Climate Change

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Re: Climate Change

Pieter Steenekamp
Nick,

What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

Philip Tetlock has done excellent work answering exactly that question. His view is simply that you can test and develop the ability of individuals and groups to increase the quality of their judgments. (His focus is on forecasting).

Pieter

On 30 December 2017 at 19:20, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter, 

 

Some months back, at the Friday Meeting of the FRIAM Mother Church at St. Johns, we had a long discussion about the degree to which ANY of us ever made judgements in such matters on the basis of EVIDENCE.  I think, just for fun, we spent some time trying to PROVE to one another, on the basis of raw experience, that New Mexico is not flat.  Harder going than one might suppose.   So, I think we concluded that most of our judgements are based on circles of trust.  So then, the question becomes, what sorts of circles of trust are evidency.  The point is that, whatever one takes to be raw evidence always comes baled with a set of inferences and assumptions that are themselves not evidenced but which come by authority and seem trustworthy. 

 

Your pointing to historical climate anomalies seemed evidency to me in that it was plausible,  I had vaguely heard of those things and it seemed logically plausible to me that we should be able to POSTDICT these anomalies from present conditions, if our models are strong.  Thus, in the context of that particular network of trusted (plausible) propositions, I momentarily joined you in your skepticism.  But none of that is EVIDENCE in the sense that we all like to use that term. 

 

In short, what is the relation between evidence and trust?  Aren’t we all guilty of group think?  Isn’t all science (following Peirce) a kind of organized groupthink?  Isn’t the point NOT that some of us think independently and some of us are victims of Groupthink, but rather that some groups think better than others?  And if so, why?  What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 5:27 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Glen, 

 

I'd like to comment on your comment a few posts earlier:

"*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution."

 

My first reply is that I consider evidence to be much more valuable than expert's opinions. The IPCC is rich in expert's opinions and very light on evidence. 

 

The second reply is that I certainly do not claim any explicit fraud in climate science. But there is evidence of bias in climate science and "soft punishment" of scientists who disagree with the main narrative. For example, refer to Judith Curry's experience when she started to challenge the main climate science narrative. She is a former Chair of the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at Georgia Tech and blogs at www.judithcurry.com.

My point is that although there is no evidence of explicit fraud, there is evidence of an environment that promotes groupthink. 

 

Combining the two points, with evidence of less temperature increase than what the models predict and evidence of an environment in climate science promoting "fitting in" and the absence of healthy challenging of climate science, my conclusion is to be skeptical towards main climate science and the IPCC's conclusions. 

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 10:30, Pieter Steenekamp <[hidden email]> wrote:

I'm also a big fan of James Lovelock. Interesting that he changed his views on climate change dramatically. I refer to an interview The Guardian newspaper had with him recently (www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/30/james-lovelock-interview-by-end-of-century-robots-will-have-taken-over). I quote:

"What has changed dramatically, however, is his position on climate change. He now says: “Anyone who tries to predict more than five to 10 years is a bit of an idiot, because so many things can change unexpectedly.” "

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 07:25, Carl Tollander <[hidden email]> wrote:

I would rather,

 than worry directly about the predictability of the climate models we currently have vs the population/variety/intitial conclusions of researchers from decades ago, 

 that we instead consider a range of climate risks, their consequences,  our responses/adaptations, and their consequences.

The latter may prepare us, and it moves that portion of the science along in any case, and may yet eventually show up any deficiencies in the former, but let's get underway.

 

Personally, I'm with Lovelock on the large grain future: the window of action gets progressively smaller the longer we delay, and that the world will likely experience

a "massive reduction in carrying capacity" (that's a euphemism) over the next century.    Looking at older cultures and how they survive, mutate, die or flourish in analogous upheavals (e.g. mid-8th-century China or black-death eras in  Europe) might be worthwhile at this point. Start by assuming the fan/speed/blades and what/who hits it; what can/should we DO?  We should at least perhaps understand when we are waiting too long to begin adaptations that are cheap, safe, economic or politically acceptable, for Nature bats last.

 

Hope y'all like mosquitoes. 

 

カール

 

On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 8:59 PM, Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick writes:

 

< IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now? >

 

The European weather model assimilates 50+ types of measurements in space and time, including satellite data.   Obviously, these measurements were not possible except in the last few decades, never mind in the middle ages or before humans.   So whether or not there were even particular kinds of climate anomalies is a subject of some debate.    For example, were those periods wet or were they warm?  Were they uniform across the global or localized to certain regions?

 

Marcus


From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Nick Thompson <[hidden email]>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 8:27:21 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

I dunno, I thought Pietr's point was kind of interesting.  IF (and I don't know if the condition is met) ... IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now?   Or did somebody already answer that. 



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 5:40 PM
To: FriAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

Well, I mean "models" writ large.  Even when gathering and reducing observational data, there's a workflow for doing that. That workflow relies on a model of a sort.  And integrating different data sets so that they're commensurate also requires models.  E.g. correlating tree ring based with other climate data.

But you're ultimately right.  It's not so much about the models as it is the whole inferential apparatus one *might* use to drive policy decisions, including huge populations of expert climatologists.  There's probably a correlation to be drawn between people who distrust government and those who distrust the "scientific establishment" and/or the "deep state".  People tend to obey/trust whoever they regard as authority figures (e.g. greater shocks to another if a person in a lab coat tells you to do it).  Those of us who inherently distrust authority figures have a particular psychological bent and our impulse can go the other way.  It could be because we know how groups can succumb to bias, or how errors get propagated (e.g. peer review), or whatever.

*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution.

On 12/29/2017 12:41 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
> IMO it is not about models. Models are complicated and controversial. Climate change in the artic is a fact, melting arctic ice is a fact, melting glaciers is a fact. In the arctic regions we can oberve the rising temperatures most clearly.


--
uǝlƃ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 

 


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
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Re: Climate Change

Marcus G. Daniels
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

 Isn’t the point NOT that some of us think independently and some of us are victims of Groupthink, but rather that some groups think better than others?


Like some groups advance goals like prudence and others, avarice.


Marcus


From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Nick Thompson <[hidden email]>
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 10:20:15 AM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change
 

Pieter, 

 

Some months back, at the Friday Meeting of the FRIAM Mother Church at St. Johns, we had a long discussion about the degree to which ANY of us ever made judgements in such matters on the basis of EVIDENCE.  I think, just for fun, we spent some time trying to PROVE to one another, on the basis of raw experience, that New Mexico is not flat.  Harder going than one might suppose.   So, I think we concluded that most of our judgements are based on circles of trust.  So then, the question becomes, what sorts of circles of trust are evidency.  The point is that, whatever one takes to be raw evidence always comes baled with a set of inferences and assumptions that are themselves not evidenced but which come by authority and seem trustworthy. 

 

Your pointing to historical climate anomalies seemed evidency to me in that it was plausible,  I had vaguely heard of those things and it seemed logically plausible to me that we should be able to POSTDICT these anomalies from present conditions, if our models are strong.  Thus, in the context of that particular network of trusted (plausible) propositions, I momentarily joined you in your skepticism.  But none of that is EVIDENCE in the sense that we all like to use that term. 

 

In short, what is the relation between evidence and trust?  Aren’t we all guilty of group think?  Isn’t all science (following Peirce) a kind of organized groupthink?  Isn’t the point NOT that some of us think independently and some of us are victims of Groupthink, but rather that some groups think better than others?  And if so, why?  What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 5:27 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Glen, 

 

I'd like to comment on your comment a few posts earlier:

"*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution."

 

My first reply is that I consider evidence to be much more valuable than expert's opinions. The IPCC is rich in expert's opinions and very light on evidence. 

 

The second reply is that I certainly do not claim any explicit fraud in climate science. But there is evidence of bias in climate science and "soft punishment" of scientists who disagree with the main narrative. For example, refer to Judith Curry's experience when she started to challenge the main climate science narrative. She is a former Chair of the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at Georgia Tech and blogs at www.judithcurry.com.

My point is that although there is no evidence of explicit fraud, there is evidence of an environment that promotes groupthink. 

 

Combining the two points, with evidence of less temperature increase than what the models predict and evidence of an environment in climate science promoting "fitting in" and the absence of healthy challenging of climate science, my conclusion is to be skeptical towards main climate science and the IPCC's conclusions. 

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 10:30, Pieter Steenekamp <[hidden email]> wrote:

I'm also a big fan of James Lovelock. Interesting that he changed his views on climate change dramatically. I refer to an interview The Guardian newspaper had with him recently (www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/30/james-lovelock-interview-by-end-of-century-robots-will-have-taken-over). I quote:

"What has changed dramatically, however, is his position on climate change. He now says: “Anyone who tries to predict more than five to 10 years is a bit of an idiot, because so many things can change unexpectedly.” "

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 07:25, Carl Tollander <[hidden email]> wrote:

I would rather,

 than worry directly about the predictability of the climate models we currently have vs the population/variety/intitial conclusions of researchers from decades ago, 

 that we instead consider a range of climate risks, their consequences,  our responses/adaptations, and their consequences.

The latter may prepare us, and it moves that portion of the science along in any case, and may yet eventually show up any deficiencies in the former, but let's get underway.

 

Personally, I'm with Lovelock on the large grain future: the window of action gets progressively smaller the longer we delay, and that the world will likely experience

a "massive reduction in carrying capacity" (that's a euphemism) over the next century.    Looking at older cultures and how they survive, mutate, die or flourish in analogous upheavals (e.g. mid-8th-century China or black-death eras in  Europe) might be worthwhile at this point. Start by assuming the fan/speed/blades and what/who hits it; what can/should we DO?  We should at least perhaps understand when we are waiting too long to begin adaptations that are cheap, safe, economic or politically acceptable, for Nature bats last.

 

Hope y'all like mosquitoes. 

 

カール

 

On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 8:59 PM, Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick writes:

 

< IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now? >

 

The European weather model assimilates 50+ types of measurements in space and time, including satellite data.   Obviously, these measurements were not possible except in the last few decades, never mind in the middle ages or before humans.   So whether or not there were even particular kinds of climate anomalies is a subject of some debate.    For example, were those periods wet or were they warm?  Were they uniform across the global or localized to certain regions?

 

Marcus


From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Nick Thompson <[hidden email]>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 8:27:21 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

I dunno, I thought Pietr's point was kind of interesting.  IF (and I don't know if the condition is met) ... IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now?   Or did somebody already answer that. 



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 5:40 PM
To: FriAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

Well, I mean "models" writ large.  Even when gathering and reducing observational data, there's a workflow for doing that. That workflow relies on a model of a sort.  And integrating different data sets so that they're commensurate also requires models.  E.g. correlating tree ring based with other climate data.

But you're ultimately right.  It's not so much about the models as it is the whole inferential apparatus one *might* use to drive policy decisions, including huge populations of expert climatologists.  There's probably a correlation to be drawn between people who distrust government and those who distrust the "scientific establishment" and/or the "deep state".  People tend to obey/trust whoever they regard as authority figures (e.g. greater shocks to another if a person in a lab coat tells you to do it).  Those of us who inherently distrust authority figures have a particular psychological bent and our impulse can go the other way.  It could be because we know how groups can succumb to bias, or how errors get propagated (e.g. peer review), or whatever.

*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution.

On 12/29/2017 12:41 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
> IMO it is not about models. Models are complicated and controversial. Climate change in the artic is a fact, melting arctic ice is a fact, melting glaciers is a fact. In the arctic regions we can oberve the rising temperatures most clearly.


--
uǝlƃ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 

 


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
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Re: Climate Change

Nick Thompson
In reply to this post by Pieter Steenekamp

Pieter,

 

Seeing my question, out in the open, away from the underbrush of my other words, I am inclined to edit it:

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 1:32 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Nick,

 

What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Philip Tetlock has done excellent work answering exactly that question. His view is simply that you can test and develop the ability of individuals and groups to increase the quality of their judgments. (His focus is on forecasting).

 

Pieter

 

On 30 December 2017 at 19:20, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter, 

 

Some months back, at the Friday Meeting of the FRIAM Mother Church at St. Johns, we had a long discussion about the degree to which ANY of us ever made judgements in such matters on the basis of EVIDENCE.  I think, just for fun, we spent some time trying to PROVE to one another, on the basis of raw experience, that New Mexico is not flat.  Harder going than one might suppose.   So, I think we concluded that most of our judgements are based on circles of trust.  So then, the question becomes, what sorts of circles of trust are evidency.  The point is that, whatever one takes to be raw evidence always comes baled with a set of inferences and assumptions that are themselves not evidenced but which come by authority and seem trustworthy. 

 

Your pointing to historical climate anomalies seemed evidency to me in that it was plausible,  I had vaguely heard of those things and it seemed logically plausible to me that we should be able to POSTDICT these anomalies from present conditions, if our models are strong.  Thus, in the context of that particular network of trusted (plausible) propositions, I momentarily joined you in your skepticism.  But none of that is EVIDENCE in the sense that we all like to use that term. 

 

In short, what is the relation between evidence and trust?  Aren’t we all guilty of group think?  Isn’t all science (following Peirce) a kind of organized groupthink?  Isn’t the point NOT that some of us think independently and some of us are victims of Groupthink, but rather that some groups think better than others?  And if so, why?  What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 5:27 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Glen, 

 

I'd like to comment on your comment a few posts earlier:

"*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution."

 

My first reply is that I consider evidence to be much more valuable than expert's opinions. The IPCC is rich in expert's opinions and very light on evidence. 

 

The second reply is that I certainly do not claim any explicit fraud in climate science. But there is evidence of bias in climate science and "soft punishment" of scientists who disagree with the main narrative. For example, refer to Judith Curry's experience when she started to challenge the main climate science narrative. She is a former Chair of the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at Georgia Tech and blogs at www.judithcurry.com.

My point is that although there is no evidence of explicit fraud, there is evidence of an environment that promotes groupthink. 

 

Combining the two points, with evidence of less temperature increase than what the models predict and evidence of an environment in climate science promoting "fitting in" and the absence of healthy challenging of climate science, my conclusion is to be skeptical towards main climate science and the IPCC's conclusions. 

