Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
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Tangentially on the topic of Philosophy v. Physics, in my review of
Dempster-Shaffer (to avoid making too stupid of misrepresentations
on my bumper-sticker) I was fascinated to find Raymond Smullyan's
"Types of Reasoners" reduced to formal logic (but also couched in
natural language explanations).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doxastic_logic#Types_of_reasonersFWIW, I contend that *LOGIC* is used (critical to) in the natural sciences but does not *arise from* them... it arises from Philosophy (Epistemology) and is formalized in Mathematics and merely USED by Science. I don't know if someone already quoted Feynman on the topic: "philosophy of science is as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds." I suspect that if birds had the type of consciousness that included self-image/awareness and the abstractions of language, that *some* would at least find ornithology *interesting* and might even find some practical ways to apply what they learn from "the study of birds". But no, for the first part it wouldn't make them better fliers, predators, foragers, scavengers, etc. And most *good* Scientists I know don't know much about or care about the larger roles of Epistemology and Metaphysics, which *sometimes* leads them to believe they have answered the hard questions outside of the bounds of Empirical Science *with* Empirical Science? Like the "spherical cow", they just "assume away" the features that their measurements and models don't/can't address (much less answer). Mumble, - Steve ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
Re: Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
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In a design, I think it is useful to tolerate confusion about some things (e.g. not identifying some types or their domains, or whether certain propositions are
true) even though other parts are clear. It involves ratcheting things down in a breadth-first or depth-first way, depending on the situation. From a fitness perspective, it is not useful to have just true and false. That does not guide selection in a
useful way. And late binding just sweeps the problem under the rug by allowing for a little more measurement of fitness (before a paradox or crash). Evolving designs need that English teacher that can mark-up an essay end-to-end and advise that some parts
need to be thrown away and other parts just need minor tweaks – multi-criteria fitness for sure. Logic by itself does not accomplish that. Some of these species of reasoners are better at synthesis than the `accurate reasoner’. From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]]
On Behalf Of Steven A Smith Tangentially on the topic of Philosophy v. Physics, in my review of Dempster-Shaffer (to avoid making too stupid of misrepresentations on my bumper-sticker) I was fascinated to find Raymond Smullyan's "Types of Reasoners" reduced to formal
logic (but also couched in natural language explanations).
FWIW, I contend that *LOGIC* is used (critical to) in the natural sciences but does not *arise from* them... it arises from Philosophy (Epistemology) and is formalized in Mathematics and merely USED by Science. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Peirce’s Pragmati[ci]sm is actually a generalization of the logic of experimental science to all of philosophy. Quite splendid, actually. By the way, the Feynman quote is really dumb, and it’s annoying that people keep trotting it out as if it was sage. The reason birds can’t make use of ornithology is they can’t read. Think how useful it would be for a cuckoo host to be able to spend a few hours reading a text on egg identification. Is the reason physicists can’t make use of philosophy of science that they can’t think? I doubt anyone who cites this “aphorism” would come to that conclusion. Bad metaphor. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Steven A Smith Tangentially on the topic of Philosophy v. Physics, in my review of Dempster-Shaffer (to avoid making too stupid of misrepresentations on my bumper-sticker) I was fascinated to find Raymond Smullyan's "Types of Reasoners" reduced to formal logic (but also couched in natural language explanations).
FWIW, I contend that *LOGIC* is used (critical to) in the natural sciences but does not *arise from* them... it arises from Philosophy (Epistemology) and is formalized in Mathematics and merely USED by Science. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
Re: Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
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As a well-known philosopher once said, any one who criticizes philosophy is a fellow philosopher. I can cite the reference if anyone cares. Frank Frank Wimberly Phone (505) 670-9918 On Sep 20, 2017 9:27 PM, "Nick Thompson" <[hidden email]> wrote:
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
It's definitely sage. But the sagacity doesn't hinge on the word "science", it hinges on the word _useful_. Science is often thought to be a body of knowledge. But there's a huge swath of people, me included, who think science is not knowledge, but a method/behavior for formulating and testing hypotheses. It's not clear to me that Feynman actually said this. But Feynman is a good candidate because he cared far more about what you _do_ than what you claim to _know_.
