A question for the emergentists among you

[Owen Densmore]

Robert: Just to help untangle the discussion: Are you saying a  
theoretical grounding for Complexity .. or even just Modeling ..  
appears to have no concrete use for you?

To be even more specific: Chaos has at least one definition:  
divergence.  It uses the Lyapunov exponent to define chaotic systems.

Thus would it be useful for you in a calculation to know whether it  
was inherently chaotic?

     -- Owen


On Oct 10, 2009, at 7:58 AM, Robert Holmes wrote:

> What's the point of determining whether a phenomenon is emergent or  
> not? What useful stuff can I actually do with that knowledge?
>
> In other areas of my life, classification can have actionable  
> consequences. For example, I can use the sophisticated pattern-
> matching algorithms and heuristics embedded in my brain to work out  
> that the three animals wandering through my house can be categorized  
> as "cats" and not "dogs". And that is useful, because it tells me  
> that I should buy cat food and not dog food when I go to PetCo.
>
> So what is an equivalent example with emergence? Once I've attached  
> the "emergent" label to a phenomenon, then what?
>
> -- Robert

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[Nick Thompson]

Thanks, Eric.  

I will be interested to see if this higher order patterning exists for
monkeys as well as apes.

N

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/




> [Original Message]
> From: Eric Smith <[hidden email]>
> To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity
Coffee Group <[hidden email]>

> Date: 10/12/2009 8:58:45 AM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for the emergentists among you
>
> Nick, hi,
>
> I can't really summon the energy to be part of the emergence thread,
> but for this particular post, you may wish to keep an eye on
> publications coming out from Flack, deWaal, Krakauer, and
> collaborators including Ay and deDeo, on primate interactions.  They
> have some very strong analysis showing that a very large component of
> group power structure and the functions associated with it, such as
> policing, is mediated by the response of individuals to dyadic
> interactions between others, and very explicitly _not_ to merely the
> members who participate in the dyads.  They have tested a variety of
> p-to-q responses, and find a very strongly significant signal in the
> 1-to-2 response (i.e. individual responds to dyad), with higher-order
> interactions apparently well explained by the composition of 1-to-2,
> and an equally strong absence of signal for any of the other
> elementary levels, or for any single strong explanatory excess of any
> higher-order p-to-q above its dependence on the 1-to-2.  
>
> What I have said here is an oversimplification of a longer and more
> complicated story involving several forms of interactions (fights,
> subordination signals, etc.) with inter-related but distinct dynamics
> and timescales, so I haven't done most of it justice.  I don't know
> how much of the new 1-to-2 work is currently published or on the SFI
> working paper list.  Some of the earlier papers explaining what
> quantitative definitions they attach to the notion of power, and its
> relation to policing and other group-coherence attributes, is out in
> Nature and several behavior journals, and probably mostly available
> from the authors' webpages.  All of this work is in various stages of
> development, write-up, or submission, and some of it may be presented
> in talks as the year wears out.  So one way or another it should be
> available either now or soon.
>
> Just a topic of interest as a bit of science.  
>
> All best, and I do find much of the larger argument interesting and
> thoughtful,
>
> Eric

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[Robert Holmes]

Actually I think the thread is heading into some interesting and (for me) useful directions. Several contributors (Eric, Glen, Russell et al.) are explicitly filling in the blank in the sentence "if a phenomenon is identified as emergent then <blank>" (and thanks to Doug for the clear statement of my question).

As to the math, I'm absolutely not against developing a theoretical grounding for emergence but (IMHO) it needs to inform the "if" clause of Doug's statement AND the "then" clause. I think that our discussions over the past months have tended to focus on the former rather than the latter: my question was just an attempt to correct the balance.

-- Robert

P.S. Does it help if I know whether my simulation will display chaotic behavior? You betcha: if I know the shape of the attractor in phase space I know which states of the system are impossible and which are possible and I can calculate the probability of finding the system in those possible states. So that means (for example) that I can apply error bars to my prediction of next week's weather or properly price the financial derivative that I am selling.

On Mon, Oct 12, 2009 at 12:13 PM, Owen Densmore <[hidden email]> wrote:

Robert: Just to help untangle the discussion: Are you saying a theoretical grounding for Complexity .. or even just Modeling .. appears to have no concrete use for you?

