AI and argument
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e.g. R. Daneel Olivaw, possessor of the finest Positronic Brain,
inventor of the Zeroth Law of Robotics, and Protector of Humanity until he resigned his post as advisor to Cleon I, Galactic Emperor? dw On Wed, Oct 4, 2017, at 08:54 AM, ┣glen┫ wrote: > > It depends on how you define "computer". If it's a CPU-in-a-vat, like a > brain in a vat, then I disagree. That kind of computer is impoverished > compared to a human. But if it's an android or somesuch, then I agree. > > On 10/04/2017 07:47 AM, Prof David West wrote: > > A necessary presupposition — if any of these program are to come to fruition — is: what a human exhibits is nothing more than what a computer CAN exhibit; i.e., that a human can be nothing more than a machine. > > > > I am curious if any of the participants in this discussion are willing to accept the presupposition? Especially if Nick, whose monist "behavior," strong agreement with Pierce's three forms of logic. and equally strong denial of "mind" might be so inclined? > > -- > ␦glen? > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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Yes, very much so! One of my favorite characters.
On 10/04/2017 07:58 AM, Prof David West wrote: > e.g. R. Daneel Olivaw, possessor of the finest Positronic Brain, > inventor of the Zeroth Law of Robotics, and Protector of Humanity until > he resigned his post as advisor to Cleon I, Galactic Emperor? -- ␦glen? ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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In reply to this post by Frank Wimberly-2
Frank, Glen, Dave, and all, What, on your various accounts is the relationship between “logic”, “right thinking”, “right reasoning”, and “truth”? As I understand Peirce, a true opinion is one that is likely to endure indefinitely, unchallenged by any new experiences, “right reasoning and thinking” are methods of inference that lead (fallibly] to such true opinions, and logic is the distillation and formalization of such methods of inference. Peirce was the premier logician of his time and the origin of much of our modern statistical method and scientific logic. Am I wrong about his views on right thinking and truth? Or do you guys hold different views? Is this just some sort of semantic food fight that we can tidy up with a few quick definitions and move on? Or are we really arguing about something, here? Am not interested in the fine points of your thought, right now. What is it that you all agree on that I don’t understand? Dave, it’s great to hear your voice! Will I see you this Friday at FRIAM? Did you report out on your Short Course? Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly Don't be discouraged. I think what I said is incorrect. What I should have said is that in logic a false premise implies everything so for instance F -> F is true. Which puzzles people. Although it is used ironically as in "If Trump is a genius then I'll go fly a kite". Frank Frank Wimberly On Oct 3, 2017 11:11 PM, "Nick Thompson" <[hidden email]> wrote:
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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There is an "out there" reality. But the map between it and me (or a bee or a tree) is plectic, with all that entails including far-from-equilibrium, polyphenism, robustness, sensitivity to initial conditions, multi-scale, etc. That implies that my understanding of what's out there can be stuck in only 1 of many attractors for a very long time, perhaps from birth to death.
