Emergence Seminar--British Emergence
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Emergence Seminar--British Emergence
 
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All,
I would like to appeal for some help from The List with the chapter we are reading this week in the Emergence Seminar. One of the central assertions of the author is that quantum mechanics put the British Emergentists out of business by making "configurational" forces seem unlikely. He goes on to say that "the discovery of the molecular structure of DNA ... make[s] the main doctrines of Britsh emergentism, so far as ...the biological [is] concerned, seem enormously implausible." (McLaughlin, 2009, p. 23).
Now here is my problem: everything that I understand about contemporary Evo/devo seems to make the structure of biological molecules (DNA, RNA, and proteins) central to our understanding of biological development. Thus, to me, these discoveries make emergentism (if not the British kind) seem dramatically MORE plausible. If all the consequences of the folding and unfolding of proteins, etc., do not constitute effects of "configurational forces" then what the dickens are they?
Can anybody help me with this paradox????
I have forwarded this comment to the Author and, if he doesn't object, will forward any remarks he may have back to you.
Nick
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar--British Emergence
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That's the problem I have with taking historical ideas seriously. Why should we care whether whatever the British Emergentists thought makes sense now? What we should care about is what does make sense now? Of course, as I mentioned to you (Nick) privately, my wife, who works in Early Modern English, thinks it's very important what people used to think.
It seems to me that if you are a historian of ideas, it may be important what people used to think, and if you want to understand how we got from there to here it may be important what people used to think, but if what you are interested in is how to understand emergence, then that should be the question. If the British Emergentists have something to say about emergence that would be worth listening to today, then it should be discussed. If the presentation of what the British Emergentists thought is not clear enough to determine whether it has something to offer today, then that's certainly a problem -- and one the author should clear up. But just because the British Emergentists used to think something, I don't see that as justification for spending much time talking about it. -- Russ On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 4:22 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar--British Emergence
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Russ,
To me, the mark of an educated person is the ability to hold different views of the same subject in mind at the same time. I think our discussions on this list have tended to lack depth, in the sense that everybody has their opinion but has grave difficulty representing with any fidelity the opinion with which they disagree.
Thus, our discussions take on the character of so many fog horns on a night-shrouded bay. Anybody who has read through and discussed the sources in this book has increased their ability to articulate their opinion, that is, to compare and contrast it with other opinions. But hey, I am an academic and a humanist: what would you expect me to believe Don't let that woman out of your sight!!
Nick
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar--British Emergence
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
As I read it, the issue isn't whether structures and/or configurations
are/aren't important, the question is whether they operate according to emergent or resultant rule sets. The Emergentists were betting heavily on the emergent rule set. They believed that the variety of chemistry couldn't possibly be the result of protons and electrons operating according to physics as they knew it. They were right, it wasn't physics as they knew it, but the answer turned out to be the result of configurational physics rather than emergent principles of chemistry. They also bet that the variety of biology couldn't be the result of chemical molecules operating according to the chemistry they knew. And they were right again, it wasn't chemistry as they knew it, but the answer turned out to be the result of configurational chemistry rather than emergent priniciples of biology. Chemistry and biology turn out to be ever more complicated configurations of protons and electrons, with some neutron ballast, operating according to the principles of quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics. It's all physics, same particles, same forces, same laws, no emergent forces. There are configuration forces, but they're not emergent forces, they're subtle results of electrons packing themselves into quantized energy levels in increasingly complicated configurations of nuclei. The structure of DNA and the elaboration of molecular biology was the last straw because it provided a purely physical mechanism for inheritance. But you're right to see it as a bit of a conundrum. The Emergentists, as McLaughlin summarizes them, were substantially correct: configurations of atoms in molecules are the key to understanding chemistry, there are all sorts of chemically distinctive things that happen because of those configurations, none of those chemically distinctive things are obvious when you play around with protons and electrons in the physics lab. But it all turned out to be part of the resultant of quantum mechanics, not emergent in the sense the Emergentists had painted themselves into, so they were wrong in the one sense they really cared about. -- rec -- On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 5:22 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote: > All, > > I would like to appeal for some help from The List with the chapter we are > reading this week in the Emergence Seminar. One of the central assertions > of the author is that quantum mechanics put the