To be even more specific: Chaos has at least one definition: divergence.  It uses the Lyapunov exponent to define chaotic systems.

Thus would it be useful for you in a calculation to know whether it was inherently chaotic?

   -- Owen

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[David Eric Smith]

Hi Nick,

Actually, all the recent work on fights and triads is done on pigtail  
macaques.  The earlier work on subordination signals in relation to  
the accumulation to form power structures was done -- I think --  
mostly on pigtails, with perhaps stumptails and rhesus compared  
because they form differently structured power groups.  I don't know  
whether any of the work on fights has been extended to other species  
within the genus besides the pigtails, or whether there are plans to  
do so.  These researchers actually like macaques as a study system  
because there are -- again, I think -- 13 species in the genus, and  
although they have recognizable similarities, there are different  
behavioral tendencies that look modest when viewed at the individual  
level, but which ramify to very different social structures,  
characteristic roles, and patterns of violence, recovery from  
violence, and group coherence as a result of it all.  My sense from  
listening to talks, but not having made an adequate effort to cover  
even the most superficial review papers, is that the chimps in their  
coalition structures are enough more complicated than the monkeys  
that it is not clear even whether the same data would be sufficient  
for a trustworthy analysis.   But now we are far out of my depth or  
knowledge.

Take care,

Eric



On Oct 12, 2009, at 12:50 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:

> Thanks, Eric.
>
> I will be interested to see if this higher order patterning exists for
> monkeys as well as apes.
>
> N
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
> Clark University ([hidden email])
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
>
>> [Original Message]
>> From: Eric Smith <[hidden email]>
>> To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied  
>> Complexity
> Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
>> Date: 10/12/2009 8:58:45 AM
>> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for the emergentists among you
>>
>> Nick, hi,
>>
>> I can't really summon the energy to be part of the emergence thread,
>> but for this particular post, you may wish to keep an eye on
>> publications coming out from Flack, deWaal, Krakauer, and
>> collaborators including Ay and deDeo, on primate interactions.  They
>> have some very strong analysis showing that a very large component of
>> group power structure and the functions associated with it, such as
>> policing, is mediated by the response of individuals to dyadic
>> interactions between others, and very explicitly _not_ to merely the
>> members who participate in the dyads.  They have tested a variety of
>> p-to-q responses, and find a very strongly significant signal in the
>> 1-to-2 response (i.e. individual responds to dyad), with higher-order
>> interactions apparently well explained by the composition of 1-to-2,
>> and an equally strong absence of signal for any of the other
>> elementary levels, or for any single strong explanatory excess of any
>> higher-order p-to-q above its dependence on the 1-to-2.
>>
>> What I have said here is an oversimplification of a longer and more
>> complicated story involving several forms of interactions (fights,
>> subordination signals, etc.) with inter-related but distinct dynamics
>> and timescales, so I haven't done most of it justice.  I don't know
>> how much of the new 1-to-2 work is currently published or on the SFI
>> working paper list.  Some of the earlier papers explaining what
>> quantitative definitions they attach to the notion of power, and its
>> relation to policing and other group-coherence attributes, is out in
>> Nature and several behavior journals, and probably mostly available
>> from the authors' webpages.  All of this work is in various stages of
>> development, write-up, or submission, and some of it may be presented
>> in talks as the year wears out.  So one way or another it should be
>> available either now or soon.
>>
>> Just a topic of interest as a bit of science.
>>
>> All best, and I do find much of the larger argument interesting and
>> thoughtful,
>>
>> Eric
>
>
>
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> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

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[Nick Thompson]

Glen Wrote:

====> Note that the above is about emergent phenomena, not emergent
properties. I still think the concept of an emergent property is either
useless, self-contradictory, or just confused.<====

Nick replies

===> Funny.  I have this exactly the opposite way.  I think I know what an
emergent property is, but I cannot imagine any more what I ever meant when
I spoke of an emergent phenomenon.  Is there a chance we come up with a
common undestanding?

