EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?
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EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?
 
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Glen,
My colleagues have already told you what the assignment is, so what follows is little more than spin. In our attempts to understand what is going on in this tangled literature, we have come up with only one way to characterize the different views of emergence that seems to endure more than a week: that is the epistemological vs ontological distinction. Hempel and Oppenheim fall soundly on the epistemological side. For them, a characteristic of on object is emergent relative to a theory and relative to a particular list of part attributes when that characteristic cannot be deduced from the part attributes using that theory. So, to say that a property is emergent is only to say something about the state of our theory with respect to the data we have already gathered. Dennett seems to come down in the middle of our distinction. His argument concerns what beliefs are REALLY. His answer -- that beliefs are really features of the world as seen from a point of view -- implies a position on the nature of emergence. Like Hemple and Oppenheim, Dennett would concede that seeing emergence requires one to take a point of view.... a STANCE, if you will. But taking that stance is like looking through binoculars ... it may limit your field of vision, but it also tells you something that is true of the world. In fact, every stance tells you something that is true of the world. A personal note: those who tried to follow my ravings concerning Holt and the New Realism this summer wont be surprized to hear me say that Dennett is sounding awfully like a New Realist. See you Thursday at 4pm. Sorry for duplicate posting. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 10/5/2009 9:38:53 AM > Subject: [FRIAM] emergence seminar: what's next? > > > What's next on the reading list? > > -- > glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?
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Quoting Nick,
For [Hempel and Oppenheim], a characteristic of on
object is emergent relative to a theory and relative to a particular list
of part attributes when that characteristic cannot be deduced from the part
attributes using that theory. So, to say that a property is emergent is
only to say something about the state of our theory with respect to the
data we have already gathered. That seems to mean that a characteristic is emergent or not depending on the theory and the part attributes considered. So based on this view any characteristic is emergent if one ignores all the part attributes. Is that a correct conclusion? Similarly no characteristic is emergent if one creates a theory that maps part attributes to it -- no matter how arbitrary and ad hoc that mapping may be. Neither of these seem like very attractive positions. They make the notion of emergence subject to all sorts of manipulation. Or is the point simply to define the term "emergence" in terms of this sort of formalism? If that's the point, i.e., to define the term "emergence" formally like this, then what do they do with this definition once created? Does this definition yield any insights, or is it just a definition? -- Russ A On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 1:00 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote: Glen, ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?
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H&O are quite methodical: "emergence: The occurrence of a characteristic W in an object w is emergent relative to a theory T, a part relation Pt, and a class G of attributes if that occurrence cannot be deduced by means of T from a characterization of the Pt-parts of w with respect to all the attributes in G."
I suspect that the proper characteristics of T are the treated in other parts of Hempel's book, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, so it isn't fair to assume that it's entirely arbitrary and ad hoc. However, the purpose of the definition is to exterminate emergence, it is a temporary state of ignorance which will be remedied by an improved theory. That the improved theory might be entirely stated in relations between "emergent" ontologies -- eg molecules, cells, organisms, populations, etc -- is of no concern, they are no longer emergent if they're in the theory. -- rec -- If it's in the theory, it's in the theory! On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 2:55 PM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote: Quoting Nick, ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?
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What do they do about characteristics that don't have descriptions in T? For example, a house has the characteristic of having 3 bedrooms. That characteristic doesn't exist in theories describing 2 x 4's, PVC, drywall, nails, stucco, etc. What would they do with that? If it's emergent, then no "better" theory will eliminate it. If it's not emergent, then how can anything else be emergent but not this?