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 10:30, Pieter Steenekamp <[hidden email]> wrote:

I'm also a big fan of James Lovelock. Interesting that he changed his views on climate change dramatically. I refer to an interview The Guardian newspaper had with him recently (www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/30/james-lovelock-interview-by-end-of-century-robots-will-have-taken-over). I quote:

"What has changed dramatically, however, is his position on climate change. He now says: “Anyone who tries to predict more than five to 10 years is a bit of an idiot, because so many things can change unexpectedly.” "

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 07:25, Carl Tollander <[hidden email]> wrote:

I would rather,

 than worry directly about the predictability of the climate models we currently have vs the population/variety/intitial conclusions of researchers from decades ago, 

 that we instead consider a range of climate risks, their consequences,  our responses/adaptations, and their consequences.

The latter may prepare us, and it moves that portion of the science along in any case, and may yet eventually show up any deficiencies in the former, but let's get underway.

 

Personally, I'm with Lovelock on the large grain future: the window of action gets progressively smaller the longer we delay, and that the world will likely experience

a "massive reduction in carrying capacity" (that's a euphemism) over the next century.    Looking at older cultures and how they survive, mutate, die or flourish in analogous upheavals (e.g. mid-8th-century China or black-death eras in  Europe) might be worthwhile at this point. Start by assuming the fan/speed/blades and what/who hits it; what can/should we DO?  We should at least perhaps understand when we are waiting too long to begin adaptations that are cheap, safe, economic or politically acceptable, for Nature bats last.

 

Hope y'all like mosquitoes. 

 

カール

 

On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 8:59 PM, Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick writes:

 

< IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now? >

 

The European weather model assimilates 50+ types of measurements in space and time, including satellite data.   Obviously, these measurements were not possible except in the last few decades, never mind in the middle ages or before humans.   So whether or not there were even particular kinds of climate anomalies is a subject of some debate.    For example, were those periods wet or were they warm?  Were they uniform across the global or localized to certain regions?

 

Marcus


From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Nick Thompson <[hidden email]>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 8:27:21 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

I dunno, I thought Pietr's point was kind of interesting.  IF (and I don't know if the condition is met) ... IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now?   Or did somebody already answer that. 



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 5:40 PM
To: FriAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

Well, I mean "models" writ large.  Even when gathering and reducing observational data, there's a workflow for doing that. That workflow relies on a model of a sort.  And integrating different data sets so that they're commensurate also requires models.  E.g. correlating tree ring based with other climate data.

But you're ultimately right.  It's not so much about the models as it is the whole inferential apparatus one *might* use to drive policy decisions, including huge populations of expert climatologists.  There's probably a correlation to be drawn between people who distrust government and those who distrust the "scientific establishment" and/or the "deep state".  People tend to obey/trust whoever they regard as authority figures (e.g. greater shocks to another if a person in a lab coat tells you to do it).  Those of us who inherently distrust authority figures have a particular psychological bent and our impulse can go the other way.  It could be because we know how groups can succumb to bias, or how errors get propagated (e.g. peer review), or whatever.

*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution.

On 12/29/2017 12:41 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
> IMO it is not about models. Models are complicated and controversial. Climate change in the artic is a fact, melting arctic ice is a fact, melting glaciers is a fact. In the arctic regions we can oberve the rising temperatures most clearly.


--
uǝlƃ

============================================================
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: Climate Change

Prof David West
In my most humble opinion:

1) it evolves in real-time, not only when new data is received but when new perspectives are offered. No more of this waiting for the old generation to die before we can change our minds crap.

2) It privileges no perspective(s), tool(s), or mode(s) of thinking. No more, "it isn't real unless it is mathematical, logical, formal, grammatical, or model-able."

3) It recognizes that, "it is always more complicated than that."

davewest



On Sat, Dec 30, 2017, at 4:29 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:

Pieter,

 

Seeing my question, out in the open, away from the underbrush of my other words, I am inclined to edit it:

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 1:32 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Nick,

 

What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Philip Tetlock has done excellent work answering exactly that question. His view is simply that you can test and develop the ability of individuals and groups to increase the quality of their judgments. (His focus is on forecasting).

 

Pieter

 

On 30 December 2017 at 19:20, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter, 

 

Some months back, at the Friday Meeting of the FRIAM Mother Church at St. Johns, we had a long discussion about the degree to which ANY of us ever made judgements in such matters on the basis of EVIDENCE.  I think, just for fun, we spent some time trying to PROVE to one another, on the basis of raw experience, that New Mexico is not flat.  Harder going than one might suppose.   So, I think we concluded that most of our judgements are based on circles of trust.  So then, the question becomes, what sorts of circles of trust are evidency.  The point is that, whatever one takes to be raw evidence always comes baled with a set of inferences and assumptions that are themselves not evidenced but which come by authority and seem trustworthy. 

 

Your pointing to historical climate anomalies seemed evidency to me in that it was plausible,  I had vaguely heard of those things and it seemed logically plausible to me that we should be able to POSTDICT these anomalies from present conditions, if our models are strong.  Thus, in the context of that particular network of trusted (plausible) propositions, I momentarily joined you in your skepticism.  But none of that is EVIDENCE in the sense that we all like to use that term. 

 

In short, what is the relation between evidence and trust?  Aren’t we all guilty of group think?  Isn’t all science (following Peirce) a kind of organized groupthink?  Isn’t the point NOT that some of us think independently and some of us are victims of Groupthink, but rather that some groups think better than others?  And if so, why?  What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 5:27 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Glen, 

 

I'd like to comment on your comment a few posts earlier:

"*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution."

 

My first reply is that I consider evidence to be much more valuable than expert's opinions. The IPCC is rich in expert's opinions and very light on evidence. 

 

The second reply is that I certainly do not claim any explicit fraud in climate science. But there is evidence of bias in climate science and "soft punishment" of scientists who disagree with the main narrative. For example, refer to Judith Curry's experience when she started to challenge the main climate science narrative. She is a former Chair of the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at Georgia Tech and blogs at www.judithcurry.com.

My point is that although there is no evidence of explicit fraud, there is evidence of an environment that promotes groupthink. 

 

Combining the two points, with evidence of less temperature increase than what the models predict and evidence of an environment in climate science promoting "fitting in" and the absence of healthy challenging of climate science, my conclusion is to be skeptical towards main climate science and the IPCC's conclusions. 

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 10:30, Pieter Steenekamp <[hidden email]> wrote:

I'm also a big fan of James Lovelock. Interesting that he changed his views on climate change dramatically. I refer to an interview The Guardian newspaper had with him recently (www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/30/james-lovelock-interview-by-end-of-century-robots-will-have-taken-over). I quote:

"What has changed dramatically, however, is his position on climate change. He now says: “Anyone who tries to predict more than five to 10 years is a bit of an idiot, because so many things can change unexpectedly.” "

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 07:25, Carl Tollander <[hidden email]> wrote:

I would rather,

 than worry directly about the predictability of the climate models we currently have vs the population/variety/intitial conclusions of researchers from decades ago, 

 that we instead consider a range of climate risks, their consequences,  our responses/adaptations, and their consequences.

The latter may prepare us, and it moves that portion of the science along in any case, and may yet eventually show up any deficiencies in the former, but let's get underway.

 

Personally, I'm with Lovelock on the large grain future: the window of action gets progressively smaller the longer we delay, and that the world will likely experience

a "massive reduction in carrying capacity" (that's a euphemism) over the next century.    Looking at older cultures and how they survive, mutate, die or flourish in analogous upheavals (e.g. mid-8th-century China or black-death eras in  Europe) might be worthwhile at this point. Start by assuming the fan/speed/blades and what/who hits it; what can/should we DO?  We should at least perhaps understand when we are waiting too long to begin adaptations that are cheap, safe, economic or politically acceptable, for Nature bats last.

 

Hope y'all like mosquitoes. 

 

カール

 

On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 8:59 PM, Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick writes:

 

< IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now? >

 

The European weather model assimilates 50+ types of measurements in space and time, including satellite data.   Obviously, these measurements were not possible except in the last few decades, never mind in the middle ages or before humans.   So whether or not there were even particular kinds of climate anomalies is a subject of some debate.    For example, were those periods wet or were they warm?  Were they uniform across the global or localized to certain regions?

 

Marcus



From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Nick Thompson <[hidden email]>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 8:27:21 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

I dunno, I thought Pietr's point was kind of interesting.  IF (and I don't know if the condition is met) ... IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now?   Or did somebody already answer that. 



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 5:40 PM
To: FriAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

Well, I mean "models" writ large.  Even when gathering and reducing observational data, there's a workflow for doing that. That workflow relies on a model of a sort.  And integrating different data sets so that they're commensurate also requires models.  E.g. correlating tree ring based with other climate data.

But you're ultimately right.  It's not so much about the models as it is the whole inferential apparatus one *might* use to drive policy decisions, including huge populations of expert climatologists.  There's probably a correlation to be drawn between people who distrust government and those who distrust the "scientific establishment" and/or the "deep state".  People tend to obey/trust whoever they regard as authority figures (e.g. greater shocks to another if a person in a lab coat tells you to do it).  Those of us who inherently distrust authority figures have a particular psychological bent and our impulse can go the other way.  It could be because we know how groups can succumb to bias, or how errors get propagated (e.g. peer review), or whatever.

*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution.

On 12/29/2017 12:41 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
> IMO it is not about models. Models are complicated and controversial. Climate change in the artic is a fact, melting arctic ice is a fact, melting glaciers is a fact. In the arctic regions we can oberve the rising temperatures most clearly.


--
uǝlƃ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 

 


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
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Re: Climate Change

Nick Thompson

Hi, Dave,

 

Hey, thanks for taking the question seriously.

 

Please see “larding”. 

 

I am still hoping to see you before you leave.  I might do coffee early Tuesday afternoon.

 

Nick

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 8:36 PM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

In my most humble opinion:

 

1) it evolves in real-time, not only when new data is received but when new perspectives are offered. No more of this waiting for the old generation to die before we can change our minds crap.

 

2) It privileges no perspective(s), tool(s), or mode(s) of thinking. No more, "it isn't real unless it is mathematical, logical, formal, grammatical, or model-able."

[NST==>Now, hang on, big fella!  It must privilege SOMETHING, else how does it know what “good” is.  And somebody might ask us what we meant by “real, here.  I guess I would prefer to say, ‘No more, “We can ignore it if it isn’t ….” ‘  <==nst]

 

3) It recognizes that, "it is always more complicated than that."

[NST==>Is this the pragmatist assertion that all certainties are provisional?  There is no sequence of head-flips of a coin  long as to guarantee that that coin is not fair.  <==nst]

 

By the way, every time I try to teach myself the periodic table I think, this isn’t a very “good” theory.  It’s got this crazy strangulated hernia and stuff kind of hanging off the end.  It just cries out to be tidied up.  I guess “tidiness” is one of the principles you think we are free to ignore? 

 

 

davewest

 

 

 

On Sat, Dec 30, 2017, at 4:29 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:

Pieter,

 

Seeing my question, out in the open, away from the underbrush of my other words, I am inclined to edit it:

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 1:32 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Nick,

 

What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Philip Tetlock has done excellent work answering exactly that question. His view is simply that you can test and develop the ability of individuals and groups to increase the quality of their judgments. (His focus is on forecasting).

 

Pieter

 

On 30 December 2017 at 19:20, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter, 

 

Some months back, at the Friday Meeting of the FRIAM Mother Church at St. Johns, we had a long discussion about the degree to which ANY of us ever made judgements in such matters on the basis of EVIDENCE.  I think, just for fun, we spent some time trying to PROVE to one another, on the basis of raw experience, that New Mexico is not flat.  Harder going than one might suppose.   So, I think we concluded that most of our judgements are based on circles of trust.  So then, the question becomes, what sorts of circles of trust are evidency.  The point is that, whatever one takes to be raw evidence always comes baled with a set of inferences and assumptions that are themselves not evidenced but which come by authority and seem trustworthy. 

 

Your pointing to historical climate anomalies seemed evidency to me in that it was plausible,  I had vaguely heard of those things and it seemed logically plausible to me that we should be able to POSTDICT these anomalies from present conditions, if our models are strong.  Thus, in the context of that particular network of trusted (plausible) propositions, I momentarily joined you in your skepticism.  But none of that is EVIDENCE in the sense that we all like to use that term. 

 

In short, what is the relation between evidence and trust?  Aren’t we all guilty of group think?  Isn’t all science (following Peirce) a kind of organized groupthink?  Isn’t the point NOT that some of us think independently and some of us are victims of Groupthink, but rather that some groups think better than others?  And if so, why?  What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 5:27 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Glen, 

 

I'd like to comment on your comment a few posts earlier:

"*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution."

 

My first reply is that I consider evidence to be much more valuable than expert's opinions. The IPCC is rich in expert's opinions and very light on evidence. 

 

The second reply is that I certainly do not claim any explicit fraud in climate science. But there is evidence of bias in climate science and "soft punishment" of scientists who disagree with the main narrative. For example, refer to Judith Curry's experience when she started to challenge the main climate science narrative. She is a former Chair of the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at Georgia Tech and blogs at www.judithcurry.com.

My point is that although there is no evidence of explicit fraud, there is evidence of an environment that promotes groupthink. 

 

Combining the two points, with evidence of less temperature increase than what the models predict and evidence of an environment in climate science promoting "fitting in" and the absence of healthy challenging of climate science, my conclusion is to be skeptical towards main climate science and the IPCC's conclusions. 

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 10:30, Pieter Steenekamp <[hidden email]> wrote:

I'm also a big fan of James Lovelock. Interesting that he changed his views on climate change dramatically. I refer to an interview The Guardian newspaper had with him recently (www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/30/james-lovelock-interview-by-end-of-century-robots-will-have-taken-over). I quote:

"What has changed dramatically, however, is his position on climate change. He now says: “Anyone who tries to predict more than five to 10 years is a bit of an idiot, because so many things can change unexpectedly.” "

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 07:25, Carl Tollander <[hidden email]> wrote:

I would rather,

 than worry directly about the predictability of the climate models we currently have vs the population/variety/intitial conclusions of researchers from decades ago, 

 that we instead consider a range of climate risks, their consequences,  our responses/adaptations, and their consequences.