British Emergentists out of > business by making "configurational" forces seem unlikely. He goes on to > say that "the discovery of the molecular structure of DNA ... make[s] the > main doctrines of Britsh emergentism, so far as ...the biological [is] > concerned, seem enormously implausible." (McLaughlin, 2009, p. 23). > > Now here is my problem: everything that I understand about contemporary > Evo/devo seems to make the structure of biological molecules (DNA, RNA, and > proteins) central to our understanding of biological development. Thus, to > me, these discoveries make emergentism (if not the British kind) seem > dramatically MORE plausible. If all the consequences of the folding and > unfolding of proteins, etc., do not constitute effects of "configurational > forces" then what the dickens are they? > > Can anybody help me with this paradox???? > > I have forwarded this comment to the Author and, if he doesn't object, will > forward any remarks he may have back to you. > > Nick > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University ([hidden email]) > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar--British Emergence
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>From the text below, it is apparent that British emergence is not the
same beast as what we call emergence today. Those very "configurational forces" you mention are precisely what I mean by emergent phenomena, which is entirely consistent with how the term is used in the complex systems literature that I have been reading my whole professional life. It would seem that "British emergence" is something akin to the widely rejected notion of vitalism, and as Russ Abbott states - why, as complexity researchers, would we be interested in that? Cheers On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 08:48:55PM -0600, Roger Critchlow wrote: > As I read it, the issue isn't whether structures and/or configurations > are/aren't important, the question is whether they operate according > to emergent or resultant rule sets. > > The Emergentists were betting heavily on the emergent rule set. They > believed that the variety of chemistry couldn't possibly be the result > of protons and electrons operating according to physics as they knew > it. They were right, it wasn't physics as they knew it, but the > answer turned out to be the result of configurational physics rather > than emergent principles of chemistry. They also bet that the variety > of biology couldn't be the result of chemical molecules operating > according to the chemistry they knew. And they were right again, it > wasn't chemistry as they knew it, but the answer turned out to be the > result of configurational chemistry rather than emergent priniciples > of biology. > > Chemistry and biology turn out to be ever more complicated > configurations of protons and electrons, with some neutron ballast, > operating according to the principles of quantum mechanics and > statistical mechanics. It's all physics, same particles, same forces, > same laws, no emergent forces. There are configuration forces, but > they're not emergent forces, they're subtle results of electrons > packing themselves into quantized energy levels in increasingly > complicated configurations of nuclei. > > The structure of DNA and the elaboration of molecular biology was the > last straw because it provided a purely physical mechanism for > inheritance. > > But you're right to see it as a bit of a conundrum. The Emergentists, > as McLaughlin summarizes them, were substantially correct: > configurations of atoms in molecules are the key to understanding > chemistry, there are all sorts of chemically distinctive things that > happen because of those configurations, none of those chemically > distinctive things are obvious when you play around with protons and > electrons in the physics lab. But it all turned out to be part of the > resultant of quantum mechanics, not emergent in the sense the > Emergentists had painted themselves into, so they were wrong in the > one sense they really cared about. > > -- rec -- > > On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 5:22 PM, Nicholas Thompson > <[hidden email]> wrote: > > All, > > > > I would like to appeal for some help from The List with the chapter we are > > reading this week in the Emergence Seminar. One of the central assertions > > of the author is that quantum mechanics put the British Emergentists out of > > business by making "configurational" forces seem unlikely. He goes on to > > say that "the discovery of the molecular structure of DNA ... make[s] the > > main doctrines of Britsh emergentism, so far as ...the biological [is] > > concerned, seem enormously implausible." (McLaughlin, 2009, p. 23). > > > > Now here is my problem: everything that I understand about contemporary > > Evo/devo seems to make the structure of biological molecules (DNA, RNA, and > > proteins) central to our understanding of biological development. Thus, to > > me, these discoveries make emergentism (if not the British kind) seem > > dramatically MORE plausible. If all the consequences of the folding and > > unfolding of proteins, etc., do not constitute effects of "configurational > > forces" then what the dickens are they? > > > > Can anybody help me with this paradox???? > > > > I have forwarded this comment to the Author and, if he doesn't object, will > > forward any remarks he may have back to you. > > > > Nick > > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > > Clark University ([hidden email]) > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > > > > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar--British Emergence
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Administrator
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[This is an email I sent to the reading group. It's title was:
Emergence, Chaos Envy, and Formalization of Complexity I think that, rather than worrying about the existing concepts of emergence, we would be far better off looking at the history of Chaos and how they achieved amazing results in a short time, and how we could similarly attempt formalization of complexity. One idea is to simply look at the "edge of chaos" idea in more detail, thus placing complexity as a field within chaos.] Nick has started a seminar on Emergence based on the book of that name by Bedau and Humphreys. This got me to thinking about the core problem of Complexity: its lack of a core definition, along with lack of any success in formalizing it. Chaos found itself in a similar position: the Lorenz equations for very simple weather modeling had quirks which were difficult to grasp. Years passed with many arguing that Lorenz was a dummy: he didn't understand error calculations, nor did he understand the limitations of computation. Many folks sided with Lorenz, siting similar phenomena such as turbulent flow, the logistics map, and the three body problem. All had one thing in common: divergence. I.e. two points near each other would find themselves at a near random distance from each other after short periods of time. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory Complexity similarly arose from observations such as sand-pile formation, flocking, ant foraging, and so on. Their commonality, however, was not divergence but convergence, not chaos but order. Typically this is coined "emergence". I would like to propose an attempt to do what Poincare, Feigenbaum, Layapunov and others have done for Chaos, but for Complexity. Nick has hit the nail on the head, I think, in choosing Emergence as the core similarity across the spectrum of phenomena we call "complex". The success of Chaos was to find a few, very constrained areas of divergence and formalize them into a mathematical framework. Initial success brought the Rosetta stone: the Lyapunov exponent: a scalar metric for identifying chaotic systems. It seems to me that a goal of understanding emergence is to formalize it, hoping for the same result Chaos had. I'd be fine limiting our scope to ABM, simply because it has a hope of being bounded .. thus simple enough for success. You see why I included Chaos Envy? -- Owen ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar--British Emergence
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Dear Russ II,
One of the things I hope to find out by discussing actual texts is whether it IS the same as vitalism. I don't think so. Another reason to spend a week on the british emergentists is because of their partial ressemblence to Authors like Juarerro and Rosen whom some of us do take seriously. It's hard to believe in top-down causality without endorsing many of the positions taken by these folks. And, remember, we are only spending a week on the B.E's; next week it's on to John Searle! Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: russell standish <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 9/15/2009 5:39:14 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Emergence Seminar--British Emergence > > >From the text below, it is apparent that British emergence is not the > same beast as what we call emergence today. Those very > "configurational forces" you mention are precisely what I mean by > emergent phenomena, which is entirely consistent with how the term is > used in the complex systems literature that I have been reading my whole > professional life. > > It would seem that "British emergence" is something akin to the widely > rejected notion of vitalism, and as Russ Abbott states - why, as > complexity researchers, would we be interested in that? > > Cheers > > On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 08:48:55PM -0600, Roger Critchlow wrote: > > As I read it, the issue isn't whether structures and/or configurations > > are/aren't important, the question is whether they operate according > > to emergent or resultant rule sets. > > > > The Emergentists were betting heavily on the emergent rule set. They > > believed that the variety of chemistry couldn't possibly be the result > > of protons and electrons operating according to physics as they knew > > it. They were right, it wasn't physics as they knew it, but the > > answer turned out to be the result of configurational physics rather > > than emergent principles of chemistry. They also bet that the variety > > of biology couldn't be the result of chemical molecules operating > > according to the chemistry they knew. And they were right again, it > > wasn't chemistry as they knew it, but the answer turned out to be the > > result of configurational chemistry rather than emergent priniciples > > of biology. > > > > Chemistry and biology turn out to be ever more complicated > > configurations of protons and electrons, with some neutron ballast, > > operating according to the principles of quantum mechanics and > > statistical mechanics. It's all physics, same particles, same forces, > > same laws, no emergent forces. There are configuration forces, but > > they're not emergent forces, they're subtle results of electrons > > packing themselves into quantized energy levels in increasingly > > complicated configurations of nuclei. > > > > The structure of DNA and the elaboration of molecular biology was the > > last straw because it provided a purely physical mechanism for > > inheritance. > > > > But you're right to see it as a bit of a conundrum. The Emergentists, > > as McLaughlin summarizes them, were substantially correct: > > configurations of atoms in molecules are the key to understanding > > chemistry, there are all sorts of chemically distinctive things that > > happen because of those configurations, none of those chemically > > distinctive things are obvious when you play around with protons and > > electrons in the physics lab. But it all turned out to be part of the > > resultant of quantum mechanics, not emergent in the sense the > > Emergentists had painted themselves into, so they were wrong in the > > one sense they really cared about. > > > > -- rec -- > > > > On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 5:22 PM, Nicholas Thompson > > <[hidden email]> wrote: > > > All, > > > > > > I would like to appeal for some help from The List with the chapter > > > reading this week in the Emergence Seminar. One of the central > > > of the author is that quantum mechanics put the British Emergentists out of > > > business by making "configurational" forces seem unlikely. He goes on to > > > say that "the discovery of the molecular structure of DNA ... make[s] the > > > main doctrines of Britsh emergentism, so far as ...the biological [is] > > > concerned, seem enormously implausible." (McLaughlin, 2009, p. 23). > > > > > > Now here is my problem: everything that I understand about contemporary > > > Evo/devo seems to make the structure of biological molecules (DNA, RNA, and > > > proteins) central to our understanding of biological development. Thus, to > > > me, these discoveries make emergentism (if not the British kind) seem > > > dramatically MORE plausible. If all the consequences of the folding and > > > unfolding of proteins, etc., do not constitute effects of "configurational > > > forces" then what the dickens are they? > > > > > > Can anybody help me with this paradox???? > > > > > > I have forwarded this comment to the Author and, if he doesn't object, will > > > forward any remarks he may have back to you. > > > > > > Nick > > > > > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > > > Clark University ([hidden email]) > > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ============================================================ > > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > > > > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > -- > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar--British Emergence
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In reply to this post by Owen Densmore
Owen,
Here's how I would start. I'm not scientist enough to know what 'configuration physics' or 'configuration chemistry' means. My guess is that it means something like a structured collection of matter where the structure itself is important. One of my friends likes to talk about that sort of thing as global constraints. I think that's a fine way of expressing it, when one understands global as referring to the entity being structured and not the world at large. I would nominate that concept--i.e., the ability to create a structured entity from unstructured components--as the commonality among "emergent" phenomena. (That's why I like the notion of level of abstraction as representative of emergence.) That raises a few questions.
-- Russ On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 8:43 PM, Owen Densmore <[hidden email]> wrote: [This is an email I sent to the reading group. It's title was: ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar--British Emergence
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Russ,
I agree with
I would nominate that concept--i.e., the ability to create a structured entity from unstructured components--as the commonality among "emergent" phenomena. (That's why I like the notion of level of abstraction as representative of emergence.) This is also, as we will see, the position of William Wimsatt, I think.
Nick
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar--British Emergence
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Oh, dear, it seems I've been relegated to the Russ II position now
:). Serves me right, I guess. I still think meaning is essential. The reason why something is structured rather than unstructured is that the structure means something to somebody. And for measuring this, I don't think we can go past informational complexity, which is really the difference in entropy of a system and its maximal possible entropy (the entropy of just the parts of the system arranged completely at random). While its a bugger to use, being horribly NP-complete in general to calculate, it can be done for some systems, and with ingenuity extended to others. Cheers On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 10:30:52PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > Russ, > > I agree with > > I would nominate that concept--i.e., the ability to create a structured entity from unstructured components--as the commonality among "emergent" phenomena. (That's why I like the notion of level of abstraction as representative of emergence.) > > This is also, as we will see, the position of William Wimsatt, I think. > > Nick > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University ([hidden email]) > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Russ Abbott > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > Sent: 9/14/2009 10:19:10 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Emergence Seminar--British Emergence > > > Owen, > > Here's how I would start. > > I'm not scientist enough to know what 'configuration physics' or 'configuration chemistry' means. My guess is that it means something like a structured collection of matter where the structure itself is important. One of my friends likes to talk about that sort of thing as global constraints. I think that's a fine way of expressing it, when one understands global as referring to the entity being structured and not the world at large. > > I would nominate that concept--i.e., the ability to create a structured entity from unstructured components--as the commonality among "emergent" phenomena. (That's why I like the notion of level of abstraction as representative of emergence.) > > That raises a few questions. > > What are the possible "binding forces" that can be used to create structure? (My answer is that there are two categories of binding forces: static and dynamic. The static ones are the forces of physics. They produce emergent phenomena like chemistry as Roger said. The dynamic ones are much more open and depend on the entities being organized. They produce emergent phenomena like biological and social entities.) > How do those binding forces work? (My answer is that the static ones work according to the laws of physics. For the dynamic ones it is much more difficult to find a useful generalization since again it depends on the entities being structured.) > Where does the energy come from that powers those forces. (My answer is that for static forces, the energy is standard physics. Static entities exist at