Glen,
I saw you coming! My bottom line is not predication but the explicitness of whatever predications one makes. What could, of course define consciousness as "whatever humans do that seems to me conscious" or "Whatever is produced by a human brain". But, after trying to do science with such definitions, I think most would realize that these definitions are incapacitating. At that point, a scientist relinquishes those definitions and begins to seek others, definitions that actually direct one toward the possibility of finding answers. Thus, I stipulate that definitions are part of the dialectic of discovery. Neither I, nor Frank, is allowed to say M is the meaning of P for all time; we are only allowed to say that for some set of purposes, in some context, M is the meaning of P. Are we constantly pressing a head toward the most universally applicable definitions? You bet! Do we ever get there? Not yet! Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University [hidden email] https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of u?l? ??? Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 11:07 AM To: FriAM <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] gelotophilia Yes! This is exactly my sentiment in objecting to the (torturously defined) concept of definite. There are a number of us here on the list who seem dyed-in-the-wool predicativists and impredicativity will be rejected at every turn, often imperiously and pretentiously. I'm not *committed* to the idea that loopiness is a primary constituent of living systems. But so few can construct a good argument *against* it that I've remained in this state for decades, now. On 7/28/20 9:57 AM, Steve Smith wrote: > Perhaps a properly broadly conceived General Artificial Intelligence would ultimately include all of this as well, and as deep learning evolves, it seems that there is no reason that a GI couldn't simulate the physiological feedback loops that drive and regulate some aspects of humore? -- ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Hm. I appreciate an attempt to cleanly separate the predicative parts from the impredicative parts. But you don't seem to be allowing *any* impredicative parts. Your push to the universal foundation *smells* like predicativism to me, especially when you go off into monism la-la land.
My claim would be that Doug is correct that the words (or concepts even) are never *defined* because they cannot be defined in the way the predicativists want. This perspective is anti-foundationalism. It's not turtles all the way down. It IS that there is no such thing as *down*. On 7/28/20 11:33 AM, [hidden email] wrote: > I saw you coming! My bottom line is not predication but the explicitness of whatever predications one makes. What could, of course define consciousness as "whatever humans do that seems to me conscious" or "Whatever is produced by a human brain". But, after trying to do science with such definitions, I think most would realize that these definitions are incapacitating. At that point, a scientist relinquishes those definitions and begins to seek others, definitions that actually direct one toward the possibility of finding answers. Thus, I stipulate that definitions are part of the dialectic of discovery. Neither I, nor Frank, is allowed to say M is the meaning of P for all time; we are only allowed to say that for some set of purposes, in some context, M is the meaning of P. Are we constantly pressing a head toward the most universally applicable definitions? You bet! Do we ever get there? Not yet! -- ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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You are pushing me hard, here, but I think the up/down thang is orthogonal to the predicativist position. (You invented that word, right?) We Predicativists need only assert that there is a before and after: i.e., BEFORE we can say whether a thing is, we have to have said, up front, what it would be for that thing to be. We can take it back soon as we see where it leads.
Nick Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University [hidden email] https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of u?l? ??? Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 12:47 PM To: FriAM <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Dogs, Computers, Joy Hm. I appreciate an attempt to cleanly separate the predicative parts from the impredicative parts. But you don't seem to be allowing *any* impredicative parts. Your push to the universal foundation *smells* like predicativism to me, especially when you go off into monism la-la land. My claim would be that Doug is correct that the words (or concepts even) are never *defined* because they cannot be defined in the way the predicativists want. This perspective is anti-foundationalism. It's not turtles all the way down. It IS that there is no such thing as *down*. On 7/28/20 11:33 AM, [hidden email] wrote: > I saw you coming! My bottom line is not predication but the explicitness of whatever predications one makes. What could, of course define consciousness as "whatever humans do that seems to me conscious" or "Whatever is produced by a human brain". But, after trying to do science with such definitions, I think most would realize that these definitions are incapacitating. At that point, a scientist relinquishes those definitions and begins to seek others, definitions that actually direct one toward the possibility of finding answers. Thus, I stipulate that definitions are part of the dialectic of discovery. Neither I, nor Frank, is allowed to say M is the meaning of P for all time; we are only allowed to say that for some set of purposes, in some context, M is the meaning of P. Are we constantly pressing a head toward the most universally applicable definitions? You bet! Do we ever get there? Not yet! -- ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Glen did not invent the word predicative. --- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Tue, Jul 28, 2020, 1:03 PM <[hidden email]> wrote: You are pushing me hard, here, but I think the up/down thang is orthogonal to the predicativist position. (You invented that word, right?) We Predicativists need only assert that there is a before and after: i.e., BEFORE we can say whether a thing is, we have to have said, up front, what it would be for that thing to be. We can take it back soon as we see where it leads. - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
In reply to this post by thompnickson2
Predicativism: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philosophy-mathematics/#Pre
Your before and after is the same as up and down. It's the *unification* into a definite (http://math.stanford.edu/~feferman/papers/whatsdef.pdf) construct that's problematic. On 7/28/20 12:03 PM, [hidden email] wrote: > You are pushing me hard, here, but I think the up/down thang is orthogonal to the predicativist position. (You invented that word, right?) We Predicativists need only assert that there is a before and after: i.e., BEFORE we can say whether a thing is, we have to have said, up front, what it would be for that thing to be. We can take it back soon as we see where it leads. -- ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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In reply to this post by Frank Wimberly-2
OHMIGOSH, Frank. Given that my whole career has been built on pointing out the implicit vicious circularity of biological arguments, It would seem that I should have encountered this distinction before. Ugh. Thank you for that link. I guess I need to be quiet for a bit. Nick Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly Glen did not invent the word predicative. --- On Tue, Jul 28, 2020, 1:03 PM <[hidden email]> wrote:
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You *have* encountered it before, while reading Robert Rosen, at least ... and on this list from me, if not from others. But I LAUD your episodic memory. The narrativists are the enemy, here. 8^D
On 7/28/20 12:32 PM, [hidden email] wrote: > It would seem that I should have encountered this distinction before. Ugh. -- ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Perhaps this is what they call a "teachable moment".
Gawd I hate that expression; why not a "learnable moment". Thanks, list. N Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University [hidden email] https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of u?l? ??? Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 1:35 PM To: FriAM <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Dogs, Computers, Joy You *have* encountered it before, while reading Robert Rosen, at least ... and on this list from me, if not from others. But I LAUD your episodic memory. The narrativists are the enemy, here. 8^D On 7/28/20 12:32 PM, [hidden email] wrote: > It would seem that I should have encountered this distinction before. Ugh. -- ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
I think many of you will find this interesting
https://dreamsongs.com/Files/InkWellTuring.pdf Richard Gabriel talking about Turing Test (Nick, do you find his set up to be fair?) and poems written by Inkwell, his AI writing assistant / poetry writing software. davew On Tue, Jul 28, 2020, at 1:37 PM, [hidden email] wrote: > Perhaps this is what they call a "teachable moment". > > Gawd I hate that expression; why not a "learnable moment". > > Thanks, list. > > N > > Nicholas Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > Clark University > [hidden email] > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of u?l? ??? > Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 1:35 PM > To: FriAM <[hidden email]> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Dogs, Computers, Joy > > You *have* encountered it before, while reading Robert Rosen, at least > ... and on this list from me, if not from others. But I LAUD your > episodic memory. The narrativists are the enemy, here. 8^D > > On 7/28/20 12:32 PM, [hidden email] wrote: > > It would seem that I should have encountered this distinction before. Ugh. > > > -- > ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ > > - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > > - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
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