The latter may prepare us, and it moves that portion of the science along in any case, and may yet eventually show up any deficiencies in the former, but let's get underway.

 

Personally, I'm with Lovelock on the large grain future: the window of action gets progressively smaller the longer we delay, and that the world will likely experience

a "massive reduction in carrying capacity" (that's a euphemism) over the next century.    Looking at older cultures and how they survive, mutate, die or flourish in analogous upheavals (e.g. mid-8th-century China or black-death eras in  Europe) might be worthwhile at this point. Start by assuming the fan/speed/blades and what/who hits it; what can/should we DO?  We should at least perhaps understand when we are waiting too long to begin adaptations that are cheap, safe, economic or politically acceptable, for Nature bats last.

 

Hope y'all like mosquitoes. 

 

カール

 

On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 8:59 PM, Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick writes:

 

< IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now? >

 

The European weather model assimilates 50+ types of measurements in space and time, including satellite data.   Obviously, these measurements were not possible except in the last few decades, never mind in the middle ages or before humans.   So whether or not there were even particular kinds of climate anomalies is a subject of some debate.    For example, were those periods wet or were they warm?  Were they uniform across the global or localized to certain regions?

 

Marcus


 

From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Nick Thompson <[hidden email]>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 8:27:21 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

I dunno, I thought Pietr's point was kind of interesting.  IF (and I don't know if the condition is met) ... IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now?   Or did somebody already answer that. 



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 5:40 PM
To: FriAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

Well, I mean "models" writ large.  Even when gathering and reducing observational data, there's a workflow for doing that. That workflow relies on a model of a sort.  And integrating different data sets so that they're commensurate also requires models.  E.g. correlating tree ring based with other climate data.

But you're ultimately right.  It's not so much about the models as it is the whole inferential apparatus one *might* use to drive policy decisions, including huge populations of expert climatologists.  There's probably a correlation to be drawn between people who distrust government and those who distrust the "scientific establishment" and/or the "deep state".  People tend to obey/trust whoever they regard as authority figures (e.g. greater shocks to another if a person in a lab coat tells you to do it).  Those of us who inherently distrust authority figures have a particular psychological bent and our impulse can go the other way.  It could be because we know how groups can succumb to bias, or how errors get propagated (e.g. peer review), or whatever.

*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution.

On 12/29/2017 12:41 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
> IMO it is not about models. Models are complicated and controversial. Climate change in the artic is a fact, melting arctic ice is a fact, melting glaciers is a fact. In the arctic regions we can oberve the rising temperatures most clearly.


--
uǝlƃ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 

 


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 

============================================================

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv

Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College

FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
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Re: Climate Change

Pieter Steenekamp
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Nick,

Referring to your What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

How does one define the "good" in "good GroupThought"?  It obviously depends on the context.

I want to refrain, for now, it could be part of another discussion, from commenting on cases where the "good" in "good thought" involves moral judgment.

For now, I want to restrict the context where it involves measurable judgments or falsifiable hypotheses. If the result of the group's thinking is measured against objective criteria the "goodness" can be measured.

An example of where groupthink went spectacularly wrong is in the groupthink of the quantum mechanics' experts in the 1920's rejecting the guiding wave theory. Especially after John von Neumann "proved" that hidden variables are inconsistent with the mathematics. The guiding wave theory requires hidden variables. The unknown Grete Hermann showed the wrong assumptions of von Neumann's proof, but the groupthink of the time rejected her findings and accepted the expert von Newman's proof. In the 1960's John Bell showed that Hermann was right and von Neumann wrong. Although the guiding wave theorem is considered incomplete today (as opposed to "wrong"), rejecting the groupthink of the 1920's up to 1960's, and accepting Grete's criticism of von Newmann's work, lead to today's accepted standard model of particle physics. One could argue that almost half a century of progress in particle physics was lost to groupthink and accepting an expert's judgment? 

There are simple principles to guide against groupthink and nurture constructive interaction that leads to wisdom of the crowd.

a) One is to never soft punish people that reject conventional thinking, even if the conventional thinking is supported by the views of experts. 

b) Emphasize objective tests and insist on falsifiable hypotheses.

I referred to Philp Tetlock in a previous post, and want to that again. He has achieved amazing success in establishing what to do to get good judgment. I want to recommend to those that are interested in this topic to read up on his work. 

As a final point of this post, I want to mention that I experienced the replies to me challenging the accepted scientific views on climate change as contributing to the wisdom of the crowds and not groupthink. I was not punished for rejecting the conventional thinking. 

Pieter

On 31 December 2017 at 01:29, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter,

 

Seeing my question, out in the open, away from the underbrush of my other words, I am inclined to edit it:

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 1:32 PM


To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Nick,

 

What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Philip Tetlock has done excellent work answering exactly that question. His view is simply that you can test and develop the ability of individuals and groups to increase the quality of their judgments. (His focus is on forecasting).

 

Pieter

 

On 30 December 2017 at 19:20, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter, 

 

Some months back, at the Friday Meeting of the FRIAM Mother Church at St. Johns, we had a long discussion about the degree to which ANY of us ever made judgements in such matters on the basis of EVIDENCE.  I think, just for fun, we spent some time trying to PROVE to one another, on the basis of raw experience, that New Mexico is not flat.  Harder going than one might suppose.   So, I think we concluded that most of our judgements are based on circles of trust.  So then, the question becomes, what sorts of circles of trust are evidency.  The point is that, whatever one takes to be raw evidence always comes baled with a set of inferences and assumptions that are themselves not evidenced but which come by authority and seem trustworthy. 

 

Your pointing to historical climate anomalies seemed evidency to me in that it was plausible,  I had vaguely heard of those things and it seemed logically plausible to me that we should be able to POSTDICT these anomalies from present conditions, if our models are strong.  Thus, in the context of that particular network of trusted (plausible) propositions, I momentarily joined you in your skepticism.  But none of that is EVIDENCE in the sense that we all like to use that term. 

 

In short, what is the relation between evidence and trust?  Aren’t we all guilty of group think?  Isn’t all science (following Peirce) a kind of organized groupthink?  Isn’t the point NOT that some of us think independently and some of us are victims of Groupthink, but rather that some groups think better than others?  And if so, why?  What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 5:27 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Glen, 

 

I'd like to comment on your comment a few posts earlier:

"*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution."

 

My first reply is that I consider evidence to be much more valuable than expert's opinions. The IPCC is rich in expert's opinions and very light on evidence. 

 

The second reply is that I certainly do not claim any explicit fraud in climate science. But there is evidence of bias in climate science and "soft punishment" of scientists who disagree with the main narrative. For example, refer to Judith Curry's experience when she started to challenge the main climate science narrative. She is a former Chair of the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at Georgia Tech and blogs at www.judithcurry.com.

My point is that although there is no evidence of explicit fraud, there is evidence of an environment that promotes groupthink. 

 

Combining the two points, with evidence of less temperature increase than what the models predict and evidence of an environment in climate science promoting "fitting in" and the absence of healthy challenging of climate science, my conclusion is to be skeptical towards main climate science and the IPCC's conclusions. 

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 10:30, Pieter Steenekamp <[hidden email]> wrote:

I'm also a big fan of James Lovelock. Interesting that he changed his views on climate change dramatically. I refer to an interview The Guardian newspaper had with him recently (www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/30/james-lovelock-interview-by-end-of-century-robots-will-have-taken-over). I quote:

"What has changed dramatically, however, is his position on climate change. He now says: “Anyone who tries to predict more than five to 10 years is a bit of an idiot, because so many things can change unexpectedly.” "

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 07:25, Carl Tollander <[hidden email]> wrote:

I would rather,

 than worry directly about the predictability of the climate models we currently have vs the population/variety/intitial conclusions of researchers from decades ago, 

 that we instead consider a range of climate risks, their consequences,  our responses/adaptations, and their consequences.

The latter may prepare us, and it moves that portion of the science along in any case, and may yet eventually show up any deficiencies in the former, but let's get underway.

 

Personally, I'm with Lovelock on the large grain future: the window of action gets progressively smaller the longer we delay, and that the world will likely experience

a "massive reduction in carrying capacity" (that's a euphemism) over the next century.    Looking at older cultures and how they survive, mutate, die or flourish in analogous upheavals (e.g. mid-8th-century China or black-death eras in  Europe) might be worthwhile at this point. Start by assuming the fan/speed/blades and what/who hits it; what can/should we DO?  We should at least perhaps understand when we are waiting too long to begin adaptations that are cheap, safe, economic or politically acceptable, for Nature bats last.

 

Hope y'all like mosquitoes. 

 

カール

 

On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 8:59 PM, Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick writes:

 

< IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now? >

 

The European weather model assimilates 50+ types of measurements in space and time, including satellite data.   Obviously, these measurements were not possible except in the last few decades, never mind in the middle ages or before humans.   So whether or not there were even particular kinds of climate anomalies is a subject of some debate.    For example, were those periods wet or were they warm?  Were they uniform across the global or localized to certain regions?

 

Marcus


From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Nick Thompson <[hidden email]>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 8:27:21 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

I dunno, I thought Pietr's point was kind of interesting.  IF (and I don't know if the condition is met) ... IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now?   Or did somebody already answer that. 



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 5:40 PM
To: FriAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

Well, I mean "models" writ large.  Even when gathering and reducing observational data, there's a workflow for doing that. That workflow relies on a model of a sort.  And integrating different data sets so that they're commensurate also requires models.  E.g. correlating tree ring based with other climate data.

But you're ultimately right.  It's not so much about the models as it is the whole inferential apparatus one *might* use to drive policy decisions, including huge populations of expert climatologists.  There's probably a correlation to be drawn between people who distrust government and those who distrust the "scientific establishment" and/or the "deep state".  People tend to obey/trust whoever they regard as authority figures (e.g. greater shocks to another if a person in a lab coat tells you to do it).  Those of us who inherently distrust authority figures have a particular psychological bent and our impulse can go the other way.  It could be because we know how groups can succumb to bias, or how errors get propagated (e.g. peer review), or whatever.

*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution.

On 12/29/2017 12:41 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
> IMO it is not about models. Models are complicated and controversial. Climate change in the artic is a fact, melting arctic ice is a fact, melting glaciers is a fact. In the arctic regions we can oberve the rising temperatures most clearly.


--
uǝlƃ

============================================================
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Re: Climate Change

Prof David West
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Hi Nick,

I always take you and your questions seriously.

RE: comments

I must insist on the absence of privileged means of knowing. If you privilege, math for example, you are saying that no idea, knowledge, insight, "truth" (if you must), or thinking, can be "good" (your term) unless it is expressible in mathematics. You are raising form above substance. You are also allowing perpetration of all kinds of mischief as long as it is hidden behind the veneer of your 'privileged means'.

For example, since the questions arose in the context of a climate change discussion; it has been asserted that those advancing climate change must be believed because they are "scientific" (the scientific approach being privileged above all others). The only way to challenge them is with alternative models, ideas, etc. that are  equally "scientific." If you simply doubt or refuse to fully accept the scientific thought on the matter you must be ignorant, stupid, and/or willfully evil. Then the mischief piles on - as interpretations, conclusions, calls for action, and public policy are promoted and justified on the grounds that since the "science" is right, then so to must be the consequents.

As to, "more complicated," - yes, in part it is an acceptance of the pragmatic provisional but it is also more than that, i.e. a red flag warning against use of the verb 'to be'. The issue is subtle and "more complicated" than current space and time afford an opportunity to discuss fully.

davewest


On Sat, Dec 30, 2017, at 10:30 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:

Hi, Dave,

 

Hey, thanks for taking the question seriously.

 

Please see “larding”. 

 

I am still hoping to see you before you leave.  I might do coffee early Tuesday afternoon.

 

Nick

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 8:36 PM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

In my most humble opinion:

 

1) it evolves in real-time, not only when new data is received but when new perspectives are offered. No more of this waiting for the old generation to die before we can change our minds crap.

 

2) It privileges no perspective(s), tool(s), or mode(s) of thinking. No more, "it isn't real unless it is mathematical, logical, formal, grammatical, or model-able."

[NST==>Now, hang on, big fella!  It must privilege SOMETHING, else how does it know what “good” is.  And somebody might ask us what we meant by “real, here.  I guess I would prefer to say, ‘No more, “We can ignore it if it isn’t ….” ‘  <==nst]

 

3) It recognizes that, "it is always more complicated than that."

[NST==>Is this the pragmatist assertion that all certainties are provisional?  There is no sequence of head-flips of a coin  long as to guarantee that that coin is not fair.  <==nst]

 

By the way, every time I try to teach myself the periodic table I think, this isn’t a very “good” theory.  It’s got this crazy strangulated hernia and stuff kind of hanging off the end.  It just cries out to be tidied up.  I guess “tidiness” is one of the principles you think we are free to ignore? 

 

 

davewest

 

 

 

On Sat, Dec 30, 2017, at 4:29 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:

Pieter,

 

Seeing my question, out in the open, away from the underbrush of my other words, I am inclined to edit it:

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 1:32 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Nick,

 

What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Philip Tetlock has done excellent work answering exactly that question. His view is simply that you can test and develop the ability of individuals and groups to increase the quality of their judgments. (His focus is on forecasting).

 

Pieter

 

On 30 December 2017 at 19:20, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter, 

 

Some months back, at the Friday Meeting of the FRIAM Mother Church at St. Johns, we had a long discussion about the degree to which ANY of us ever made judgements in such matters on the basis of EVIDENCE.  I think, just for fun, we spent some time trying to PROVE to one another, on the basis of raw experience, that New Mexico is not flat.  Harder going than one might suppose.   So, I think we concluded that most of our judgements are based on circles of trust.  So then, the question becomes, what sorts of circles of trust are evidency.  The point is that, whatever one takes to be raw evidence always comes baled with a set of inferences and assumptions that are themselves not evidenced but which come by authority and seem trustworthy. 

 

Your pointing to historical climate anomalies seemed evidency to me in that it was plausible,  I had vaguely heard of those things and it seemed logically plausible to me that we should be able to POSTDICT these anomalies from present conditions, if our models are strong.  Thus, in the context of that particular network of trusted (plausible) propositions, I momentarily joined you in your skepticism.  But none of that is EVIDENCE in the sense that we all like to use that term. 

