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At the limits of thought

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gepr

At the limits of thought

https://aeon.co/essays/will-brains-or-algorithms-rule-the-kingdom-of-science

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uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen

gepr

Re: At the limits of thought

I suppose it's delusional synergy that I saw Krakauer's essay the same (sleepless) morning I saw this:

Experience Grounds Language
https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.10151

And since all the news all the time is about the parasite, I can't help but think Krakauer's wrong in the main thread that understanding and prediction are distinct. In Bisk et al above, the current machine learning algorithms are parasitic. Their predictions are akin to state space reconstruction algorithms that posit some deep structure that's expressive enough to mimic our linguistic output, but that's very different from our (internal) state machines. (And to be clear, our internal state machines are just as opaque as those of the machines. That we think our state machines are "understanding" whereas the machines' state machines are opaque, however predictive, is illusory ... or perhaps anthropocentric.) And although I'd claim the machines, like SARS-CoV-2, *understand*, it's *what* they understand that differs, not *that* they don't understand.

The machines' algorithms are parasitic because they depend deeply on our state machines' output (WS1 and WS2 in the Bisk paper). But as the machines' scopes grow (from disembodied binaries pushed by hardware clocks to fully parallel, sensorimotor manifolds in real or virtual space and time), the machines' understanding will be less opaque because it will be less parasitic and more autonomous ... in the same way we go "Awwww" when one of Karl Sims' virtual creatures walks across the virtual landscape. They'll still be as opaque as, say, Nick's mind is to mine ... which is pretty damned opaque. But it'll be much easier for us to "see where they're coming from" because they, like us, will have grown up poking around in the world.

On 4/22/20 8:01 AM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
>
> https://aeon.co/essays/will-brains-or-algorithms-rule-the-kingdom-of-science
>

--
☣ uǝlƃ

.-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
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uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen

Prof David West

Re: At the limits of thought

Glen,

I waited a long time in hopes that others would comment and pursue the issues being raised here. The subject matter is near and dear to my heart as well as current explorations.

The first article prompted the following:

We speak of "knowing" in different ways:
1- I know that 2+2=4.
2-I know that the sun will rise later this morning. (It is still quite dark outside as I write this.)
3-I know what kind of clothing I should wear on "Casual Friday."
4-I know how to move to intercept and catch a high fly ball.
5-I know that there is a God.

Are there multiple modes of "knowledge acquisition" behind these statements? I believe that there are. Among them: the formalist/algorithmic mode that underlies most of science (following the lead of the first paper you cited); another the "story absorption" mode by which you acquired all your knowledge of the culture(s) within which you operate and how to conform your behavior to cultural norms; and the kind of "direct perception" of the mystic.

My reaction to the understanding versus algorithm paper tended to ignore the binary choice presented by the authors, but to interpret the issue raised in the paper in terms of — there are multiple modes of knowledge acquisition but, since the Age of Reason, we have neglected our understanding of all but the "scientific" mode and, as we reach the limits of that mode, we are left adrift in a sea of incomprehension because we have neglected the modes of though that might have led to comprehension and understanding.

The Master and His Emissary, by Iain McGilchrist argues, I believe, a parallel point.

The second article argues, "context matters." This supports long held beliefs; beliefs that underpin my criticism of software engineering (the context of the domain is irrelevant as long as you have set of complete, unambiguous, and consistent requirements) and AI (one kind of context is embodiment and an AI lacks such context). I do not mean embodiment in a human body, but embodiment in the world.

I hope that others will take up this discussion.

davew

On Wed, Apr 22, 2020, at 3:17 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:

> I suppose it's delusional synergy that I saw Krakauer's essay the same
> (sleepless) morning I saw this:
>
> Experience Grounds Language
> https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.10151
>
> And since all the news all the time is about the parasite, I can't help
> but think Krakauer's wrong in the main thread that understanding and
> prediction are distinct. In Bisk et al above, the current machine
> learning algorithms are parasitic. Their predictions are akin to state
> space reconstruction algorithms that posit some deep structure that's
> expressive enough to mimic our linguistic output, but that's very
> different from our (internal) state machines. (And to be clear, our
> internal state machines are just as opaque as those of the machines.
> That we think our state machines are "understanding" whereas the
> machines' state machines are opaque, however predictive, is illusory
> ... or perhaps anthropocentric.) And although I'd claim the machines,
> like SARS-CoV-2, *understand*, it's *what* they understand that
> differs, not *that* they don't understand.
>
> The machines' algorithms are parasitic because they depend deeply on
> our state machines' output (WS1 and WS2 in the Bisk paper). But as the
> machines' scopes grow (from disembodied binaries pushed by hardware
> clocks to fully parallel, sensorimotor manifolds in real or virtual
> space and time), the machines' understanding will be less opaque
> because it will be less parasitic and more autonomous ... in the same
> way we go "Awwww" when one of Karl Sims' virtual creatures walks across
> the virtual landscape. They'll still be as opaque as, say, Nick's mind
> is to mine ... which is pretty damned opaque. But it'll be much easier
> for us to "see where they're coming from" because they, like us, will
> have grown up poking around in the world.
>
> On 4/22/20 8:01 AM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
> >
> > https://aeon.co/essays/will-brains-or-algorithms-rule-the-kingdom-of-science
> >
>
> --
> ☣ uǝlƃ
>
> .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .-
> ... .... . ...
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
> unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
>

thompnickson2

Re: At the limits of thought

Dave,

At the risk of doing a very shallow dive into your deep pool, here:

I tried to do some careful thinking some months back about the concept of "knowledge" and came to the conclusion that it's traditional philosophical definition -- justified true belief -- is absurd. Now, I just think of knowledge is just "strong belief." "I could have sworn that I left my wallet on the dining room table." I KNEW where it was.