equilibrium in energy wells. For dynamic entities the energy is continually imported from outside. That's why they are "far from equilibrium." They must import energy to keep themselves together.) > Finally, what holds levels of abstraction together within software? (My answer is that software is subsidized. It runs without having to worry about the energy it uses. Consequently software confuses us because it hides the energy issue. One can build anything one can think of in software using the mechanisms for construction built into (and on top of) the programming language one is using.) > > > -- Russ > > > > On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 8:43 PM, Owen Densmore <[hidden email]> wrote: > > [This is an email I sent to the reading group. It's title was: > Emergence, Chaos Envy, and Formalization of Complexity > I think that, rather than worrying about the existing concepts of emergence, we would be far better off looking at the history of Chaos and how they achieved amazing results in a short time, and how we could similarly attempt formalization of complexity. One idea is to simply look at the "edge of chaos" idea in more detail, thus placing complexity as a field within chaos.] > > Nick has started a seminar on Emergence based on the book of that name by Bedau and Humphreys. This got me to thinking about the core problem of Complexity: its lack of a core definition, along with lack of any success in formalizing it. > > Chaos found itself in a similar position: the Lorenz equations for very simple weather modeling had quirks which were difficult to grasp. Years passed with many arguing that Lorenz was a dummy: he didn't understand error calculations, nor did he understand the limitations of computation. > > Many folks sided with Lorenz, siting similar phenomena such as turbulent flow, the logistics map, and the three body problem. All had one thing in common: divergence. I.e. two points near each other would find themselves at a near random distance from each other after short periods of time. > See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory > > Complexity similarly arose from observations such as sand-pile formation, flocking, ant foraging, and so on. Their commonality, however, was not divergence but convergence, not chaos but order. Typically this is coined "emergence". > > I would like to propose an attempt to do what Poincare, Feigenbaum, Layapunov and others have done for Chaos, but for Complexity. > > Nick has hit the nail on the head, I think, in choosing Emergence as the core similarity across the spectrum of phenomena we call "complex". > > The success of Chaos was to find a few, very constrained areas of divergence and formalize them into a mathematical framework. Initial success brought the Rosetta stone: the Lyapunov exponent: a scalar metric for identifying chaotic systems. > > It seems to me that a goal of understanding emergence is to formalize it, hoping for the same result Chaos had. I'd be fine limiting our scope to ABM, simply because it has a hope of being bounded .. thus simple enough for success. > > You see why I included Chaos Envy? > > -- Owen > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar--British Emergence
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Dear Russ S,
I'm not sure I follow the meaning point. Biological organisms are structured in important (emergent) ways, but how do you attach meaning to that? -- Russ A On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 9:55 PM, russell standish <[hidden email]> wrote: Oh, dear, it seems I've been relegated to the Russ II position now ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
concrete study (was Re: Emergence Seminar--British Emergence)
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In reply to this post by Russell Standish
Russell's on to something, here. What RussA refers to as "structure" is predicate or operator dependent. (I don't go as far as Russell and boil it all down to meaning. Meaning is just one kind of operator.) There is no such thing as an "unstructured component". Hence, there is no such thing as a "structured entity from unstructured components". But there are operators that apply to the components and that do not apply to the collection of components and vice versa. So, the structure of the collection can (usually will) be different from the structure of the components. As for Owen's pragmatic approach, I'd constrain the areas of convergence studied even more (way tighter than ABM). I'd recommend picking 3 concrete examples and work particularly with them. Systems with components such that: 1) the operators apply equally well with the system as with the components (like the systems RussA was trying to find a word for recently), 2) the operators don't, in general, apply to both systems and their components, but that can be tweaked so that they do apply, and 3) the set of operators on the systems and the set of operators on the components are disjoint. (1) represents trivial (or no) emergence. (2) represents weak emergence. and (3) represents strong emergence. Of course, perhaps we can't formalize any systems+components so that we realize (3). But failing to find that 3rd concrete example would be a learning experience. Thus spake russell standish circa 09/14/2009 09:55 PM: > I still think meaning is essential. The reason why something is > structured rather than unstructured is that the structure means > something to somebody. > > [...] > > On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 10:30:52PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: >> I agree with >> >> Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 09/14/2009 09:18 PM: >>> I would nominate that concept--i.e., the ability to create a >>> structured entity from unstructured components--as the >>> commonality among "emergent" phenomena. (That's why I like the >>> notion of level of abstraction as representative of emergence.) >> >> This is also, as we will see, the position of William Wimsatt, I >> think. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar--British Emergence