Philosophy (of anything) can be useful. But to any working scientist, it is far less useful than, say, glass blowing, programming, or cell sorting. And if you think distinguishing between the usefulness of beakers from the usefulness of ... oh, let's say Popper's 3 worlds, then your expression says more about you than it does about them. On 09/20/2017 08:27 PM, Nick Thompson wrote: > By the way, the Feynman quote is really dumb, and it’s annoying that people keep trotting it out as if it was sage. The reason birds can’t make use of ornithology is they can’t read. Think how useful it would be for a cuckoo host to be able to spend a few hours reading a text on egg identification. Is the reason physicists can’t make use of philosophy of science that they can’t think? I doubt anyone who cites this “aphorism” would come to that conclusion. Bad metaphor. -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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A better Feynman quote that targets this issue is this one, I think from a BBC interview:
"When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't ... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the unverse without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me." He was talking in the context of religion, but I think it applies to every type of "knowledge", including the "thought manipulation" that is philosophy. The point is not that "thought manipulation" can never be useful. But that one can _justifiably_ take the position that philosophy should (moral imperative) be done in the _service_ of something else. You cited Smullyan in the OP, which is relevant. Many of Smullyan's publications are puzzles, games. Some of us simply enjoy puzzles. (I don't.) But every puzzle is a math problem. It's up to the puzzle solver to settle on why they're solving puzzles. Are they doing it because it FEELS good? Or are they doing it because either the solutions or the exercises facilitate some other objective? Some puzzle solvers (e.g. video gamers) find themselves in a defensive position, trying to justify their fetish against the world around them. The silly rancor many "practical" people aim at philosophers can make some of them defensive. And it's a real shame that we shame philosophers for doing it just because they enjoy it. But it moves from merely shameful to outright dangerous when a philosopher can't distinguish their own _why_. Someone who does it because it's fun shouldn't waste any time yapping about how useful it is. And someone who does it because it's useful shouldn't waste any time yapping about how fun it is. Get over it. Be confident. Engage your fetish and ignore the nay-sayers. On 09/21/2017 09:53 AM, Steven A Smith wrote: > Glen - > > I share your use of the term "Science" as in being an activity (roughly) defined by "the Scientific Method" just as I use the term "Art" as the process rather than the product (aka "Artifact"). > > When I do anything vaguely (or presumptively) artistic, I think of my role as that of an "Artifex" more than an "Artist" because I feel more emphasis on the conception/making than on being tuned into or tied into a larger, higher group/power which is how I read "Art and Artist". I have a similar ambivalence about "Scientist/Science". Despite degrees in Math and Physics, my practice has rarely involved actual Science (or more math than just really fancy arithmetic), though I have worked with "real Scientists" and close to "Scientific Progress" for most of my life. I don't even think of my work as having been that of an Engineer, but truly much closer to simply that of a "Technologist". And as everyone who has read my missives here can attest, my throwdown as a "Philosopher" is equally detuned... but suspect myself to oscillate wildly between the poles of "Philosopher" and "Philistine". All that rattled off, I truly value having enough understanding of all of these > ideals to recognize the differences qualitatively, and to have mildly informed opinions about the better and worser examples of each quantitatively. -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Glen -
in stark juxtaposition, we have Freeman Dyson saying: "it is better to be wrong than vague" I think I know what he meant and generally support not getting frozen in inaction or muddying/qualifying a statement to the point of losing meaning. On the other hand, I find this quote (or at least idea) as an excuse for rash over thoughtful action. - Steve On 9/21/17 11:58 AM, gⅼеɳ ☣ wrote: > A better Feynman quote that targets this issue is this one, I think from a BBC interview: > > "When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't ... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the unverse without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me." > > He was talking in the context of religion, but I think it applies to every type of "knowledge", including the "thought manipulation" that is philosophy. The point is not that "thought manipulation" can never be useful. But that one can _justifiably_ take the position that philosophy should (moral imperative) be done in the _service_ of something else. > > You cited Smullyan in the OP, which is relevant. Many of Smullyan's publications are puzzles, games. Some of us simply enjoy puzzles. (I don't.) But every puzzle is a math problem. It's up to the puzzle solver to settle on why they're solving puzzles. Are they doing it because it FEELS good? Or are they doing it because either the solutions or the exercises facilitate some other objective? Some puzzle solvers (e.g. video gamers) find themselves in a defensive position, trying to justify their fetish against the world around them. The silly rancor many "practical" people aim at philosophers can make some of them defensive. And it's a real shame that we shame philosophers for doing it just because they enjoy it. > > But it moves from merely shameful to outright dangerous when a philosopher can't distinguish their own _why_. Someone who does it because