 

In short, what is the relation between evidence and trust?  Aren’t we all guilty of group think?  Isn’t all science (following Peirce) a kind of organized groupthink?  Isn’t the point NOT that some of us think independently and some of us are victims of Groupthink, but rather that some groups think better than others?  And if so, why?  What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 5:27 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Glen, 

 

I'd like to comment on your comment a few posts earlier:

"*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution."

 

My first reply is that I consider evidence to be much more valuable than expert's opinions. The IPCC is rich in expert's opinions and very light on evidence. 

 

The second reply is that I certainly do not claim any explicit fraud in climate science. But there is evidence of bias in climate science and "soft punishment" of scientists who disagree with the main narrative. For example, refer to Judith Curry's experience when she started to challenge the main climate science narrative. She is a former Chair of the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at Georgia Tech and blogs at www.judithcurry.com.

My point is that although there is no evidence of explicit fraud, there is evidence of an environment that promotes groupthink. 

 

Combining the two points, with evidence of less temperature increase than what the models predict and evidence of an environment in climate science promoting "fitting in" and the absence of healthy challenging of climate science, my conclusion is to be skeptical towards main climate science and the IPCC's conclusions. 

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 10:30, Pieter Steenekamp <[hidden email]> wrote:

I'm also a big fan of James Lovelock. Interesting that he changed his views on climate change dramatically. I refer to an interview The Guardian newspaper had with him recently (www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/30/james-lovelock-interview-by-end-of-century-robots-will-have-taken-over). I quote:

"What has changed dramatically, however, is his position on climate change. He now says: “Anyone who tries to predict more than five to 10 years is a bit of an idiot, because so many things can change unexpectedly.” "

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 07:25, Carl Tollander <[hidden email]> wrote:

I would rather,

 than worry directly about the predictability of the climate models we currently have vs the population/variety/intitial conclusions of researchers from decades ago, 

 that we instead consider a range of climate risks, their consequences,  our responses/adaptations, and their consequences.

The latter may prepare us, and it moves that portion of the science along in any case, and may yet eventually show up any deficiencies in the former, but let's get underway.

 

Personally, I'm with Lovelock on the large grain future: the window of action gets progressively smaller the longer we delay, and that the world will likely experience

a "massive reduction in carrying capacity" (that's a euphemism) over the next century.    Looking at older cultures and how they survive, mutate, die or flourish in analogous upheavals (e.g. mid-8th-century China or black-death eras in  Europe) might be worthwhile at this point. Start by assuming the fan/speed/blades and what/who hits it; what can/should we DO?  We should at least perhaps understand when we are waiting too long to begin adaptations that are cheap, safe, economic or politically acceptable, for Nature bats last.

 

Hope y'all like mosquitoes. 

 

カール

 

On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 8:59 PM, Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick writes:

 

< IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now? >

 

The European weather model assimilates 50+ types of measurements in space and time, including satellite data.   Obviously, these measurements were not possible except in the last few decades, never mind in the middle ages or before humans.   So whether or not there were even particular kinds of climate anomalies is a subject of some debate.    For example, were those periods wet or were they warm?  Were they uniform across the global or localized to certain regions?

 

Marcus



 

From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Nick Thompson <[hidden email]>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 8:27:21 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

I dunno, I thought Pietr's point was kind of interesting.  IF (and I don't know if the condition is met) ... IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now?   Or did somebody already answer that. 



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 5:40 PM
To: FriAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

Well, I mean "models" writ large.  Even when gathering and reducing observational data, there's a workflow for doing that. That workflow relies on a model of a sort.  And integrating different data sets so that they're commensurate also requires models.  E.g. correlating tree ring based with other climate data.

But you're ultimately right.  It's not so much about the models as it is the whole inferential apparatus one *might* use to drive policy decisions, including huge populations of expert climatologists.  There's probably a correlation to be drawn between people who distrust government and those who distrust the "scientific establishment" and/or the "deep state".  People tend to obey/trust whoever they regard as authority figures (e.g. greater shocks to another if a person in a lab coat tells you to do it).  Those of us who inherently distrust authority figures have a particular psychological bent and our impulse can go the other way.  It could be because we know how groups can succumb to bias, or how errors get propagated (e.g. peer review), or whatever.

*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution.

On 12/29/2017 12:41 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
> IMO it is not about models. Models are complicated and controversial. Climate change in the artic is a fact, melting arctic ice is a fact, melting glaciers is a fact. In the arctic regions we can oberve the rising temperatures most clearly.


--
uǝlƃ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Re: Climate Change

Marcus G. Daniels
In reply to this post by Prof David West

< 2) It privileges no perspective(s), tool(s), or mode(s) of thinking. No more, "it isn't real unless it is mathematical, logical, formal, grammatical, or model-able." >


How might one anticipate material properties at MBar and thousands of Kelvin, such as in the deep Earth?  There are lots of situations in which even the most advanced diagnostic techniques cannot measure without destroying a sample, or measure with sufficient resolution/frequency.   In these situations, ab initio calculations are needed.


Now, hypothetically, that might involve using models learned by machines, and not directly comprehensible by human analysts, but if patterns are learned that can be validated, then I'd say that falls into the category of "model-able".


I am skeptical there is any value in GroupThought outside of politics.

There can be useful syntheses of the works of individuals, but for it to be coherent it needs to be made readable and writable in ways that are not completely lossy.


Marcus




From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Prof David West <[hidden email]>
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 8:35 PM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change
 
In my most humble opinion:

1) it evolves in real-time, not only when new data is received but when new perspectives are offered. No more of this waiting for the old generation to die before we can change our minds crap.

2) It privileges no perspective(s), tool(s), or mode(s) of thinking. No more, "it isn't real unless it is mathematical, logical, formal, grammatical, or model-able."

3) It recognizes that, "it is always more complicated than that."

davewest



On Sat, Dec 30, 2017, at 4:29 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:

Pieter,

 

Seeing my question, out in the open, away from the underbrush of my other words, I am inclined to edit it:

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 1:32 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Nick,

 

What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Philip Tetlock has done excellent work answering exactly that question. His view is simply that you can test and develop the ability of individuals and groups to increase the quality of their judgments. (His focus is on forecasting).

 

Pieter

 

On 30 December 2017 at 19:20, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter, 

 

Some months back, at the Friday Meeting of the FRIAM Mother Church at St. Johns, we had a long discussion about the degree to which ANY of us ever made judgements in such matters on the basis of EVIDENCE.  I think, just for fun, we spent some time trying to PROVE to one another, on the basis of raw experience, that New Mexico is not flat.  Harder going than one might suppose.   So, I think we concluded that most of our judgements are based on circles of trust.  So then, the question becomes, what sorts of circles of trust are evidency.  The point is that, whatever one takes to be raw evidence always comes baled with a set of inferences and assumptions that are themselves not evidenced but which come by authority and seem trustworthy. 

 

Your pointing to historical climate anomalies seemed evidency to me in that it was plausible,  I had vaguely heard of those things and it seemed logically plausible to me that we should be able to POSTDICT these anomalies from present conditions, if our models are strong.  Thus, in the context of that particular network of trusted (plausible) propositions, I momentarily joined you in your skepticism.  But none of that is EVIDENCE in the sense that we all like to use that term. 

 

In short, what is the relation between evidence and trust?  Aren’t we all guilty of group think?  Isn’t all science (following Peirce) a kind of organized groupthink?  Isn’t the point NOT that some of us think independently and some of us are victims of Groupthink, but rather that some groups think better than others?  And if so, why?  What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 5:27 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Glen, 

 

I'd like to comment on your comment a few posts earlier:

"*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution."

 

My first reply is that I consider evidence to be much more valuable than expert's opinions. The IPCC is rich in expert's opinions and very light on evidence. 

 

The second reply is that I certainly do not claim any explicit fraud in climate science. But there is evidence of bias in climate science and "soft punishment" of scientists who disagree with the main narrative. For example, refer to Judith Curry's experience when she started to challenge the main climate science narrative. She is a former Chair of the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at Georgia Tech and blogs at www.judithcurry.com.

My point is that although there is no evidence of explicit fraud, there is evidence of an environment that promotes groupthink. 

 

Combining the two points, with evidence of less temperature increase than what the models predict and evidence of an environment in climate science promoting "fitting in" and the absence of healthy challenging of climate science, my conclusion is to be skeptical towards main climate science and the IPCC's conclusions. 

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 10:30, Pieter Steenekamp <[hidden email]> wrote:

I'm also a big fan of James Lovelock. Interesting that he changed his views on climate change dramatically. I refer to an interview The Guardian newspaper had with him recently (www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/30/james-lovelock-interview-by-end-of-century-robots-will-have-taken-over). I quote:

"What has changed dramatically, however, is his position on climate change. He now says: “Anyone who tries to predict more than five to 10 years is a bit of an idiot, because so many things can change unexpectedly.” "

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 07:25, Carl Tollander <[hidden email]> wrote:

I would rather,

 than worry directly about the predictability of the climate models we currently have vs the population/variety/intitial conclusions of researchers from decades ago, 

 that we instead consider a range of climate risks, their consequences,  our responses/adaptations, and their consequences.

The latter may prepare us, and it moves that portion of the science along in any case, and may yet eventually show up any deficiencies in the former, but let's get underway.

 

Personally, I'm with Lovelock on the large grain future: the window of action gets progressively smaller the longer we delay, and that the world will likely experience

a "massive reduction in carrying capacity" (that's a euphemism) over the next century.    Looking at older cultures and how they survive, mutate, die or flourish in analogous upheavals (e.g. mid-8th-century China or black-death eras in  Europe) might be worthwhile at this point. Start by assuming the fan/speed/blades and what/who hits it; what can/should we DO?  We should at least perhaps understand when we are waiting too long to begin adaptations that are cheap, safe, economic or politically acceptable, for Nature bats last.

 

Hope y'all like mosquitoes. 

 

カール

 

On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 8:59 PM, Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick writes:

 

< IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now? >

 

The European weather model assimilates 50+ types of measurements in space and time, including satellite data.   Obviously, these measurements were not possible except in the last few decades, never mind in the middle ages or before humans.   So whether or not there were even particular kinds of climate anomalies is a subject of some debate.    For example, were those periods wet or were they warm?  Were they uniform across the global or localized to certain regions?

 

Marcus



From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Nick Thompson <[hidden email]>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 8:27:21 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

I dunno, I thought Pietr's point was kind of interesting.  IF (and I don't know if the condition is met) ... IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now?   Or did somebody already answer that. 



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 5:40 PM
To: FriAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

Well, I mean "models" writ large.  Even when gathering and reducing observational data, there's a workflow for doing that. That workflow relies on a model of a sort.  And integrating different data sets so that they're commensurate also requires models.  E.g. correlating tree ring based with other climate data.

But you're ultimately right.  It's not so much about the models as it is the whole inferential apparatus one *might* use to drive policy decisions, including huge populations of expert climatologists.  There's probably a correlation to be drawn between people who distrust government and those who distrust the "scientific establishment" and/or the "deep state".  People tend to obey/trust whoever they regard as authority figures (e.g. greater shocks to another if a person in a lab coat tells you to do it).  Those of us who inherently distrust authority figures have a particular psychological bent and our impulse can go the other way.  It could be because we know how groups can succumb to bias, or how errors get propagated (e.g. peer review), or whatever.

*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution.

On 12/29/2017 12:41 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
> IMO it is not about models. Models are complicated and controversial. Climate change in the artic is a fact, melting arctic ice is a fact, melting glaciers is a fact. In the arctic regions we can oberve the rising temperatures most clearly.


--
uǝlƃ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


============================================================
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


============================================================
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 

 


============================================================
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
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Re: Climate Change

Marcus G. Daniels
In reply to this post by Pieter Steenekamp

"An example of where groupthink went spectacularly wrong is in the groupthink of the quantum mechanics' experts in the 1920's rejecting the guiding wave theory."


Did it go spectacularly wrong?   Sure I have a `weakness' for preferring theories that have a simple physical intuition behind them, but has the field really been significantly damaged by `bias' against hidden variable theory?


Here again, there's a political dimension:  What kind of work gets funded or not funded.   Besides that, a researcher can believe whatever interpretation they want, provided they can make their models predict the real world.   Also there can be the situation in which the intellectual consensus of the community is that what is needed is more depth, and not more breadth.   (And that kind of bias can be more than self-serving.)


Someone once told me that their research in quantum mechanics was, for the near term, limited to "shut up and calculate" topics that were `safe'.   The foundational questions of what the hell is going on would have to wait for tenure.


This kind of thinking seems to me to be a competency trap. 


Marcus


From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Pieter Steenekamp <[hidden email]>
Sent: Sunday, December 31, 2017 12:39:29 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change
 
Nick,

Referring to your What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

How does one define the "good" in "good GroupThought"?  It obviously depends on the context.

I want to refrain, for now, it could be part of another discussion, from commenting on cases where the "good" in "good thought" involves moral judgment.

For now, I want to restrict the context where it involves measurable judgments or falsifiable hypotheses. If the result of the group's thinking is measured against objective criteria the "goodness" can be measured.

An example of where groupthink went spectacularly wrong is in the groupthink of the quantum mechanics' experts in the 1920's rejecting the guiding wave theory. Especially after John von Neumann "proved" that hidden variables are inconsistent with the mathematics. The guiding wave theory requires hidden variables. The unknown Grete Hermann showed the wrong assumptions of von Neumann's proof, but the groupthink of the time rejected her findings and accepted the expert von Newman's proof. In the 1960's John Bell showed that Hermann was right and von Neumann wrong. Although the guiding wave theorem is considered incomplete today (as opposed to "wrong"), rejecting the groupthink of the 1920's up to 1960's, and accepting Grete's criticism of von Newmann's work, lead to today's accepted standard model of particle physics. One could argue that almost half a century of progress in particle physics was lost to groupthink and accepting an expert's judgment? 

There are simple principles to guide against groupthink and nurture constructive interaction that leads to wisdom of the crowd.

a) One is to never soft punish people that reject conventional thinking, even if the conventional thinking is supported by the views of experts. 

b) Emphasize objective tests and insist on falsifiable hypotheses.

