Emergence X. Trying to wrap things up.

[Nick Thompson]

If I say that the strength of a triangle is due (in part, obviously) to the arrangement  of its legs, have I  "reduced" the  the triangle's strength to the properties of its legs?  Well, that depends on what one means by reduced.  If by reduced, one means that only that one has made mention of the legs in the course of explaining a property of the whole, then, the explanation is, indeed, a reduction.   If,  on the other hand, the requirement of reduction is that the explanation make mention only of the properties of the individual parts, then the explanation fails as a reduction, because an "arrangement" of legs is not strictly speaking, a property of the individual legs, themselves.  "An arrangement" is already a nominal emergent of the legs.  On this account, an explanation of the properties of a whole by reference to a temporal or spacial arrangement of its parts is in fact an explanation of one emergent property by another.   

 

This seems to open up a crack in the argument that non-reductive physicalism violates the causal closure of the physical.   For, it suggests that any complete explanation of properties at one level in terms of properties of another would have  at least  three steps.  The first step is the emergent to emergent step,  showing that nominal emergent properties lead to other emergent properties.  The second step is to identify the causes of the arrangement, which could be physical causes.  The third step is to show  why it is that arrangement in this way facilitates those properties.  These, too,  could be physical causes.   So, if we now allow into our concept of causal closure of the physical  to include the idea that arrangements of parts are constraints on the motions and positions of those parts, can't have a dual account where triangleness causes strength and the physical properties of the elements of a triangle (the legs and the joints) cause THAT [triangleness causes strength].   Causal closure of the physical is complete because if nominally emergent properties such as temporal and spatial arrangement are allowed into the family of physical causes, we just have a case of physical causes causing physical causes.  

 

Nick   

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe]

 

 

 

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[Douglas Roberts-2]

On those  "the strength of a triangle", and "that triangleness causes strength" suppositions:   Bosh.  Balderdash.  Bushwaw.  Bull Puckee.

Everybody knows that triangles are inherently unstable because eventually (and sooner rather than later), the injured party finds out about that third "leg", and then all Hell breaks loose.  Divorce invariably ensues, and the triangle once more  becomes flatland, with nary an angle to be found, much less individual well-arranged legs.

Trust me Nick, you don't want to go the triangle route.

--Doug

On Tue, Nov 24, 2009 at 11:23 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

If I say that the strength of a triangle is due (in part, obviously) to the arrangement  of its legs, have I  "reduced" the  the triangle's strength to the properties of its legs?  Well, that depends on what one means by reduced.  If by reduced, one means that only that one has made mention of the legs in the course of explaining a property of the whole, then, the explanation is, indeed, a reduction.   If,  on the other hand, the requirement of reduction is that the explanation make mention only of the properties of the individual parts, then the explanation fails as a reduction, because an "arrangement" of legs is not strictly speaking, a property of the individual legs, themselves.  "An arrangement" is already a nominal emergent of the legs.  On this account, an explanation of the properties of a whole by reference to a temporal or spacial arrangement of its parts is in fact an explanation of one emergent property by another.   

 

This seems to open up a crack in the argument that non-reductive physicalism violates the causal closure of the physical.   For, it suggests that any complete explanation of properties at one level in terms of properties of another would have  at least  three steps.  The first step is the emergent to emergent step,  showing that nominal emergent properties lead to other emergent properties.  The second step is to identify the causes of the arrangement, which could be physical causes.  The third step is to show  why it is that arrangement in this way facilitates those properties.  These, too,  could be physical causes.   So, if we now allow into our concept of causal closure of the physical  to include the idea that arrangements of parts are constraints on the motions and positions of those parts, can't have a dual account where triangleness causes strength and the physical properties of the elements of a triangle (the legs and the joints) cause THAT [triangleness causes strength].   Causal closure of the physical is complete because if nominally emergent properties such as temporal and spatial arrangement are allowed into the family of physical causes, we just have a case of physical causes causing physical causes.  

 

Nick   

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe]

 

 

 

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org