it's fun shouldn't waste any time yapping about how useful it is. And someone who does it because it's useful shouldn't waste any time yapping about how fun it is. Get over it. Be confident. Engage your fetish and ignore the nay-sayers. > > On 09/21/2017 09:53 AM, Steven A Smith wrote: >> Glen - >> >> I share your use of the term "Science" as in being an activity (roughly) defined by "the Scientific Method" just as I use the term "Art" as the process rather than the product (aka "Artifact"). >> >> When I do anything vaguely (or presumptively) artistic, I think of my role as that of an "Artifex" more than an "Artist" because I feel more emphasis on the conception/making than on being tuned into or tied into a larger, higher group/power which is how I read "Art and Artist". I have a similar ambivalence about "Scientist/Science". Despite degrees in Math and Physics, my practice has rarely involved actual Science (or more math than just really fancy arithmetic), though I have worked with "real Scientists" and close to "Scientific Progress" for most of my life. I don't even think of my work as having been that of an Engineer, but truly much closer to simply that of a "Technologist". And as everyone who has read my missives here can attest, my throwdown as a "Philosopher" is equally detuned... but suspect myself to oscillate wildly between the poles of "Philosopher" and "Philistine". All that rattled off, I truly value having enough understanding of all of these >> ideals to recognize the differences qualitatively, and to have mildly informed opinions about the better and worser examples of each quantitatively. > ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
Re: Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
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Good have the metaknowledge of vagueness and seek to reduce it.
Like learning to avoid mistakes.. https://www.wired.com/story/the-education-of-brett-the-robot/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Steven A Smith Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 12:09 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia Glen - in stark juxtaposition, we have Freeman Dyson saying: "it is better to be wrong than vague" I think I know what he meant and generally support not getting frozen in inaction or muddying/qualifying a statement to the point of losing meaning. On the other hand, I find this quote (or at least idea) as an excuse for rash over thoughtful action. - Steve On 9/21/17 11:58 AM, gⅼеɳ ☣ wrote: > A better Feynman quote that targets this issue is this one, I think from a BBC interview: > > "When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't ... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the unverse without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me." > > He was talking in the context of religion, but I think it applies to every type of "knowledge", including the "thought manipulation" that is philosophy. The point is not that "thought manipulation" can never be useful. But that one can _justifiably_ take the position that philosophy should (moral imperative) be done in the _service_ of something else. > > You cited Smullyan in the OP, which is relevant. Many of Smullyan's publications are puzzles, games. Some of us simply enjoy puzzles. (I don't.) But every puzzle is a math problem. It's up to the puzzle solver to settle on why they're solving puzzles. Are they doing it because it FEELS good? Or are they doing it because either the solutions or the exercises facilitate some other objective? Some puzzle solvers (e.g. video gamers) find themselves in a defensive position, trying to justify their fetish against the world around them. The silly rancor many "practical" people aim at philosophers can make some of them defensive. And it's a real shame that we shame philosophers for doing it just because they enjoy it. > > But it moves from merely shameful to outright dangerous when a philosopher can't distinguish their own _why_. Someone who does it because it's fun shouldn't waste any time yapping about how useful it is. And someone who does it because it's useful shouldn't waste any time yapping about how fun it is. Get over it. Be confident. Engage your fetish and ignore the nay-sayers. > > On 09/21/2017 09:53 AM, Steven A Smith wrote: >> Glen - >> >> I share your use of the term "Science" as in being an activity (roughly) defined by "the Scientific Method" just as I use the term "Art" as the process rather than the product (aka "Artifact"). >> >> When I do anything vaguely (or presumptively) artistic, I think of my role as that of an "Artifex" more than an "Artist" because I feel more emphasis on the conception/making than on being tuned into or tied into a larger, higher group/power which is how I read "Art and Artist". I have a similar ambivalence about "Scientist/Science". Despite degrees in Math and Physics, my practice has rarely involved actual Science (or more math than just really fancy arithmetic), though I have worked with "real Scientists" and close to "Scientific Progress" for most of my life. I don't even think of my work as having been that of an Engineer, but truly much closer to simply that of a "Technologist". And as everyone who has read my missives here can attest, my throwdown as a "Philosopher" is equally detuned... but suspect myself to oscillate wildly between the poles of "Philosopher" and "Philistine". All that rattled off, I truly value having enough understanding of all of these >> ideals to recognize the differences qualitatively, and to have mildly informed opinions about the better and worser examples of each quantitatively. > ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Bah! Do you actually think Dyson's aphorism is in stark juxtaposition to Feynman's? I thought, by including so much of what Feynman said, it would be less likely anyone would read it wrong. But if you think Feynman was saying being vague is better than being wrong, you TOTALLY misunderstood what he was saying.