-- Russ Abbott _____________________________________________ Professor, Computer Science California State University, Los Angeles Cell phone: 310-621-3805 o Check out my blog at http://russabbott.blogspot.com/ On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 2:24 PM, Roger Critchlow <[hidden email]> wrote: H&O are quite methodical: "emergence: The occurrence of a characteristic W in an object w is emergent relative to a theory T, a part relation Pt, and a class G of attributes if that occurrence cannot be deduced by means of T from a characterization of the Pt-parts of w with respect to all the attributes in G." ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Thus spake Nicholas Thompson circa 09-10-05 01:00 PM:
> In our attempts to understand what is going on in this tangled literature, > we have come up with only one way to characterize the different views of > emergence that seems to endure more than a week: that is the > epistemological vs ontological distinction. I think that's an insight that can't be ignored. > Like Hemple and Oppenheim, Dennett would concede > that seeing emergence requires one to take a point of view.... a STANCE, if > you will. But taking that stance is like looking through binoculars ... it > may limit your field of vision, but it also tells you something that is > true of the world. In fact, every stance tells you something that is true > of the world. Thanks! Risking an abuse of the rather strict thread control for this seminar, I'll say that I'm very much in agreement with this position on "emergence". However, I'd stretch it just a tiny bit to include _any_ measure operator, not just a stance (a.k.a. point of view, perspective, subject-sensitive perception, etc.). The "looking through binoculars" is a great example of a measurement operator. But it's a subjective measurement (an objective form of it would be the image projected onto a piece of paper behind the binoculars). There are, I posit, objective measurements. And _any_ inaccurate measurement will introduce just such a stance, albeit objective. Hence, as long as the measurements are used in some sort of positive or negative feedback loop as part of the mechanism of the system being measured, then it realizes ontological complexity. If, however, the measurements (the range of the operator) are NOT part of the system's mechanism, then we merely have epistemological complexity (if even that). And for the sake of this discussion, I'll posit that only complex systems exhibit emergence, which means I basically agree with some of what Bedau says early on. And to take it back to what I've actually read from the book, I can say that Bedeau's constructions are _totally_ unsatisfying because he doesn't explicitly treat the operators at all. For example, he talks about "gliders" as if we all grew a "glider-sensor" out of our forehead ... like an ear or an eyeball or something. True, I know what he _means_; but he glosses over the extreme difficulty of unambiguously defining a measure operator to determine if some set of cells over time is exhibiting a "glider" or not. His text is chock full of such glossed abstractions, which make it totally unusable to me. And, by the way, why do we have to use the term "supervenience"? Why can't we just say the map between property sets A and B is surjective? It's so much clearer than saying "B supervenes upon A".... Sheesh. ;-) -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Owen,
For many, mind, consciousness, "life", etc., are what makes the emergence conversation interesting. I happen to share your opinion, but if we are to know what we are talking about in this domain, we had better have SOME contact with that viewpoint. Which means that, at some point, we are going to have to come to terms with "supervenience" But I am willing to hold off until we have read part II. I think being exposed to the range of meanings attached to terms like emergence and reduction is one of the great benefits to what we are doing. One of our problems in discussions here is that each of us tends to assume that the meaning he attaches to a word is the same meaning that everybody else does. That works find if you are talking to yourself, but if one is going to talk to other people, one has to have enough acquaintance with the variety of uses of terms to anticipate others responses to what one is saying. Our brief discussion of "ontology" was a great case in point. Nick PS: Not clear to me why Wimsatt is not the beginning of a possible formalization. In fact, it is not clear to me that Rosen's Life Itself was not an attempt to create that very formalization. Have you ever looked at Rosen???? Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: Owen Densmore <[hidden email]> > To: Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> > Cc: Jim Gattiker <[hidden email]>; Frank Wimberly <[hidden email]>; Roger E Critchlow Jr <[hidden email]>; Chip Garner <[hidden email]>; maryl <[hidden email]>; nthompson <[hidden email]> > Date: 10/6/2009 4:06:46 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next? > > As much as I like the seminar, I find it frustrating due to the huge > variation in scale under study of the authors. Mind, conscienceness, > etc are just too remote. I appreciate it when brought into concrete > ideas such as patterns, aggregativity, resultant properties, nominal > emergence and so on, especially with specific examples. > > But I am not interested in the philosophic, other than Glen's great > observation that they are in the wilds looking for the Next Big > Thing. Fine, so we've read enough of that to be getting on with things. > > For the seminar, my goal is not simply understanding the broad, > current, philosophic notions of emergence. Rather I am interested in > emergence "in silico". I.e. models, computation, mathematics. For > example, emergence may be related to a "no shortcuts" computational > complexity class like P, NP and others. > > Now why is this? Because in science we typically isolate the minimal > example of the phenomenon under study, and look for concrete > properties that the phenomenon exhibits. > > In chaos, we look at the iterated logistic map, say. From it we are > surprised that divergence, at a particular value of the logistic > constant, becomes of interest. Bifurcation also is of interest in the > less chaotic realm. We "get a grip" on the simple example and see if > we can define the phenomenon within the simple. > > The book does not seem to be doing this. (I may be wrong, point me to > where you see this happening.) Is it impossible? For example, could > we use the Game of Life or other models just as chaos used the > logistic map? Could we then look for emergence within these models? > Then see if we can define a metric analogous to divergence for chaos? > > So concretely, I propose we go after the chapters in the book > satisfying the above. Then possibly explore other papers that may be > more along that line, especially in silico. Note that many of the > papers are rather dated, and much has been done since. > > Seminars have goals. I'd like to nudge ours toward computation. > > -- Owen > > > On Oct 5, 2009, at 2:00 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > > Glen, > > > > My colleagues have already told you what the assignment is, so what > > follows > > is little more than spin. > > > > In our attempts to understand what is going on in this tangled > > literature, > > we have come up with only one way to characterize the different > > views of > > emergence that seems to endure more than a week: that is the > > epistemological vs ontological distinction. Hempel and Oppenheim fall > > soundly on the epistemological side. For them, a characteristic of on > > object is emergent relative to a theory and relative to a particular > > list > > of part attributes when that characteristic cannot be deduced from > > the part > > attributes using that theory. So, to say that a property is > > emergent is > > only to say something about the state of our theory with respect to > > the > > data we have already gathered. > > > > Dennett seems to come down in the middle of our distinction. His > > argument > > concerns what beliefs are REALLY. His answer -- that beliefs are > > really > > features of the world as seen from a point of view -- implies a > > position on > > the nature of emergence. Like Hemple and Oppenheim, Dennett would > > concede > > that seeing emergence requires one to take a point of view.... a > > STANCE, if > > you will. But taking that stance is like looking through > > binoculars ... it > > may limit your field of vision, but it also tells you something that > > is > > true of the world. In fact, every stance tells you something that > > is true > > of the world. > > > > A personal note: those who tried to follow my ravings concerning > > Holt and > > the New Realism this summer wont be surprized to hear me say that > > Dennett > > is sounding awfully like a New Realist. > > > > See you Thursday at 4pm. > > > > Sorry for duplicate posting. > > > > N > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > > Clark University ([hidden email]) > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > >> [Original Message] > >> From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> > >> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > >> > > >> Date: 10/5/2009 9:38:53 AM > >> Subject: [FRIAM] emergence seminar: what's next? > >> > >> > >> What's next on the reading list? > >> > >> -- > >> glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: EMERGENCE SEMINAR V: Dennett et al; WAS: emergence seminar: what's next?
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Thus spake Nicholas Thompson circa 09-10-06 11:39 PM:
> In fact, it is not clear to me that Rosen's Life Itself was > not an attempt to create that very formalization. Have you ever looked at > Rosen???? I know you were talking to Owen (am I hijacking the thread, here?); but I'd like to say that I _do_ think Rosen's work on _complexity_ is a start towards the ability to create complex (computational) formalisms -- where Rosen's claim is that all current (computational) formalisms are _simple_ because of the way we define and implement them. The trouble with Rosen's work and its extensions is that, in order to construct such formalisms, we _must_ include construction loops. And when we include construction loops in computational systems, we get ambiguity (multivalence... multiple, equally correct, answers to the same question). In the most strict situations, the ambiguity is realized as things like "deadlocks" (where multiple blocking processes are waiting for the same resource) and (I speculate) race conditions (where multiple concurrent processes race to see which will get its way in the end). So, while we can build these formalisms, they are unsatisfying to the little engineering homunculus in our heads because they violate a sacred requirement: they don't reduce to a single outcome. No SANE computer scientist would want to build an ambiguous computing device. Right?!?! ;-) Or perhaps I should say no sane computer _engineer_ would want to... By all rights, a computer SCIENTIST would love to create such things and study them. I qualify "formalism" with "computational" because we do have non-algorithm, mathematical, philosophical, and logical formalisms that express complexity in this sense. But they require us to toss out the axiom of regularity (which says that sets can't be members of themselves). This makes any computation we formulate in such a wacko formalism open to running forever (infinite regress, race conditions, deadlocks, etc.) or coming up with multiple different results. Also note that all the standard computer programming languages are "turing complete", which, according to Rosen's work, means any program written in them will be a _simple_... not complex ... system. In any case, sorry for the distraction. It's not at all clear how these formalisms relate to "emergence" UNLESS we define emergence as a measure of complexity. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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