Nick

Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
[hidden email]
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 6:21 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] At the limits of thought

Glen,

I waited a long time in hopes that others would comment and pursue the issues being raised here. The subject matter is near and dear to my heart as well as current explorations.

The first article prompted the following:

We speak of "knowing" in different ways:
1- I know that 2+2=4.
2-I know that the sun will rise later this morning. (It is still quite dark outside as I write this.) 3-I know what kind of clothing I should wear on "Casual Friday."
4-I know how to move to intercept and catch a high fly ball.
5-I know that there is a God.

Are there multiple modes of "knowledge acquisition" behind these statements? I believe that there are. Among them: the formalist/algorithmic mode that underlies most of science (following the lead of the first paper you cited); another the "story absorption" mode by which you acquired all your knowledge of the culture(s) within which you operate and how to conform your behavior to cultural norms; and the kind of "direct perception" of the mystic.

My reaction to the understanding versus algorithm paper tended to ignore the binary choice presented by the authors, but to interpret the issue raised in the paper in terms of — there are multiple modes of knowledge acquisition but, since the Age of Reason, we have neglected our understanding of all but the "scientific" mode and, as we reach the limits of that mode, we are left adrift in a sea of incomprehension because we have neglected the modes of though that might have led to comprehension and understanding.

The Master and His Emissary, by Iain McGilchrist argues, I believe, a parallel point.

The second article argues, "context matters." This supports long held beliefs; beliefs that underpin my criticism of software engineering (the context of the domain is irrelevant as long as you have set of complete, unambiguous, and consistent requirements) and AI (one kind of context is embodiment and an AI lacks such context). I do not mean embodiment in a human body, but embodiment in the world.

I hope that others will take up this discussion.

davew

On Wed, Apr 22, 2020, at 3:17 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:

> I suppose it's delusional synergy that I saw Krakauer's essay the same
> (sleepless) morning I saw this:
>
> Experience Grounds Language
> https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.10151
>
> And since all the news all the time is about the parasite, I can't
> help but think Krakauer's wrong in the main thread that understanding
> and prediction are distinct. In Bisk et al above, the current machine
> learning algorithms are parasitic. Their predictions are akin to state
> space reconstruction algorithms that posit some deep structure that's
> expressive enough to mimic our linguistic output, but that's very
> different from our (internal) state machines. (And to be clear, our
> internal state machines are just as opaque as those of the machines.
> That we think our state machines are "understanding" whereas the
> machines' state machines are opaque, however predictive, is illusory
> ... or perhaps anthropocentric.) And although I'd claim the machines,
> like SARS-CoV-2, *understand*, it's *what* they understand that
> differs, not *that* they don't understand.
>
> The machines' algorithms are parasitic because they depend deeply on
> our state machines' output (WS1 and WS2 in the Bisk paper). But as the
> machines' scopes grow (from disembodied binaries pushed by hardware
> clocks to fully parallel, sensorimotor manifolds in real or virtual
> space and time), the machines' understanding will be less opaque
> because it will be less parasitic and more autonomous ... in the same
> way we go "Awwww" when one of Karl Sims' virtual creatures walks
> across the virtual landscape. They'll still be as opaque as, say,
> Nick's mind is to mine ... which is pretty damned opaque. But it'll be
> much easier for us to "see where they're coming from" because they,
> like us, will have grown up poking around in the world.
>
> On 4/22/20 8:01 AM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
> >
> > https://aeon.co/essays/will-brains-or-algorithms-rule-the-kingdom-of
> > -science
> >
>
> --
> ☣ uǝlƃ
>
> .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .-
> ... .... . ...
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn
> GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe
> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
>

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FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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.-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
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Frank Wimberly-2

Re: At the limits of thought

To take every possible utterance of the know and it's conjugations as evidence for what it means seems weak to me.

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020, 9:49 AM <[hidden email]> wrote:

Dave,

At the risk of doing a very shallow dive into your deep pool, here:

I tried to do some careful thinking some months back about the concept of "knowledge" and came to the conclusion that it's traditional philosophical definition -- justified true belief -- is absurd. Now, I just think of knowledge is just "strong belief." "I could have sworn that I left my wallet on the dining room table." I KNEW where it was.

Nick

Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
[hidden email]
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 6:21 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] At the limits of thought

Glen,

I waited a long time in hopes that others would comment and pursue the issues being raised here. The subject matter is near and dear to my heart as well as current explorations.

The first article prompted the following:

We speak of "knowing" in different ways:
1- I know that 2+2=4.
2-I know that the sun will rise later this morning. (It is still quite dark outside as I write this.) 3-I know what kind of clothing I should wear on "Casual Friday."
4-I know how to move to intercept and catch a high fly ball.
5-I know that there is a God.

Are there multiple modes of "knowledge acquisition" behind these statements? I believe that there are. Among them: the formalist/algorithmic mode that underlies most of science (following the lead of the first paper you cited); another the "story absorption" mode by which you acquired all your knowledge of the culture(s) within which you operate and how to conform your behavior to cultural norms; and the kind of "direct perception" of the mystic.

My reaction to the understanding versus algorithm paper tended to ignore the binary choice presented by the authors, but to interpret the issue raised in the paper in terms of — there are multiple modes of knowledge acquisition but, since the Age of Reason, we have neglected our understanding of all but the "scientific" mode and, as we reach the limits of that mode, we are left adrift in a sea of incomprehension because we have neglected the modes of though that might have led to comprehension and understanding.

