Friam Digest, Vol 38, Issue 3

[Jochen Fromm-3]

 
Whoa. Three buzzwords in a row: non-linearity, emergence and
complexity. You forgot non-equilibrium and edge of chaos.
How does this sound like: a revolutionary paradigm shift
towards a variety of non-linear, non-equilibrium patterns out
of the loop at the edge of chaos that are uniquely associated
with emerging complex organization increasing your
return-on-investment at the end of the day. This sentence
includes at least 8 buzzwords. Can you top that ?

-J.

-----Original Message-----
From: Phil Henshaw
Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 5:40 AM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 38, Issue 3

[...]
Still, there are a variety of non-linear patterns that are uniquely
associated with emerging complex organization.  

[Jochen Fromm-3]

If the USA delivers weapons and military knowledge to autonomous
parties in instable countries like Israel, Afghanistan and the
former Iraq and even trains people there to fight, it is of course
not surprising at all (perhaps even unavoidable) that eventually
these weapons will be used for an unintended purpose against the
will of the US, especially if all these people can do and have
learned is to fight.

Although it is therefore obvious that a blowback can happen
in this case, it would perhaps interesting to find out the
circumstances when it happens exactly, for example by simulating
the phenomenon with agent-based modelling in the way Marcus mentioned
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowback_(intelligence)

I guess one sequence how terrorists are made goes in
a chain of events like this:
1. A superpower first delivers weapons and military knowledge
   to autonomous parties or groups in instable countries
   (according to the proverb "The enemy of my enemy is my friend")
2. The autonomous parties succeed in their conflict, fight or
   resistance against something, e.g. an occupier or aggressor
   (Bin Laden was successful against the Russian occupier)
3. The autonomous parties do something that is not intended  
   by the superpower (for example bombing embassies in their
   home countries)
4. The superpower turns against the autonomous parties, threatens
   them or tries to eliminate them (the Clinton administration for
   example tried to eliminate Bin Laden with a Cruise missile attack)  
5. The autonomous parties react: they are going mad (become terrorists)
   and plan a terrorist attack on the superpower

Terms are relative: the terrorist for one is a freedom fighter
for the other and vice versa.

-J.

-----Original Message-----
From: Marcus G. Daniels
Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 7:32 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 38, Issue 3

[...]

Zbigniew Brzezinski might have pondered "if we fund the Mujahideen to
fight the Soviets, what's the likelihood these people will endure and
extend their narcissistic rage toward the United States [as
Al-Qaeda]".   Or the Mossad might have thought more carefully about how
much rope they extended to the Hamas.   A computer simulation that
tracked these organizations as existing and intermixing with the general
population (trying to spread their message) could provide some risk
profile for the kind of damage they could do.  It would at least remind
elected officials in later years of the fact they exist at all.

[...]

I see such a model as sort of thermometer to answer questions like:

 Who is mad
 What are they doing now (as a group, relevant to the conflict)
 What could they do in the next week, month & year, if they achieve it
 What can't they do in the next week, month & year if they are stopped
 Where are they
 Who are they connected to as allies and as enemies
 What do they want
 What do they need
 What do they believe and how mutable is it

[Marcus G. Daniels-3]

Jochen Fromm wrote:
> Although it is therefore obvious that a blowback can happen
> in this case, it would perhaps interesting to find out the
> circumstances when it happens exactly
There unintended consequences in many things, but that doesn't mean
individuals or nations can be expected not to protect their interests.  
Most useful drugs have side effects, for example.  Further, it's not
obvious what the world would look like today if somehow the Soviet Union
had survived and the many direct and covert actions the U.S. made to
undermine communism had never occurred.  

My take is that leaders are not likely to abandon covert operations.  So
either the autonomous organizations need to made non-autonomous (but
sufficiently anonymous), or they need to be quietly hunted down when
their work is done.   Or, better, certain high risk approaches shouldn't
be taken at all without lots of agonizing by professionals on the long
term consequences (like with computer models).  My guess is that many of
the people that come up with this stuff realize that the blowback make
take decades and by then their career will be done (esp. elected
officials).  They'll have their glory and the collective memory will
fade about the how the pieces fit together.

Marcus

[Justin Lyon-2]

Jochen,

20/20 hindsight can only be turned into 20/20 foresight with simulation.
Yet, for some reason, I have repeatedly failed to convince policymakers
of this in numerous meetings.

I did an analysis for one of my MIT classes using strategy dynamics
(basically, a dumbed down version of system dynamics for non-math
people) to look at the growth of islamists in Afghanistan during the 80s.

I hypothesized that the use of strategy dynamics by intelligence
agencies would make sense as a way of developing a framework for
analyzing complex situations and providing clear insights into possible
future issues, including possible blowback situations.

I then worked with Dr. Warren (an LBS professor who was teaching system
dynamics at MIT via distance learning) and some other colleagues to use
strategy dynamics to look at the conflict in Sierra Leonne and we had
the opportunity to present the findings to the director of the
secretary-generals office of the UN in New York.

In both cases, I tried to get more funding to explore using strategy
dynamics and system dynamics to analyze terrorists issues, but failed to
know the right people or how to navigate the paperwork to secure
funding. Since it's easier selling work to corporations, that is where I
focus.

But, I still remain convinced that system dynamics, enhanced with agent
based models, in a hybrid model using software like NetLogo or AnyLogic
would be a powerful tool for intelligence purposes.

The strategy dynamics process is well-suited to gathering data in a
structured manner that can be easily fed to analysts back home. I call
it developing a strategic simulation architecture (SSA). It can be
taught to people in a few weeks.

We even discussed training people at the UN and with the head of police
in Sierra Leonne who got it but, once again, we were stymied by lack of
funding.

The key benefit of strategy dynamics, system dynamics and agent based
models are their  ability to deal with intangibles, such as the
accumulation of anger in a given population and then provide insights
into plausible scenarios on how that anger impacts the inflow of new
recruits into terrorist organizations.

See my short paper here for more:
http://s158641480.onlinehome.us/public/DS-004_SSA_Terrorism_V0-5_en.doc

Would love to hear your thoughts as the paper has languished in
obscurity since I wrote it in 2001.