Further, because other humans have similar physiology to me, some, many, or all other humans can find themselves stuck in a stable attractor for a very long time, perhaps over an infinite number of generations. Hence, if Peirce's definition of truth is that which endures indefinitely, then I disagree fundamentally. I, you, and all of us, can easily persist in complete delusion forever. The question becomes whether that delusion is satisficing. Do we care that our sense of truth could switch from one attractor to another at any moment? Is it OK that our models of reality aren't general enough to be full (or complete) models? My guess is that most of us don't care and are happy to assume their concept of truth is actually true. In this conception, (if you've characterized him right) Peirce would merely be another pluralist, admitting there can be many truths and I would be a monist, insisting there is only 1 truth, but many ways to interact with it. On 10/04/2017 08:51 AM, Nick Thompson wrote: > What, on your various accounts is the relationship between “logic”, “right thinking”, “right reasoning”, and “truth”? As I understand Peirce, a true opinion is one that is likely to endure indefinitely, unchallenged by any new experiences, “right reasoning and thinking” are methods of inference that lead (fallibly] to such true opinions, and logic is the distillation and formalization of such methods of inference. Peirce was the premier logician of his time and the origin of much of our modern statistical method and scientific logic. Am I wrong about his views on right thinking and truth? Or do you guys hold different views? Is this just some sort of semantic food fight that we can tidy up with a few quick definitions and move on? Or are we really arguing about something, here? Am not interested in the fine points of your thought, right now. What is it that */you all agree/* on that I don’t understand? -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Glen, Well, unless you understand Peirce as a fallibilist, I have described him wrongly or you have misunderstood me. To Peirce, there is only one kind of stuff ... experience. He would not understand what on earth you meant by "out there", unless you were clear that you meant only that some experiences have a character of "out there ness" which you are obligated to define. Peirce starts with his pragmatic understanding of meaning as the conequences of an conception to experience, and by experience he means scientific experience ... almost "experiments". He deploys this pragmatic understanding of meaning on the word truth and ends up with the truth as that stable opinion toward which we all strive. But nothing in that definition of truth implies necessarily that the truth is ever known. Hence Peirce’s fallibilism is at least as profound as your own. Imagining that there is a truth of the matter has the [pragmatic] effect of forcing us all into a convergent discourse and this effect is for Peirce the central meaning of the word truth. He has great contempt for styles and fashions of criticism precisely because there is no commitment to convergence in such discourses. Screw pluralism. I think you ARE a Peircean. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- There is an "out there" reality. But the map between it and me (or a bee or a tree) is plectic, with all that entails including far-from-equilibrium, polyphenism, robustness, sensitivity to initial conditions, multi-scale, etc. That implies that my understanding of what's out there can be stuck in only 1 of many attractors for a very long time, perhaps from birth to death. Further, because other humans have similar physiology to me, some, many, or all other humans can find themselves stuck in a stable attractor for a very long time, perhaps over an infinite number of generations. Hence, if Peirce's definition of truth is that which endures indefinitely, then I disagree fundamentally. I, you, and all of us, can easily persist in complete delusion forever. The question becomes whether that delusion is satisficing. Do we care that our sense of truth could switch from one attractor to another at any moment? Is it OK that our models of reality aren't general enough to be full (or complete) models? My guess is that most of us don't care and are happy to assume their concept of truth is actually true. In this conception, (if you've characterized him right) Peirce would merely be another pluralist, admitting there can be many truths and I would be a monist, insisting there is only 1 truth, but many ways to interact with it. On 10/04/2017 08:51 AM, Nick Thompson wrote: > What, on your various accounts is the relationship between “logic”, > “right thinking”, “right reasoning”, and “truth”? As I understand Peirce, a true opinion is one that is likely to endure indefinitely, unchallenged by any new experiences, “right reasoning and thinking” are methods of inference that lead (fallibly] to such true opinions, and logic is the distillation and formalization of such methods of inference. Peirce was the premier logician of his time and the origin of much of our modern statistical method and scientific logic. Am I wrong about his views on right thinking and truth? Or do you guys hold different views? Is this just some sort of semantic food fight that we can tidy up with a few quick definitions and move on? Or are we really arguing about something, here? Am not interested in the fine points of your thought, right now. What is it that */you all agree/* on that I don’t understand? -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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I propose that any commonalities between experiences, are due to common physiology. And that means that were I and a mouse to get together and define some scientific experiments we *both* could perform independently (say, jumping on a see-saw or pushing a kibble lever), then the mouse would have a fundamentally different experience than I would have. If experience is somehow "truth", then there are 2 truths, mine and the mouse's. That's pluralism.