The Master and His Emissary, by Iain McGilchrist argues, I believe, a parallel point.

The second article argues, "context matters." This supports long held beliefs; beliefs that underpin my criticism of software engineering (the context of the domain is irrelevant as long as you have set of complete, unambiguous, and consistent requirements) and AI (one kind of context is embodiment and an AI lacks such context). I do not mean embodiment in a human body, but embodiment in the world.

I hope that others will take up this discussion.

davew

On Wed, Apr 22, 2020, at 3:17 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
> I suppose it's delusional synergy that I saw Krakauer's essay the same
> (sleepless) morning I saw this:
>
> Experience Grounds Language
> https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.10151
>
> And since all the news all the time is about the parasite, I can't
> help but think Krakauer's wrong in the main thread that understanding
> and prediction are distinct. In Bisk et al above, the current machine
> learning algorithms are parasitic. Their predictions are akin to state
> space reconstruction algorithms that posit some deep structure that's
> expressive enough to mimic our linguistic output, but that's very
> different from our (internal) state machines. (And to be clear, our
> internal state machines are just as opaque as those of the machines.
> That we think our state machines are "understanding" whereas the
> machines' state machines are opaque, however predictive, is illusory
> ... or perhaps anthropocentric.) And although I'd claim the machines,
> like SARS-CoV-2, *understand*, it's *what* they understand that
> differs, not *that* they don't understand.
>
> The machines' algorithms are parasitic because they depend deeply on
> our state machines' output (WS1 and WS2 in the Bisk paper). But as the
> machines' scopes grow (from disembodied binaries pushed by hardware
> clocks to fully parallel, sensorimotor manifolds in real or virtual
> space and time), the machines' understanding will be less opaque
> because it will be less parasitic and more autonomous ... in the same
> way we go "Awwww" when one of Karl Sims' virtual creatures walks
> across the virtual landscape. They'll still be as opaque as, say,
> Nick's mind is to mine ... which is pretty damned opaque. But it'll be
> much easier for us to "see where they're coming from" because they,
> like us, will have grown up poking around in the world.
>
> On 4/22/20 8:01 AM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
> >
> > https://aeon.co/essays/will-brains-or-algorithms-rule-the-kingdom-of
> > -science
> >
>
> --
> ☣ uǝlƃ
>
> .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .-
> ... .... . ...
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn
> GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe
> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
>

.-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/

.-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/

thompnickson2

Re: At the limits of thought

I don’t think I meant to take any of its uses. I meant to take a pragmaticist position on knowledge: that the only consequence that follows for saying that X knows Y is that you can count on X to act as if Y were the case, and there is no other.

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 10:34 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] At the limits of thought

To take every possible utterance of the know and it's conjugations as evidence for what it means seems weak to me.

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020, 9:49 AM <[hidden email]> wrote:

Dave,

At the risk of doing a very shallow dive into your deep pool, here:

I tried to do some careful thinking some months back about the concept of "knowledge" and came to the conclusion that it's traditional philosophical definition -- justified true belief -- is absurd. Now, I just think of knowledge is just "strong belief." "I could have sworn that I left my wallet on the dining room table." I KNEW where it was.

Nick

Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
[hidden email]
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 6:21 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] At the limits of thought

Glen,

I waited a long time in hopes that others would comment and pursue the issues being raised here. The subject matter is near and dear to my heart as well as current explorations.

The first article prompted the following:

We speak of "knowing" in different ways:
1- I know that 2+2=4.
2-I know that the sun will rise later this morning. (It is still quite dark outside as I write this.) 3-I know what kind of clothing I should wear on "Casual Friday."
4-I know how to move to intercept and catch a high fly ball.
5-I know that there is a God.

Are there multiple modes of "knowledge acquisition" behind these statements? I believe that there are. Among them: the formalist/algorithmic mode that underlies most of science (following the lead of the first paper you cited); another the "story absorption" mode by which you acquired all your knowledge of the culture(s) within which you operate and how to conform your behavior to cultural norms; and the kind of "direct perception" of the mystic.

My reaction to the understanding versus algorithm paper tended to ignore the binary choice presented by the authors, but to interpret the issue raised in the paper in terms of — there are multiple modes of knowledge acquisition but, since the Age of Reason, we have neglected our understanding of all but the "scientific" mode and, as we reach the limits of that mode, we are left adrift in a sea of incomprehension because we have neglected the modes of though that might have led to comprehension and understanding.

The Master and His Emissary, by Iain McGilchrist argues, I believe, a parallel point.

The second article argues, "context matters." This supports long held beliefs; beliefs that underpin my criticism of software engineering (the context of the domain is irrelevant as long as you have set of complete, unambiguous, and consistent requirements) and AI (one kind of context is embodiment and an AI lacks such context). I do not mean embodiment in a human body, but embodiment in the world.