:-P

Best,
Justin

Jochen Fromm wrote:

>If the USA delivers weapons and military knowledge to autonomous
>parties in instable countries like Israel, Afghanistan and the
>former Iraq and even trains people there to fight, it is of course
>not surprising at all (perhaps even unavoidable) that eventually
>these weapons will be used for an unintended purpose against the
>will of the US, especially if all these people can do and have
>learned is to fight.
>
>Although it is therefore obvious that a blowback can happen
>in this case, it would perhaps interesting to find out the
>circumstances when it happens exactly, for example by simulating
>the phenomenon with agent-based modelling in the way Marcus mentioned
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowback_(intelligence)
>
>I guess one sequence how terrorists are made goes in
>a chain of events like this:
>1. A superpower first delivers weapons and military knowledge
>   to autonomous parties or groups in instable countries
>   (according to the proverb "The enemy of my enemy is my friend")
>2. The autonomous parties succeed in their conflict, fight or
>   resistance against something, e.g. an occupier or aggressor
>   (Bin Laden was successful against the Russian occupier)
>3. The autonomous parties do something that is not intended  
>   by the superpower (for example bombing embassies in their
>   home countries)
>4. The superpower turns against the autonomous parties, threatens
>   them or tries to eliminate them (the Clinton administration for
>   example tried to eliminate Bin Laden with a Cruise missile attack)  
>5. The autonomous parties react: they are going mad (become terrorists)
>   and plan a terrorist attack on the superpower
>
>Terms are relative: the terrorist for one is a freedom fighter
>for the other and vice versa.
>
>-J.
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Marcus G. Daniels
>Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 7:32 AM
>To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
>Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 38, Issue 3
>
>[...]
>
>Zbigniew Brzezinski might have pondered "if we fund the Mujahideen to
>fight the Soviets, what's the likelihood these people will endure and
>extend their narcissistic rage toward the United States [as
>Al-Qaeda]".   Or the Mossad might have thought more carefully about how
>much rope they extended to the Hamas.   A computer simulation that
>tracked these organizations as existing and intermixing with the general
>population (trying to spread their message) could provide some risk
>profile for the kind of damage they could do.  It would at least remind
>elected officials in later years of the fact they exist at all.
>
>[...]
>
>I see such a model as sort of thermometer to answer questions like:
>
> Who is mad
> What are they doing now (as a group, relevant to the conflict)
> What could they do in the next week, month & year, if they achieve it
> What can't they do in the next week, month & year if they are stopped
> Where are they
> Who are they connected to as allies and as enemies
> What do they want
> What do they need
> What do they believe and how mutable is it
>
>
>
>============================================================
>FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>  
>

[Robert J. Cordingley]

The recent discussions on developing models for political analysis have
been very interesting.  I fully expect that to persuade folks
(policymakers and business leaders) to part with their organization's
time and money will require demonstrable results.  Demonstrating one can
build a model and show life-like performance is great, but proving it
has value, matches reality and isn't just another SimCity seems to me to
be what's missing.  I know this is a bootstrap problem, if one could get
the funding one would be sure it would prove itself.

The question has to be answered: does the process work in this domain?  
Do the ethnographic studies, the incorporation of the best political
advisors, etc., perhaps with the use of all the computing power you can
dream of, along with the latest and sharpest computing tools produce a
system that has measurable performance against the real world.  What is
the probability that when X is tested, Y will occur?  When does chaos
takeover?  Is it meaningful in the time it takes to implement policy?  
Having performance based results are key to success and probably not
readily shared.  (For example, if someone has a functioning model of the
stock market that works, I'd expect them to keep it a pretty closely
guarded secret.)

I'd recommend studies be done on a small scale perhaps to model the
performance of island or tribal cultures.  With solid performance data
that proves the technology, one can build a case for larger
implementations. Do such results exist?

Robert
(my 2c)


Justin Lyon wrote:

>Jochen,
>
>20/20 hindsight can only be turned into 20/20 foresight with simulation.
>Yet, for some reason, I have repeatedly failed to convince policymakers
>of this in numerous meetings.
>
>I did an analysis for one of my MIT classes using strategy dynamics
>(basically, a dumbed down version of system dynamics for non-math
>people) to look at the growth of islamists in Afghanistan during the 80s.
>
>I hypothesized that the use of strategy dynamics by intelligence
>agencies would make sense as a way of developing a framework for
>analyzing complex situations and providing clear insights into possible
>future issues, including possible blowback situations.
>
>I then worked with Dr. Warren (an LBS professor who was teaching system
>dynamics at MIT via distance learning) and some other colleagues to use
>strategy dynamics to look at the conflict in Sierra Leonne and we had
>the opportunity to present the findings to the director of the
>secretary-generals office of the UN in New York.
>
>In both cases, I tried to get more funding to explore using strategy
>dynamics and system dynamics to analyze terrorists issues, but failed to
>know the right people or how to navigate the paperwork to secure
>funding. Since it's easier selling work to corporations, that is where I
>focus.
>
>But, I still remain convinced that system dynamics, enhanced with agent
>based models, in a hybrid model using software like NetLogo or AnyLogic
>would be a powerful tool for intelligence purposes.
>
>The strategy dynamics process is well-suited to gathering data in a
>structured manner that can be easily fed to analysts back home. I call
>it developing a strategic simulation architecture (SSA). It can be
>taught to people in a few weeks.
>
>We even discussed training people at the UN and with the head of police
>in Sierra Leonne who got it but, once again, we were stymied by lack of
>funding.
>
>The key benefit of strategy dynamics, system dynamics and agent based
>models are their  ability to deal with intangibles, such as the
>accumulation of anger in a given population and then provide insights
>into plausible scenarios on how that anger impacts the inflow of new
>recruits into terrorist organizations.
>
>See my short paper here for more:
>http://s158641480.onlinehome.us/public/DS-004_SSA_Terrorism_V0-5_en.doc
>
>Would love to hear your thoughts as the paper has languished in
>obscurity since I wrote it in 2001.
>
>:-P
>
>Best,
>Justin
>
>Jochen Fromm wrote:
>
>  
>
>>If the USA delivers weapons and military knowledge to autonomous
>>parties in instable countries like Israel, Afghanistan and the
>>former Iraq and even trains people there to fight, it is of course
>>not surprising at all (perhaps even unavoidable) that eventually
>>these weapons will be used for an unintended purpose against the
>>will of the US, especially if all these people can do and have
>>learned is to fight.
>>
>>Although it is therefore obvious that a blowback can happen
>>in this case, it would perhaps interesting to find out the
>>circumstances when it happens exactly, for example by simulating
>>the phenomenon with agent-based modelling in the way Marcus mentioned
>>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowback_(intelligence)
>>
>>I guess one sequence how terrorists are made goes in
>>a chain of events like this:
>>1. A superpower first delivers weapons and military knowledge
>>  to autonomous parties or groups in instable countries
>>  (according to the proverb "The enemy of my enemy is my friend")
>>2. The autonomous parties succeed in their conflict, fight or
>>  resistance against something, e.g. an occupier or aggressor
>>  (Bin Laden was successful against the Russian occupier)
>>3. The autonomous parties do something that is not intended  
>>  by the superpower (for example bombing embassies in their
>>  home countries)
>>4. The superpower turns against the autonomous parties, threatens
>>  them or tries to eliminate them (the Clinton administration for
>>  example tried to eliminate Bin Laden with a Cruise missile attack)  
>>5. The autonomous parties react: they are going mad (become terrorists)
>>  and plan a terrorist attack on the superpower
>>
>>Terms are relative: the terrorist for one is a freedom fighter
>>for the other and vice versa.
>>
>>-J.
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: Marcus G. Daniels
>>Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 7:32 AM
>>To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
>>Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 38, Issue 3
>>
>>[...]
>>
>>Zbigniew Brzezinski might have pondered "if we fund the Mujahideen to
>>fight the Soviets, what's the likelihood these people will endure and
>>extend their narcissistic rage toward the United States [as
>>Al-Qaeda]".   Or the Mossad might have thought more carefully about how
>>much rope they extended to the Hamas.   A computer simulation that
>>tracked these organizations as existing and intermixing with the general
>>population (trying to spread their message) could provide some risk
>>profile for the kind of damage they could do.  It would at least remind
>>elected officials in later years of the fact they exist at all.
>>
>>[...]
>>
>>I see such a model as sort of thermometer to answer questions like:
>>
>>Who is mad
>>What are they doing now (as a group, relevant to the conflict)
>>What could they do in the next week, month & year, if they achieve it
>>What can't they do in the next week, month & year if they are stopped
>>Where are they
>>Who are they connected to as allies and as enemies
>>What do they want
>>What do they need
>>What do they believe and how mutable is it
>>
>>
>>
>>============================================================
>>FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>>Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>>lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>>
>>
>>
>>    
>>
>
>
>============================================================
>FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>
>  
>

