm
> not sure if you are agreeing about that or not. And in order for something
> to have meaning, it must have meaning in the mind of a conceptualizing
> being.

Symbols by themselves have ALL the meaning.  It's the abstract concepts
in our minds that have no meaning.

To go back to math and science, one can sit around all day _thinking_
and it doesn't matter at all.  Thinking is totally and completely
useless without the languages into which we translate our thoughts.
Concepts are NOT important in this context.  The external, objective,
language is the important thing.

Math and science have, as a primary objective, the task of constructing
linguistic objects that at least guide the thoughts of others, if not
outright _create_ thoughts in others.  Hence, the symbols (e.g.
equations) are the most important part of math.  Similarly, the most
important part of science is the _stuff_ ... the beakers, telescopes,
dosage protocols, etc... everything you find in the "methods" section of
the papers.  That's the most important part, not the random, bizarre,
baroque, peculiar, and particular concepts in any given scientist's mind.

(Remember that I'm arguing this _strongly_ just to make my point clear.
 What is actually true is that symbols and concepts are two aspects of
the exact same thing.  Neither precedes the other.  Neither is more
important than the other.  I'm making the strong case for the eminence
of symbols just to make my point clear.)

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


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FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org