I hope that others will take up this discussion.

davew

On Wed, Apr 22, 2020, at 3:17 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:

> I suppose it's delusional synergy that I saw Krakauer's essay the same
> (sleepless) morning I saw this:
>
> Experience Grounds Language
> https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.10151
>
> And since all the news all the time is about the parasite, I can't
> help but think Krakauer's wrong in the main thread that understanding
> and prediction are distinct. In Bisk et al above, the current machine
> learning algorithms are parasitic. Their predictions are akin to state
> space reconstruction algorithms that posit some deep structure that's
> expressive enough to mimic our linguistic output, but that's very
> different from our (internal) state machines. (And to be clear, our
> internal state machines are just as opaque as those of the machines.
> That we think our state machines are "understanding" whereas the
> machines' state machines are opaque, however predictive, is illusory
> ... or perhaps anthropocentric.) And although I'd claim the machines,
> like SARS-CoV-2, *understand*, it's *what* they understand that
> differs, not *that* they don't understand.
>
> The machines' algorithms are parasitic because they depend deeply on
> our state machines' output (WS1 and WS2 in the Bisk paper). But as the
> machines' scopes grow (from disembodied binaries pushed by hardware
> clocks to fully parallel, sensorimotor manifolds in real or virtual
> space and time), the machines' understanding will be less opaque
> because it will be less parasitic and more autonomous ... in the same
> way we go "Awwww" when one of Karl Sims' virtual creatures walks
> across the virtual landscape. They'll still be as opaque as, say,
> Nick's mind is to mine ... which is pretty damned opaque. But it'll be
> much easier for us to "see where they're coming from" because they,
> like us, will have grown up poking around in the world.
>
> On 4/22/20 8:01 AM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
> >
> > https://aeon.co/essays/will-brains-or-algorithms-rule-the-kingdom-of
> > -science
> >
>
> --
> ☣ uǝlƃ
>
> .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .-
> ... .... . ...
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn
> GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe
> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
>

.-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/

.-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/

Frank Wimberly-2

Re: At the limits of thought

I was responding to the example you gave about the coffee cup.

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020, 10:38 AM <[hidden email]> wrote:

I don’t think I meant to take any of its uses. I meant to take a pragmaticist position on knowledge: that the only consequence that follows for saying that X knows Y is that you can count on X to act as if Y were the case, and there is no other.

N

Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
[hidden email]
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 10:34 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] At the limits of thought

To take every possible utterance of the know and it's conjugations as evidence for what it means seems weak to me.
---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020, 9:49 AM <[hidden email]> wrote:
Dave,

At the risk of doing a very shallow dive into your deep pool, here:

I tried to do some careful thinking some months back about the concept of "knowledge" and came to the conclusion that it's traditional philosophical definition -- justified true belief -- is absurd. Now, I just think of knowledge is just "strong belief." "I could have sworn that I left my wallet on the dining room table." I KNEW where it was.

Nick

Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
[hidden email]
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 6:21 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] At the limits of thought

Glen,

I waited a long time in hopes that others would comment and pursue the issues being raised here. The subject matter is near and dear to my heart as well as current explorations.

The first article prompted the following:

We speak of "knowing" in different ways:
1- I know that 2+2=4.
2-I know that the sun will rise later this morning. (It is still quite dark outside as I write this.) 3-I know what kind of clothing I should wear on "Casual Friday."
4-I know how to move to intercept and catch a high fly ball.
5-I know that there is a God.

Are there multiple modes of "knowledge acquisition" behind these statements? I believe that there are. Among them: the formalist/algorithmic mode that underlies most of science (following the lead of the first paper you cited); another the "story absorption" mode by which you acquired all your knowledge of the culture(s) within which you operate and how to conform your behavior to cultural norms; and the kind of "direct perception" of the mystic.

My reaction to the understanding versus algorithm paper tended to ignore the binary choice presented by the authors, but to interpret the issue raised in the paper in terms of — there are multiple modes of knowledge acquisition but, since the Age of Reason, we have neglected our understanding of all but the "scientific" mode and, as we reach the limits of that mode, we are left adrift in a sea of incomprehension because we have neglected the modes of though that might have led to comprehension and understanding.

The Master and His Emissary, by Iain McGilchrist argues, I believe, a parallel point.

The second article argues, "context matters." This supports long held beliefs; beliefs that underpin my criticism of software engineering (the context of the domain is irrelevant as long as you have set of complete, unambiguous, and consistent requirements) and AI (one kind of context is embodiment and an AI lacks such context). I do not mean embodiment in a human body, but embodiment in the world.

I hope that others will take up this discussion.

davew

On Wed, Apr 22, 2020, at 3:17 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:

> I suppose it's delusional synergy that I saw Krakauer's essay the same
> (sleepless) morning I saw this:
>
> Experience Grounds Language
> https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.10151
>
> And since all the news all the time is about the parasite, I can't
> help but think Krakauer's wrong in the main thread that understanding
> and prediction are distinct. In Bisk et al above, the current machine
> learning algorithms are parasitic. Their predictions are akin to state
> space reconstruction algorithms that posit some deep structure that's
> expressive enough to mimic our linguistic output, but that's very
> different from our (internal) state machines. (And to be clear, our
> internal state machines are just as opaque as those of the machines.
> That we think our state machines are "understanding" whereas the
> machines' state machines are opaque, however predictive, is illusory
> ... or perhaps anthropocentric.) And although I'd claim the machines,
> like SARS-CoV-2, *understand*, it's *what* they understand that
> differs, not *that* they don't understand.
>
> The machines' algorithms are parasitic because they depend deeply on
> our state machines' output (WS1 and WS2 in the Bisk paper). But as the
> machines' scopes grow (from disembodied binaries pushed by hardware
> clocks to fully parallel, sensorimotor manifolds in real or virtual
> space and time), the machines' understanding will be less opaque
> because it will be less parasitic and more autonomous ... in the same
> way we go "Awwww" when one of Karl Sims' virtual creatures walks
> across the virtual landscape. They'll still be as opaque as, say,
> Nick's mind is to mine ... which is pretty damned opaque. But it'll be
> much easier for us to "see where they're coming from" because they,
> like us, will have grown up poking around in the world.
>
> On 4/22/20 8:01 AM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
> >
> > https://aeon.co/essays/will-brains-or-algorithms-rule-the-kingdom-of
> > -science
> >
>
> --
> ☣ uǝlƃ
>
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jon zingale