-------------- next part --------------
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[Frank Wimberly]

What about the following issue:  I suspect that a simulation
(agent-based or otherwise) of the "stock market" (e.g. the DJIA) could
be developed which is statistically indistinguishable from the real
thing.  That is, the moments, fat tails, etc. would not serve to allow a
statistician to distinguish between the simulated signal and some, as
yet unobserved, actual data.  Yet, such a simulation would have no
predictive value except on some set of measure zero.  However similar to
the real world the simulation is, it won't tell you the level of the
DJIA next Tuesday.  How is it possible to make simulations useful for
PREDICTION?

Frank

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz??????????????[phone] or [phone] (cell)
Santa Fe, NM 87505???????????wimberly3 at earthlink.net
-----Original Message-----
From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On
Behalf Of Robert Cordingley
Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 12:53 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Agent-Based Modelling of a Blowback - How
Terrorists are made

The recent discussions on developing models for political analysis have
been very interesting.? I fully expect that to persuade folks
(policymakers and business leaders) to part with their organization's
time and money will require demonstrable results.? Demonstrating one can
build a model and show life-like performance is great, but proving it
has value, matches reality and isn't just another SimCity seems to me to
be what's missing.? I know this is a bootstrap problem, if one could get
the funding one would be sure it would prove itself.?

The question has to be answered: does the process work in this domain??
Do the ethnographic studies, the incorporation of the best political
advisors, etc., perhaps with the use of all the computing power you can
dream of, along with the latest and sharpest computing tools produce a
system that has measurable performance against the real world.? What is
the probability that when X is tested, Y will occur?? When does chaos
takeover?? Is it meaningful in the time it takes to implement policy? ?
Having performance based results are key to success and probably not
readily shared.? (For example, if someone has a functioning model of the
stock market that works, I'd expect them to keep it a pretty closely
guarded secret.)?

I'd recommend studies be done on a small scale perhaps to model the
performance of island or tribal cultures.? With solid performance data
that proves the technology, one can build a case for larger
implementations. Do such results exist?

Robert
(my 2c)


Justin Lyon wrote:
Jochen,

20/20 hindsight can only be turned into 20/20 foresight with simulation.

Yet, for some reason, I have repeatedly failed to convince policymakers
of this in numerous meetings.

I did an analysis for one of my MIT classes using strategy dynamics
(basically, a dumbed down version of system dynamics for non-math
people) to look at the growth of islamists in Afghanistan during the
80s.

I hypothesized that the use of strategy dynamics by intelligence
agencies would make sense as a way of developing a framework for
analyzing complex situations and providing clear insights into possible
future issues, including possible blowback situations.

I then worked with Dr. Warren (an LBS professor who was teaching system
dynamics at MIT via distance learning) and some other colleagues to use
strategy dynamics to look at the conflict in Sierra Leonne and we had
the opportunity to present the findings to the director of the
secretary-generals office of the UN in New York.

In both cases, I tried to get more funding to explore using strategy
dynamics and system dynamics to analyze terrorists issues, but failed to

know the right people or how to navigate the paperwork to secure
funding. Since it's easier selling work to corporations, that is where I

focus.

But, I still remain convinced that system dynamics, enhanced with agent
based models, in a hybrid model using software like NetLogo or AnyLogic
would be a powerful tool for intelligence purposes.

The strategy dynamics process is well-suited to gathering data in a
structured manner that can be easily fed to analysts back home. I call
it developing a strategic simulation architecture (SSA). It can be
taught to people in a few weeks.

We even discussed training people at the UN and with the head of police
in Sierra Leonne who got it but, once again, we were stymied by lack of
funding.

The key benefit of strategy dynamics, system dynamics and agent based
models are their  ability to deal with intangibles, such as the
accumulation of anger in a given population and then provide insights
into plausible scenarios on how that anger impacts the inflow of new
recruits into terrorist organizations.

See my short paper here for more:
http://s158641480.onlinehome.us/public/DS-004_SSA_Terrorism_V0-5_en.doc

Would love to hear your thoughts as the paper has languished in
obscurity since I wrote it in 2001.

:-P

Best,
Justin

Jochen Fromm wrote:

 
If the USA delivers weapons and military knowledge to autonomous
parties in instable countries like Israel, Afghanistan and the
former Iraq and even trains people there to fight, it is of course
not surprising at all (perhaps even unavoidable) that eventually
these weapons will be used for an unintended purpose against the
will of the US, especially if all these people can do and have
learned is to fight.

Although it is therefore obvious that a blowback can happen
in this case, it would perhaps interesting to find out the
circumstances when it happens exactly, for example by simulating
the phenomenon with agent-based modelling in the way Marcus mentioned
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowback_(intelligence)

I guess one sequence how terrorists are made goes in
a chain of events like this:
1. A superpower first delivers weapons and military knowledge
  to autonomous parties or groups in instable countries
  (according to the proverb "The enemy of my enemy is my friend")
2. The autonomous parties succeed in their conflict, fight or
  resistance against something, e.g. an occupier or aggressor
  (Bin Laden was successful against the Russian occupier)
3. The autonomous parties do something that is not intended  
  by the superpower (for example bombing embassies in their
  home countries)
4. The superpower turns against the autonomous parties, threatens
  them or tries to eliminate them (the Clinton administration for
  example tried to eliminate Bin Laden with a Cruise missile attack)  
5. The autonomous parties react: they are going mad (become terrorists)
  and plan a terrorist attack on the superpower

Terms are relative: the terrorist for one is a freedom fighter
for the other and vice versa.

-J.

-----Original Message-----
From: Marcus G. Daniels
Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 7:32 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 38, Issue 3

[...]

Zbigniew Brzezinski might have pondered "if we fund the Mujahideen to
fight the Soviets, what's the likelihood these people will endure and
extend their narcissistic rage toward the United States [as
Al-Qaeda]".   Or the Mossad might have thought more carefully about how
much rope they extended to the Hamas.   A computer simulation that
tracked these organizations as existing and intermixing with the general

population (trying to spread their message) could provide some risk
profile for the kind of damage they could do.  It would at least remind
elected officials in later years of the fact they exist at all.

[...]

I see such a model as sort of thermometer to answer questions like:

Who is mad
What are they doing now (as a group, relevant to the conflict)
What could they do in the next week, month & year, if they achieve it
What can't they do in the next week, month & year if they are stopped
Where are they
Who are they connected to as allies and as enemies
What do they want
What do they need
What do they believe and how mutable is it



============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

 

   


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org


 

[Douglas Roberts-2]

Frank,

PREDICTION (Co., Inc.) already has a number of stock market simulations
which I believe they have found to be quite useful.