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In reply to this post by Russ Abbott
Meaning is definitely there. From the meaning that humans give the the
biological world: ever noticed how there are many words for some species (eg dogs or horses), but hardly any covering other major groups of species (eg ants or beetles). Where there are explicit distinctions made, there tends to be meaning, whether beneficial or pest. Of course there is biological meaning to most species, albeit not so sophisticated. Most species will classify others into friend, foe or neutral, for instance. One of the biggest meanings is self-meaning. I am because I can be. This leads to heritable qualities, which is the raw stuff of evolution. Without meaning, there is no evolution - just random drift, or noise. Without meaning, there is no complexity or emergence either. Sorry I don't have to time to say more, and I'm sure there are others who can put it more eloquently. It is one of the strands of my book "Theory of Nothing", but not a major focus of it. Cheers On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 10:02:04PM -0700, Russ Abbott wrote: > Dear Russ S, > > I'm not sure I follow the meaning point. Biological organisms are structured > in important (emergent) ways, but how do you attach meaning to that? > > -- Russ A > > > > On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 9:55 PM, russell standish <[hidden email]>wrote: > > > Oh, dear, it seems I've been relegated to the Russ II position now > > :). Serves me right, I guess. > > > > I still think meaning is essential. The reason why something is > > structured rather than unstructured is that the structure means > > something to somebody. > > > > And for measuring this, I don't think we can go past informational > > complexity, which is really the difference in entropy of a system > > and its maximal possible entropy (the entropy of just the parts of the > > system arranged completely at random). > > > > While its a bugger to use, being horribly NP-complete in general to > > calculate, it can be done for some systems, and with ingenuity > > extended to others. > > > > Cheers > > > > On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 10:30:52PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > > Russ, > > > > > > I agree with > > > > > > I would nominate that concept--i.e., the ability to create a structured > > entity from unstructured components--as the commonality among "emergent" > > phenomena. (That's why I like the notion of level of abstraction as > > representative of emergence.) > > > > > > This is also, as we will see, the position of William Wimsatt, I think. > > > > > > Nick > > > > > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > > > Clark University ([hidden email]) > > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/<http://home.earthlink.net/%7Enickthompson/naturaldesigns/> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > > From: Russ Abbott > > > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > > > Sent: 9/14/2009 10:19:10 PM > > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Emergence Seminar--British Emergence > > > > > > > > > Owen, > > > > > > Here's how I would start. > > > > > > I'm not scientist enough to know what 'configuration physics' or > > 'configuration chemistry' means. My guess is that it means something like a > > structured collection of matter where the structure itself is important. One > > of my friends likes to talk about that sort of thing as global constraints. > > I think that's a fine way of expressing it, when one understands global as > > referring to the entity being structured and not the world at large. > > > > > > I would nominate that concept--i.e., the ability to create a structured > > entity from unstructured components--as the commonality among "emergent" > > phenomena. (That's why I like the notion of level of abstraction as > > representative of emergence.) > > > > > > That raises a few questions. > > > > > > What are the possible "binding forces" that can be used to create > > structure? (My answer is that there are two categories of binding forces: > > static and dynamic. The static ones are the forces of physics. They produce > > emergent phenomena like chemistry as Roger said. The dynamic ones are much > > more open and depend on the entities being organized. They produce emergent > > phenomena like biological and social entities.) > > > How do those binding forces work? (My answer is that the static ones work > > according to the laws of physics. For the dynamic ones it is much more > > difficult to find a useful generalization since again it depends on the > > entities being structured.) > > > Where does the energy come from that powers those forces. (My answer is > > that for static forces, the energy is standard physics. Static entities > > exist at equilibrium in energy wells. For dynamic entities the energy is > > continually imported from outside. That's why they are "far from > > equilibrium." They must import energy to keep themselves together.) > > > Finally, what holds levels of abstraction together within software? (My > > answer is that software is subsidized. It runs without having to worry about > > the energy it uses. Consequently software confuses us because it hides the > > energy issue. One can build anything one can think of in software using the > > mechanisms for construction built into (and on top of) the programming > > language one is using.) > > > > > > > > > -- Russ > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 8:43 PM, Owen Densmore <[hidden email]> > > wrote: > > > > > > [This is an email I sent to the reading group. It's title was: > > > Emergence, Chaos Envy, and Formalization of Complexity > > > I think that, rather than worrying about the existing concepts of > > emergence, we would be far better off looking at the history of Chaos and > > how they achieved amazing results in a short time, and how we could > > similarly attempt formalization of complexity. One idea is to simply look > > at the "edge of chaos" idea in more detail, thus placing complexity as a > > field within chaos.] > > > > > > Nick has started a