Re: At the limits of thought

In reply to this post by gepr

I like that Sims approaches the problem of AI from the perspective that

life is a consequence of the world, that life is the world discovering itself.
He specifies a learning semantics (genetic algorithms) and a learning
syntax (motivation functions and virtual embodiment in time) for his creations.
His specifications are functor-like in that they determine a structure on the
world that when probed gives information about the world, more or less finely.
Through process come functions like crawling, reaching, or defending.
Some how these functions follow from motivation, learning and the world.
Is it reasonable to interpret them as dependent functions of the underlying
motivation functions, the motivations acting as a generalized grobner basis?

To Glen's point, or perhaps the point of the Bengio paper, if we watch long
enough and the virtual world has sufficient analog to our own, we can begin
to experience a transparency of understanding. Still perhaps, the understanding

is not of the agent but of the world.

gepr

Re: At the limits of thought

Well said! While I don't think I understand the Gröbner basis analogy, I would argue that the motivations will also be derived from the world, though perhaps more deeply with long memories. [†] Add to that the loopiness where the agents co-construct the world that constructs them and it's not clear to me that any basis could be well-formed.

Folding this into Jochen's suggestion to Nick, when comparing inheritance from path-dependence to inheritance from generators, we'd have to do something to handle state. If we went with path-dependence, we'd have to define where the saved state accumulates (and presumably rates of decay). And like my statement about non-loopy/well-formedness of a potential basis, some of the saved state will be stored in the environment and some in the gametes. E.g. cities (buildings, roads, utility lines, cell phones, etc.) are state saved in the environment (Renee's grandkids don't even know what a rotary phone is/does) and things like eye color are state saved in gametes. Are the two types of data/state different in kind? Or is there a smooth transition between gametes state and environmental state.

I feel confident the functional programming people have had all these discussions. 8^) Marcus and Chris once insisted that I'd understand much better if I simply read section 3.5 of SICP ... they underestimated just how stupid I am, however.

[†] I have argued, even on this list, that perhaps the motivation can be unified into something I call Twitch, which someone (on this list) pointed out to me was discussed in Warren's All the King's Men, arguably my favorite novel. It's not quite clear to me what my conception of Twitch is or would be if I took it seriously ... some kind of heat maybe, a pressure to explore every crevice of the universe ... a pressure strong enough maybe to *create* the universe ... like virtual particles at an event horizon.

On 4/27/20 10:14 AM, Jon Zingale wrote:

> I like that Sims approaches the problem of AI from the perspective that
> life is a consequence of the world, that life is the world discovering itself.
> He specifies a learning semantics (genetic algorithms) and a learning
> syntax (motivation functions and virtual embodiment in time) for his creations.
> His specifications are functor-like in that they determine a structure on the
> world that when probed gives information about the world, more or less finely.
> Through process come functions like crawling, reaching, or defending.
> Some how these functions follow from motivation, learning and the world.
> Is it reasonable to interpret them as dependent functions of the underlying
> motivation functions, the motivations acting as a generalized grobner basis?
>
> To Glen's point, or perhaps the point of the Bengiopaper, if we watch long
> enough and the virtual world has sufficient analog to our own, we can begin
> to experience a transparency of understanding. Still perhaps, the understanding
> is not of the agent but of the world.

--
☣ uǝlƃ

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uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen

Frank Wimberly-2

Re: At the limits of thought

> I call Twitch, which someone (on this list) pointed out to me was discussed in Warren's All the King's Men, arguably my favorite novel.

It was I. My narcissism requires that I receive the recognition I deserve.

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 2:38 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:

Well said! While I don't think I understand the Gröbner basis analogy, I would argue that the motivations will also be derived from the world, though perhaps more deeply with long memories. [†] Add to that the loopiness where the agents co-construct the world that constructs them and it's not clear to me that any basis could be well-formed.

Folding this into Jochen's suggestion to Nick, when comparing inheritance from path-dependence to inheritance from generators, we'd have to do something to handle state. If we went with path-dependence, we'd have to define where the saved state accumulates (and presumably rates of decay). And like my statement about non-loopy/well-formedness of a potential basis, some of the saved state will be stored in the environment and some in the gametes. E.g. cities (buildings, roads, utility lines, cell phones, etc.) are state saved in the environment (Renee's grandkids don't even know what a rotary phone is/does) and things like eye color are state saved in gametes. Are the two types of data/state different in kind? Or is there a smooth transition between gametes state and environmental state.

I feel confident the functional programming people have had all these discussions. 8^) Marcus and Chris once insisted that I'd understand much better if I simply read section 3.5 of SICP ... they underestimated just how stupid I am, however.

[†] I have argued, even on this list, that perhaps the motivation can be unified into something I call Twitch, which someone (on this list) pointed out to me was discussed in Warren's All the King's Men, arguably my favorite novel. It's not quite clear to me what my conception of Twitch is or would be if I took it seriously ... some kind of heat maybe, a pressure to explore every crevice of the universe ... a pressure strong enough maybe to *create* the universe ... like virtual particles at an event horizon.