To me,  a property is emergent when it depends on the arrangement of the
parts that make up the whole. The problem with calling the whole thing "the
emergent" or "an emergent phenomenon" from my point of view is that some
the properties of an object can be emergent while others are not.  So, an
object of conversation can be emergent in some of its particulars and not
in others.  

One escape from this dilemma, proposed by several of our authors, is to
simply declare that any "thing" with emergent properties is an emergent.  

But this solution makes "properties" primary, and so flies in the face of
what you said.  

It would be nice to get squared away on this. <=====

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/




> [Original Message]
> From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]>
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 10/12/2009 9:57:59 AM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for the emergentists among you
>
> Thus spake ERIC P. CHARLES circa 10/11/2009 09:13 PM:
> > "Once I've
> > attached the 'emergent' label to a phenomenon, I now know that I CANNOT
apply

> > scientific methodologies to the problem that treat the phenomenon as
> > if:
>
> Excellent modification.  I do have a (speculative) positive answer,
> though.  I've just been waiting to see if anyone else put it forward.
>
> My answer to Robert's question is: Once I trust that a phenomenon is
> emergent, I can be more confident in the assumption that the phenomenon
> can be used as a mechanism in a layer of abstraction that generates
> coarser phenomena.
>
> If a phenomenon is NOT emergent, then, in order to build an adequate
> description of the whole system, I must include the details of the
> mechanism that generated the phenomenon.  I.e. any abstraction of those
> details will be inadequate or impoverished... the abstraction will be
> too easily punctured.  If, however, a phenomenon is emergent, then I'm
> under less pressure to delineate each detail of its mechanism and can
> get away with encapsulating the phenomenon in a coarser abstraction.
>
> The _use_ to which such a categorization would be put is the method of
> replacement in, for example, modeling and simulation.  If we need a more
> "sciency" method, then we can talk about compressibility.  I might be
> able to claim that systems exhibiting emergent phenomena are _more_
> compressible than those without them.
>
>
> Note that the above is about emergent phenomena, not emergent
> properties.  I still think the concept of an emergent property is either
> useless, self-contradictory, or just confused.
>
> --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com
>
>
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[glen e. p. ropella-2]

It's actually quite simple to me.  Phenomena are the outputs of
operators.  (Phenomenon means "to appear", it is perceived, observable.)
 By contrast, a property is inherent in the system and exists regardless
of any perspective (a.k.a stance) from which it may appear, be
perceived, or be observed.

Measurement (or, more generically, the application of an operator[*]) is
required for emergence.  Nothing can emerge unless it is the result of
some sort of measurement or, more specifically, observation.

So, to speak of emergent phenomena is uncontroversial, as Roger points
out.  But to speak of emergent properties is confused (unless you go
back and re-read what I've written before about circular causality).


* Note that I'm NOT requiring that the operator, operands, or results
require any type of observer, conscious or not.  I believe operators
would exist even if there were no life in the universe.


Thus spake Nicholas Thompson circa 09-10-12 03:50 PM:

> Glen Wrote:
>
> ====> Note that the above is about emergent phenomena, not emergent
> properties. I still think the concept of an emergent property is either
> useless, self-contradictory, or just confused.<====
>
> Nick replies
>
> ===> Funny.  I have this exactly the opposite way.  I think I know what an
> emergent property is, but I cannot imagine any more what I ever meant when
> I spoke of an emergent phenomenon.  Is there a chance we come up with a
> common undestanding?
>
> To me,  a property is emergent when it depends on the arrangement of the
> parts that make up the whole. The problem with calling the whole thing "the
> emergent" or "an emergent phenomenon" from my point of view is that some
> the properties of an object can be emergent while others are not.  So, an
> object of conversation can be emergent in some of its particulars and not
> in others.  
>
> One escape from this dilemma, proposed by several of our authors, is to
> simply declare that any "thing" with emergent properties is an emergent.  
>
> But this solution makes "properties" primary, and so flies in the face of
> what you said.  
>
> It would be nice to get squared away on this. <=====

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


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[glen e. p. ropella-2]

Thus spake glen e. p. ropella circa 09-10-12 04:41 PM:
>  By contrast, a property is inherent in the system and exists regardless
> of any perspective (a.k.a stance) from which it may appear, be
> perceived, or be observed.