seminar on Emergence based on the book of that name by > > Bedau and Humphreys. This got me to thinking about the core problem of > > Complexity: its lack of a core definition, along with lack of any success in > > formalizing it. > > > > > > Chaos found itself in a similar position: the Lorenz equations for very > > simple weather modeling had quirks which were difficult to grasp. Years > > passed with many arguing that Lorenz was a dummy: he didn't understand error > > calculations, nor did he understand the limitations of computation. > > > > > > Many folks sided with Lorenz, siting similar phenomena such as turbulent > > flow, the logistics map, and the three body problem. All had one thing in > > common: divergence. I.e. two points near each other would find themselves at > > a near random distance from each other after short periods of time. > > > See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory > > > > > > Complexity similarly arose from observations such as sand-pile formation, > > flocking, ant foraging, and so on. Their commonality, however, was not > > divergence but convergence, not chaos but order. Typically this is coined > > "emergence". > > > > > > I would like to propose an attempt to do what Poincare, Feigenbaum, > > Layapunov and others have done for Chaos, but for Complexity. > > > > > > Nick has hit the nail on the head, I think, in choosing Emergence as the > > core similarity across the spectrum of phenomena we call "complex". > > > > > > The success of Chaos was to find a few, very constrained areas of > > divergence and formalize them into a mathematical framework. Initial > > success brought the Rosetta stone: the Lyapunov exponent: a scalar metric > > for identifying chaotic systems. > > > > > > It seems to me that a goal of understanding emergence is to formalize it, > > hoping for the same result Chaos had. I'd be fine limiting our scope to > > ABM, simply because it has a hope of being bounded .. thus simple enough for > > success. > > > > > > You see why I included Chaos Envy? > > > > > > -- Owen > > > > > > > > > > > > ============================================================ > > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > ============================================================ > > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > > -- > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > Mathematics > > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] > > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Emergence Seminar--British Emergence
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Hey, folks. I am trying to keep this thread for discussions of
MacLaughlin's chapter. You want to talk about realism/idealism, get your own damn thread. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: russell standish <[hidden email]> > To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 9/17/2009 1:37:04 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Emergence Seminar--British Emergence > > Meaning is definitely there. From the meaning that humans give the the > biological world: ever noticed how there are many words for some > species (eg dogs or horses), but hardly any covering other major groups of > species (eg ants or beetles). Where there are explicit distinctions > made, there tends to be meaning, whether beneficial or pest. > > Of course there is biological meaning to most species, albeit not so > sophisticated. Most species will classify others into friend, foe or > neutral, for instance. > > One of the biggest meanings is self-meaning. I am because I can > be. This leads to heritable qualities, which is the raw stuff of > evolution. Without meaning, there is no evolution - just random drift, > or noise. Without meaning, there is no complexity or emergence either. > > Sorry I don't have to time to say more, and I'm sure there are others > who can put it more eloquently. It is one of the strands of my book > "Theory of Nothing", but not a major focus of it. > > Cheers > > On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 10:02:04PM -0700, Russ Abbott wrote: > > Dear Russ S, > > > > I'm not sure I follow the meaning point. Biological organisms are > > in important (emergent) ways, but how do you attach meaning to that? > > > > -- Russ A > > > > > > > > On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 9:55 PM, russell standish <[hidden email]>wrote: > > > > > Oh, dear, it seems I've been relegated to the Russ II position now > > > :). Serves me right, I guess. > > > > > > I still think meaning is essential. The reason why something is > > > structured rather than unstructured is that the structure means > > > something to somebody. > > > > > > And for measuring this, I don't think we can go past informational > > > complexity, which is really the difference in entropy of a system > > > and its maximal possible entropy (the entropy of just the parts of the > > > system arranged completely at random). > > > > > > While its a bugger to use, being horribly NP-complete in general to > > > calculate, it can be done for some systems, and with ingenuity > > > extended to others. > > > > > > Cheers > > > > > > On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 10:30:52PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > > > Russ, > > > > > > > > I agree with > > > > > > > > I would nominate that concept--i.e., the ability to create a > > > entity from unstructured components--as the commonality among "emergent" > > > phenomena. (That's why I like the notion of level of abstraction as > > > representative of emergence.) > > > > > > > > This is also, as we will see, the position of William Wimsatt, I think. > > > > > > > > Nick > > > > > > > > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > > > > Clark University ([hidden email]) > > > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/<http://home.earthlin k.net/%7Enickthompson/naturaldesigns/> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > > > From: Russ Abbott > > > > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > > > > Sent: 9/14/2009 10:19:10 PM > > > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Emergence