On 4/27/20 10:14 AM, Jon Zingale wrote:
> I like that Sims approaches the problem of AI from the perspective that
> life is a consequence of the world, that life is the world discovering itself.
> He specifies a learning semantics (genetic algorithms) and a learning
> syntax (motivation functions and virtual embodiment in time) for his creations.
> His specifications are functor-like in that they determine a structure on the
> world that when probed gives information about the world, more or less finely.
> Through process come functions like crawling, reaching, or defending.
> Some how these functions follow from motivation, learning and the world.
> Is it reasonable to interpret them as dependent functions of the underlying
> motivation functions, the motivations acting as a generalized grobner basis?
>
> To Glen's point, or perhaps the point of the Bengiopaper, if we watch long
> enough and the virtual world has sufficient analog to our own, we can begin
> to experience a transparency of understanding. Still perhaps, the understanding
> is not of the agent but of the world.

--
☣ uǝlƃ

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Frank Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918

gepr

Re: At the limits of thought

Excellent! Such credit tracking is something I've always wished I were competent at. I look at all these publications of people I respect and see hundreds of items in the references and my imagination runs wild with how much work they had to do to track down where any given idea came from. Renee's fond of exclamations like "They're so talented!" when watching some musician or somesuch (e.g. this guy https://youtu.be/4LFcNd-psRA). My refrain consists of "Talent is an illusion. What you see is the result of a ton of work." It's a song we sing a lot. I'll gladly cop to being lazy. >8^D

I noticed that Jon hid (too well) his answer to Dave's comment about modes of knowledge acquisition. Assuming I'm not imputing it, the idea is that these modes are not necessarily isolated or disjoint, and possibly not even countable. Each agent could comprise 1 mode or a set of modes. But the important part comes down to the idea that the agent (and/or its modes) derives from the world. So, it takes "context matters" to an extreme. The very fact that Dave identifies 5 "ways of knowing" should be derivable from the world (in particular, the slice of the world Dave's experienced). Ontologically, if the world were something other than what it is, an agent like Dave might identify only 1 or hundreds of modes instead of 5. Epistemologically, a different agent might identify 4 or 6 ways of knowing with or without overlap of Dave's 5. If Dave laments the (apparent) fact that everyone's become a scientismist, it may be because the world is expressing scientism through the agents it produces.

To me, the issue boils down to the expressive power of the mode. My favorite meta-mathematician is Raymond Smullyan, who competently wrote on all sorts of topics, including something akin to panpsychism. Are his explorations of circularity in logic the same or a different mode from his rejection of traditional Christianity because Hell is unchristian? I have no idea. But it should be clear that Smullyan is both a product of his environment and an encapsulation of some sort of spark/twitch that differs from most of us. Which came first? The egg, of course.

On 4/27/20 1:43 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
>> I call Twitch, which someone (on this list) pointed out to me was discussed in Warren's All the King's Men, arguably my favorite novel.
>
>
> It was I. My narcissism requires that I receive the recognition I deserve.

--
☣ uǝlƃ
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uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen

Frank Wimberly-2

Re: At the limits of thought

Academia does something like that. "You have [so many] mentions. To see your mentions come a full member"

i.e. send money. I think mentions is slightly more general than citations. They might mention your name without citing a paper?

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 4:58 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:

Excellent! Such credit tracking is something I've always wished I were competent at. I look at all these publications of people I respect and see hundreds of items in the references and my imagination runs wild with how much work they had to do to track down where any given idea came from. Renee's fond of exclamations like "They're so talented!" when watching some musician or somesuch (e.g. this guy https://youtu.be/4LFcNd-psRA). My refrain consists of "Talent is an illusion. What you see is the result of a ton of work." It's a song we sing a lot. I'll gladly cop to being lazy. >8^D

I noticed that Jon hid (too well) his answer to Dave's comment about modes of knowledge acquisition. Assuming I'm not imputing it, the idea is that these modes are not necessarily isolated or disjoint, and possibly not even countable. Each agent could comprise 1 mode or a set of modes. But the important part comes down to the idea that the agent (and/or its modes) derives from the world. So, it takes "context matters" to an extreme. The very fact that Dave identifies 5 "ways of knowing" should be derivable from the world (in particular, the slice of the world Dave's experienced). Ontologically, if the world were something other than what it is, an agent like Dave might identify only 1 or hundreds of modes instead of 5. Epistemologically, a different agent might identify 4 or 6 ways of knowing with or without overlap of Dave's 5. If Dave laments the (apparent) fact that everyone's become a scientismist, it may be because the world is expressing scientism through the agents it produces.

To me, the issue boils down to the expressive power of the mode. My favorite meta-mathematician is Raymond Smullyan, who competently wrote on all sorts of topics, including something akin to panpsychism. Are his explorations of circularity in logic the same or a different mode from his rejection of traditional Christianity because Hell is unchristian? I have no idea. But it should be clear that Smullyan is both a product of his environment and an encapsulation of some sort of spark/twitch that differs from most of us. Which came first? The egg, of course.

On 4/27/20 1:43 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
>> I call Twitch, which someone (on this list) pointed out to me was discussed in Warren's All the King's Men, arguably my favorite novel.
>
>
> It was I. My narcissism requires that I receive the recognition I deserve.

--
☣ uǝlƃ
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Frank Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918

Gillian Densmore

Re: At the limits of thought

Twitch is what icall a streaming service

it's also what I see when a friam is now all POTUS, the Covid19 Cluster, and then someone sends it into the mirror universe (Hi Glen!)

So to make copypast bingo simple

POTUS is a jerk because POTUS Said

OH *@*! COVID19 it's been 5 nanoseconds!

Now when you say (person place or thing). What is about that person place or thing ness that makes it...it

Saright? Saright!