I referred to Philp Tetlock in a previous post, and want to that again. He has achieved amazing success in establishing what to do to get good judgment. I want to recommend to those that are interested in this topic to read up on his work. 

As a final point of this post, I want to mention that I experienced the replies to me challenging the accepted scientific views on climate change as contributing to the wisdom of the crowds and not groupthink. I was not punished for rejecting the conventional thinking. 

Pieter

On 31 December 2017 at 01:29, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter,

 

Seeing my question, out in the open, away from the underbrush of my other words, I am inclined to edit it:

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 1:32 PM


To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Nick,

 

What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Philip Tetlock has done excellent work answering exactly that question. His view is simply that you can test and develop the ability of individuals and groups to increase the quality of their judgments. (His focus is on forecasting).

 

Pieter

 

On 30 December 2017 at 19:20, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter, 

 

Some months back, at the Friday Meeting of the FRIAM Mother Church at St. Johns, we had a long discussion about the degree to which ANY of us ever made judgements in such matters on the basis of EVIDENCE.  I think, just for fun, we spent some time trying to PROVE to one another, on the basis of raw experience, that New Mexico is not flat.  Harder going than one might suppose.   So, I think we concluded that most of our judgements are based on circles of trust.  So then, the question becomes, what sorts of circles of trust are evidency.  The point is that, whatever one takes to be raw evidence always comes baled with a set of inferences and assumptions that are themselves not evidenced but which come by authority and seem trustworthy. 

 

Your pointing to historical climate anomalies seemed evidency to me in that it was plausible,  I had vaguely heard of those things and it seemed logically plausible to me that we should be able to POSTDICT these anomalies from present conditions, if our models are strong.  Thus, in the context of that particular network of trusted (plausible) propositions, I momentarily joined you in your skepticism.  But none of that is EVIDENCE in the sense that we all like to use that term. 

 

In short, what is the relation between evidence and trust?  Aren’t we all guilty of group think?  Isn’t all science (following Peirce) a kind of organized groupthink?  Isn’t the point NOT that some of us think independently and some of us are victims of Groupthink, but rather that some groups think better than others?  And if so, why?  What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 5:27 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Glen, 

 

I'd like to comment on your comment a few posts earlier:

"*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution."

 

My first reply is that I consider evidence to be much more valuable than expert's opinions. The IPCC is rich in expert's opinions and very light on evidence. 

 

The second reply is that I certainly do not claim any explicit fraud in climate science. But there is evidence of bias in climate science and "soft punishment" of scientists who disagree with the main narrative. For example, refer to Judith Curry's experience when she started to challenge the main climate science narrative. She is a former Chair of the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at Georgia Tech and blogs at www.judithcurry.com.

My point is that although there is no evidence of explicit fraud, there is evidence of an environment that promotes groupthink. 

 

Combining the two points, with evidence of less temperature increase than what the models predict and evidence of an environment in climate science promoting "fitting in" and the absence of healthy challenging of climate science, my conclusion is to be skeptical towards main climate science and the IPCC's conclusions. 

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 10:30, Pieter Steenekamp <[hidden email]> wrote:

I'm also a big fan of James Lovelock. Interesting that he changed his views on climate change dramatically. I refer to an interview The Guardian newspaper had with him recently (www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/30/james-lovelock-interview-by-end-of-century-robots-will-have-taken-over). I quote:

"What has changed dramatically, however, is his position on climate change. He now says: “Anyone who tries to predict more than five to 10 years is a bit of an idiot, because so many things can change unexpectedly.” "

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 07:25, Carl Tollander <[hidden email]> wrote:

I would rather,

 than worry directly about the predictability of the climate models we currently have vs the population/variety/intitial conclusions of researchers from decades ago, 

 that we instead consider a range of climate risks, their consequences,  our responses/adaptations, and their consequences.

The latter may prepare us, and it moves that portion of the science along in any case, and may yet eventually show up any deficiencies in the former, but let's get underway.

 

Personally, I'm with Lovelock on the large grain future: the window of action gets progressively smaller the longer we delay, and that the world will likely experience

a "massive reduction in carrying capacity" (that's a euphemism) over the next century.    Looking at older cultures and how they survive, mutate, die or flourish in analogous upheavals (e.g. mid-8th-century China or black-death eras in  Europe) might be worthwhile at this point. Start by assuming the fan/speed/blades and what/who hits it; what can/should we DO?  We should at least perhaps understand when we are waiting too long to begin adaptations that are cheap, safe, economic or politically acceptable, for Nature bats last.

 

Hope y'all like mosquitoes. 

 

カール

 

On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 8:59 PM, Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick writes:

 

< IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now? >

 

The European weather model assimilates 50+ types of measurements in space and time, including satellite data.   Obviously, these measurements were not possible except in the last few decades, never mind in the middle ages or before humans.   So whether or not there were even particular kinds of climate anomalies is a subject of some debate.    For example, were those periods wet or were they warm?  Were they uniform across the global or localized to certain regions?

 

Marcus


From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Nick Thompson <[hidden email]>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 8:27:21 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

I dunno, I thought Pietr's point was kind of interesting.  IF (and I don't know if the condition is met) ... IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now?   Or did somebody already answer that. 



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 5:40 PM
To: FriAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

Well, I mean "models" writ large.  Even when gathering and reducing observational data, there's a workflow for doing that. That workflow relies on a model of a sort.  And integrating different data sets so that they're commensurate also requires models.  E.g. correlating tree ring based with other climate data.

But you're ultimately right.  It's not so much about the models as it is the whole inferential apparatus one *might* use to drive policy decisions, including huge populations of expert climatologists.  There's probably a correlation to be drawn between people who distrust government and those who distrust the "scientific establishment" and/or the "deep state".  People tend to obey/trust whoever they regard as authority figures (e.g. greater shocks to another if a person in a lab coat tells you to do it).  Those of us who inherently distrust authority figures have a particular psychological bent and our impulse can go the other way.  It could be because we know how groups can succumb to bias, or how errors get propagated (e.g. peer review), or whatever.

*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution.

On 12/29/2017 12:41 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
> IMO it is not about models. Models are complicated and controversial. Climate change in the artic is a fact, melting arctic ice is a fact, melting glaciers is a fact. In the arctic regions we can oberve the rising temperatures most clearly.


--
uǝlƃ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 

 


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


============================================================
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
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Re: Climate Change

Nick Thompson
In reply to this post by Pieter Steenekamp

Hi, Pieter,

 

Thanks for this thoughtful post.

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

The italicized bit is actually a definition both of “good” and “objective”.  Peirce asserts that this is what we MEAN when we say that thought is good and results are objective.  We MEAN that they are likely to survive future experience: ie,  that the experiences we have (experiments that we do) in the future are unlikely to dislodge them.  Or as Peirce puts it, an objective fact is proposition that does not depend on whether you, or I, or any other particular individual or groups believe it.  His is a statistical model.  The coin that is flipped a thousand times and comes up roughly 50 percent is more likely to be drawn from a population of fair coins than from a population of unfair coins, and one’s confidence rises as the size of the sample increases. Similarly, the coin that comes up fair when it is flipped under a variety of circumstances – replications in different labs.  And yes, statements made about a coin which, when flipped, we have no idea whether it came up heads or tails are unlikely to endure. 

 

The Congregation has heard all of this from me before and are beginning to roll their eyes as we speak.  I am an alert vampire, and I sense that you are new blood.   Thanks for listening, if, indeed, you are still with me. 

 

All the best,

 

Nick

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Sunday, December 31, 2017 12:39 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Nick,

 

Referring to your What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

How does one define the "good" in "good GroupThought"?  It obviously depends on the context.

 

I want to refrain, for now, it could be part of another discussion, from commenting on cases where the "good" in "good thought" involves moral judgment.

 

For now, I want to restrict the context where it involves measurable judgments or falsifiable hypotheses. If the result of the group's thinking is measured against objective criteria the "goodness" can be measured.

 

An example of where groupthink went spectacularly wrong is in the groupthink of the quantum mechanics' experts in the 1920's rejecting the guiding wave theory. Especially after John von Neumann "proved" that hidden variables are inconsistent with the mathematics. The guiding wave theory requires hidden variables. The unknown Grete Hermann showed the wrong assumptions of von Neumann's proof, but the groupthink of the time rejected her findings and accepted the expert von Newman's proof. In the 1960's John Bell showed that Hermann was right and von Neumann wrong. Although the guiding wave theorem is considered incomplete today (as opposed to "wrong"), rejecting the groupthink of the 1920's up to 1960's, and accepting Grete's criticism of von Newmann's work, lead to today's accepted standard model of particle physics. One could argue that almost half a century of progress in particle physics was lost to groupthink and accepting an expert's judgment? 

 

There are simple principles to guide against groupthink and nurture constructive interaction that leads to wisdom of the crowd.

 

a) One is to never soft punish people that reject conventional thinking, even if the conventional thinking is supported by the views of experts. 

 

b) Emphasize objective tests and insist on falsifiable hypotheses.

 

I referred to Philp Tetlock in a previous post, and want to that again. He has achieved amazing success in establishing what to do to get good judgment. I want to recommend to those that are interested in this topic to read up on his work. 

 

As a final point of this post, I want to mention that I experienced the replies to me challenging the accepted scientific views on climate change as contributing to the wisdom of the crowds and not groupthink. I was not punished for rejecting the conventional thinking. 

 

Pieter

 

On 31 December 2017 at 01:29, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter,

 

Seeing my question, out in the open, away from the underbrush of my other words, I am inclined to edit it:

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 1:32 PM


To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Nick,

 

What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Philip Tetlock has done excellent work answering exactly that question. His view is simply that you can test and develop the ability of individuals and groups to increase the quality of their judgments. (His focus is on forecasting).

 

Pieter

 

On 30 December 2017 at 19:20, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter, 

 

Some months back, at the Friday Meeting of the FRIAM Mother Church at St. Johns, we had a long discussion about the degree to which ANY of us ever made judgements in such matters on the basis of EVIDENCE.  I think, just for fun, we spent some time trying to PROVE to one another, on the basis of raw experience, that New Mexico is not flat.  Harder going than one might suppose.   So, I think we concluded that most of our judgements are based on circles of trust.  So then, the question becomes, what sorts of circles of trust are evidency.  The point is that, whatever one takes to be raw evidence always comes baled with a set of inferences and assumptions that are themselves not evidenced but which come by authority and seem trustworthy. 

 

Your pointing to historical climate anomalies seemed evidency to me in that it was plausible,  I had vaguely heard of those things and it seemed logically plausible to me that we should be able to POSTDICT these anomalies from present conditions, if our models are strong.  Thus, in the context of that particular network of trusted (plausible) propositions, I momentarily joined you in your skepticism.  But none of that is EVIDENCE in the sense that we all like to use that term. 

 

In short, what is the relation between evidence and trust?  Aren’t we all guilty of group think?  Isn’t all science (following Peirce) a kind of organized groupthink?  Isn’t the point NOT that some of us think independently and some of us are victims of Groupthink, but rather that some groups think better than others?  And if so, why?  What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 5:27 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Glen, 

 

I'd like to comment on your comment a few posts earlier:

"*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution."

 

My first reply is that I consider evidence to be much more valuable than expert's opinions. The IPCC is rich in expert's opinions and very light on evidence. 

 

The second reply is that I certainly do not claim any explicit fraud in climate science. But there is evidence of bias in climate science and "soft punishment" of scientists who disagree with the main narrative. For example, refer to Judith Curry's experience when she started to challenge the main climate science narrative. She is a former Chair of the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at Georgia Tech and blogs at www.judithcurry.com.

My point is that although there is no evidence of explicit fraud, there is evidence of an environment that promotes groupthink. 

 

Combining the two points, with evidence of less temperature increase than what the models predict and evidence of an environment in climate science promoting "fitting in" and the absence of healthy challenging of climate science, my conclusion is to be skeptical towards main climate science and the IPCC's conclusions. 

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 10:30, Pieter Steenekamp <[hidden email]> wrote:

I'm also a big fan of James Lovelock. Interesting that he changed his views on climate change dramatically. I refer to an interview The Guardian newspaper had with him recently (www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/30/james-lovelock-interview-by-end-of-century-robots-will-have-taken-over). I quote:

"What has changed dramatically, however, is his position on climate change. He now says: “Anyone who tries to predict more than five to 10 years is a bit of an idiot, because so many things can change unexpectedly.” "

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 07:25, Carl Tollander <[hidden email]> wrote:

I would rather,

 than worry directly about the predictability of the climate models we currently have vs the population/variety/intitial conclusions of researchers from decades ago, 

 that we instead consider a range of climate risks, their consequences,  our responses/adaptations, and their consequences.

The latter may prepare us, and it moves that portion of the science along in any case, and may yet eventually show up any deficiencies in the former, but let's get underway.

 

Personally, I'm with Lovelock on the large grain future: the window of action gets progressively smaller the longer we delay, and that the world will likely experience

a "massive reduction in carrying capacity" (that's a euphemism) over the next century.    Looking at older cultures and how they survive, mutate, die or flourish in analogous upheavals (e.g. mid-8th-century China or black-death eras in  Europe) might be worthwhile at this point. Start by assuming the fan/speed/blades and what/who hits it; what can/should we DO?  We should at least perhaps understand when we are waiting too long to begin adaptations that are cheap, safe, economic or politically acceptable, for Nature bats last.

 

Hope y'all like mosquitoes. 

 

カール

 

On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 8:59 PM, Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick writes:

 

< IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now? >

 

The European weather model assimilates 50+ types of measurements in space and time, including satellite data.   Obviously, these measurements were not possible except in the last few decades, never mind in the middle ages or before humans.   So whether or not there were even particular kinds of climate anomalies is a subject of some debate.    For example, were those periods wet or were they warm?  Were they uniform across the global or localized to certain regions?

 

Marcus


From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Nick Thompson <[hidden email]>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 8:27:21 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

I dunno, I thought Pietr's point was kind of interesting.  IF (and I don't know if the condition is met) ... IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now?   Or did somebody already answer that. 