Seminar--British Emergence > > > > > > > > > > > > Owen, > > > > > > > > Here's how I would start. > > > > > > > > I'm not scientist enough to know what 'configuration physics' or > > > 'configuration chemistry' means. My guess is that it means something > > > structured collection of matter where the structure itself is important. One > > > of my friends likes to talk about that sort of thing as global constraints. > > > I think that's a fine way of expressing it, when one understands global as > > > referring to the entity being structured and not the world at large. > > > > > > > > I would nominate that concept--i.e., the ability to create a structured > > > entity from unstructured components--as the commonality among "emergent" > > > phenomena. (That's why I like the notion of level of abstraction as > > > representative of emergence.) > > > > > > > > That raises a few questions. > > > > > > > > What are the possible "binding forces" that can be used to create > > > structure? (My answer is that there are two categories of binding forces: > > > static and dynamic. The static ones are the forces of physics. They produce > > > emergent phenomena like chemistry as Roger said. The dynamic ones are much > > > more open and depend on the entities being organized. They produce emergent > > > phenomena like biological and social entities.) > > > > How do those binding forces work? (My answer is that the static ones work > > > according to the laws of physics. For the dynamic ones it is much more > > > difficult to find a useful generalization since again it depends on the > > > entities being structured.) > > > > Where does the energy come from that powers those forces. (My answer is > > > that for static forces, the energy is standard physics. Static entities > > > exist at equilibrium in energy wells. For dynamic entities the energy is > > > continually imported from outside. That's why they are "far from > > > equilibrium." They must import energy to keep themselves together.) > > > > Finally, what holds levels of abstraction together within software? (My > > > answer is that software is subsidized. It runs without having to worry about > > > the energy it uses. Consequently software confuses us because it hides the > > > energy issue. One can build anything one can think of in software using the > > > mechanisms for construction built into (and on top of) the programming > > > language one is using.) > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Russ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 8:43 PM, Owen Densmore <[hidden email]> > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > [This is an email I sent to the reading group. It's title was: > > > > Emergence, Chaos Envy, and Formalization of Complexity > > > > I think that, rather than worrying about the existing concepts of > > > emergence, we would be far better off looking at the history of Chaos > > > how they achieved amazing results in a short time, and how we could > > > similarly attempt formalization of complexity. One idea is to simply look > > > at the "edge of chaos" idea in more detail, thus placing complexity as a > > > field within chaos.] > > > > > > > > Nick has started a seminar on Emergence based on the book of that name by > > > Bedau and Humphreys. This got me to thinking about the core problem of > > > Complexity: its lack of a core definition, along with lack of any success in > > > formalizing it. > > > > > > > > Chaos found itself in a similar position: the Lorenz equations for very > > > simple weather modeling had quirks which were difficult to grasp. Years > > > passed with many arguing that Lorenz was a dummy: he didn't understand error > > > calculations, nor did he understand the limitations of computation. > > > > > > > > Many folks sided with Lorenz, siting similar phenomena such as turbulent > > > flow, the logistics map, and the three body problem. All had one thing in > > > common: divergence. I.e. two points near each other would find themselves at > > > a near random distance from each other after short periods of time. > > > > See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory > > > > > > > > Complexity similarly arose from observations such as sand-pile formation, > > > flocking, ant foraging, and so on. Their commonality, however, was not > > > divergence but convergence, not chaos but order. Typically this is coined > > > "emergence". > > > > > > > > I would like to propose an attempt to do what Poincare, Feigenbaum, > > > Layapunov and others have done for Chaos, but for Complexity. > > > > > > > > Nick has hit the nail on the head, I think, in choosing Emergence as the > > > core similarity across the spectrum of phenomena we call "complex". > > > > > > > > The success of Chaos was to find a few, very constrained areas of > > > divergence and formalize them into a mathematical framework. Initial > > > success brought the Rosetta stone: the Lyapunov exponent: a scalar metric > > > for identifying chaotic systems. > > > > > > > > It seems to me that a goal of understanding emergence is to formalize it, > > > hoping for the same result Chaos had. I'd be fine limiting our scope to > > > ABM, simply because it has a hope of being bounded .. thus simple enough for > > > success. > > > > > > > > You see why I included Chaos Envy? > > > > > > > > -- Owen > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ============================================================ > > > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > > ============================================================ > > > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > > > > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > > Mathematics > > > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] > > > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > ============================================================ > > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > > > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > -- > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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