;-}

--Doug

On 8/8/06, Frank Wimberly <wimberly3 at earthlink.net> wrote:

>
> What about the following issue:  I suspect that a simulation
> (agent-based or otherwise) of the "stock market" (e.g. the DJIA) could
> be developed which is statistically indistinguishable from the real
> thing.  That is, the moments, fat tails, etc. would not serve to allow a
> statistician to distinguish between the simulated signal and some, as
> yet unobserved, actual data.  Yet, such a simulation would have no
> predictive value except on some set of measure zero.  However similar to
> the real world the simulation is, it won't tell you the level of the
> DJIA next Tuesday.  How is it possible to make simulations useful for
> PREDICTION?
>
> Frank
>
> ---
> Frank C. Wimberly
> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz(505) 995-8715 or [phone] (cell)
> Santa Fe, NM 87505wimberly3 at earthlink.net
> -----Original Message-----
> From: friam-bounces at redfish.com [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] On
> Behalf Of Robert Cordingley
> Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 12:53 PM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Agent-Based Modelling of a Blowback - How
> Terrorists are made
>
> The recent discussions on developing models for political analysis have
> been very interesting. I fully expect that to persuade folks
> (policymakers and business leaders) to part with their organization's
> time and money will require demonstrable results. Demonstrating one can
> build a model and show life-like performance is great, but proving it
> has value, matches reality and isn't just another SimCity seems to me to
> be what's missing. I know this is a bootstrap problem, if one could get
> the funding one would be sure it would prove itself.
>
> The question has to be answered: does the process work in this domain?
> Do the ethnographic studies, the incorporation of the best political
> advisors, etc., perhaps with the use of all the computing power you can
> dream of, along with the latest and sharpest computing tools produce a
> system that has measurable performance against the real world. What is
> the probability that when X is tested, Y will occur? When does chaos
> takeover? Is it meaningful in the time it takes to implement policy?
> Having performance based results are key to success and probably not
> readily shared. (For example, if someone has a functioning model of the
> stock market that works, I'd expect them to keep it a pretty closely
> guarded secret.)
>
> I'd recommend studies be done on a small scale perhaps to model the
> performance of island or tribal cultures. With solid performance data
> that proves the technology, one can build a case for larger
> implementations. Do such results exist?
>
> Robert
> (my 2c)
>
>
> Justin Lyon wrote:
> Jochen,
>
> 20/20 hindsight can only be turned into 20/20 foresight with simulation.
>
> Yet, for some reason, I have repeatedly failed to convince policymakers
> of this in numerous meetings.
>
> I did an analysis for one of my MIT classes using strategy dynamics
> (basically, a dumbed down version of system dynamics for non-math
> people) to look at the growth of islamists in Afghanistan during the
> 80s.
>
> I hypothesized that the use of strategy dynamics by intelligence
> agencies would make sense as a way of developing a framework for
> analyzing complex situations and providing clear insights into possible
> future issues, including possible blowback situations.
>
> I then worked with Dr. Warren (an LBS professor who was teaching system
> dynamics at MIT via distance learning) and some other colleagues to use
> strategy dynamics to look at the conflict in Sierra Leonne and we had
> the opportunity to present the findings to the director of the
> secretary-generals office of the UN in New York.
>
> In both cases, I tried to get more funding to explore using strategy
> dynamics and system dynamics to analyze terrorists issues, but failed to
>
> know the right people or how to navigate the paperwork to secure
> funding. Since it's easier selling work to corporations, that is where I
>
> focus.
>
> But, I still remain convinced that system dynamics, enhanced with agent
> based models, in a hybrid model using software like NetLogo or AnyLogic
> would be a powerful tool for intelligence purposes.
>
> The strategy dynamics process is well-suited to gathering data in a
> structured manner that can be easily fed to analysts back home. I call
> it developing a strategic simulation architecture (SSA). It can be
> taught to people in a few weeks.
>
> We even discussed training people at the UN and with the head of police
> in Sierra Leonne who got it but, once again, we were stymied by lack of
> funding.
>
> The key benefit of strategy dynamics, system dynamics and agent based
> models are their  ability to deal with intangibles, such as the
> accumulation of anger in a given population and then provide insights
> into plausible scenarios on how that anger impacts the inflow of new
> recruits into terrorist organizations.
>
> See my short paper here for more:
> http://s158641480.onlinehome.us/public/DS-004_SSA_Terrorism_V0-5_en.doc
>
> Would love to hear your thoughts as the paper has languished in
> obscurity since I wrote it in 2001.
>
> :-P
>
> Best,
> Justin
>
> Jochen Fromm wrote:
>
>
> If the USA delivers weapons and military knowledge to autonomous
> parties in instable countries like Israel, Afghanistan and the
> former Iraq and even trains people there to fight, it is of course
> not surprising at all (perhaps even unavoidable) that eventually
> these weapons will be used for an unintended purpose against the
> will of the US, especially if all these people can do and have
> learned is to fight.
>
> Although it is therefore obvious that a blowback can happen
> in this case, it would perhaps interesting to find out the
> circumstances when it happens exactly, for example by simulating
> the phenomenon with agent-based modelling in the way Marcus mentioned
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowback_(intelligence)
>
> I guess one sequence how terrorists are made goes in
> a chain of events like this:
> 1. A superpower first delivers weapons and military knowledge
>   to autonomous parties or groups in instable countries
>   (according to the proverb "The enemy of my enemy is my friend")
> 2. The autonomous parties succeed in their conflict, fight or
>   resistance against something, e.g. an occupier or aggressor
>   (Bin Laden was successful against the Russian occupier)
> 3. The autonomous parties do something that is not intended
>   by the superpower (for example bombing embassies in their
>   home countries)
> 4. The superpower turns against the autonomous parties, threatens
>   them or tries to eliminate them (the Clinton administration for
>   example tried to eliminate Bin Laden with a Cruise missile attack)
> 5. The autonomous parties react: they are going mad (become terrorists)
>   and plan a terrorist attack on the superpower
>
> Terms are relative: the terrorist for one is a freedom fighter
> for the other and vice versa.
>
> -J.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Marcus G. Daniels
> Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 7:32 AM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 38, Issue 3
>
> [...]
>
> Zbigniew Brzezinski might have pondered "if we fund the Mujahideen to
> fight the Soviets, what's the likelihood these people will endure and
> extend their narcissistic rage toward the United States [as
> Al-Qaeda]".   Or the Mossad might have thought more carefully about how
> much rope they extended to the Hamas.   A computer simulation that
> tracked these organizations as existing and intermixing with the general
>
> population (trying to spread their message) could provide some risk
> profile for the kind of damage they could do.  It would at least remind
> elected officials in later years of the fact they exist at all.
>
> [...]
>
> I see such a model as sort of thermometer to answer questions like:
>
> Who is mad
> What are they doing now (as a group, relevant to the conflict)
> What could they do in the next week, month & year, if they achieve it
> What can't they do in the next week, month & year if they are stopped
> Where are they
> Who are they connected to as allies and as enemies
> What do they want
> What do they need
> What do they believe and how mutable is it
>
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>
>
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>

--
Doug Roberts, RTI International
droberts at rti.org
doug at parrot-farm.net
505-455-7333 - Office
505-670-8195 - Cell
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[Marcus G. Daniels-3]

Quoting Frank Wimberly <wimberly3 at earthlink.net>:

> What about the following issue:  I suspect that a simulation
> (agent-based or otherwise) of the "stock market" (e.g. the DJIA) could
> be developed which is statistically indistinguishable from the real
> thing.  That is, the moments, fat tails, etc. would not serve to allow a
> statistician to distinguish between the simulated signal and some, as
> yet unobserved, actual data.  Yet, such a simulation would have no
> predictive value except on some set of measure zero.  However similar to
> the real world the simulation is, it won't tell you the level of the
> DJIA next Tuesday.  