I'm reminded of Otto. Are we seriously trading aphorisms? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5YKbYLb5GVc On 09/21/2017 11:09 AM, Steven A Smith wrote: > in stark juxtaposition, we have Freeman Dyson saying: > > "it is better to be wrong than vague" > > I think I know what he meant and generally support not getting frozen in inaction or muddying/qualifying a statement to the point of losing meaning. -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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In reply to this post by gepr
Glen,
This baffled me as much as it interested me. In the end, I wasn't sure whose side you were on. My problem may be that, being a Peircean, philosophy is for me just an extension of the scientific method and philosophical knowledge is just "meta-knowledge" gleaned from the same sources as scientific knowledge. Speaking as a sort-of ornithologist, I still think the metaphor stinks. It still strikes me as one of those unthinking philosophical platitudes trotted out by people without the knowledge of experience to think philosophically. Remember that guy Donald Griffin who thought he knew about "mind" because he knew so much about bats and insects? Nick Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of g??? ? Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 12:28 PM To: FriAM <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia It's definitely sage. But the sagacity doesn't hinge on the word "science", it hinges on the word _useful_. Science is often thought to be a body of knowledge. But there's a huge swath of people, me included, who think science is not knowledge, but a method/behavior for formulating and testing hypotheses. It's not clear to me that Feynman actually said this. But Feynman is a good candidate because he cared far more about what you _do_ than what you claim to _know_. Philosophy (of anything) can be useful. But to any working scientist, it is far less useful than, say, glass blowing, programming, or cell sorting. And if you think distinguishing between the usefulness of beakers from the usefulness of ... oh, let's say Popper's 3 worlds, then your expression says more about you than it does about them. On 09/20/2017 08:27 PM, Nick Thompson wrote: > By the way, the Feynman quote is really dumb, and it’s annoying that people keep trotting it out as if it was sage. The reason birds can’t make use of ornithology is they can’t read. Think how useful it would be for a cuckoo host to be able to spend a few hours reading a text on egg identification. Is the reason physicists can’t make use of philosophy of science that they can’t think? I doubt anyone who cites this “aphorism” would come to that conclusion. Bad metaphor. -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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Heh, I'm on the side of people who refuse to take aphorisms seriously, no matter who coins them, repeats them, etc. Otto's reading Nietzsche is the perfect example. Attempts to be pithy only appeal to sloppy thinkers.
I admit that inside jokes can be good and comforting, but ONLY when you're sure there is an "inside". If you have any doubt about the in-group status of the group you find yourself with, then stay away from aphorisms and try to tell an authentic story. On 09/21/2017 12:31 PM, Nick Thompson wrote: > This baffled me as much as it interested me. In the end, I wasn't sure whose side you were on. My problem may be that, being a Peircean, philosophy is for me just an extension of the scientific method and philosophical knowledge is just "meta-knowledge" gleaned from the same sources as scientific knowledge. Speaking as a sort-of ornithologist, I still think the metaphor stinks. It still strikes me as one of those unthinking philosophical platitudes trotted out by people without the knowledge of experience to think philosophically. Remember that guy Donald Griffin who thought he knew about "mind" because he knew so much about bats and insects? -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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In reply to this post by gepr
OK, you got me.. (as usual). I suppose I was speaking of how this particular Feynman Quote is
(mis)used vs how the Dyson quote is (mis)used. I wasn't
responding to your elaboration in this case, nor presuming to know
what either of them actually *meant*. How is that for weasely? Thanks for the Otto/Wanda link... not sure of the precise
relevance (except for audacious banter?)