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 5:40 PM
To: FriAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

Well, I mean "models" writ large.  Even when gathering and reducing observational data, there's a workflow for doing that. That workflow relies on a model of a sort.  And integrating different data sets so that they're commensurate also requires models.  E.g. correlating tree ring based with other climate data.

But you're ultimately right.  It's not so much about the models as it is the whole inferential apparatus one *might* use to drive policy decisions, including huge populations of expert climatologists.  There's probably a correlation to be drawn between people who distrust government and those who distrust the "scientific establishment" and/or the "deep state".  People tend to obey/trust whoever they regard as authority figures (e.g. greater shocks to another if a person in a lab coat tells you to do it).  Those of us who inherently distrust authority figures have a particular psychological bent and our impulse can go the other way.  It could be because we know how groups can succumb to bias, or how errors get propagated (e.g. peer review), or whatever.

*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution.

On 12/29/2017 12:41 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
> IMO it is not about models. Models are complicated and controversial. Climate change in the artic is a fact, melting arctic ice is a fact, melting glaciers is a fact. In the arctic regions we can oberve the rising temperatures most clearly.


--
uǝlƃ

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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: Climate Change

Prof David West
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Nick,

forgot a point. "good," as you use it, does not follow from "privilege" as I use it. 'Good' as in good theory does come from other aspects of thought like "siimplicity" and "elegance" which are not "scientific," "mathematical," "logical," etc.

Pieter's comments brought to mind a "problem" with contemporary physics - none of the cutting edge theories, e.g. string theory, quantum loop gravity, cannot possible be "good group think' because they do not generate falsifiable hypotheses, nor empirical tests. Self consistency and maybe the aforementioned elegance / simplicity are the, to date, only ways to evaluate their goodness.

davew


On Sat, Dec 30, 2017, at 10:30 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:

Hi, Dave,

 

Hey, thanks for taking the question seriously.

 

Please see “larding”. 

 

I am still hoping to see you before you leave.  I might do coffee early Tuesday afternoon.

 

Nick

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 8:36 PM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

In my most humble opinion:

 

1) it evolves in real-time, not only when new data is received but when new perspectives are offered. No more of this waiting for the old generation to die before we can change our minds crap.

 

2) It privileges no perspective(s), tool(s), or mode(s) of thinking. No more, "it isn't real unless it is mathematical, logical, formal, grammatical, or model-able."

[NST==>Now, hang on, big fella!  It must privilege SOMETHING, else how does it know what “good” is.  And somebody might ask us what we meant by “real, here.  I guess I would prefer to say, ‘No more, “We can ignore it if it isn’t ….” ‘  <==nst]

 

3) It recognizes that, "it is always more complicated than that."

[NST==>Is this the pragmatist assertion that all certainties are provisional?  There is no sequence of head-flips of a coin  long as to guarantee that that coin is not fair.  <==nst]

 

By the way, every time I try to teach myself the periodic table I think, this isn’t a very “good” theory.  It’s got this crazy strangulated hernia and stuff kind of hanging off the end.  It just cries out to be tidied up.  I guess “tidiness” is one of the principles you think we are free to ignore? 

 

 

davewest

 

 

 

On Sat, Dec 30, 2017, at 4:29 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:

Pieter,

 

Seeing my question, out in the open, away from the underbrush of my other words, I am inclined to edit it:

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 1:32 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Nick,

 

What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Philip Tetlock has done excellent work answering exactly that question. His view is simply that you can test and develop the ability of individuals and groups to increase the quality of their judgments. (His focus is on forecasting).

 

Pieter

 

On 30 December 2017 at 19:20, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter, 

 

Some months back, at the Friday Meeting of the FRIAM Mother Church at St. Johns, we had a long discussion about the degree to which ANY of us ever made judgements in such matters on the basis of EVIDENCE.  I think, just for fun, we spent some time trying to PROVE to one another, on the basis of raw experience, that New Mexico is not flat.  Harder going than one might suppose.   So, I think we concluded that most of our judgements are based on circles of trust.  So then, the question becomes, what sorts of circles of trust are evidency.  The point is that, whatever one takes to be raw evidence always comes baled with a set of inferences and assumptions that are themselves not evidenced but which come by authority and seem trustworthy. 

 

Your pointing to historical climate anomalies seemed evidency to me in that it was plausible,  I had vaguely heard of those things and it seemed logically plausible to me that we should be able to POSTDICT these anomalies from present conditions, if our models are strong.  Thus, in the context of that particular network of trusted (plausible) propositions, I momentarily joined you in your skepticism.  But none of that is EVIDENCE in the sense that we all like to use that term. 

 

In short, what is the relation between evidence and trust?  Aren’t we all guilty of group think?  Isn’t all science (following Peirce) a kind of organized groupthink?  Isn’t the point NOT that some of us think independently and some of us are victims of Groupthink, but rather that some groups think better than others?  And if so, why?  What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 5:27 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Glen, 

 

I'd like to comment on your comment a few posts earlier:

"*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution."

 

My first reply is that I consider evidence to be much more valuable than expert's opinions. The IPCC is rich in expert's opinions and very light on evidence. 

 

The second reply is that I certainly do not claim any explicit fraud in climate science. But there is evidence of bias in climate science and "soft punishment" of scientists who disagree with the main narrative. For example, refer to Judith Curry's experience when she started to challenge the main climate science narrative. She is a former Chair of the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at Georgia Tech and blogs at www.judithcurry.com.

My point is that although there is no evidence of explicit fraud, there is evidence of an environment that promotes groupthink. 

 

Combining the two points, with evidence of less temperature increase than what the models predict and evidence of an environment in climate science promoting "fitting in" and the absence of healthy challenging of climate science, my conclusion is to be skeptical towards main climate science and the IPCC's conclusions. 

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 10:30, Pieter Steenekamp <[hidden email]> wrote:

I'm also a big fan of James Lovelock. Interesting that he changed his views on climate change dramatically. I refer to an interview The Guardian newspaper had with him recently (www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/30/james-lovelock-interview-by-end-of-century-robots-will-have-taken-over). I quote:

"What has changed dramatically, however, is his position on climate change. He now says: “Anyone who tries to predict more than five to 10 years is a bit of an idiot, because so many things can change unexpectedly.” "

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 07:25, Carl Tollander <[hidden email]> wrote:

I would rather,

 than worry directly about the predictability of the climate models we currently have vs the population/variety/intitial conclusions of researchers from decades ago, 

 that we instead consider a range of climate risks, their consequences,  our responses/adaptations, and their consequences.

The latter may prepare us, and it moves that portion of the science along in any case, and may yet eventually show up any deficiencies in the former, but let's get underway.

 

Personally, I'm with Lovelock on the large grain future: the window of action gets progressively smaller the longer we delay, and that the world will likely experience

a "massive reduction in carrying capacity" (that's a euphemism) over the next century.    Looking at older cultures and how they survive, mutate, die or flourish in analogous upheavals (e.g. mid-8th-century China or black-death eras in  Europe) might be worthwhile at this point. Start by assuming the fan/speed/blades and what/who hits it; what can/should we DO?  We should at least perhaps understand when we are waiting too long to begin adaptations that are cheap, safe, economic or politically acceptable, for Nature bats last.

 

Hope y'all like mosquitoes. 

 

カール

 

On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 8:59 PM, Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick writes:

 

< IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now? >

 

The European weather model assimilates 50+ types of measurements in space and time, including satellite data.   Obviously, these measurements were not possible except in the last few decades, never mind in the middle ages or before humans.   So whether or not there were even particular kinds of climate anomalies is a subject of some debate.    For example, were those periods wet or were they warm?  Were they uniform across the global or localized to certain regions?

 

Marcus



 

From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Nick Thompson <[hidden email]>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 8:27:21 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

I dunno, I thought Pietr's point was kind of interesting.  IF (and I don't know if the condition is met) ... IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now?   Or did somebody already answer that. 



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 5:40 PM
To: FriAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

Well, I mean "models" writ large.  Even when gathering and reducing observational data, there's a workflow for doing that. That workflow relies on a model of a sort.  And integrating different data sets so that they're commensurate also requires models.  E.g. correlating tree ring based with other climate data.

But you're ultimately right.  It's not so much about the models as it is the whole inferential apparatus one *might* use to drive policy decisions, including huge populations of expert climatologists.  There's probably a correlation to be drawn between people who distrust government and those who distrust the "scientific establishment" and/or the "deep state".  People tend to obey/trust whoever they regard as authority figures (e.g. greater shocks to another if a person in a lab coat tells you to do it).  Those of us who inherently distrust authority figures have a particular psychological bent and our impulse can go the other way.  It could be because we know how groups can succumb to bias, or how errors get propagated (e.g. peer review), or whatever.

*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution.

On 12/29/2017 12:41 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
> IMO it is not about models. Models are complicated and controversial. Climate change in the artic is a fact, melting arctic ice is a fact, melting glaciers is a fact. In the arctic regions we can oberve the rising temperatures most clearly.


--
uǝlƃ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: Climate Change

gepr
In reply to this post by Pieter Steenekamp
Although the sophist- ... icated tangent into groupthink and goodness of thought might be interesting, it's politically bankrupt, as is any sort of philosophical skepticism.

The problem is what to *do*, if anything.  I think Carl's post targets this most directly.  It seems to me our policy options are: 1) do nothing, 2) do something, 2a) treat the symptoms, and 2b) *attempt* to treat causes.  Doing nothing is just as much an action as doing something.  And if we choose to do nothing, then the we are still responsible for the consequences of missed opportunities to act.

Most people who agree that the climate is changing, regardless of the causes, also agree that it is the *poor* who will suffer.  Even in cities like Miami, the wealthy will be able to lose their homes, businesses, and local economy and simply move or retrain or retire, or whatever.  Similarly, in places like Syria, what's left of the privileged will be able to further exploit or move.  The rest will risk their lives trying to migrate.  It seems rather obvious that we have already agreed to actions of type (2a), even if the choice of actions (idiot Trump egging on Pakistan vs. many local churches in the US still willing to take in more refugees) isn't a consensus.

So, the question boils down to whether or not we engage (2b).  If a skeptical claim is that we simply don't know enough to act at all, then it's a reasonable point and that ignorance can be remedied by (2b) actions like education and research.  If, however, we admit that we *do* know some things that *might* help, then we have to engage in the RoI analysis to decide which (2b) actions to take.  I.e. regardless of the other option, (2b) ensues.  Option (1) begins to look pretty silly.

If the skeptical claim is used as sleight-of-hand to game the system into doing nothing, then it's no longer merely skepticism.  It's an existential threat to be dealt with as soon as possible and as harshly as possible.  And *that* is why most believers treat skeptics like narcissistic, exploitative, gamers ... because the reasoning seems to lead inexorably to the 2 options: a skeptic is either an advocate for more research and education *or* a scheming profiteer, regardless of whether climate change is human-caused or not.

Therefore, it seems reasonable for the (authentic) skeptic to apply herself to (2b).  Here is another resource that might be useful:

   https://www.earthsystemgrid.org/


>     On 30 December 2017 at 07:25, Carl Tollander <[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote:
>
>         I would rather,
>          than worry directly about the predictability of the climate models we currently have vs the population/variety/intitial conclusions of researchers from decades ago, 
>          that we instead consider a range of climate risks, their consequences,  our responses/adaptations, and their consequences.
>         The latter may prepare us, and it moves that portion of the science along in any case, and may yet eventually show up any deficiencies in the former, but let's get underway.
>
>         Personally, I'm with Lovelock on the large grain future: the window of action gets progressively smaller the longer we delay, and that the world will likely experience
>         a "massive reduction in carrying capacity" (that's a euphemism) over the next century.    Looking at older cultures and how they survive, mutate, die or flourish in analogous upheavals (e.g. mid-8th-century China or black-death eras in  Europe) might be worthwhile at this point. Start by assuming the fan/speed/blades and what/who hits it; what can/should we DO?  We should at least perhaps understand when we are waiting too long to begin adaptations that are cheap, safe, economic or politically acceptable, for Nature bats last.
>
>         Hope y'all like mosquitoes. 
>
>         カール
>


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Re: Climate Change

Pieter Steenekamp
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Hi Nick,

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

I want to take it somewhat further than merely seeking for objective facts that do not depend whether anyone believes it. My question is what are the properties of the processes that lead to good GroupThought. And then also the properties of bad GroupThought so that one can actively take precautions against it. What can we do to ensure that we can see the emperor has no clothes before the little boy tells us that.

When good GroupThought prevails the collective's thoughts are much better than any individuals' whilst with bad GroupThought it's much worse.

I'm no expert in this field and am open to being corrected, but as I see it Philip Tetlock's work can give us concrete practical advice how to achieve Peirce's good GroupThought. 

Pieter

On 31 December 2017 at 19:03, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Hi, Pieter,

 

Thanks for this thoughtful post.

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

The italicized bit is actually a definition both of “good” and “objective”.  Peirce asserts that this is what we MEAN when we say that thought is good and results are objective.  We MEAN that they are likely to survive future experience: ie,  that the experiences we have (experiments that we do) in the future are unlikely to dislodge them.  Or as Peirce puts it, an objective fact is proposition that does not depend on whether you, or I, or any other particular individual or groups believe it.  His is a statistical model.  The coin that is flipped a thousand times and comes up roughly 50 percent is more likely to be drawn from a population of fair coins than from a population of unfair coins, and one’s confidence rises as the size of the sample increases. Similarly, the coin that comes up fair when it is flipped under a variety of circumstances – replications in different labs.  And yes, statements made about a coin which, when flipped, we have no idea whether it came up heads or tails are unlikely to endure. 

 

The Congregation has heard all of this from me before and are beginning to roll their eyes as we speak.  I am an alert vampire, and I sense that you are new blood.   Thanks for listening, if, indeed, you are still with me. 

 

All the best,

 

Nick

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Sunday, December 31, 2017 12:39 AM


To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Nick,

 

Referring to your What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

How does one define the "good" in "good GroupThought"?  It obviously depends on the context.

 

I want to refrain, for now, it could be part of another discussion, from commenting on cases where the "good" in "good thought" involves moral judgment.

