Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle
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Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle
 
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All,
the third meeting of the emergence seminar is tomorrow at 4pm at DS. The readings are Searle's REDUCTIONISM AND THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
and wimsatt's AGREGATIVITY: REDUCTIVE HEURISTICS FOR FINDING EMERGENCE both from Bedau and Humphreys, EMERGENCE.
I think the chief challange of our discussions will be trying to figure out the degree to which the two authors agree. I was startled on second reading at the degree to which they agree on what constitutes emergence.
SEARLE "...some other system features cannot be figured out just from the compositoin of the elements and environmental relationws; they have to be explained in terms of the causal interactions among the elements. Let's call these 'causally emergent system features.'"
WIMSAT " An emergent property is --roughly-- a system property which is dependent upon the mode of organization of the system's parts".
These two definitions are by no means the same, but both allow for emergence to be a common place.
The two seem also to have similar views of what constitutes reduction. Searle goes to the trouble to explicate five different kinds of reduction, but in the end, he lights on "causal reduction", in part because it often leads to the other kinds.
SEARLE : A causal reduction has taken place when "the causal powers of the reduced entity [i.e., the macro-level entity] are shown to be entirely explainable in thers of the causal powers of the reducing phenomena [i.e., the micro-level phenomena]" Odd that he changes from entity to phenomena in mid definition, but I am supposed to be avoiding editorial comment here.
WIMSAT: .... a reductive explanation of a behavior or a property of a system is one showing it to be mechanistically explainable in terms of the properties of and interactions among the parts of the system." A lot would seem to hang on the word "mechanistically" here, so I looked it up in web dictionary of philosophical terms. maintained by garth kemerling:
Belief that science can explain all natural phenomena in terms of the causal interactions among material particles, without any reference to intelligent agency or purpose. As employed by Descartes and Hobbes, mechanism offered an alternative to the scholastic reliance on explanatory appeals to final causes. Is there anybody out there who is reading along with us????
Nick
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle
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Thus spake Nicholas Thompson circa 09/23/2009 08:33 PM:
> the third meeting of the emergence seminar is tomorrow at 4pm at DS. The readings are Searle's REDUCTIONISM AND THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS > and wimsatt's AGREGATIVITY: REDUCTIVE HEURISTICS FOR FINDING EMERGENCE both from Bedau and Humphreys, EMERGENCE. Yay! I finally got my copy. Next week I'll be able to yap at y'all in context. ;-) -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Great, Glen,
I will set up a thread, Emergence Seminar, IV: Chapter 8, Bedau. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 9/24/2009 7:04:51 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle > > Thus spake Nicholas Thompson circa 09/23/2009 08:33 PM: > > the third meeting of the emergence seminar is tomorrow at 4pm at DS. The readings are Searle's REDUCTIONISM AND THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS > > and wimsatt's AGREGATIVITY: REDUCTIVE HEURISTICS FOR FINDING EMERGENCE both from Bedau and Humphreys, EMERGENCE. > > Yay! I finally got my copy. Next week I'll be able to yap at y'all in > context. ;-) > > -- > glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
All,
As you all may remember, I had decided on the basis of my first two readings of Wimsatt, that his was the final word on the definition of emergence: a property of a macro-entity is emergent when it depends on the arrangement of the micro entities [in time and/or in space]. Unfortunately, I read it a third time. I woke up in the middle of the night realizing what was wrong with his position. (1) Ineliminably, emergence has to do with the relation between macro and micro entities. (I suppose somebody might challange that statement, but I dont think anybody has so far.) (2) Emergent properties of a macro entity are those that are dependant on the arrangement of the micro entities. (3) But "An arrangement of X's" cannot be a property of any microentity (duh!). (4) There fore, whatever (2) IS a definition of, it cannot be a definition of emergence OR emergence does not have to do with relations among levels. Back to the old drawing board. n Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > On Wed, Sep 23, 2009 at 9:33 PM, Nicholas Thompson > <[hidden email]> wrote: > > All, > > > > the third meeting of the emergence seminar is tomorrow at 4pm at DS. The > > readings are Searle's REDUCTIONISM AND THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS > > and wimsatt's AGREGATIVITY: REDUCTIVE HEURISTICS FOR FINDING EMERGENCE both > > from Bedau and Humphreys, EMERGENCE. > > > > I think the