Wanda is one of my favorite characters of all time (not Otto, I have other favorite Kevin Kline roles) but the scene where he is huffing Jamie Lee Curtis' boot is classic! On 9/21/17 12:33 PM, gⅼеɳ ☣ wrote:
Bah! Do you actually think Dyson's aphorism is in stark juxtaposition to Feynman's? I thought, by including so much of what Feynman said, it would be less likely anyone would read it wrong. But if you think Feynman was saying being vague is better than being wrong, you TOTALLY misunderstood what he was saying. I'm reminded of Otto. Are we seriously trading aphorisms? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5YKbYLb5GVc On 09/21/2017 11:09 AM, Steven A Smith wrote: ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
Re: Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
To clarify, I meant `meta-knowledge' in the sense of "Do I know what I know?" or "Do I know I don't know?" as opposed to the idea of drawing conclusions by studying other studies. Can one label their questions or propositions as vague or not vague..
-----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Nick Thompson Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:32 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <[hidden email]> Cc: 'Mike Bybee' <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia Glen, This baffled me as much as it interested me. In the end, I wasn't sure whose side you were on. My problem may be that, being a Peircean, philosophy is for me just an extension of the scientific method and philosophical knowledge is just "meta-knowledge" gleaned from the same sources as scientific knowledge. Speaking as a sort-of ornithologist, I still think the metaphor stinks. It still strikes me as one of those unthinking philosophical platitudes trotted out by people without the knowledge of experience to think philosophically. Remember that guy Donald Griffin who thought he knew about "mind" because he knew so much about bats and insects? Nick Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of g??? ? Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 12:28 PM To: FriAM <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia It's definitely sage. But the sagacity doesn't hinge on the word "science", it hinges on the word _useful_. Science is often thought to be a body of knowledge. But there's a huge swath of people, me included, who think science is not knowledge, but a method/behavior for formulating and testing hypotheses. It's not clear to me that Feynman actually said this. But Feynman is a good candidate because he cared far more about what you _do_ than what you claim to _know_. Philosophy (of anything) can be useful. But to any working scientist, it is far less useful than, say, glass blowing, programming, or cell sorting. And if you think distinguishing between the usefulness of beakers from the usefulness of ... oh, let's say Popper's 3 worlds, then your expression says more about you than it does about them. On 09/20/2017 08:27 PM, Nick Thompson wrote: > By the way, the Feynman quote is really dumb, and it’s annoying that people keep trotting it out as if it was sage. The reason birds can’t make use of ornithology is they can’t read. Think how useful it would be for a cuckoo host to be able to spend a few hours reading a text on egg identification. Is the reason physicists can’t make use of philosophy of science that they can’t think? I doubt anyone who cites this “aphorism” would come to that conclusion. Bad metaphor. -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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In reply to this post by gepr
Dear Glen, I don't know why I am so pissed at Feynman right now but this quote: "When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't ... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the universe without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me." … is another one of those sentiments that we would immediately recognise as absurd if Feynman hadn’t said it. Peirce would say, for the most part, we cannot live in doubt. We cannot doubt that the floor is still under our feet when we put our legs out of the bed in the morning or that the visual field is whole, even though our eyes tell us that there are two gian holes in it. Every perception is doubtable in the sense that Feynman so vaingloriously lays out here, yet for the most part we live in a world of inferred expectations which are largely confirmed. Like the other Feynman quote, it is wise only when we stipulate what is absurd about it and make something wise and noble of what is left. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- A better Feynman quote that targets this issue is this one, I think from a BBC interview: "When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't ... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the unverse without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me." He was talking in the context of religion, but I think it applies to every type of "knowledge", including the "thought manipulation" that is philosophy. The point is not that "thought manipulation" can never be useful. But that one can _justifiably_ take the position that philosophy should (moral imperative) be done in the _service_ of something else. You cited Smullyan in the OP, which is relevant. Many of Smullyan's publications are puzzles, games. Some of us simply enjoy puzzles. (I don't.) But every puzzle is a math problem. It's up to the puzzle solver to settle on why they're solving puzzles. Are they doing it because it FEELS good? Or are they doing it because either the solutions or the exercises facilitate some other objective? Some puzzle solvers (e.g. video gamers) find themselves in a defensive position, trying to justify their fetish against the world around them. The silly rancor many "practical" people