 

For now, I want to restrict the context where it involves measurable judgments or falsifiable hypotheses. If the result of the group's thinking is measured against objective criteria the "goodness" can be measured.

 

An example of where groupthink went spectacularly wrong is in the groupthink of the quantum mechanics' experts in the 1920's rejecting the guiding wave theory. Especially after John von Neumann "proved" that hidden variables are inconsistent with the mathematics. The guiding wave theory requires hidden variables. The unknown Grete Hermann showed the wrong assumptions of von Neumann's proof, but the groupthink of the time rejected her findings and accepted the expert von Newman's proof. In the 1960's John Bell showed that Hermann was right and von Neumann wrong. Although the guiding wave theorem is considered incomplete today (as opposed to "wrong"), rejecting the groupthink of the 1920's up to 1960's, and accepting Grete's criticism of von Newmann's work, lead to today's accepted standard model of particle physics. One could argue that almost half a century of progress in particle physics was lost to groupthink and accepting an expert's judgment? 

 

There are simple principles to guide against groupthink and nurture constructive interaction that leads to wisdom of the crowd.

 

a) One is to never soft punish people that reject conventional thinking, even if the conventional thinking is supported by the views of experts. 

 

b) Emphasize objective tests and insist on falsifiable hypotheses.

 

I referred to Philp Tetlock in a previous post, and want to that again. He has achieved amazing success in establishing what to do to get good judgment. I want to recommend to those that are interested in this topic to read up on his work. 

 

As a final point of this post, I want to mention that I experienced the replies to me challenging the accepted scientific views on climate change as contributing to the wisdom of the crowds and not groupthink. I was not punished for rejecting the conventional thinking. 

 

Pieter

 

On 31 December 2017 at 01:29, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter,

 

Seeing my question, out in the open, away from the underbrush of my other words, I am inclined to edit it:

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 1:32 PM


To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Nick,

 

What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Philip Tetlock has done excellent work answering exactly that question. His view is simply that you can test and develop the ability of individuals and groups to increase the quality of their judgments. (His focus is on forecasting).

 

Pieter

 

On 30 December 2017 at 19:20, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter, 

 

Some months back, at the Friday Meeting of the FRIAM Mother Church at St. Johns, we had a long discussion about the degree to which ANY of us ever made judgements in such matters on the basis of EVIDENCE.  I think, just for fun, we spent some time trying to PROVE to one another, on the basis of raw experience, that New Mexico is not flat.  Harder going than one might suppose.   So, I think we concluded that most of our judgements are based on circles of trust.  So then, the question becomes, what sorts of circles of trust are evidency.  The point is that, whatever one takes to be raw evidence always comes baled with a set of inferences and assumptions that are themselves not evidenced but which come by authority and seem trustworthy. 

 

Your pointing to historical climate anomalies seemed evidency to me in that it was plausible,  I had vaguely heard of those things and it seemed logically plausible to me that we should be able to POSTDICT these anomalies from present conditions, if our models are strong.  Thus, in the context of that particular network of trusted (plausible) propositions, I momentarily joined you in your skepticism.  But none of that is EVIDENCE in the sense that we all like to use that term. 

 

In short, what is the relation between evidence and trust?  Aren’t we all guilty of group think?  Isn’t all science (following Peirce) a kind of organized groupthink?  Isn’t the point NOT that some of us think independently and some of us are victims of Groupthink, but rather that some groups think better than others?  And if so, why?  What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 5:27 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Glen, 

 

I'd like to comment on your comment a few posts earlier:

"*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution."

 

My first reply is that I consider evidence to be much more valuable than expert's opinions. The IPCC is rich in expert's opinions and very light on evidence. 

 

The second reply is that I certainly do not claim any explicit fraud in climate science. But there is evidence of bias in climate science and "soft punishment" of scientists who disagree with the main narrative. For example, refer to Judith Curry's experience when she started to challenge the main climate science narrative. She is a former Chair of the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at Georgia Tech and blogs at www.judithcurry.com.

My point is that although there is no evidence of explicit fraud, there is evidence of an environment that promotes groupthink. 

 

Combining the two points, with evidence of less temperature increase than what the models predict and evidence of an environment in climate science promoting "fitting in" and the absence of healthy challenging of climate science, my conclusion is to be skeptical towards main climate science and the IPCC's conclusions. 

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 10:30, Pieter Steenekamp <[hidden email]> wrote:

I'm also a big fan of James Lovelock. Interesting that he changed his views on climate change dramatically. I refer to an interview The Guardian newspaper had with him recently (www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/30/james-lovelock-interview-by-end-of-century-robots-will-have-taken-over). I quote:

"What has changed dramatically, however, is his position on climate change. He now says: “Anyone who tries to predict more than five to 10 years is a bit of an idiot, because so many things can change unexpectedly.” "

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 07:25, Carl Tollander <[hidden email]> wrote:

I would rather,

 than worry directly about the predictability of the climate models we currently have vs the population/variety/intitial conclusions of researchers from decades ago, 

 that we instead consider a range of climate risks, their consequences,  our responses/adaptations, and their consequences.

The latter may prepare us, and it moves that portion of the science along in any case, and may yet eventually show up any deficiencies in the former, but let's get underway.

 

Personally, I'm with Lovelock on the large grain future: the window of action gets progressively smaller the longer we delay, and that the world will likely experience

a "massive reduction in carrying capacity" (that's a euphemism) over the next century.    Looking at older cultures and how they survive, mutate, die or flourish in analogous upheavals (e.g. mid-8th-century China or black-death eras in  Europe) might be worthwhile at this point. Start by assuming the fan/speed/blades and what/who hits it; what can/should we DO?  We should at least perhaps understand when we are waiting too long to begin adaptations that are cheap, safe, economic or politically acceptable, for Nature bats last.

 

Hope y'all like mosquitoes. 

 

カール

 

On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 8:59 PM, Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick writes:

 

< IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now? >

 

The European weather model assimilates 50+ types of measurements in space and time, including satellite data.   Obviously, these measurements were not possible except in the last few decades, never mind in the middle ages or before humans.   So whether or not there were even particular kinds of climate anomalies is a subject of some debate.    For example, were those periods wet or were they warm?  Were they uniform across the global or localized to certain regions?

 

Marcus


From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Nick Thompson <[hidden email]>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 8:27:21 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

I dunno, I thought Pietr's point was kind of interesting.  IF (and I don't know if the condition is met) ... IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now?   Or did somebody already answer that. 



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 5:40 PM
To: FriAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

Well, I mean "models" writ large.  Even when gathering and reducing observational data, there's a workflow for doing that. That workflow relies on a model of a sort.  And integrating different data sets so that they're commensurate also requires models.  E.g. correlating tree ring based with other climate data.

But you're ultimately right.  It's not so much about the models as it is the whole inferential apparatus one *might* use to drive policy decisions, including huge populations of expert climatologists.  There's probably a correlation to be drawn between people who distrust government and those who distrust the "scientific establishment" and/or the "deep state".  People tend to obey/trust whoever they regard as authority figures (e.g. greater shocks to another if a person in a lab coat tells you to do it).  Those of us who inherently distrust authority figures have a particular psychological bent and our impulse can go the other way.  It could be because we know how groups can succumb to bias, or how errors get propagated (e.g. peer review), or whatever.

*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution.

On 12/29/2017 12:41 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
> IMO it is not about models. Models are complicated and controversial. Climate change in the artic is a fact, melting arctic ice is a fact, melting glaciers is a fact. In the arctic regions we can oberve the rising temperatures most clearly.


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Re: Climate Change

Frank Wimberly-2

From Roger Jones.  This is probably what some of us say we shouldn’t do:

cid:image001.png@01D383C5.98365590

 

 

 

 

Frank C. Wimberly

140 Calle Ojo Feliz

Santa Fe, NM 87505

 

[hidden email]     [hidden email]

Phone:  (505) 995-8715      Cell:  (505) 670-9918

 

From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Tuesday, January 02, 2018 11:51 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Hi Nick,

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

I want to take it somewhat further than merely seeking for objective facts that do not depend whether anyone believes it. My question is what are the properties of the processes that lead to good GroupThought. And then also the properties of bad GroupThought so that one can actively take precautions against it. What can we do to ensure that we can see the emperor has no clothes before the little boy tells us that.

 

When good GroupThought prevails the collective's thoughts are much better than any individuals' whilst with bad GroupThought it's much worse.

 

I'm no expert in this field and am open to being corrected, but as I see it Philip Tetlock's work can give us concrete practical advice how to achieve Peirce's good GroupThought. 

 

Pieter

 

On 31 December 2017 at 19:03, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Hi, Pieter,

 

Thanks for this thoughtful post.

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

The italicized bit is actually a definition both of “good” and “objective”.  Peirce asserts that this is what we MEAN when we say that thought is good and results are objective.  We MEAN that they are likely to survive future experience: ie,  that the experiences we have (experiments that we do) in the future are unlikely to dislodge them.  Or as Peirce puts it, an objective fact is proposition that does not depend on whether you, or I, or any other particular individual or groups believe it.  His is a statistical model.  The coin that is flipped a thousand times and comes up roughly 50 percent is more likely to be drawn from a population of fair coins than from a population of unfair coins, and one’s confidence rises as the size of the sample increases. Similarly, the coin that comes up fair when it is flipped under a variety of circumstances – replications in different labs.  And yes, statements made about a coin which, when flipped, we have no idea whether it came up heads or tails are unlikely to endure. 

 

The Congregation has heard all of this from me before and are beginning to roll their eyes as we speak.  I am an alert vampire, and I sense that you are new blood.   Thanks for listening, if, indeed, you are still with me. 

 

All the best,

 

Nick

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Sunday, December 31, 2017 12:39 AM


To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Nick,

 

Referring to your What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

How does one define the "good" in "good GroupThought"?  It obviously depends on the context.

 

I want to refrain, for now, it could be part of another discussion, from commenting on cases where the "good" in "good thought" involves moral judgment.

 

For now, I want to restrict the context where it involves measurable judgments or falsifiable hypotheses. If the result of the group's thinking is measured against objective criteria the "goodness" can be measured.

 

An example of where groupthink went spectacularly wrong is in the groupthink of the quantum mechanics' experts in the 1920's rejecting the guiding wave theory. Especially after John von Neumann "proved" that hidden variables are inconsistent with the mathematics. The guiding wave theory requires hidden variables. The unknown Grete Hermann showed the wrong assumptions of von Neumann's proof, but the groupthink of the time rejected her findings and accepted the expert von Newman's proof. In the 1960's John Bell showed that Hermann was right and von Neumann wrong. Although the guiding wave theorem is considered incomplete today (as opposed to "wrong"), rejecting the groupthink of the 1920's up to 1960's, and accepting Grete's criticism of von Newmann's work, lead to today's accepted standard model of particle physics. One could argue that almost half a century of progress in particle physics was lost to groupthink and accepting an expert's judgment? 

 

There are simple principles to guide against groupthink and nurture constructive interaction that leads to wisdom of the crowd.

 

a) One is to never soft punish people that reject conventional thinking, even if the conventional thinking is supported by the views of experts. 

 

b) Emphasize objective tests and insist on falsifiable hypotheses.

 

I referred to Philp Tetlock in a previous post, and want to that again. He has achieved amazing success in establishing what to do to get good judgment. I want to recommend to those that are interested in this topic to read up on his work. 

 

As a final point of this post, I want to mention that I experienced the replies to me challenging the accepted scientific views on climate change as contributing to the wisdom of the crowds and not groupthink. I was not punished for rejecting the conventional thinking. 

 

Pieter

 

On 31 December 2017 at 01:29, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter,

 

Seeing my question, out in the open, away from the underbrush of my other words, I am inclined to edit it:

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 1:32 PM


To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Nick,

 

What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Philip Tetlock has done excellent work answering exactly that question. His view is simply that you can test and develop the ability of individuals and groups to increase the quality of their judgments. (His focus is on forecasting).

 

Pieter

 

On 30 December 2017 at 19:20, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter, 

 

Some months back, at the Friday Meeting of the FRIAM Mother Church at St. Johns, we had a long discussion about the degree to which ANY of us ever made judgements in such matters on the basis of EVIDENCE.  I think, just for fun, we spent some time trying to PROVE to one another, on the basis of raw experience, that New Mexico is not flat.  Harder going than one might suppose.   So, I think we concluded that most of our judgements are based on circles of trust.  So then, the question becomes, what sorts of circles of trust are evidency.  The point is that, whatever one takes to be raw evidence always comes baled with a set of inferences and assumptions that are themselves not evidenced but which come by authority and seem trustworthy. 

 

Your pointing to historical climate anomalies seemed evidency to me in that it was plausible,  I had vaguely heard of those things and it seemed logically plausible to me that we should be able to POSTDICT these anomalies from present conditions, if our models are strong.  Thus, in the context of that particular network of trusted (plausible) propositions, I momentarily joined you in your skepticism.  But none of that is EVIDENCE in the sense that we all like to use that term. 

 

In short, what is the relation between evidence and trust?  Aren’t we all guilty of group think?  Isn’t all science (following Peirce) a kind of organized groupthink?  Isn’t the point NOT that some of us think independently and some of us are victims of Groupthink, but rather that some groups think better than others?  And if so, why?  What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 5:27 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
[hidden email]>


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Glen, 

 

I'd like to comment on your comment a few posts earlier:

"*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution."

 

My first reply is that I consider evidence to be much more valuable than expert's opinions. The IPCC is rich in expert's opinions and very light on evidence. 

 

The second reply is that I certainly do not claim any explicit fraud in climate science. But there is evidence of bias in climate science and "soft punishment" of scientists who disagree with the main narrative. For example, refer to Judith Curry's experience when she started to challenge the main climate science narrative. She is a former Chair of the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at Georgia Tech and blogs at www.judithcurry.com.

My point is that although there is no evidence of explicit fraud, there is evidence of an environment that promotes groupthink. 

 

Combining the two points, with evidence of less temperature increase than what the models predict and evidence of an environment in climate science promoting "fitting in" and the absence of healthy challenging of climate science, my conclusion is to be skeptical towards main climate science and the IPCC's conclusions. 