Just to be clear, I get this (perhaps peculiar) definition of "property"
from the IE root per and entry VI(3)(b) in American Heritage's list of
IE roots:

"b. proper, property; appropriate, expropriate, proprioception,
proprioceptor, proprium, from Latin proprius, one's own, particular (<
pr prv, in particular, from the ablative of prvus, single; pr, for; see
V. 4.)."

Note that "proprioceptive" is VERY close to what I mean by circular
causality, the difference being that I think proprioception is totally
ordered in time with the order being applied by the "self", which is
doing the perceiving. When I talk about circular causality, I'm talking
about a system with inherent ambiguity like that achieved by parallel,
distributed systems that can reach deadlock.  Of course, what do I know
about things like proprioception?  Well, nothing, of course, which is
why this is all speculation on my part. ;-)

The POINT is that "emergent phenomena" makes total sense to me whereas
with my definition of "property", "emergent property" sounds like total
nonsense to me.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


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[Russ Abbott]

Glen, I have questions about your version of operators and properties.

1. Operators. What do you mean by an operator? Would you give a few examples.
2. Properties. It seems to me that one of the most basic properties is mass. Another is electric charge. Do you not see these as properties? Or is it your position that only primitive (and perhaps circular) properties make sense?
   

-- Russ A

On Mon, Oct 12, 2009 at 5:00 PM, glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> wrote:

Thus spake glen e. p. ropella circa 09-10-12 04:41 PM:

>  By contrast, a property is inherent in the system and exists regardless
> of any perspective (a.k.a stance) from which it may appear, be
> perceived, or be observed.

Just to be clear, I get this (perhaps peculiar) definition of "property"
from the IE root per and entry VI(3)(b) in American Heritage's list of
IE roots:

"b. proper, property; appropriate, expropriate, proprioception,
proprioceptor, proprium, from Latin proprius, one's own, particular (<
pr prv, in particular, from the ablative of prvus, single; pr, for; see
V. 4.)."

Note that "proprioceptive" is VERY close to what I mean by circular
causality, the difference being that I think proprioception is totally
ordered in time with the order being applied by the "self", which is
doing the perceiving. When I talk about circular causality, I'm talking
about a system with inherent ambiguity like that achieved by parallel,
distributed systems that can reach deadlock.  Of course, what do I know
about things like proprioception?  Well, nothing, of course, which is
why this is all speculation on my part. ;-)

The POINT is that "emergent phenomena" makes total sense to me whereas
with my definition of "property", "emergent property" sounds like total
nonsense to me.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


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[glen e. p. ropella-2]

Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 10/12/2009 05:48 PM:
>    1. *Operators.* What do you mean by an operator? Would you give a few
>    examples.

It's nothing special.  It's defined as: a mapping between two function
spaces.

1) The perception of a "glider" while watching the game of life.

2) Square root: R -> C.

3) Hydrolysis.

>    2. *Properties. *It seems to me that one of the most basic properties is
>    mass. Another is electric charge. Do you not see these as properties? Or is
>    it your position that only primitive (and perhaps circular) properties make
>    sense?

Ultimately both mass and charge are relational operators.  Mass is
measured against a normalized reference object (a convenient fiction)
and negative, neutral, and positive charges don't make sense if you
remove any one of them.  So, both mass and charge are _definitely_
phenomena because they are measured with respect to some extrinsic
object.  However, the dominant way we USE the concept of mass allows us
to trust in the abstraction that mass is an intrinsic property (at least
as long as we don't consider relative inertial frames).  So, I usually
trust that abstraction and consider mass a property.  But, for example,
a negative charge is definitely NOT intrinsic to an electron.  Charge is
a relational operator between different objects, e.g. one negative and
one positive.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


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[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Oct 12, 2009 at 08:57:08AM -0700, glen e. p. ropella wrote:
>
> Note that the above is about emergent phenomena, not emergent
> properties.  I still think the concept of an emergent property is either
> useless, self-contradictory, or just confused.
>

Eh? What's the difference between a property and a phenomenon? This
might explain why we were talking past each other before.

--

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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UNSW SYDNEY 2052                 [hidden email]
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