aim at philosophers can make some of them defensive. And it's a real shame that we shame philosophers for doing it just because they enjoy it. But it moves from merely shameful to outright dangerous when a philosopher can't distinguish their own _why_. Someone who does it because it's fun shouldn't waste any time yapping about how useful it is. And someone who does it because it's useful shouldn't waste any time yapping about how fun it is. Get over it. Be confident. Engage your fetish and ignore the nay-sayers. On 09/21/2017 09:53 AM, Steven A Smith wrote: > Glen - > > I share your use of the term "Science" as in being an activity (roughly) defined by "the Scientific Method" just as I use the term "Art" as the process rather than the product (aka "Artifact"). > > When I do anything vaguely (or presumptively) artistic, I think of my role as that of an "Artifex" more than an "Artist" because I feel more emphasis on the conception/making than on being tuned into or tied into a larger, higher group/power which is how I read "Art and Artist". I have a similar ambivalence about "Scientist/Science". Despite degrees in Math and Physics, my practice has rarely involved actual Science (or more math than just really fancy arithmetic), though I have worked with "real Scientists" and close to "Scientific Progress" for most of my life. I don't even think of my work as having been that of an Engineer, but truly much closer to simply that of a "Technologist". And as everyone who has read my missives here can attest, my throwdown as a "Philosopher" is equally detuned... but suspect myself to oscillate wildly between the poles of "Philosopher" and "Philistine". All that rattled off, I truly value having enough understanding of all of these > ideals to recognize the differences qualitatively, and to have mildly informed opinions about the better and worser examples of each quantitatively. -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
Re: Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
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There is nothing that infuriates me more than trying to solve a problem with/for someone is confident in their hypothesis for no reason other than a few past experiences. No we definitely can live with doubt.
For goodness sake we have Donald as president. It is a personality disorder when people can’t depart from their priors in the face of actual evidence. From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of
Nick Thompson Dear Glen, I don't know why I am so pissed at Feynman right now but this quote: "When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to live not knowing than to have answers which might
be wrong. I have approximate answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't ...
Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the universe without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me." … is another one of those sentiments that we would immediately recognise as absurd if Feynman hadn’t said it.
Peirce would say, for the most part, we cannot live in doubt. We cannot doubt that the floor is still under our feet when we put our legs out of the bed in the morning or that the visual field is whole, even though our eyes tell us
that there are two gian holes in it. Every perception is doubtable in the sense that Feynman so vaingloriously lays out here, yet for the most part we live in a world of inferred expectations which are largely confirmed. Like the other Feynman quote, it
is wise only when we stipulate what is absurd about it and make something wise and noble of what is left.
Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- A better Feynman quote that targets this issue is this one, I think from a BBC interview: "When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate
answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't ... Ι don't feel frightened by
not knowing things, by being lost in the unverse without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me." He was talking in the context of religion, but I think it applies to every type of "knowledge", including the "thought manipulation" that is philosophy. The point is not that "thought manipulation" can never be useful. But that one
can _justifiably_ take the position that philosophy should (moral imperative) be done in the _service_ of something else. You cited Smullyan in the OP, which is relevant. Many of Smullyan's publications are puzzles, games. Some of us simply enjoy puzzles. (I don't.) But every puzzle is a math problem. It's up to the puzzle solver to settle on why they're
solving puzzles. Are they doing it because it FEELS good? Or are they doing it because either the solutions or the exercises facilitate some other objective? Some puzzle solvers (e.g. video gamers) find themselves in a defensive position, trying to justify
their fetish against the world around them. The silly rancor many "practical" people aim at philosophers can make some of them defensive. And it's a real shame that we shame philosophers for doing it just because they enjoy it. But it moves from merely shameful to outright dangerous when a philosopher can't distinguish their own _why_. Someone who does it because it's fun shouldn't waste any time yapping about how useful it is. And someone who does it because
it's useful shouldn't waste any time yapping about how fun it is. Get over it. Be confident. Engage your fetish and ignore the nay-sayers. On 09/21/2017 09:53 AM, Steven A Smith wrote: > Glen - > > I share your use of the term "Science" as in being an activity (roughly) defined by "the Scientific Method" just as I use the term "Art" as the process rather than the product (aka "Artifact"). > > When I do anything vaguely (or presumptively) artistic, I think of my role as that of an "Artifex" more than an "Artist" because I feel more emphasis on the conception/making than on being tuned into or tied into a larger, higher group/power