One way is to get NYSE and NASDAQ datasets and iterate the 30 DJIA order books
forward in time from a long  period of real observed order flow.  For each
trader on each stock you could fit or engineer an agent that reproduces that
order flow to some degree of precision (based on the evolving orderbooks they
had in front of the and perhaps based on estimates of their initial inventory
(or at least aversions to large changes).  Now take all of the order books and
iterate them forward in time with the synthetic agent rules until next
Tuesday.  You'd have estimates of all the best prices on all of the stocks and
thus the DJIA, given assumption that the behaviors at work in the data would
continue to occur into the future.

One question is how intelligent do the agents have to be?  That simple agents
who do little more than hide their inventory can do a good job of getting
aggregate statistics of the market right suggest that internal dynamics of the
markets are as important as real news.

http://www.santafe.edu/~jdf/papers/zero.pdf
http://www.santafe.edu/~jdf/papers/TheoryForLongMemory.pdf
http://www.santafe.edu/~jdf/papers/quantitativemodel.pdf

[Phil Henshaw-2]

Honestly Marcus, your ethics seem no better than your sense of modeling.
Just because we're in what the Chinese call 'interesting times' doesn't
mean that abusing people is either OK or useful.  Where have you been
for the last two years? I myself am occasionally known for saying wild,
if strategically pointed, things for fun.   I really hope your comments
on the irrelevance of being concerned with harming people by our
incompetence falls into that category somehow.

But on systems, you say this research institute idea will let people
become nearly clairvoyant about how people will behave.  What do you
think the amazing shape of the Bush approval curve means, about the
complex system events of American politics?
http://jackman.stanford.edu/blog/?p=74   I rate this as very high
quality data on a very real but unnoticed large scale complex system
behavior.  What do you see it as.


Phil Henshaw                       ????.?? ? `?.????
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
680 Ft. Washington Ave
NY NY 10040                      
tel: [phone]                
e-mail: pfh at synapse9.com          
explorations: www.synapse9.com    

> -----Original Message-----
> From: friam-bounces at redfish.com
> [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus G. Daniels
> Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 1:32 AM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 38, Issue 3
>
>
> Phil Henshaw wrote:
> > Try predicting the repeat offences of individual criminals.
>  It's not
> > possible.
> >  
> I'm actually not suggesting predicting anything on a
> individual level,
> except to the extent that ex-officio roles like Olmert, Nasrallah,
> Ahmadinejad, bin Laden, and Bush would probably need to be
> modeled.  I'm
> suggesting predicting trends in a set of subpopulations over
> time.   The
> primary purpose of a model like this would be to make aggregate
> predictions about the cascade of events from a significant event.  
> Secondarily, because getting fine-grained data on how  events
> actually
> transpire is hard, a simulation facilitates what-if exploration of a
> tactical and strategic space, given an array of made-up but plausible
> group reaction functions.
>
> Zbigniew Brzezinski might have pondered "if we fund the Mujahideen to
> fight the Soviets, what's the likelihood these people will endure and
> extend their narcissistic rage toward the United States [as
> Al-Qaeda]".   Or the Mossad might have thought more carefully
> about how
> much rope they extended to the Hamas.   A computer simulation that
> tracked these organizations as existing and intermixing with
> the general
> population (trying to spread their message) could provide some risk
> profile for the kind of damage they could do.  It would at
> least remind
> elected officials in later years of the fact they exist at all.
>
> One place to start would be to use signals intelligence to infer a
> network of communication patterns.   Then on that network overlay
> representative agents that have some capability set, depth of
> funding,
> human resources, and degree of extremism or political agendas.  The
> overall political climate would determine what rate
> volunteers could be
> recruited, and the organizational types would determine where
> they went.
>   (That goes for all sides.)  For example, we keep hearing analysts
> saying how Israel has polarized the Lebanese to the point that now
> Hezbollah is popular.   Perhaps that fades away fast, or perhaps it
> collapses in a month or two of intensive destruction, or perhaps it
> intensifies and mobilizes a larger set of fighters.  Point is, it's
> surely got some scaling and dynamics -- mad people create dynamics at
> least so long as they are alive.
>
> I see such a model as sort of thermometer to answer questions like:
>
>  Who is mad
>  What are they doing now (as a group, relevant to the
> conflict)  What could they do in the next week, month & year,
> if they achieve it  What can't they do in the next week,
> month & year if they are stopped  Where are they  Who are
> they connected to as allies and as enemies  What do they want
>  What do they need  What do they believe and how mutable is it
>
> Some of these things will change over time, some of may have narrow
> variances some of them wide.   But hit it hard enough, or wait for
> someone else to, and something has got to give.  If some of
> those shifts
> are predictable, then that's potentially usable for decision
> makers.  
> It doesn't mean it all has to be predictable.  It doesn't matter what
> virtual soldier Shlomo is having for lunch (unless perhaps he
> shows up
> on CNN).  The parts that are hopeless can be discarded and the parts
> that show utility can be elaborated.  But this is not like medicine
> where doing harm is avoided.  No, in our world it seems to be
> the norm
> to futz with the patient using blunt dirty instruments and see what
> happens (and then sometimes bother to write it down).
>
> Marcus
>
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>

[Phil Henshaw-2]

touche', As I recall I did throw in the 'non-linear', and maybe some
other stuff rather haphazardly.  It was a sloppy way of saying that I
know you guys have keen insight into what complex systems are and what
they do and I really wish you'd try to define it as observation tools so
people can learn how to identify them in their own worlds.  