chief challange of our discussions will be trying to figure out > > the degree to which the two authors agree. I was startled on second reading > > at the degree to which they agree on what constitutes emergence. > > > > SEARLE "...some other system features cannot be figured out just from the > > compositoin of the elements and environmental relationws; they have to be > > explained in terms of the causal interactions among the elements. Let's > > call these 'causally emergent system features.'" > > > > WIMSAT " An emergent property is --roughly-- a system property which is > > dependent upon the mode of organization of the system's parts". > > > > These two definitions are by no means the same, but both allow for emergence > > to be a common place. > > > > The two seem also to have similar views of what constitutes reduction. > > Searle goes to the trouble to explicate five different kinds of reduction, > > but in the end, he lights on "causal reduction", in part because it often > > leads to the other kinds. > > > > SEARLE : A causal reduction has taken place when "the causal powers of the > > reduced entity [i.e., the macro-level entity] are shown to be entirely > > explainable in thers of the causal powers of the reducing phenomena [i.e., > > the micro-level phenomena]" Odd that he changes from entity to phenomena in > > mid definition, but I am supposed to be avoiding editorial comment here. > > > > WIMSAT: .... a reductive explanation of a behavior or a property of a > > system is one showing it to be mechanistically explainable in terms of the > > properties of and interactions among the parts of the system." A lot would > > seem to hang on the word "mechanistically" here, so I looked it up in web > > dictionary of philosophical terms. maintained by garth kemerling: > > > > mechanism > > > > Belief that science can explain all natural phenomena in terms of the causal > > interactions among material particles, without any reference to intelligent > > agency or purpose. As employed by Descartes and Hobbes, mechanism offered an > > alternative to the scholastic reliance on explanatory appeals to final > > causes. > > > > Is there anybody out there who is reading along with us???? > > > > Nick > > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > > Clark University ([hidden email]) > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > > > > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle
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On Fri, Sep 25, 2009 at 07:50:53PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> All, > > As you all may remember, I had decided on the basis of my first two > readings of Wimsatt, that his was the final word on the definition of > emergence: a property of a macro-entity is emergent when it depends on the > arrangement of the micro entities [in time and/or in space]. > Unfortunately, I read it a third time. > > I woke up in the middle of the night realizing what was wrong with his > position. > > (1) Ineliminably, emergence has to do with the relation between macro and > micro entities. (I suppose somebody might challange that statement, but I > dont think anybody has so far.) > > (2) Emergent properties of a macro entity are those that are dependant on > the arrangement of the micro entities. > > (3) But "An arrangement of X's" cannot be a property of any microentity > (duh!). > > (4) There fore, whatever (2) IS a definition of, it cannot be a definition > of emergence OR emergence does not have to do with relations among levels. > > > Back to the old drawing board. > > n > I got lost at step 4 here. The obvious syllogism of (1), (2) & (3) is that an emergent property is not a property of a micro entity. But this doesn't surprise me, as its actually my definition of emergence. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
So, Russ S,
when you say, "> I got lost at step 4 here. The obvious syllogism of (1), (2) & (3) is > that an emergent property is not a property of a micro entity. But > this doesn't surprise me, as its actually my definition of emergence." Does that mean that you are comfortable saying that emergence is actually a relationship between two different properties of the same object. I agree that the emergent property ... "being a copying device" has to be a property of the macro entity. But in this case, the CAUSE of the emergent property is also an emergent property, i.e., "being composed of parts arranged in a double helix". Is saying that a wooden construction is strong because its members are formed in triangles is like saying that a ball rolls because it is round? You wouldnt be the first Russ to say that I am getting my knickers unnecessarily twisted over this, but it does seem .... queer .... to me in someway. NIck Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: russell standish <[hidden email]> > To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 9/26/2009 8:35:52 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle > > On Fri, Sep 25, 2009 at 07:50:53PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > All, > > > > As you all may remember, I had decided on the basis of my first two > > readings of Wimsatt, that his was the final word on the definition of > > emergence: a property of a