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 10:30, Pieter Steenekamp <[hidden email]> wrote:

I'm also a big fan of James Lovelock. Interesting that he changed his views on climate change dramatically. I refer to an interview The Guardian newspaper had with him recently (www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/30/james-lovelock-interview-by-end-of-century-robots-will-have-taken-over). I quote:

"What has changed dramatically, however, is his position on climate change. He now says: “Anyone who tries to predict more than five to 10 years is a bit of an idiot, because so many things can change unexpectedly.” "

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 07:25, Carl Tollander <[hidden email]> wrote:

I would rather,

 than worry directly about the predictability of the climate models we currently have vs the population/variety/intitial conclusions of researchers from decades ago, 

 that we instead consider a range of climate risks, their consequences,  our responses/adaptations, and their consequences.

The latter may prepare us, and it moves that portion of the science along in any case, and may yet eventually show up any deficiencies in the former, but let's get underway.

 

Personally, I'm with Lovelock on the large grain future: the window of action gets progressively smaller the longer we delay, and that the world will likely experience

a "massive reduction in carrying capacity" (that's a euphemism) over the next century.    Looking at older cultures and how they survive, mutate, die or flourish in analogous upheavals (e.g. mid-8th-century China or black-death eras in  Europe) might be worthwhile at this point. Start by assuming the fan/speed/blades and what/who hits it; what can/should we DO?  We should at least perhaps understand when we are waiting too long to begin adaptations that are cheap, safe, economic or politically acceptable, for Nature bats last.

 

Hope y'all like mosquitoes. 

 

カール

 

On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 8:59 PM, Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick writes:

 

< IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now? >

 

The European weather model assimilates 50+ types of measurements in space and time, including satellite data.   Obviously, these measurements were not possible except in the last few decades, never mind in the middle ages or before humans.   So whether or not there were even particular kinds of climate anomalies is a subject of some debate.    For example, were those periods wet or were they warm?  Were they uniform across the global or localized to certain regions?

 

Marcus


From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Nick Thompson <[hidden email]>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 8:27:21 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

I dunno, I thought Pietr's point was kind of interesting.  IF (and I don't know if the condition is met) ... IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now?   Or did somebody already answer that. 



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [
[hidden email]] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 5:40 PM
To: FriAM <
[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

Well, I mean "models" writ large.  Even when gathering and reducing observational data, there's a workflow for doing that. That workflow relies on a model of a sort.  And integrating different data sets so that they're commensurate also requires models.  E.g. correlating tree ring based with other climate data.

But you're ultimately right.  It's not so much about the models as it is the whole inferential apparatus one *might* use to drive policy decisions, including huge populations of expert climatologists.  There's probably a correlation to be drawn between people who distrust government and those who distrust the "scientific establishment" and/or the "deep state".  People tend to obey/trust whoever they regard as authority figures (e.g. greater shocks to another if a person in a lab coat tells you to do it).  Those of us who inherently distrust authority figures have a particular psychological bent and our impulse can go the other way.  It could be because we know how groups can succumb to bias, or how errors get propagated (e.g. peer review), or whatever.

*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution.

On 12/29/2017 12:41 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
> IMO it is not about models. Models are complicated and controversial. Climate change in the artic is a fact, melting arctic ice is a fact, melting glaciers is a fact. In the arctic regions we can oberve the rising temperatures most clearly.


--
uǝlƃ

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Re: Climate Change

Nick Thompson

Yeah.  It just cannot be the case that everybody who does not believe what we believe is dumb.  That’s just too much of a coincidence. 

 

Nick

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Tuesday, January 02, 2018 1:19 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

From Roger Jones.  This is probably what some of us say we shouldn’t do:

cid:image001.png@01D383C5.98365590

 

 

 

 

Frank C. Wimberly

140 Calle Ojo Feliz

Santa Fe, NM 87505

 

[hidden email]     [hidden email]

Phone:  (505) 995-8715      Cell:  (505) 670-9918

 

From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Tuesday, January 02, 2018 11:51 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Hi Nick,

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

I want to take it somewhat further than merely seeking for objective facts that do not depend whether anyone believes it. My question is what are the properties of the processes that lead to good GroupThought. And then also the properties of bad GroupThought so that one can actively take precautions against it. What can we do to ensure that we can see the emperor has no clothes before the little boy tells us that.

 

When good GroupThought prevails the collective's thoughts are much better than any individuals' whilst with bad GroupThought it's much worse.

 

I'm no expert in this field and am open to being corrected, but as I see it Philip Tetlock's work can give us concrete practical advice how to achieve Peirce's good GroupThought. 

 

Pieter

 

On 31 December 2017 at 19:03, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Hi, Pieter,

 

Thanks for this thoughtful post.

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

The italicized bit is actually a definition both of “good” and “objective”.  Peirce asserts that this is what we MEAN when we say that thought is good and results are objective.  We MEAN that they are likely to survive future experience: ie,  that the experiences we have (experiments that we do) in the future are unlikely to dislodge them.  Or as Peirce puts it, an objective fact is proposition that does not depend on whether you, or I, or any other particular individual or groups believe it.  His is a statistical model.  The coin that is flipped a thousand times and comes up roughly 50 percent is more likely to be drawn from a population of fair coins than from a population of unfair coins, and one’s confidence rises as the size of the sample increases. Similarly, the coin that comes up fair when it is flipped under a variety of circumstances – replications in different labs.  And yes, statements made about a coin which, when flipped, we have no idea whether it came up heads or tails are unlikely to endure. 

 

The Congregation has heard all of this from me before and are beginning to roll their eyes as we speak.  I am an alert vampire, and I sense that you are new blood.   Thanks for listening, if, indeed, you are still with me. 

 

All the best,

 

Nick

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Sunday, December 31, 2017 12:39 AM


To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Nick,

 

Referring to your What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

How does one define the "good" in "good GroupThought"?  It obviously depends on the context.

 

I want to refrain, for now, it could be part of another discussion, from commenting on cases where the "good" in "good thought" involves moral judgment.

 

For now, I want to restrict the context where it involves measurable judgments or falsifiable hypotheses. If the result of the group's thinking is measured against objective criteria the "goodness" can be measured.

 

An example of where groupthink went spectacularly wrong is in the groupthink of the quantum mechanics' experts in the 1920's rejecting the guiding wave theory. Especially after John von Neumann "proved" that hidden variables are inconsistent with the mathematics. The guiding wave theory requires hidden variables. The unknown Grete Hermann showed the wrong assumptions of von Neumann's proof, but the groupthink of the time rejected her findings and accepted the expert von Newman's proof. In the 1960's John Bell showed that Hermann was right and von Neumann wrong. Although the guiding wave theorem is considered incomplete today (as opposed to "wrong"), rejecting the groupthink of the 1920's up to 1960's, and accepting Grete's criticism of von Newmann's work, lead to today's accepted standard model of particle physics. One could argue that almost half a century of progress in particle physics was lost to groupthink and accepting an expert's judgment? 

 

There are simple principles to guide against groupthink and nurture constructive interaction that leads to wisdom of the crowd.

 

a) One is to never soft punish people that reject conventional thinking, even if the conventional thinking is supported by the views of experts. 

 

b) Emphasize objective tests and insist on falsifiable hypotheses.

 

I referred to Philp Tetlock in a previous post, and want to that again. He has achieved amazing success in establishing what to do to get good judgment. I want to recommend to those that are interested in this topic to read up on his work. 

 

As a final point of this post, I want to mention that I experienced the replies to me challenging the accepted scientific views on climate change as contributing to the wisdom of the crowds and not groupthink. I was not punished for rejecting the conventional thinking. 

 

Pieter

 

On 31 December 2017 at 01:29, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter,

 

Seeing my question, out in the open, away from the underbrush of my other words, I am inclined to edit it:

 

What are the properties of good GroupThought:  i.e., Group Thought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 1:32 PM


To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Nick,

 

What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Philip Tetlock has done excellent work answering exactly that question. His view is simply that you can test and develop the ability of individuals and groups to increase the quality of their judgments. (His focus is on forecasting).

 

Pieter

 

On 30 December 2017 at 19:20, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Pieter, 

 

Some months back, at the Friday Meeting of the FRIAM Mother Church at St. Johns, we had a long discussion about the degree to which ANY of us ever made judgements in such matters on the basis of EVIDENCE.  I think, just for fun, we spent some time trying to PROVE to one another, on the basis of raw experience, that New Mexico is not flat.  Harder going than one might suppose.   So, I think we concluded that most of our judgements are based on circles of trust.  So then, the question becomes, what sorts of circles of trust are evidency.  The point is that, whatever one takes to be raw evidence always comes baled with a set of inferences and assumptions that are themselves not evidenced but which come by authority and seem trustworthy. 

 

Your pointing to historical climate anomalies seemed evidency to me in that it was plausible,  I had vaguely heard of those things and it seemed logically plausible to me that we should be able to POSTDICT these anomalies from present conditions, if our models are strong.  Thus, in the context of that particular network of trusted (plausible) propositions, I momentarily joined you in your skepticism.  But none of that is EVIDENCE in the sense that we all like to use that term. 

 

In short, what is the relation between evidence and trust?  Aren’t we all guilty of group think?  Isn’t all science (following Peirce) a kind of organized groupthink?  Isn’t the point NOT that some of us think independently and some of us are victims of Groupthink, but rather that some groups think better than others?  And if so, why?  What are the properties of GroupThought that is likely to survive experience into the deep future?

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Pieter Steenekamp
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2017 5:27 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
[hidden email]>


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

Glen, 

 

I'd like to comment on your comment a few posts earlier:

"*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution."

 

My first reply is that I consider evidence to be much more valuable than expert's opinions. The IPCC is rich in expert's opinions and very light on evidence. 

 

The second reply is that I certainly do not claim any explicit fraud in climate science. But there is evidence of bias in climate science and "soft punishment" of scientists who disagree with the main narrative. For example, refer to Judith Curry's experience when she started to challenge the main climate science narrative. She is a former Chair of the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at Georgia Tech and blogs at www.judithcurry.com.

My point is that although there is no evidence of explicit fraud, there is evidence of an environment that promotes groupthink. 

 

Combining the two points, with evidence of less temperature increase than what the models predict and evidence of an environment in climate science promoting "fitting in" and the absence of healthy challenging of climate science, my conclusion is to be skeptical towards main climate science and the IPCC's conclusions. 

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 10:30, Pieter Steenekamp <[hidden email]> wrote:

I'm also a big fan of James Lovelock. Interesting that he changed his views on climate change dramatically. I refer to an interview The Guardian newspaper had with him recently (www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/30/james-lovelock-interview-by-end-of-century-robots-will-have-taken-over). I quote:

"What has changed dramatically, however, is his position on climate change. He now says: “Anyone who tries to predict more than five to 10 years is a bit of an idiot, because so many things can change unexpectedly.” "

 

 

On 30 December 2017 at 07:25, Carl Tollander <[hidden email]> wrote:

I would rather,

 than worry directly about the predictability of the climate models we currently have vs the population/variety/intitial conclusions of researchers from decades ago, 

 that we instead consider a range of climate risks, their consequences,  our responses/adaptations, and their consequences.

The latter may prepare us, and it moves that portion of the science along in any case, and may yet eventually show up any deficiencies in the former, but let's get underway.

 

Personally, I'm with Lovelock on the large grain future: the window of action gets progressively smaller the longer we delay, and that the world will likely experience

a "massive reduction in carrying capacity" (that's a euphemism) over the next century.    Looking at older cultures and how they survive, mutate, die or flourish in analogous upheavals (e.g. mid-8th-century China or black-death eras in  Europe) might be worthwhile at this point. Start by assuming the fan/speed/blades and what/who hits it; what can/should we DO?  We should at least perhaps understand when we are waiting too long to begin adaptations that are cheap, safe, economic or politically acceptable, for Nature bats last.

 

Hope y'all like mosquitoes. 

 

カール

 

On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 8:59 PM, Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick writes:

 

< IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now? >

 

The European weather model assimilates 50+ types of measurements in space and time, including satellite data.   Obviously, these measurements were not possible except in the last few decades, never mind in the middle ages or before humans.   So whether or not there were even particular kinds of climate anomalies is a subject of some debate.    For example, were those periods wet or were they warm?  Were they uniform across the global or localized to certain regions?

 

Marcus


From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Nick Thompson <[hidden email]>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 8:27:21 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'


Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

 

I dunno, I thought Pietr's point was kind of interesting.  IF (and I don't know if the condition is met) ... IF climate models cannot "predict" past anomalies, why should we trust them now?   Or did somebody already answer that. 



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [
[hidden email]] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2017 5:40 PM
To: FriAM <
[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Climate Change

Well, I mean "models" writ large.  Even when gathering and reducing observational data, there's a workflow for doing that. That workflow relies on a model of a sort.  And integrating different data sets so that they're commensurate also requires models.  E.g. correlating tree ring based with other climate data.

But you're ultimately right.  It's not so much about the models as it is the whole inferential apparatus one *might* use to drive policy decisions, including huge populations of expert climatologists.  There's probably a correlation to be drawn between people who distrust government and those who distrust the "scientific establishment" and/or the "deep state".  People tend to obey/trust whoever they regard as authority figures (e.g. greater shocks to another if a person in a lab coat tells you to do it).  Those of us who inherently distrust authority figures have a particular psychological bent and our impulse can go the other way.  It could be because we know how groups can succumb to bias, or how errors get propagated (e.g. peer review), or whatever.

*That* is why I think focusing on the workflows (modeling) is important.  Those of us who distrust the experts bear the burden of proof.  Hence, we have to really dig in and find the flaw in the experts' thinking.  To do otherwise is irrational.

Those of us who can delegate and tend to trust experts only need to dig in when/if a skeptic produces a defensible counter-argument.  If all a skeptic has to offer are blanket generalizations about human error or whatnot, then it seems rational to ignore that doubt and go with the conclusions of the experts.

If Pieter knows of a specific flaw in the way the experts do their work, then it would be a valuable contribution.

On 12/29/2017 12:41 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote:
> IMO it is not about models. Models are complicated and controversial. Climate change in the artic is a fact, melting arctic ice is a fact, melting glaciers is a fact. In the arctic regions we can oberve the rising temperatures most clearly.


--
uǝlƃ

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