What my tools do is very sensitively strip away the homeostatic
fluctuation and reconstruct the larger scale dynamics so you can see the
timing of the structural changes.   Applying formulas to time series is
rigid a form to feel out and display the subtle shapes.  One of my
oldest studies is of the history of annual records of US GNP.  My
analysis shows that the growth rate steadily declines except at times of
large scale destruction/renewal.  It make sense, is part of various
growth theories I think, but I don't think anyone ever demonstrated it
empirically before.   http://www.synapse9.com/drpage.htm#usgnp


Phil Henshaw                       ????.?? ? `?.????
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
680 Ft. Washington Ave
NY NY 10040                      
tel: [phone]                
e-mail: pfh at synapse9.com          
explorations: www.synapse9.com    

> -----Original Message-----
> From: friam-bounces at redfish.com
> [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] On Behalf Of Jochen Fromm
> Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 4:25 AM
> To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
> Subject: [FRIAM] Buzzwords
>
>
>  
> Whoa. Three buzzwords in a row: non-linearity, emergence and
> complexity. You forgot non-equilibrium and edge of chaos. How
> does this sound like: a revolutionary paradigm shift
> towards a variety of non-linear, non-equilibrium patterns out
> of the loop at the edge of chaos that are uniquely associated
> with emerging complex organization increasing your
> return-on-investment at the end of the day. This sentence
> includes at least 8 buzzwords. Can you top that ?
>
> -J.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Phil Henshaw
> Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 5:40 AM
> To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 38, Issue 3
>
> [...]
> Still, there are a variety of non-linear patterns that are uniquely
> associated with emerging complex organization.  
>
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>

[Phil Henshaw-2]

Well, the money markets are special.  They're intensely watched by the
world's most sophisticated manipulators.   I don't think that makes a
good test bed for the starting phase of developing a wholly new
technology.   Someone here is suggesting something more than standard
regression curves aren't they?   It sounds like you guys are talking
about observing chaos and reconstructing the deterministic equations for
it... or something.  Is there any simple model you can think of that
would actually be suitable for test run experiments?


Phil Henshaw                       ????.?? ? `?.????
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
680 Ft. Washington Ave
NY NY 10040                      
tel: [phone]                
e-mail: pfh at synapse9.com          
explorations: www.synapse9.com    

> -----Original Message-----
> From: friam-bounces at redfish.com
> [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
> Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 3:05 PM
> To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Agent-Based Modelling of a Blowback -
> How Terroristsare made
>
>
> What about the following issue:  I suspect that a simulation
> (agent-based or otherwise) of the "stock market" (e.g. the
> DJIA) could be developed which is statistically
> indistinguishable from the real thing.  That is, the moments,
> fat tails, etc. would not serve to allow a statistician to
> distinguish between the simulated signal and some, as yet
> unobserved, actual data.  Yet, such a simulation would have
> no predictive value except on some set of measure zero.  
> However similar to the real world the simulation is, it won't
> tell you the level of the DJIA next Tuesday.  How is it
> possible to make simulations useful for PREDICTION?
>
> Frank
>
> ---
> Frank C. Wimberly
> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz??????????????[phone] or (505)
> 670-9918 (cell) Santa Fe, NM 87505???????????

wimberly3 at earthlink.net -----Original > Message-----

> From: friam-bounces at redfish.com
> [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] On Behalf Of Robert Cordingley
> Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 12:53 PM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Agent-Based Modelling of a Blowback -
> How Terrorists are made
>
> The recent discussions on developing models for political
> analysis have been very interesting.? I fully expect that to
> persuade folks (policymakers and business leaders) to part
> with their organization's time and money will require
> demonstrable results.? Demonstrating one can build a model
> and show life-like performance is great, but proving it has
> value, matches reality and isn't just another SimCity seems
> to me to be what's missing.? I know this is a bootstrap
> problem, if one could get the funding one would be sure it
> would prove itself.?
>
> The question has to be answered: does the process work in
> this domain??
> Do the ethnographic studies, the incorporation of the best
> political advisors, etc., perhaps with the use of all the
> computing power you can dream of, along with the latest and
> sharpest computing tools produce a system that has measurable
> performance against the real world.? What is the probability
> that when X is tested, Y will occur?? When does chaos
> takeover?? Is it meaningful in the time it takes to implement
> policy? ?
> Having performance based results are key to success and
> probably not readily shared.? (For example, if someone has a
> functioning model of the stock market that works, I'd expect
> them to keep it a pretty closely guarded secret.)?
>
> I'd recommend studies be done on a small scale perhaps to
> model the performance of island or tribal cultures.? With
> solid performance data that proves the technology, one can
> build a case for larger implementations. Do such results exist?
>
> Robert
> (my 2c)
>
>
> Justin Lyon wrote:
> Jochen,
>
> 20/20 hindsight can only be turned into 20/20 foresight with
> simulation.
>
> Yet, for some reason, I have repeatedly failed to convince
> policymakers
> of this in numerous meetings.
>
> I did an analysis for one of my MIT classes using strategy dynamics
> (basically, a dumbed down version of system dynamics for non-math
> people) to look at the growth of islamists in Afghanistan
> during the 80s.
>
> I hypothesized that the use of strategy dynamics by intelligence
> agencies would make sense as a way of developing a framework for
> analyzing complex situations and providing clear insights
> into possible
> future issues, including possible blowback situations.
>
> I then worked with Dr. Warren (an LBS professor who was
> teaching system
> dynamics at MIT via distance learning) and some other
> colleagues to use
> strategy dynamics to look at the conflict in Sierra Leonne and we had
> the opportunity to present the findings to the director of the
> secretary-generals office of the UN in New York.
>
> In both cases, I tried to get more funding to explore using strategy
> dynamics and system dynamics to analyze terrorists issues,
> but failed to
>
> know the right people or how to navigate the paperwork to secure
> funding. Since it's easier selling work to corporations, that
> is where I
>
> focus.
>
> But, I still remain convinced that system dynamics, enhanced
> with agent
> based models, in a hybrid model using software like NetLogo
> or AnyLogic
> would be a powerful tool for intelligence purposes.
>
> The strategy dynamics process is well-suited to gathering data in a
> structured manner that can be easily fed to analysts back
> home. I call
> it developing a strategic simulation architecture (SSA). It can be
> taught to people in a few weeks.
>
> We even discussed training people at the UN and with the head
> of police
> in Sierra Leonne who got it but, once again, we were stymied
> by lack of
> funding.
>
> The key benefit of strategy dynamics, system dynamics and agent based
> models are their  ability to deal with intangibles, such as the
> accumulation of anger in a given population and then provide insights
> into plausible scenarios on how that anger impacts the inflow of new
> recruits into terrorist organizations.
>
> See my short paper here for more:
> http://s158641480.onlinehome.us/public/DS-004_SSA_Terrorism_V0
> -5_en.doc
>
> Would love to hear your thoughts as the paper has languished in
> obscurity since I wrote it in 2001.
>
> :-P
>
> Best,
> Justin
>
> Jochen Fromm wrote:
>
>  
> If the USA delivers weapons and military knowledge to autonomous
> parties in instable countries like Israel, Afghanistan and
> the former Iraq and even trains people there to fight, it is
> of course
> not surprising at all (perhaps even unavoidable) that eventually
> these weapons will be used for an unintended purpose against the
> will of the US, especially if all these people can do and have
> learned is to fight.
>
> Although it is therefore obvious that a blowback can happen
> in this case, it would perhaps interesting to find out the
> circumstances when it happens exactly, for example by simulating
> the phenomenon with agent-based modelling in the way Marcus mentioned
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowback_(intelligence)
>
> I guess one sequence how terrorists are made goes in
> a chain of events like this:
> 1. A superpower first delivers weapons and military knowledge
>   to autonomous parties or groups in instable countries
>   (according to the proverb "The enemy of my enemy is my
> friend") 2. The autonomous parties succeed in their conflict,
> fight or
>   resistance against something, e.g. an occupier or aggressor
>   (Bin Laden was successful against the Russian occupier)
> 3. The autonomous parties do something that is not intended  
>   by the superpower (for example bombing embassies in their
>   home countries)
> 4. The superpower turns against the autonomous parties, threatens
>   them or tries to eliminate them (the Clinton administration for
>   example tried to eliminate Bin Laden with a Cruise missile
> attack)  
> 5. The autonomous parties react: they are going mad (become
> terrorists)
>   and plan a terrorist attack on the superpower
>
> Terms are relative: the terrorist for one is a freedom
> fighter for the other and vice versa.
>
> -J.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Marcus G. Daniels
> Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 7:32 AM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 38, Issue 3
>
> [...]
>
> Zbigniew Brzezinski might have pondered "if we fund the Mujahideen to
> fight the Soviets, what's the likelihood these people will endure and
> extend their narcissistic rage toward the United States [as
> Al-Qaeda]".   Or the Mossad might have thought more carefully
> about how
> much rope they extended to the Hamas.   A computer simulation that
> tracked these organizations as existing and intermixing with
> the general
>
> population (trying to spread their message) could provide some risk
> profile for the kind of damage they could do.  It would at
> least remind
> elected officials in later years of the fact they exist at all.
>
> [...]
>
> I see such a model as sort of thermometer to answer questions like:
>
> Who is mad
> What are they doing now (as a group, relevant to the
> conflict) What could they do in the next week, month & year,
> if they achieve it What can't they do in the next week, month
> & year if they are stopped Where are they Who are they
> connected to as allies and as enemies What do they want What
> do they need What do they believe and how mutable is it
>
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>  
>
>    
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>
>  
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>