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 5:05 PM Frank Wimberly <[hidden email]> wrote:

Academia does something like that. "You have [so many] mentions. To see your mentions come a full member"
i.e. send money. I think mentions is slightly more general than citations. They might mention your name without citing a paper?

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 4:58 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:
Excellent! Such credit tracking is something I've always wished I were competent at. I look at all these publications of people I respect and see hundreds of items in the references and my imagination runs wild with how much work they had to do to track down where any given idea came from. Renee's fond of exclamations like "They're so talented!" when watching some musician or somesuch (e.g. this guy https://youtu.be/4LFcNd-psRA). My refrain consists of "Talent is an illusion. What you see is the result of a ton of work." It's a song we sing a lot. I'll gladly cop to being lazy. >8^D

I noticed that Jon hid (too well) his answer to Dave's comment about modes of knowledge acquisition. Assuming I'm not imputing it, the idea is that these modes are not necessarily isolated or disjoint, and possibly not even countable. Each agent could comprise 1 mode or a set of modes. But the important part comes down to the idea that the agent (and/or its modes) derives from the world. So, it takes "context matters" to an extreme. The very fact that Dave identifies 5 "ways of knowing" should be derivable from the world (in particular, the slice of the world Dave's experienced). Ontologically, if the world were something other than what it is, an agent like Dave might identify only 1 or hundreds of modes instead of 5. Epistemologically, a different agent might identify 4 or 6 ways of knowing with or without overlap of Dave's 5. If Dave laments the (apparent) fact that everyone's become a scientismist, it may be because the world is expressing scientism through the agents it produces.

To me, the issue boils down to the expressive power of the mode. My favorite meta-mathematician is Raymond Smullyan, who competently wrote on all sorts of topics, including something akin to panpsychism. Are his explorations of circularity in logic the same or a different mode from his rejection of traditional Christianity because Hell is unchristian? I have no idea. But it should be clear that Smullyan is both a product of his environment and an encapsulation of some sort of spark/twitch that differs from most of us. Which came first? The egg, of course.

On 4/27/20 1:43 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
>> I call Twitch, which someone (on this list) pointed out to me was discussed in Warren's All the King's Men, arguably my favorite novel.
>
>
> It was I. My narcissism requires that I receive the recognition I deserve.

--
☣ uǝlƃ
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--
Frank Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918
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Jochen Fromm-5

Re: At the limits of thought

In reply to this post by Frank Wimberly-2

The "limits of thought" is a nice subject. For Trump the limits of thought must be everything that has nothing to do with himself. For narcissists the own person defines the limits of thought, while there are no limits to lies and criminal activities.

-J.

-------- Original message --------

From: Frank Wimberly <[hidden email]>

Date: 4/27/20 22:44 (GMT+01:00)

To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] At the limits of thought

> I call Twitch, which someone (on this list) pointed out to me was discussed in Warren's All the King's Men, arguably my favorite novel.

It was I. My narcissism requires that I receive the recognition I deserve.

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 2:38 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:

Well said! While I don't think I understand the Gröbner basis analogy, I would argue that the motivations will also be derived from the world, though perhaps more deeply with long memories. [†] Add to that the loopiness where the agents co-construct the world that constructs them and it's not clear to me that any basis could be well-formed.

Folding this into Jochen's suggestion to Nick, when comparing inheritance from path-dependence to inheritance from generators, we'd have to do something to handle state. If we went with path-dependence, we'd have to define where the saved state accumulates (and presumably rates of decay). And like my statement about non-loopy/well-formedness of a potential basis, some of the saved state will be stored in the environment and some in the gametes. E.g. cities (buildings, roads, utility lines, cell phones, etc.) are state saved in the environment (Renee's grandkids don't even know what a rotary phone is/does) and things like eye color are state saved in gametes. Are the two types of data/state different in kind? Or is there a smooth transition between gametes state and environmental state.

I feel confident the functional programming people have had all these discussions. 8^) Marcus and Chris once insisted that I'd understand much better if I simply read section 3.5 of SICP ... they underestimated just how stupid I am, however.

[†] I have argued, even on this list, that perhaps the motivation can be unified into something I call Twitch, which someone (on this list) pointed out to me was discussed in Warren's All the King's Men, arguably my favorite novel. It's not quite clear to me what my conception of Twitch is or would be if I took it seriously ... some kind of heat maybe, a pressure to explore every crevice of the universe ... a pressure strong enough maybe to *create* the universe ... like virtual particles at an event horizon.

On 4/27/20 10:14 AM, Jon Zingale wrote:
> I like that Sims approaches the problem of AI from the perspective that
> life is a consequence of the world, that life is the world discovering itself.
> He specifies a learning semantics (genetic algorithms) and a learning
> syntax (motivation functions and virtual embodiment in time) for his creations.
> His specifications are functor-like in that they determine a structure on the
> world that when probed gives information about the world, more or less finely.
> Through process come functions like crawling, reaching, or defending.
> Some how these functions follow from motivation, learning and the world.
> Is it reasonable to interpret them as dependent functions of the underlying
> motivation functions, the motivations acting as a generalized grobner basis?
>
> To Glen's point, or perhaps the point of the Bengiopaper, if we watch long
> enough and the virtual world has sufficient analog to our own, we can begin
> to experience a transparency of understanding. Still perhaps, the understanding
> is not of the agent but of the world.