which is how I read "Art and Artist". I have a similar ambivalence about "Scientist/Science". Despite degrees in Math and Physics, my practice has rarely involved actual Science (or more math than just really fancy arithmetic), though I have worked with
"real Scientists" and close to "Scientific Progress" for most of my life. I don't even think of my work as having been that of an Engineer, but truly much closer to simply that of a "Technologist". And as everyone who has read my missives here can attest,
my throwdown as a "Philosopher" is equally detuned... but suspect myself to oscillate wildly between the poles of "Philosopher" and "Philistine". All that rattled off, I truly value having enough understanding of all of these > ideals to recognize the differences qualitatively, and to have mildly informed opinions about the better and worser examples of each quantitatively. -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe
http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
It's strange. You speak about the way _you_ think and behave as if that's the way _I_ think and behave. Can we all say "vainglorously" together? 8^)
I can tell you unflinchingly and honestly that I DO doubt that the floor is still under my feet when I put my legs out of the bed in the morning. If you don't doubt it, then you are governed by faith and convinced by things you believe. Even IF you know precisely what Peirce WOULD say (which we can doubt), it still doesn't mean Peirce was right. Yeah, it's likely he was way smarter than me. But that doesn't mean he knows what I do and don't doubt. I doubt nearly everything about myself on a continual basis. I doubt my strength. I doubt my intelligence. I doubt every purchase I've ever made. I doubt that Renee' will stay with me. I doubt everything on a continual basis. So, you (or Peirce) are clearly flat-out wrong. It seems very arrogant to stumble along thinking your expectations are somehow important enough to remain true. On 09/21/2017 12:48 PM, Nick Thompson wrote: > Peirce would say, for the most part, we cannot live in doubt. We cannot doubt that the floor is still under our feet when we put our legs out of the bed in the morning or that the visual field is whole, even though our eyes tell us that there are two gian holes in it. Every perception is doubtable in the sense that Feynman so vaingloriously lays out here, yet for the most part we live in a world of inferred expectations which are largely confirmed. Like the other Feynman quote, it is wise only when we stipulate what is absurd about it and make something wise and noble of what is left. -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Glen,
I apologize. My rhetorical manners are not in good order. I am being cranky. I am afraid this discussion is about to dissolve into a quibble about the meaning of the words "doubt" and "belief", but let's take it one more round. In my use of the words ... and I think Peirce's ... one can entertain a doubt without "really" having one. Knowledge of perception tells us that every perceived "fact" is an inference subject to doubt and yet, if one acts in the assurance that some fact is the case, one cannot be said to really doubt it, can one? It follows, then, that to the extent that we act on our perceptions, we act without doubt on expectations that are doubtable. Eric Charles may be able to help me with this: there is some debate between William James and Peirce about whether the man, being chased by the bear who pauses at the edge of the chasm, and then leaps across it, doubted at the moment of leaping that he could make the jump. I think James says Yes and Peirce says No. If that is the argument we are having, then I am satisfied we have wrung everything we can out of it. Anyway. I regret being cranky, but I can't seem to stop. Is that another example of what we are talking about here? Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of g??? ? Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 3:58 PM To: FriAM <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia It's strange. You speak about the way _you_ think and behave as if that's the way _I_ think and behave. Can we all say "vainglorously" together? 8^) I can tell you unflinchingly and honestly that I DO doubt that the floor is still under my feet when I put my legs out of the bed in the morning. If you don't doubt it, then you are governed by faith and convinced by things you believe. Even IF you know precisely what Peirce WOULD say (which we can doubt), it still doesn't mean Peirce was right. Yeah, it's likely he was way smarter than me. But that doesn't mean he knows what I do and don't doubt. I doubt nearly everything about myself on a continual basis. I doubt my strength. I doubt my intelligence. I doubt every purchase I've ever made. I doubt that Renee' will stay with me. I doubt everything on a continual basis. So, you (or Peirce) are clearly flat-out wrong. It seems very arrogant to stumble along thinking your expectations are somehow important enough to remain true. On 09/21/2017 12:48 PM, Nick Thompson wrote: > Peirce would say, for the most part, we cannot live in doubt. We cannot doubt that the floor is still under our feet when we put our legs out of the bed in the morning or that the visual field is whole, even though our eyes tell us that there are two gian holes in it. Every perception is doubtable in the sense that Feynman so vaingloriously lays out here, yet for the most part we live in a world of inferred expectations which are largely confirmed. Like the other Feynman quote, it is wise only when we stipulate what is absurd about it and make something wise and noble of what is left. -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
Hmm!