[Marcus G. Daniels-3]

Hi Phil,
> But on systems, you say this research institute idea will let people
> become nearly clairvoyant about how people will behave.
Um, you suggested a research institute, not me.  I would see this kind
of project as largely modeling work to be done, with a strong focus on
skillful applied people and domain experts.

A strategic simulation system is pretty well understood cognitive tool,
but I admit I do imagine something bigger.

Indeed, an architecture that can be used to model populations on a
multitude of dimensions.  For use from everything from urban planning to
national security.   Full GIS, automatic parallelism, optional object
orientation, physics simulation features, clever constraint fitting and
optimization, etc.  Automated model validation with an expectation of
huge underlying compute power.   Not just numerically but also
semantically, building on projects like http://www.opencyc.com.  

A while back DoD had a project called HLA (High Level Architecture) that
was along these lines but I think it never really went anywhere. My main
objection to that was that it was too concerned about federated
simulation, i.e. pulling in legacy simulation codes.

Also needed is a growing array of database resources;  Everything from
Lexus/Nexus to detailed map, scholarly works, census data, and whatever
else would be available to classified users -- all integrated by some
kind of unified query system.   A big workbench where analysts can work
efficiently to try to pin down algorithms for human behaviors and
institutions they see or read about.

Ideally there would be some open source core package developed  for the
public good that would seek to support many different kinds of users in
academia, business and government.   Perhaps that could be done at some
invented institute, but probably better to actually try to ensure it
gets done by hiring a credible contractor.  With that momentum to get
started, users could develop more open or proprietary modules and
databases to develop a rich ecology for modeling the human world.

Could such a thing make decision makers clairvoyant?  Of course not.  
But it could pull everything together in one place and help the people
that support those decision makers look at a problem at a range of
scales, and consider alternatives systematically.

Marcus

[Marcus G. Daniels-3]

Phil Henshaw wrote:
> Honestly Marcus, your ethics seem no better than your sense of modeling.
> Just because we're in what the Chinese call 'interesting times' doesn't
> mean that abusing people is either OK or useful.
At the end of a long work day, I'll indulge myself.  Ok, I'm not a
pacifist and I'm not opposed to the use of force -- I am, however,
opposed to blind and thoughtless use of force that does not serve U.S.
interests even in the near term.

We insure ourselves in various ways as individuals and pay according to
some formula some actuary has worked out for someone we vaguely
resemble.  As far as I'm concerned would be great to see elected
officials so constrained as well.   Would be nice to know if their
decisions pass a standard national safety and efficiency quality control
suite (a simulation), as that's surely a heck of a lot more critical
accountability than they have now!

Marcus

[Marcus G. Daniels-3]

Phil Henshaw wrote:
> What do you
> think the amazing shape of the Bush approval curve means, about the
> complex system events of American politics?
> http://jackman.stanford.edu/blog/?p=74   I rate this as very high
> quality data on a very real but unnoticed large scale complex system
> behavior.  What do you see it as.
>  
It might show that people prefer to follow rather than think.

[Jochen Fromm-3]

I am not sure if agent-based modelling offers better insight
than the knowledge of history combined with common sense,
but it is probably much better than Game Theory and pure
mathematical analysis. One problem is the myriad ways in which
actors in societies can interact with each other: if seventy
agents were lining up to enter a gate, there are 70! different
ways how this could be arranged ( which equals roughly 10^100, see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Googol )

Another factor that makes modeling of real societies difficult
is the intractable individual behavior (which depends on
prejudices, preferences, personal experiences, etc.).
Jared Diamond writes in his No.1 bestseller "Collapse"
in chapter 9 "Opposite Paths to Success/Other Successes"
that even "...people with long-term stakes don't always
act wisely. Often they still prefer short-term goals, and
often again they do things that are foolish in both the
short term and the long term. That's what makes biography
and history infinitely more complicated and less predictable
than the courses of chemical reactions..."

-J.
________________________________

From: Robert Cordingley
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Agent-Based Modelling of a Blowback - How Terrorists
are made

[...]

The question has to be answered: does the process work in this
domain?  Do the ethnographic studies, the incorporation of the
best political advisors, etc., perhaps with the use of all the
computing power you can dream of, along with the latest and
sharpest computing tools produce a system that has measurable
performance against the real world.  What is the probability
that when X is tested, Y will occur?  When does chaos takeover?  
Is it meaningful in the time it takes to implement policy?  
Having performance based results are key to success and probably
not readily shared.  

[Phil Henshaw-2]

Well that curve is the clearest kind of complex systems inforation we
ever get.   This is one beautiful and dramatic bullet of information,
and I think if we ask a hundred systems scientists what it means we'll
get a lot of opinion, much of it not based on systems theory.  

I think what's amazing about the curve is that it shows a remarkably
clear dynamic in the trust of the nation, a long period on the same path
of decay.   What I read it as, and others may differ, is that out trust
in war as a response to terror actually never had a growth, climax or
stability period, only a decay period.  

Growth curves are usually direct evidence of the regular organizational
development processes of complex systems.   I think we should include
using them to locate physical examples of the phenomena we wish to
model, as one means of finding windows into seeing how they actually
work.