On 10/04/2017 09:55 AM, Nick Thompson wrote: > Well, unless you understand Peirce as a fallibilist, I have described him wrongly or you have misunderstood me. To Peirce, there is only one kind of stuff ... experience. He would not understand what on earth you meant by "out there", unless you were clear that you meant only that some experiences have a character of "out there ness" which you are obligated to define. Peirce starts with his pragmatic understanding of meaning as the conequences of an conception to experience, and by experience he means scientific experience ... almost "experiments". He deploys this pragmatic understanding of meaning on the word truth and ends up with the truth as that stable opinion toward which we all strive. */But nothing in that definition of truth implies necessarily that the truth is ever known. Hence Peirce’s fallibilism is at least as profound as your own. /*Imagining that there is a truth of the matter has the [pragmatic] effect of forcing us all into a convergent discourse and > this effect is for Peirce the central meaning of the word truth. He has great contempt for styles and fashions of criticism precisely because there is no commitment to convergence in such discourses. Screw pluralism. > > > > I think you ARE a Peircean. -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Glen,
Peirce does not presume that there ARE any communalities. He presumes only that if there ARE any communalities, they are what truth would be. Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of g??? ? Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2017 11:10 AM To: FriAM <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] AI and argument I propose that any commonalities between experiences, are due to common physiology. And that means that were I and a mouse to get together and define some scientific experiments we *both* could perform independently (say, jumping on a see-saw or pushing a kibble lever), then the mouse would have a fundamentally different experience than I would have. If experience is somehow "truth", then there are 2 truths, mine and the mouse's. That's pluralism. On 10/04/2017 09:55 AM, Nick Thompson wrote: > Well, unless you understand Peirce as a fallibilist, I have described > him wrongly or you have misunderstood me. To Peirce, there is only one kind of stuff ... experience. He would not understand what on earth you meant by "out there", unless you were clear that you meant only that some experiences have a character of "out there ness" which you are obligated to define. Peirce starts with his pragmatic understanding of meaning as the conequences of an conception to experience, and by experience he means scientific experience ... almost "experiments". He deploys this pragmatic understanding of meaning on the word truth and ends up with the truth as that stable opinion toward which we all strive. */But nothing in that definition of truth implies necessarily that the truth is ever known. Hence Peirce’s fallibilism is at least as profound as your own. /*Imagining that there is a truth of the matter has the [pragmatic] effect of forcing us all into a convergent discourse and this effect is for Peirce the central meaning of the word truth. He has great contempt for styles and fashions of criticism precisely because there is no commitment to convergence in such discourses. Screw pluralism. > > > > I think you ARE a Peircean. -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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How can there be "convergent discourse" if there are no commonalities?
On 10/04/2017 11:56 AM, Nick Thompson wrote: > Peirce does not presume that there ARE any communalities. He presumes only that if there ARE any communalities, they are what truth would be. > On 10/04/2017 09:55 AM, Nick Thompson wrote: >> /*Imagining that there is a truth of the matter has the [pragmatic] effect of forcing us all into a convergent discourse and this effect is for Peirce the central meaning of the word truth. He has great contempt for styles and fashions of criticism precisely because there is no commitment to convergence in such discourses. Screw pluralism. -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Turn that question around: How can even have a discussion if we don't assume that there is a truth of the matter? "Truth" is what makes it possible to have a discussion.
N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of g??? ? Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2017 1:03 PM To: FriAM <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] AI and argument How can there be "convergent discourse" if there are no commonalities? On 10/04/2017 11:56 AM, Nick Thompson wrote: > Peirce does not presume that there ARE any communalities. He presumes only that if there ARE any communalities, they are what truth would be. > On 10/04/2017 09:55 AM, Nick Thompson wrote: >> /*Imagining that there is a truth of the matter has the [pragmatic] effect of forcing us all into a convergent discourse and this effect is for Peirce the central meaning of the word truth. He has great contempt for styles and fashions of criticism precisely because there is no commitment to convergence in such discourses. Screw pluralism. -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove |
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Sheesh. I suppose we'll continue to trade "pithy" little sentences without saying anything of substance.
So! You're now contradicting your earlier statement and suggesting that Peirce *does* assume there are commonalities? On 10/04/2017 12:48 PM, Nick Thompson wrote: > Turn that question around: How can even have a discussion if we don't assume that there is a truth of the matter? "Truth" is what makes it possible to have a discussion. -- ☣ gⅼеɳ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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