I meant "meta knowledge" as knowledge of how to go about something gleaned from watching others succeed and fail at it. Is that the same thing? n Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 3:39 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> Cc: 'Mike Bybee' <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia To clarify, I meant `meta-knowledge' in the sense of "Do I know what I know?" or "Do I know I don't know?" as opposed to the idea of drawing conclusions by studying other studies. Can one label their questions or propositions as vague or not vague.. -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Nick Thompson Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:32 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <[hidden email]> Cc: 'Mike Bybee' <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia Glen, This baffled me as much as it interested me. In the end, I wasn't sure whose side you were on. My problem may be that, being a Peircean, philosophy is for me just an extension of the scientific method and philosophical knowledge is just "meta-knowledge" gleaned from the same sources as scientific knowledge. Speaking as a sort-of ornithologist, I still think the metaphor stinks. It still strikes me as one of those unthinking philosophical platitudes trotted out by people without the knowledge of experience to think philosophically. Remember that guy Donald Griffin who thought he knew about "mind" because he knew so much about bats and insects? Nick Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of g??? ? Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 12:28 PM To: FriAM <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia It's definitely sage. But the sagacity doesn't hinge on the word "science", it hinges on the word _useful_. Science is often thought to be a body of knowledge. But there's a huge swath of people, me included, who think science is not knowledge, but a method/behavior for formulating and testing hypotheses. It's not clear to me that Feynman actually said this. But Feynman is a good candidate because he cared far more about what you _do_ than what you claim to _know_. Philosophy (of anything) can be useful. But to any working scientist, it is far less useful than, say, glass blowing, programming, or cell sorting. And if you think distinguishing between the usefulness of beakers from the usefulness of ... oh, let's say Popper's 3 worlds, then your expression says more about you than it does about them. On 09/20/2017 08:27 PM, Nick Thompson wrote: > By the way, the Feynman quote is really dumb, and it’s annoying that people keep trotting it out as if it was sage. The reason birds can’t make use of ornithology is they can’t read. Think how useful it would be for a cuckoo host to be able to spend a few hours reading a text on egg identification. Is the reason physicists can’t make use of philosophy of science that they can’t think? I doubt anyone who cites this “aphorism” would come to that conclusion. Bad metaphor. -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
Re: Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
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To me "metaknowledge" denotes knowledge about knowledge. For example, "I know 7,486 aphorisms". That's a false statement. Frank Frank Wimberly Phone (505) 670-9918 On Sep 21, 2017 2:25 PM, "Nick Thompson" <[hidden email]> wrote: Hmm! ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
No regrets or apology are needed. And even if we are about to "argue about words" ... I forget what famous dead white guy said that ... it's still useful to me.
You say: "if one acts in the assurance that some fact is the case, one cannot be said to really doubt it" The answer is clarified by reading Marcus' post. If you act with assurance, then you're not open to changing your mind. So, you've simply moved the goal posts or passed the buck. I *never* act with assurance, as far as I can tell. Every thing I do seems plagued with doubt. I can force myself out of this state with some activities. Running more than 3 miles does it. Math sometimes does it. Beer does it. Etc. But for almost every other action, I do doubt it. So, I don't think we're having the discussion James and Peirce might have. I think we're talking about two different types of people, those with a tendency to believe their own beliefs and those who tend to disbelieve their own beliefs. Maybe it's because people who act with assurance are just smarter than people like me? I don't know. It's important in this modern world, what with our affirmation bubbles, fake news, and whatnot. What is it that makes people prefer to associate with people whose beliefs they share? What makes some people prefer the company of people different from them? Etc. On 09/21/2017 01:20 PM, Nick Thompson wrote: > I am afraid this discussion is about to dissolve into a quibble about the meaning of the words "doubt" and "belief", but let's take it one more round. In my use of the words ... and I think Peirce's ... one can entertain a doubt without "really" having one. Knowledge of perception tells us that every perceived "fact" is an inference subject to doubt and yet, if one acts in the assurance that some fact is the case, one cannot be said to really doubt it, can one? It follows, then, that to the extent that we act on our perceptions, we act without doubt on expectations that are doubtable. > > Eric Charles may be able to help me with this: there is some debate between William James and Peirce about whether the man, being chased by the bear who pauses at the edge of the chasm, and then leaps across it, doubted at the moment of leaping that he could make the jump. I think James says Yes and Peirce says No. If that is the argument we are having, then I am satisfied we have wrung everything we can out of it. > > Anyway. I regret being cranky, but I can't seem to stop. Is that another example of what we are talking about here? -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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