macro-entity is emergent when it depends on the > > arrangement of the micro entities [in time and/or in space]. > > Unfortunately, I read it a third time. > > > > I woke up in the middle of the night realizing what was wrong with his > > position. > > > > (1) Ineliminably, emergence has to do with the relation between macro and > > micro entities. (I suppose somebody might challange that statement, but I > > dont think anybody has so far.) > > > > (2) Emergent properties of a macro entity are those that are dependant on > > the arrangement of the micro entities. > > > > (3) But "An arrangement of X's" cannot be a property of any microentity > > (duh!). > > > > (4) There fore, whatever (2) IS a definition of, it cannot be a definition > > of emergence OR emergence does not have to do with relations among levels. > > > > > > Back to the old drawing board. > > > > n > > > > I got lost at step 4 here. The obvious syllogism of (1), (2) & (3) is > that an emergent property is not a property of a micro entity. But > this doesn't surprise me, as its actually my definition of emergence. > > -- > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle
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On Sat, Sep 26, 2009 at 01:24:47AM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> So, Russ S, > > when you say, > > "> I got lost at step 4 here. The obvious syllogism of (1), (2) & (3) is > > that an emergent property is not a property of a micro entity. But > > this doesn't surprise me, as its actually my definition of emergence." > > Does that mean that you are comfortable saying that emergence is actually a > relationship between two different properties of the same object. > Not exactly. It is more a relationship between languages. It is the presence of a property (the emergent one) expressed in one language that is impossible to express in the other language. We would normally say the languages are incommensurate, although Glen used a neat term for it the other day starting with "lexical" that raised the other Russ's eyebrows. > I agree that the emergent property ... "being a copying device" has to be a > property of the macro entity. But in this case, the CAUSE of the emergent > property is also an emergent property, i.e., "being composed of parts > arranged in a double helix". > > Is saying that a wooden construction is strong because its members are > formed in triangles is like saying that a ball rolls because it is round? > > You wouldnt be the first Russ to say that I am getting my knickers > unnecessarily twisted over this, but it does seem .... queer .... to me in > someway. > Um, well, maybe you are getting your knickers in a twist. I don't really get your point, queer or no :(. > NIck > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University ([hidden email]) > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > [Original Message] > > From: russell standish <[hidden email]> > > To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity > Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > > Date: 9/26/2009 8:35:52 PM > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle > > > > On Fri, Sep 25, 2009 at 07:50:53PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > > All, > > > > > > As you all may remember, I had decided on the basis of my first two > > > readings of Wimsatt, that his was the final word on the definition of > > > emergence: a property of a macro-entity is emergent when it depends on > the > > > arrangement of the micro entities [in time and/or in space]. > > > Unfortunately, I read it a third time. > > > > > > I woke up in the middle of the night realizing what was wrong with his > > > position. > > > > > > (1) Ineliminably, emergence has to do with the relation between macro > and > > > micro entities. (I suppose somebody might challange that statement, > but I > > > dont think anybody has so far.) > > > > > > (2) Emergent properties of a macro entity are those that are dependant > on > > > the arrangement of the micro entities. > > > > > > (3) But "An arrangement of X's" cannot be a property of any microentity > > > (duh!). > > > > > > (4) There fore, whatever (2) IS a definition of, it cannot be a > definition > > > of emergence OR emergence does not have to do with relations among > levels. > > > > > > > > > Back to the old drawing board. > > > > > > n > > > > > > > I got lost at step 4 here. The obvious syllogism of (1), (2) & (3) is > > that an emergent property is not a property of a micro entity. But > > this doesn't surprise me, as its actually my definition of emergence. > > > > -- > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > Mathematics > > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] > > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle
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It's been my position for a while that one of the misleading issues with emergence is that (as Russ S) says the emergent properties are simply not expressible in the language one uses to describe the micro elements. To take Fodor's original example again, there is no way to talk about Gresham's law (bad money drives out good) in the language of quantum mechanics -- because quantum mechanics doesn't have the concept of money, good or bad.