Phil Henshaw                       ????.?? ? `?.????
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
680 Ft. Washington Ave
NY NY 10040                      
tel: [phone]                
e-mail: pfh at synapse9.com          
explorations: www.synapse9.com    

> -----Original Message-----
> From: friam-bounces at redfish.com
> [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus G. Daniels
> Sent: Wednesday, August 09, 2006 1:37 AM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 38, Issue 3
>
>
> Phil Henshaw wrote:
> > What do you
> > think the amazing shape of the Bush approval curve means, about the
> > complex system events of American politics?
> > http://jackman.stanford.edu/blog/?p=74   I rate this as very high
> > quality data on a very real but unnoticed large scale
> complex system
> > behavior.  What do you see it as.
> >  
> It might show that people prefer to follow rather than think.
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>

[Marcus G. Daniels-3]

Phil Henshaw wrote:

> Well that curve is the clearest kind of complex systems inforation we
> ever get.   This is one beautiful and dramatic bullet of information,
> and I think if we ask a hundred systems scientists what it means we'll
> get a lot of opinion, much of it not based on systems theory.  
>
> I think what's amazing about the curve is that it shows a remarkably
> clear dynamic in the trust of the nation, a long period on the same path
> of decay.   What I read it as, and others may differ, is that out trust
> in war as a response to terror actually never had a growth, climax or
> stability period, only a decay period.  
>  

I think it is reasonable to posit that the lack of trust that explains
these general trends.  However, in this case it appears to have started
before 9/11 (and before military actions in Afghanistan or Iraq).  The
same plots for other presidents could give a baseline for general
properties of presidential popularity.   There may be a common
friction.  One could compare the general slope for one and two term
presidents with the idea that two term presidents did something right.  
(I would think someone has done this, but have not investigated.)

Another interpretation is that popularity decays just in the face of
steady negative media coverage.   That some people are sensitive to the
news and some are less sensitive and that it takes a long period of
exposure for some people to take a negative opinion.  In this model,
introducing a concept like trust is not necessary.

Marcus

[Phil Henshaw-2]

I'm very pleased you also see the curve as reflecting a pattern in the
phenomenon of public trust, and I think you're right on to observe that
the decay pattern started *prior* to any of the big mistakes that later
confirmed it.    One thing that might produce that pattern is excessive
original expectations, that we may have had 'irrational exuberance' for
things we thought we could do about 9/11 and as a community, we held on
to the desire to retaliate even as our ability to believe it possible
kept getting steadily harder and harder...  

For phenomena there tends to be a small constellation of workable models
for what the system dynamic was.   That there was anything this
consistent going on I think was well below everyone's radar.  I see the
media as primarily an entertainment service rather than a truth seeking
process.   A truth seeking process homes in on things and the media tend
to multiply any entertaining new idea politicians can 'score points'
with, thus Al Gore's observation that the scientific literature develops
broad consensus and the popular literature doesn't.  The decay of public
trust is one that both literatures missed entirely I think.

Does this give you any hint of why I highly value reading the sustained
system developmental processes displayed in growth curves?


Phil Henshaw                       ????.?? ? `?.????
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
680 Ft. Washington Ave
NY NY 10040                      
tel: [phone]                
e-mail: pfh at synapse9.com          
explorations: www.synapse9.com    

> -----Original Message-----
> From: friam-bounces at redfish.com
> [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus G. Daniels
> Sent: Thursday, August 10, 2006 10:15 AM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 38, Issue 3
>
>
> Phil Henshaw wrote:
> > Well that curve is the clearest kind of complex systems
> inforation we
> > ever get.   This is one beautiful and dramatic bullet of
> information,
> > and I think if we ask a hundred systems scientists what it
> means we'll
> > get a lot of opinion, much of it not based on systems theory.  
> >
> > I think what's amazing about the curve is that it shows a
> remarkably
> > clear dynamic in the trust of the nation, a long period on
> the same path
> > of decay.   What I read it as, and others may differ, is
> that out trust
> > in war as a response to terror actually never had a growth,
> climax or
> > stability period, only a decay period.
> >  
> I think it is reasonable to posit that the lack of trust that
> explains
> these general trends.  However, in this case it appears to
> have started
> before 9/11 (and before military actions in Afghanistan or
> Iraq).  The
> same plots for other presidents could give a baseline for general
> properties of presidential popularity.   There may be a common
> friction.  One could compare the general slope for one and two term
> presidents with the idea that two term presidents did
> something right.  
> (I would think someone has done this, but have not investigated.)
>
> Another interpretation is that popularity decays just in the face of
> steady negative media coverage.   That some people are
> sensitive to the
> news and some are less sensitive and that it takes a long period of
> exposure for some people to take a negative opinion.  In this model,
> introducing a concept like trust is not necessary.
>
> Marcus
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>

[Marcus G. Daniels-3]

Phil Henshaw wrote:
> I'm very pleased you also see the curve as reflecting a pattern in the
> phenomenon of public trust
I said it was reasonable to posit that.  Also reasonable to posit other
things to find the model that explains the most while assuming the
least, e.g. that `trust' is something all people seek, and thus some
kind of universal explanation for human inclinations.
> I think you're right on to observe that
> the decay pattern started *prior* to any of the big mistakes that later
> confirmed it.    One thing that might produce that pattern is excessive
> original expectations, that we may have had 'irrational exuberance' for
> things we thought we could do about 9/11 and as a community, we held on
> to the desire to retaliate even as our ability to believe it possible
> kept getting steadily harder and harder...  
>  
Actually I meant the period prior to 9/11.  There appears to be a
downward trend there too.

A contrasting hypothesis being roughly "Things go bad for typical
presidents in this democracy, it's just a question of how fast."  Put
another way, that intensity of presidential criticism scales with time,
automatically as a general collective protection mechanism.  As
cumulative deaths in Iraq are necessarily only increasing, and
popularity is going down steadily, it's no surprise to see a
correlation.  (And they say this.)  I find the volatility and change
plots in the paper more convincing correlates of Iraq-related events,
e.g. figure 6 and 8.  And really not a big difference in Table 2
comparing change in log gas price vs. cumulative U.S. deaths in Iraq /
1000.  It would be interesting to see what they find should they look at
local trend models, as they indicate they want to (page 20).

Marcus

[Phil Henshaw-2]

Well, the world is clearly behaving strangely and I want to ask again,
do we maybe know why?   It's been a couple months and there's still no
comment on my various suggestions here that growth is an explosive
process of developing complexity, and that as a process necessarily
overwhelms its own guidance systems if not checked by anything else.  It
unavoidably would reach a limit when repercussions explode and adaptive
responses get misdirected or collapse.  

Granted, the scale of world evolution is much larger and much slower
than we're accustomed to, and the disastrous speeds of events that can't
be responded to include those that can appear majestically gradual on a
human scale.  It takes some adjustment to think about it.  Most people
think society has greatly benefited from the systematic economic growth
that has continued for around 600 years.   I'm still saying 'stable
growth' is a deeply false plan and expectation, and I think we basically
know that.  

What's strange is that stable growth clearly appears to be the world
professional and governmental consensus long range plan, using business
to rearrange the earth and our lives at explosively accelerating rates,
forever.  I think the big plan and what science has had to say about it
so far are deeply curious, don't you?  

Are there vested interests who might pull our funding if we talked about
it?  Very possibly, but I think that's well down the list of the 101
possible reasons for our bizarre situation and relative professional
silence about it.  One that makes it through Ocham's Razor for me is
that when modern science took an interest in complex systems it
concentrated on theory rather than on carefully documenting the physical
phenomenon.  Well, anyway, that's what makes me ask this question.


Make any sense?


Phil Henshaw                       ????.?? ? `?.????
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
680 Ft. Washington Ave
NY NY 10040                      
tel: [phone]                
e-mail: pfh at synapse9.com          
explorations: www.synapse9.com