--
☣ uǝlƃ

.-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ...
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
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Frank Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918

gepr

Re: At the limits of thought

In reply to this post by Gillian Densmore

Ha! Yes, I have 2 twitch logins, one for play and one for work. I find it fascinating how these people can both play some game well *and* read chat and facilitate parasocial relationships with large numbers of their fans. I briefly worked on using Twitch to stream tutorials for my M&S workflow (a combination of RStudio and byobu works pretty well through OBS). But I've found Discord is a better place for such things. I did stream some game play. But I can't even maintain relationships with my meat space friends, much less devote attention to Twitch people. Plus, I suck at video games.

On 4/27/20 6:29 PM, Gillian Densmore wrote:

> Twitch is what icall a streaming service
> it's also what I see when a friam is now all POTUS, the Covid19 Cluster, and then someone sends it into the mirror universe (Hi Glen!)
> So to make copypast bingo simple
> POTUS is a jerk because POTUS Said
>
> OH *@*! COVID19 it's been 5 nanoseconds!
>
> Now when you say (person place or thing). What is about that person place or thing ness that makes it...it
>
> Saright? Saright!

uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen

Russell Standish-2

Re: At the limits of thought

In reply to this post by Frank Wimberly-2

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 05:04:52PM -0600, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> Academia does something like that. "You have [so many] mentions. To see your
> mentions come a full member"
> i.e. send money. I think mentions is slightly more general than citations.
> They might mention your name without citing a paper?

I did wonder - I keep getting messages congratulating on my 700th (or
whatever) mention. But it exceeds my citation count according to
Google scholar. But I'm not curious enough to fork over the money to
find out :).

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Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
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thompnickson2

Re: At the limits of thought

Russell,

I have both research gate and Academia. Academia can't tell me from anybody
that has the name nicholas or thompson or ns thompson or... nick thompson
or.... and, believe you me, there are a lot of us. Research Gate doesn't
make that sort of mistake near as often. Academia is a bit better at
finding things for me to read, but I am overwhelmed as it is, so that's not
of much use to me. I don't think I am going to renew it.

Nick

Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
[hidden email]
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Russell Standish
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 8:07 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] At the limits of thought

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 05:04:52PM -0600, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> Academia does something like that. "You have [so many] mentions. To
> see your mentions come a full member"
> i.e. send money. I think mentions is slightly more general than
> citations. They might mention your name without citing a paper?

I did wonder - I keep getting messages congratulating on my 700th (or
whatever) mention. But it exceeds my citation count according to Google
scholar. But I'm not curious enough to fork over the money to find out :).

--

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders [hidden email]
http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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gepr

Re: At the limits of thought

In reply to this post by gepr

So Frank has been harassing me with psychobabble >8^D and during the course of it, I finally snapped and thought again about this paper:

Experience Grounds Language
https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.10151

The idea is that WS3 and higher *ground* the algorithm such that it's mechanism and output will match, more naturally, the mechanism and output of us humans. Psychodynamics (the process by which some sympathetic nit-picker infiltrates your mind through an interplay between your words and theirs) is simply a Turing test. (Shirley, we've all met Eliza: <http://psych.fullerton.edu/mbirnbaum/psych101/Eliza.htm>) We ought to be able to automate psychodynamics so that a patient can talk to their computer and reap the same (or better) results than going to a meat space Freud. And, sure enough, I found this:

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22242553
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/An-automated-method-of-content-analysis-for-A-Salvatore-Gelo/a0f2ffdbf9abe716ac30e37f63f7d6c7e72e4c45

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Frank Wimberly-2

Re: At the limits of thought

What you're overlooking is that the hypercathexis of the narcissistic libido is impossible where the object is an entity without a physical instantiation of an organism which resembles the parent imago, especially the undifferentiated other which is eventually differentiated from the self and over time is recognized as the mother.

On Fri, May 1, 2020 at 4:34 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:

So Frank has been harassing me with psychobabble >8^D and during the course of it, I finally snapped and thought again about this paper:

Experience Grounds Language
https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.10151

The idea is that WS3 and higher *ground* the algorithm such that it's mechanism and output will match, more naturally, the mechanism and output of us humans. Psychodynamics (the process by which some sympathetic nit-picker infiltrates your mind through an interplay between your words and theirs) is simply a Turing test. (Shirley, we've all met Eliza: <http://psych.fullerton.edu/mbirnbaum/psych101/Eliza.htm>) We ought to be able to automate psychodynamics so that a patient can talk to their computer and reap the same (or better) results than going to a meat space Freud. And, sure enough, I found this:

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22242553
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/An-automated-method-of-content-analysis-for-A-Salvatore-Gelo/a0f2ffdbf9abe716ac30e37f63f7d6c7e72e4c45

--
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Frank Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz
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505 670-9918

thompnickson2

Re: At the limits of thought

Tiz Frabjious and the boregos did gyro gimbal in the mame.

Or something like that.

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 5:01 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] At the limits of thought

On Fri, May 1, 2020 at 4:34 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:

So Frank has been harassing me with psychobabble >8^D and during the course of it, I finally snapped and thought again about this paper:

Experience Grounds Language
https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.10151

The idea is that WS3 and higher *ground* the algorithm such that it's mechanism and output will match, more naturally, the mechanism and output of us humans. Psychodynamics (the process by which some sympathetic nit-picker infiltrates your mind through an interplay between your words and theirs) is simply a Turing test. (Shirley, we've all met Eliza: <http://psych.fullerton.edu/mbirnbaum/psych101/Eliza.htm>) We ought to be able to automate psychodynamics so that a patient can talk to their computer and reap the same (or better) results than going to a meat space Freud. And, sure enough, I found this:

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22242553
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/An-automated-method-of-content-analysis-for-A-Salvatore-Gelo/a0f2ffdbf9abe716ac30e37f63f7d6c7e72e4c45

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Frank Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918