If you want to call that incommensurability or lexical mismatch, I guess that's ok -- although I would recommend that one explain the problem rather than just labeling it. (It never was clear to me whether this was what Glen was getting at. We had a long private exchange and still didn't clear it up.) As you have heard me say before, the problem arises because a new level of abstraction creates and makes use of concepts that don't exist at the implementing level. That too is a fairly standard idea in computer science, although the concept of level of abstraction may not be as familiar to those outside our field. (This is Gutag's original 1997 article. This is the most relevant Wikipedia article. This is the NIST page. This is how Encyclopedia.com describes it. This is Dictionary.com's definition.) So basically, the problem is less linguistic than ontological. There are new data types (e.g., money). That is an ontological issue. Money as an ontological category does not exist at the level of quantum mechanics. Of course one wants to talk about those new data types and their properties. The language one uses (to talk about,e.g., money) is necessarily different from the language one uses in describing the elements used to implement those new data type (e.g., the language of quantum mechanics). Perhaps more importantly, the new data types are defined independently of their implementation. That was the original point of Guttag's article, namely that the properties of stacks, lists, etc. can be specified without having to talk about any particular implementation -- and in fact that there can be multiple implementations, all of which will produce stacks, etc. that satisfy the direct, high level (if Glen won't object to my using the term "level") description. -- Russ A On Sun, Sep 27, 2009 at 1:44 AM, russell standish <[hidden email]> wrote:
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Nick Thompson wrote
> I agree that the emergent property ... "being a copying device" has to be a > property of the macro entity. But in this case, the CAUSE of the emergent > property is also an emergent property, i.e., "being composed of parts > arranged in a double helix". > > Is saying that a wooden construction is strong because its members are > formed in triangles like saying that a ball rolls because it is round? > > You wouldn't be the first Russ to say that I am getting my knickers > unnecessarily twisted over this, but it does seem .... queer .... to me in > someway. > Um, well, maybe you are getting your knickers in a twist. I don't really get your point, queer or no :(. To which Nick Thompson Replies: NST-->I apologize for using irrelevantly evocative language. I meant "queer" literally: "odd, unsettling", and by "knickers in a twist" I just meant that I was "unsettled, confused." Try to read around it. NST-->However, please could you look at the substance of what I wrote again? ASSUMING that one believes that emergence involves a relationship between levels, of some sort, doesn't saying that "a wooden construction is strong because its members are formed in triangles" fail as an example? Since "formed in triangles" is at the same level as "strong". NST-->Or is the concept of level cracking under the weight, here? For instance, notice that BOTH "strong" and "formed in triangles" are arguably "interlevel properties", since to talk about "formed in triangles" you have to talk about the level of components and to talk about "strong" you have to talk about the relationship between the whole and its context. (To demonstrate that something is strong, something outside of it has to stress it.) So "strong because triangles" is actually a relationship between two interlevel relationships. NST-->Your comments focus our attention on Bedau's concept of nominal emergence, which is in this week's reading? Are you reading along with us? Wimsatt? Searle? Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: russell standish <[hidden email]> > To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 9/27/2009 10:44:58 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle > > On Sat, Sep 26, 2009 at 01:24:47AM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > So, Russ S, > > > > when you say, > > > > "> I got lost at step 4 here. The obvious syllogism of (1), (2) & (3) is > > > that an emergent property is not a property of a micro entity. But > > > this doesn't surprise me, as its actually my definition of emergence." > > > > Does that mean that you are comfortable saying that emergence is > > relationship between two different properties of the same object. > > > > Not exactly. It is more a relationship between languages. It is the > presence of a property (the emergent one) expressed in one language > that is impossible to express in the other language. We would normally > say the languages are incommensurate, although Glen used a neat term > for it the other day starting with "lexical" that raised the other > Russ's eyebrows. > > > I agree that the emergent property ... "being a copying device" has to > > property of the macro entity. But in this case, the CAUSE of the emergent > > property is also an emergent property, i.e., "being composed of parts > > arranged in a double helix". > > > > Is saying that a wooden construction is strong because its members are > > formed in triangles is like saying that a ball rolls because it is round? > > > > You wouldnt be the first Russ to say that I am getting my knickers > > unnecessarily twisted over this, but it does seem .... queer .... to me in > > someway. > > > > Um, well, maybe you are getting your knickers in a twist. I don't > really get your point, queer or no :(. > > > NIck > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > > Clark University ([hidden email]) > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > > > > > > [Original Message] > > > From: russell standish <[hidden email]> > > > To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied > > Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > > > Date: 9/26/2009 8:35:52 PM > > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle > > > > > > On Fri, Sep 25, 2009 at 07:50:53PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > > > All, > > > > > > > > As you all may remember, I had decided on the basis of my first two > > > > readings of Wimsatt, that his was the final word on the definition of > > > > emergence: a property of a macro-entity is emergent when it depends on > > the > > > > arrangement of the micro entities [in time and/or in space]. > > > > Unfortunately, I read it a third time. > > > > > > > > I woke up in the middle of the night realizing what was wrong with his > > > > position. > > > > > > > > (1) Ineliminably, emergence has to do with the relation between macro > > and > > > > micro entities. (I suppose somebody might challange that statement, > > but I > > > > dont think anybody has so far.) > > > > > > > > (2) Emergent properties of a macro entity are those that are dependant > > on > > > > the arrangement of the micro entities. > > > > > > > > (3) But "An arrangement of X's" cannot be a property of any microentity > > > > (duh!). > > > > > > > > (4) There fore, whatever (2) IS a definition of, it cannot be a > > definition > > > > of emergence OR emergence does not have to do with relations among > > levels. > > > > > > > > > > > > Back to the old drawing board. > > > > > > > > n > > > > > > > > > > I got lost at step 4 here. The obvious syllogism of (1), (2) & (3) is > > > that an emergent property is not a property of a micro entity. But > > > this doesn't surprise me, as its actually my definition of emergence. > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > > > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > > Mathematics > > > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] > > > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > -- > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle
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Why is it important to assume "that emergence involves a relationship
between levels, of some sort"?
Wordnet defines "emergence" as "the gradual beginning or coming forth." That doesn't necessarily imply a relatioship between levels. Admittedly I haven't read the Wimsett article. Does he defined emergence as a relationship between levels? All that notwithstanding, here is an attempt to characterize emergence as a relationship between levels. Mathematically a relation is a set of pairs. So if emergence is a relation(ship) it would be the set of pairs (of levels) that reflect emergence. For example, one element in that set of pairs might be (the level of) sticks paired with (the level of) triangles constructed out of sticks. (This second level is defined deliberately narrowly. Is that a problem?) Then it seems to make sense that that pair (level of sticks, level of stick triangles) is one element of the emergence relation. With that in mind, here's a possible definition of emergence as a relation. Emergence (as a relation) is defined to be: {(A, B) | A and B are levels, where a level is (at least) a set of elements & the elements in B have properties that the elements in A don't & the elements in B are composed of elements of A} Is that a fair partial formalization of emergence as a relation(ship) between levels? I'm not absolutely committed to it. I submit it as a draft definition. Does it work? It seems to work for sticks and stick triangles. -- Russ A On Sun, Sep 27, 2009 at 10:40 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote: Nick Thompson wrote ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Russ,
this lead's us into the kind of territory that Owen Densmore would like to take us to.... formalism, mathematical formalism. I hope he responds.
It will require some careful study on my part, so I wont try a response now.
But, in the spirit of duelling definitions, let me just site the philosphical dictionary's definition of emergence.
An irreducible feature (now commonly called supervenient) of a complex whole that cannot be inferred directly from the features of its simpler parts. Thus, for example, the familiar taste of salt is an emergent property with respect to the sodium and chlorine of which it is composed. http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/e.htm#emrg with a nod to Garth Kemerling Note the explicit reference to the part/whole relation. In general, the emergentist tradition has a committment to ontological levels. In fact, it is meant to be an explanation of the existence of such levels. that, of course, doesnt cover the emergence of a bean plant from its seed. I guess. Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar, III: Wimsatt and Searle
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I'm not sure I get your point. First of all, it's not a very deeply thought out definition. As given, the example depends on subjective experience! (Tastes salty) But even so, everything in the definition typically applies to levels of abstraction as well as to the relational formalism I suggested. I explicitly required that the B elements be composed of A elements. So there's part-whole right there.
Your comment that " the emergentist tradition has a commitment to ontological levels." is more to the point. But it has little to do with the definition you cite as far as I can see. You had asked about a relation between levels. So I defined one. Implicit in the definition is the notion that each level exists, i.e., is ontologically real. So I don't understand what you see as missing. In one of the messages to your smaller group I noted that the term emergence itself adds to the confusion. It seems to imply that the emergent phenomenon just happens, i.e., that there is no explanation for how it came to be, how it came to emerge. If you want to include such a "no explanation" property explicitly in the notion of emergence, then emergence does indeed become more mysterious -- by definition. But in fact there are well understood mechanisms that lead to the creation of emergent phenomena. Salt didn't just happen to come into existence. Salt exists for reasons explained by physics and chemistry. (Furthermore salt "tastes" salty is better understood to mean that a salt molecule fits the salt receptors in tongue. Then there is no subjective experience aspect to it.) So I would watch out for smuggling in (and wanting to retain) a mystery about how emergent phenomena come to be. I don't think you are going this far, but it almost sounds like you are saying (or at least hoping) that if it can be explained how an emergent phenomenon came about then it should no longer be considered emergent. Do you want emergence to include in its meaning that the emergent phenomenon just appeared (just emerged) with no way to explain it? -- Russ A On Sun, Sep 27, 2009 at 2:01 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:
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